These are appeals in two separate actions from dismissal of plaintiffs’ actions against the State as the result of automobile accidents. The cases present similar facts, give rise to nearly identical questions of law and therefore were consolidated upon appeal. The principal questions involve the constitutionality and correct interpretation of two sections of the Idaho Tort Claims Act enacted in 1971.
The facts as they relate to the Newlan case are as follows. Linda Newlan, the daughter of appellants Newlan, died on June 5, 1971 as the result of injuries suffered in an automobile accident which occurred June 1, 1971. On May 24, 1973 the Newlans filed a notice of claim against the State of Idaho for the wrongful death of their daughter. On June 1, 1973 the instant action was filed against the State and other defendants for wrongful death as a result of a slippery highway caused by inappropriate paving materials specified by the Idaho Department of Highways. The State moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that a claim for the damages had not been presented and filed with the Secretary of State within 120 days from the date the claim arose, or reasonably should have been discovered, as required by I.C. §§ 6-905 — 908. The motion was granted, the case dismissed and this appeal results.
The facts of the Agost case are similar. On July 31, 1972 Dale F. Agost, son of plaintiffs-appellants Agost died as a result of injuries sustained in an automobile accident which occurred that same day. On May 23, 1973 appellants Agost filed a notice of claim against the State of Idaho and then on September 5, 1973 commenced the instant action against the State for the wrongful death of their son alleging that it *713resulted from the slippery condition of the road where the accident took place. As in the Newlan case, the complaint was dismissed for failure to comply with I.C. § 6-905, and this appeal results.
In Smith v. State, 93 Idaho 795, 473 P.2d 937 (1970) this court abrogated the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the State of Idaho. The court stated that the holding would govern only :
“* * * future causes of action arising on or after 60 days subsequent to the adjournment of the First Regular Session of the Forty-First Idaho State Legislature unless legislation is enacted at that session with respect to the abolition of the sovereign immunity of the state.” Smith, supra, at 808, 473 P.2d at 950.
Thus Smith was to apply only prospectively and only in the absence of legislation. That holding was reiterated in Dawson v. Olson, 94 Idaho 636, 496 P.2d 97 (1972); Rathbun v. Department of Highways, 94 Idaho 700, 496 P.2d 937 (1972); Sims v. State, 94 Idaho 801, 498 P.2d 1274 (1972).
In 1971 in response to Smith the Idaho Legislature passed a comprehensive Idaho Tort Claims Act. That enactment exposed the State to more liability than did the court in Smith, extending state liability, with some exceptions, to include situations wherein the State was acting in a governmental capacity. The court in Smith had held the State liable only when it acted in a proprietary capacity. The Tort Claims Act also set forth certain procedural requirements such as I.C. § 6-905, which is at the core of this case and which provides :
“Filing claims against state — Time.—All claims against the state arising under the provisions of this act shall be presented to and filed with the secretary of state within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date the claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered, whichever is later.”
In both the instant cases it is undisputed that the notices of claims were not filed within 120 days of the respective deaths when the cause of action arose. In Agost the claim was filed 296 days after the accident and in Newlan the time was a full 719 days after the death. Nevertheless appellants argue their claims should not have been dismissed. They challenge first the constitutionality of the above statute on equal protection grounds and further argue that even if constitutional, the statute does not mandate dismissal under the facts of the cases. The Agosts further argue that even if the statute is applicable, their actions indicate that their claim was filed within 120 days of the time they reasonably discovered their claim notwithstanding the fact that the claim was actually filed 296 days after the accident.
Appellants argue that the constitution prohibits the statutory establishment of two classes and discrimination against one of those classes since such is a denial of equal protection of the laws and thus our notice requirement is unconstitutional. That argument has been accepted in two states, Michigan and Nevada, and they have nullified their notice statutes. Reich v. State Highway Department, 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972); Turner v. Staggs, 510 P.2d 879 (Nev.1973), cert. den., Clark County v. Turner, 414 U.S. 1079, 94 S.Ct. 598, 38 L.Ed.2d 486 (1973).
The statute under consideration herein does distinguish between two types of tort claimants but it is not every statutory classification that violates the equal protection clause. Stucki v. Loveland, 94 Idaho 621, 495 P.2d 571 (1972). As reviewed in Stucki the United States Supreme Court has approached the problem of statutory classification on a two-tier basis. If the classification is suspect because it is based on matters such as race, national origin or alienage, or the statute infringes upon fundamental rights such as voting, procreation or rights regarding criminal procedure then strict judicial scrutiny is applied and the classification scheme will be upheld only if necessary to further a compelling state interest. In the *714absence of such “suspect” classification or infringement upon a fundamental right a traditional test will be applied to resolve the question of rational basis and all inferences as to constitutionality of statutes are indulged. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969); San Antonio, etc., School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973).
