I write separately to express a concern that has been overlooked by the majority. Civil defendants who wish to limit their liability to the minimum amount specifically pleaded can (1) force plaintiffs to undergo the frustration and expense of discovery, and then (2) absent themselves allowing a default to be entered. This is exactly what happened here.
As the majority note, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.10, subdivision (b)1 requires that the specific amount demanded must be set forth in the complaint. (See maj. opn. at p. 826.) The only exemption involves cases in which damages are sought to recompense a personal injury. However, as Witkin observes: “[ajlthough the statute [§ 425.10, subd. (b)] purports to require a [specific] demand, the prayer is not a part of the cause of action and, under the authorities, is not even essential in a contested case. A defective prayer is not subject to demurrer but may be corrected by amendment . . . .” (4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Pleading, § 447, p. 491.)
In addition, Witkin notes, “C.C.P. 580 provides that if the defendant answers the court may grant ‘any relief consistent with the case made by the complaint and embraced within the issue,’ and the rule is well settled that in a contested case the plaintiff may secure relief different from or greater than that demanded. [Citations.]” (4 Witkin, supra, § 449, p. 492, italics added; maj. opn. at p. 827.)2
*832On initial examination, the current rule limiting a plaintiff’s recovery to the specific amount demanded would appear to apply only in traditional default situations, i.e., cases in which the defendant has exercised his or her option not to respond to the allegations made in the complaint. (See § 580.) As the majority note, none of the sections governing default judgments (§§ 580, 585, 586) explicitly list answers stricken as a discovery sanction “as proceedings in which default judgment is rendered ‘as if the defendant had failed to answer ....’(§ 586).” (See maj. opn. at p. 828.)
Although the majority acknowledge the fact that the statutory scheme does not address this situation, they insist that due process requires a “strict construction of section 580. . . .” (See maj. opn. at p. 826.) However, this interpretation would mandate the application of the damage ceiling to actions in which answers are stricken as a discovery sanction. In so doing, the majority expand the parameters of section 580 by incorporating all cases falling within the ambit of section 2034.3
The justification proffered for equating defaults entered at the pleading stage with those resulting from sanctions imposed under section 2034 is the concern that defaulting parties may be denied the formal notice of the maximum amount of potential liability required by due process. (See maj. opn. at pp. 826-827.)
The first clause of section 580 was set down by the Legislature to guarantee defendants adequate notice of the maximum judgment that may be assessed against them. (See maj. opn. at p. 826.) However, it is clear that the statutory language contemplates two different situations. The first clause of section 580 addresses the traditional default context where a defendant has failed to answer. In this situation, fundamental fairness requires that the defendant be notified. The second clause of section 580, by contrast, refers to contested cases.4 Absent the discovery abuses that occurred here, the defendant would have an opportunity to determine and contest the maximum amount of damages pleaded. In contested cases, therefore, any affirmative action taken by a defendant demonstrates that notice has been received.
In the present proceeding, defendants not only filed an answer to the complaint, they gave both plaintiff and the court the impression that they would participate in the discovery process. For the two-year period between the date plaintiff filed the complaint—August of 1980—and the date the court granted plaintiff’s motion to strike the answer and enter a default— *833August of 1982—this case was “contested.” In fact, had plaintiff’s motion to strike been unsuccessful, her complaint would have permitted her to recover all the damages she could prove despite a defective prayer.
The record demonstrates that during this two-year period defendants had no intention of providing plaintiff with any information through the discovery process. As the majority note, defendant Rodman “actively resist[ed] both document production and deposition.” (See maj. opn. at p. 825.) He repeatedly failed to appear at scheduled meetings and, during the one deposition he chose to attend, engaged in behavior that can only be described as shocking, inhumane, and inexcusable.
In light of these circumstances, I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that default judgments entered as a sanction for obstruction of discovery must be treated as if no answer had been filed in the first instance. The policy considerations underlying a decision to uphold judgments exceeding the demand where the defendant’s affirmative actions invite a default judgment are considerably more compelling than the majority allow.
The principal purpose of the ceiling set forth in section 580 is to apprise defendants of their potential liability so that they may evaluate the consequences of exercising their right not to answer. Here, the defendant Rodman has answered and then obstructed the discovery process. In so doing, he prevented the plaintiff from ascertaining the proper amount of damages. If the ceiling on damages is applied to this situation, it would permit the defendants to profit from wrongdoing.
Consider the facts of this case. Defendants answered the complaint, thereby indicating their intention to contest plaintiff’s allegations. The ensuing evasive maneuvers permitted defendants to gauge plaintiff’s case while raising the stakes by forcing her to file expensive and futile discovery motions. When it became clear that plaintiff could not realistically estimate the losses she suffered as a result of the dissolution without defendants’ cooperation, defendants attempted to limit their liability by suddenly withdrawing from the proceedings.
The majority admit that the rule they delineate will undercut the effectiveness of discovery sanctions in causes where, as here, only the defendants know the dollar value of the losses suffered. Nevertheless, they claim that due process mandates such a result. If their concern is proper notice to defendants, I see no reason why plaintiffs must suffer the frustration and expense of refiling their claims so that obstreperous defendants may choose the optimal point at which to drop out of the litigation. The majority’s *834holding eliminates any remedy for outrageous abuses of the discovery process.
To avoid this inequity, I would suggest an alternative procedure. The trial court, at the time it enters the default, would send a notice to the defendant stating that it will consider evidence in support of a claim of damages in an amount exceeding the prayer of the complaint at the scheduled “prove-up” hearing under section 585. During that proceeding, the defendant would be permitted to present rebuttal evidence.
This procedure5 would provide defendants with ample notice of their potential liability and an opportunity to challenge the amount of damages sought. This solution is preferable to that suggested by the majority for it accommodates due process while ensuring the effectiveness of motions to strike answers as sanctions for clear abuses of the discovery process.
Appellants’ petition for a rehearing was denied December 31, 1986.
Code of Civil Procedure section 425.10 provides in pertinent part: “A complaint or cross-complaint shall contain ... the following: [I] (b) A demand for judgment for the relief to which the pleader claims he is entitled. If the recovery of money or damages be demanded, the amount thereof shall be stated . . . .”
Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
Section 580 states: “The relief granted to the plaintiff, if there be no answer, cannot exceed that which he shall have demanded in his complaint; but in any other case, the court may grant him any relief consistent with the case made by the complaint and embraced within the issue.”
Section 2034 empowers the courts to impose sanctions against litigants who wrongfully fail or refuse to participate in the discovery process.
See footnote 2, ante.
This procedure would be analogous to that employed in the federal courts in cases where a plaintiff seeks damages exceeding the demand in the complaint. (See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes (2d Cir. 1971) 449 F.2d 51, revd. on other grounds (1973) 409 U.S. 363 [34 L.Ed.2d 577, 93 S.Ct. 647].)