concurring specially.
I concur in the judgment of reversal, but the majority opinion, it seems to me, leaves the implication that the Georgia Department of Public Safety could revoke the Georgia license merely by giving "full faith and credit” to the Florida revocation.
I think it should be made clear that the Georgia Department of Public Safety cannot, upon receipt of a certificate of revocation by another state, revoke a Georgia license without according notice and a hearing to the holder of the Georgia license. Code Ann. § 92A-609 (c) is a statutory provision requiring revocation of a Georgia license held by one who has had his license issued by another state revoked by that state. But before revocation of the Georgia license takes place by virtue of this statute, the holder of the Georgia license is entitled to notice and a hearing predicated on the fact that Georgia revocation will take place because of revocation of the foreign license by the foreign state.
At such a hearing the holder of the Georgia license has an opportunity to prove that the foreign revocation took place in an illegal or unconstitutional manner. And if foreign revocation did take place in an illegal or unconstitutional manner, then "full faith and credit” is not accorded to the foreign revocation ruling.
In the case at bar the appellant was given a hearing before the Georgia Department of Public Safety. At such hearing it was incumbent upon the appellant to show that the foreign revocation ruling was illegal or unconstitutional. This he did not do. Therefore, rev*388ocation of the Georgia license was authorized pursuant to Code Ann. § 92A-609 (c).
As I read this record, the appellant was accorded procedural due process of law in the Georgia revocation proceedings, and I concur in the judgment of reversal.
I am authorized to state that Justice Ingram concurs in this special concurrence.