There is no contention here that the establishment of a class of persons with tort claims against the state falls into a category of a “suspect” class. There are relatively few classifications which have been held to be suspect and among them are race, McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 85 S.C. 283, 13 L.Ed.2d 222 (1964); alien-age, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971); ancestry, Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 68 S.Ct. 269, 92 L.Ed. 249 (1947), and perhaps sex, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971). However, also see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973). For fundamental constitutional rights see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, supra; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968).
Although appellants argue that Boddie v. State of Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971) is applicable to the case at bar, we disagree. There the question was the ability to obtain access to the courts and denial thereof on the basis of wealth. The instant case does not involve that problem since all persons obtain the ability to sue the state regardless of wealth or the lack thereof insolong as they conform to the precedent statutory conditions.
We hold that the instant statute does not establish a suspect classification and establish a discrimination against one class nor does the instant statute infringe upon a fundamental right and therefore the traditional equal protection test is applicable herein. This court in Evans v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 95 Idaho 54, 57-58, 501 P.2d 1054, 1057-1058 (1972) quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425—426, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1105, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961) stated:
“ * * the Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts may be conceived to justify it.’ ”
We hold that there are legitimate reasons for the statutory requirement of notice. See Jorstad v. City of Lewiston, 93 Idaho 122, 456 P.2d 766 (1969). There the court stated at 125, 456 P.2d at 769:
“ * * * such a statute gives the city time to negotiate an amicable accord with an injured party. Probably the most compelling reason for the existence of such statutes, however, is to give a municipality time to investigate a claim, determine its merits, and prepare a defense if necessary.”
See also Roberts v. State, 39 Cal.App.3d 844, 114 Cal.Rptr. 518 (1974); Lunday v. Vogelmann, 213 N.W.2d 904 (Iowa, 1973). The Supreme Court of Washington in Cook v. State, 83 Wash.2d 599, 521 P.2d 725 (1974) has recognized the legitimacy of different classifications between the state as a defendant tort-feasor and private parties as defendant tort-feasors. Therein the court stated:
“The state and its political subdivisions with the multitude of departments, agen*715cies, officers and employees and their diverse and widespread activities, touching virtually every aspect of life within the state, render the state and its subdivisions inherently different from any ordinary private tort-feasor. Public funds as opposed to private funds are involved. The number of claims against governmental agencies are vastly greater than against any individual private tort-feasor. An ordinary private tort-feasor is normally immediately aware of an incident involving potential liability, whereas the claim filing statute is usually the only sure and certain means by which the state or its subdivisions may be alerted to potential liability arising from a governmental activity.” Cook v. State, 521 P.2d at 728.
We turn now to a consideration of the decisions of our sister states who have faced a similar problem. In Reich v. State Highway Department, 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972) that court declared invalid a notice period of only sixty days as compared to 120 day limitation in the instant case. The shortness of the sixty day period in Michigan was stressed in that opinion and although not applicable to that case the court stressed a then recent amendment to the Michigan statute M.C. L.A., § 691.1404, M.S.A. § 3.996(104), providing for a 120 day notice period with 180 days for minors and incapacitated persons. All of the plaintiffs in Reich would have qualified under the amended statute. We find the opinion in Reich to be highly conclusory without any consideration of the rationale for such notice statute, nor any real analysis of the equal protection problem. We are not persuaded by that authority.
We find Turner v. Staggs, 510 P.2d 879 (Nev.1973) to be equally unpersuasive. Therein the court was split three to two with a strong dissent. Arguably the constitutional question set forth in the opinion was dictum since the court had prior to that consideration already held that the minority of the plaintiff therein excused compliance with the statute.
We believe the opinions of the Michigan and Nevada courts are contrary to the weight of authority. Most states have consistently rejected similar constitutional attacks. See Artukovich v. Astendorf, 21 Cal.2d 329, 131 P.2d 831 (1942); Roberts v. State, supra; Cook v. State, supra; Lunday v. Vogelmann, supra, and Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 Utah 2d 27, 492 P.2d 1335 (1972).
It is argued that this court in Smith v. State, supra, should be taken to have prevented the legislature from enacting a notice requirement. In Smith we held that since the courts had developed the doctrine of sovereign immunity the courts had the power to modify or abrogate it “so long as the legislature has not acted.” 93 Idaho at 803, 473 P.2d at 945. That abrogation was not held to have been constitutionally required and this court in fact said: “Ideally the subject should be dealt with by the legislature by a comprehensive legislative enactment.” 93 Idaho at 805, 473 P.2d at 947. We note further that in California where the first landmark case judicially abolishing sovereign immunity was issued, Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District, 55 Cal.2d 211, 11 Cal.Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457 (1961), the courts have thereafter uniformly followed procedures enacted by the legislature, including notice of claim requirements. As was said in Dias v. Eden Township Hospital District, 57 Cal.2d 502, 20 Cal.Rptr. 630, 370 P.2d 334-335 (1962) “There is no merit to plaintiffs’ argument that our decision in Muskopf ... in effect eliminated the requirement for presentation of claims as a condition to the maintenance of actions against public entities.” See also Roberts v. State, supra.
