State v. Cottrell

Chief Justice TOAL,

dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. I would affirm Appellant’s conviction and hold that there is no evidence supporting a voluntary manslaughter charge.

*266Voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being in the sudden heat of passion upon a sufficient legal provocation. State v. Childers, 373 S.C. 367, 373, 645 S.E.2d 233, 236 (2007). In cases involving the killing of a police officer, the general rule is:

A lawful arrest or detention in a lawful manner by an officer ... will not constitute an adequate provocation for heat of passion reducing the grade of the homicide to manslaughter; nor will other lawful acts of officers while in the discharge of their duties constitute adequate provocation ... The killing [of a police officer] may be only manslaughter where a legal arrest is attempted in an unlawful manner, as when the passion of the accused is aroused by the employment of unnecessary violence.

State v. Linder, 276 S.C. 304, 308, 278 S.E.2d 335, 337 (1981) (quoting 40 C.J.S. Homicide 116 (2007)). However, [w]here there are no actions by the deceased to constitute legal provocation, a charge on voluntary manslaughter is not required. State v. Wood, 362 S.C. 135, 142, 607 S.E.2d 57, 60 (2004).

In my view, the majority errs in holding that the record contained evidence of sufficient legal provocation entitling Appellant to a voluntary manslaughter charge. Specifically, I would hold that the trial court correctly ruled that there was no evidence that the police officer shot Appellant first. While the pathologist speculated that the bullet may have rendered the police officer instantly incapacitated, the record reveals that the only evidence from the witnesses was that Appellant fired the first shot. Moreover, although Amber testified that she saw the police officer draw his gun and follow Appellant behind the car, she explicitly stated that she could not see if Appellant pulled a gun or who fired the first shot.'4 Accordingly, I would hold that there was no evidence of sufficient legal provocation, and therefore, Appellant was not entitled to a voluntary manslaughter charge.

*267For these reasons, I would hold the trial court properly refused Appellant’s request for a voluntary manslaughter charge.

. The trial court refused to give a voluntary manslaughter charge as well as a self-defense charge based on the trial court’s ruling that there was no evidence that the police officer fired the first shot.