We treat appellants’ argument that the Tort Claims Act was ill conceived and hastily drafted only with the observation that once this court has determined the statute to be constitutional we have no alternative but to interpret and apply it, *716thereby heeding the admonition of the United States Supreme Court in Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 644, 57 S.Ct. 904, 910, 81 L.Ed. 1307 (1937) “Whether wisdom or unwisdom resides in the [statutory scheme] is not for us to say. The answer to such inquiries must come from Congress, not the courts. Our concern here as often is with power, not with wisdom.”
Having held that I.C. § 6-905 is constitutional we now consider appellants’ argument that failure to comply with the notice requirement is not a bar to suit unless the State can show prejudice to it.
I.C. § 6-908 states:
“Restriction on allowance of claims.- — -No claim or action shall be allowed against a governmental entity unless the claim has been presented and filed within the time limits prescribed by this act.”
The statutory language is clear and unambiguous. It can occasion but one interpretation and that is compliance is a condition precedent to bringing suit against the state. Where a statute is not ambiguous it is the duty of the court to follow the law as enacted and if the statute is unwise, power to correct is legislative not judicial. Anstine v. Hawkins, 92 Idaho 561, 447 P.2d 677 (1968). It is clear that compliance with a notice of claim requirement is mandatory and without such compliance a suit may not be maintained. See Dunn v. Boise City, 45 Idaho 362, 262 P. 507 (1927); McLean v. City of Spirit Lake, 91 Idaho 779, 430 P.2d 670 (1967); Carter v. Allan, 94 Idaho 190, 484 P.2d 739 (1971).
Appellants argue that the State knew of and investigated both accidents within hours of their occurrence and therefore the State had actual notice of the claim rendering literal compliance with the notice statute unnecessary, relying on Jorstad v. City of Lewiston, supra. We note first that appellants herein are adults with no incapacities. In Jorstad the court stressed that the real parties in interest therein were minors, that the notice period was only 30 days and that the requirement was part of a municipal code “which inherently have limited publication and are rarely uniform.” 93 Idaho at 125, 456 P.2d at 769. In Jorstad the city had argued that the action should not lie since plaintiffs had failed to give notice of the claim within 30 days as required by the city charter. This court disagreed holding that where “the city has had substantial actual notice of serious injury to a potential plaintiff, it cannot complain of the plaintiff’s failure to follow the letter of the formal requirements of the notice statute, [in actuality city ordinance]” Jorstad, supra, 93 Idaho at 126, 456 P.2d at 770. (Emphasis in original)
We have examined all cases drawn to our attention by appellants and amicus curiae, both within and without Idaho where a court refused to apply such a notice statute strictly. With the sole exception of Jorstad we find that all such cases involved some action of some type taken or attempted by the plaintiffs within the statutory notice period showing at least some compliance with the notice requirement. Those courts so finding for plaintiffs held that the action taken was sufficient. None of those cases appear to cover a situation where a plaintiff took no action whatsoever within the statutory period. Jorstad appears to be the only case wherein actual notice was held to be sufficient although no claim at all was filed within the statutory period. The continued vitality of Jorstad may be in doubt since I.C. § 6-905 and Carter v. Allan, supra, are developments subsequent to the issuance of the opinion in Jorstad.
Even assuming, however, that the Jorstad actual notice test is still viable there has been no such actual notice in these cases. Although the accidents involved herein were apparently investigated and reports thereof were filed, nevertheless there is no indication that the State could have even suspected it might be subject to a claim. The State was not on notice of any facts to allow it to arrive at an amicable accord with a claimant or to investigate a possible claim to determine its merits and if neces*717sary prepare a defense, which are two of the purposes for a notice statute set forth in Jorstad.
Appellants Agost argue compliance with the statute in that they filed notice of claim within 120 days of the date the claim “reasonably should have been discovered . . . ” I.C. § 6-905. This court has stated in the context of fraud and the statute of limitations, “knowledge of facts that would put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry is equivalent to knowledge of the fraud, and will start the running of the statute.” Parish v. Page, 50 Idaho 87, 293 P. 979 (1930). See also Gerlach v. Schultz, 72 Idaho 507, 244 P.2d 1095 (1952). Appellants Agost assert that- although they had knowledge of the facts the day of the accident nevertheless they were not aware they had a cause of action until they consulted with a lawyer. Such is not a sufficient excuse and as pointed out by the trial court no other reason or cause was pleaded, shown or argued for the extended delay. We cannot say as a matter of law that the trial court erred in ruling that there was noncompliance with the statute.
The orders of the trial courts are affirmed. Costs to Respondent.
McFADDEN, DONALDSON and BAKES, JJ., concur.