dissenting.
I concur in that portion of the majority opinion that holds that Mr. Peters made a submissible case, but dissent with respect to the majority’s opinion that holds that trial error was prejudicial and necessitates a new trial. I think the amount of the judgment is excessive. I would affirm the judgment subject to remittitur of the amount of actual and punitive damages and would remand only for recomputation of the amount of prejudgment interest. Therefore, all of GM’s points on appeal will be addressed.
There are several additional facts favorable to the jury verdict. Mrs. Peters, a teacher of gifted students was leaving the house to go to Hickman Mills High School. There was no evidence or inference that she was in a rush or was late. There was a horrific accident when the car went down the driveway, across the street, and struck a tree with sufficient force to partially sever her arm and cause seven skull fractures. After hitting the tree, with the driver unconscious, the car came back across the street, in reverse. Both tires on the left side of the car went over the foot high planter, with one tire in the box when the car came to a rest. I would differ with the majority’s statement of the facts where it states that there was no evidence of a malfunction that caused the accident. There was no direct evidence in this case that Mrs. Peters caused the accident. There was no direct evidence the cruise control or any other means of accelerating the car caused the accident. Evidence either way was circumstantial. There were reasonable inferences from the evidence which indicated Mrs. Peters did not accelerate the car in reverse to cause the collision with the tree. It was infera-ble from the evidence that the car continued to self-propel after the collision with the tree. It was for the trier of fact to infer the Cutlass malfunctioned, causing the accident.
I. GM’s Points on Appeal
A. EVIDENCE OF SIMILAR INCIDENTS
1. Seven Witnesses
The majority holds that the trial court erred in allowing the admission of evidence of other similar accidents. I disagree and would affirm the decision of the trial court to allow the testimony of the seven witnesses. The events were sufficiently similar to the Peters’ accident. The testimony of all but one of the seven witnesses that the vehicle continued to accelerate despite the application of the brake pedal is not a *29fatal dissimilarity — all of the accidents were the result of the same cause: sudden acceleration.
Evidence of other similar accidents may be admitted if the other accidents are of like character, occurred under substantially the same circumstances, and resulted from the same cause. Lopez v. Three Rivers Elec. Coop., Inc., 26 S.W.3d 151, 159 (Mo. banc 2000). A trial court is afforded wide discretion in deciding whether to admit evidence of similar occurrences. Alcorn v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 50 S.W.3d 226, 244 (Mo. banc 2001). Concerning the admission of evidence of similar occurrences:
[jjudicial discretion is abused when the trial court’s ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration; if reasonable people can differ about the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion.
Newman v. Ford Motor Co., 975 S.W.2d 147, 151 (Mo. banc 1998) (citing Richardson v. State Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 863 S.W.2d 876, 881 (Mo. banc 1993)).
There are many similarities between Mrs. Peters’ accident and the other accidents testified to by the seven witnesses. Each incident testified to by the seven witnesses involved a “W” car that was equipped with the three-mode cruise control system also used in the Peters’ car. Each incident occurred as the driver was shifting from park into reverse and was attempting to “back out” from a parked position. The witnesses also testified that they did not inadvertently depress the accelerator to cause the sudden acceleration. Furthermore, in each instance, a GM representative investigated the accident and, like the case at bar, did not discover any evidence of a mechanical or electrical malfunction.
The majority asserts that the other accidents were not sufficiently similar to the accident here because there was no definitive reason provided as to the cause of those accidents, let alone that defective cruise control was the cause. However, this ignores the fact that a disputed proposition of fact may be proven by circumstantial evidence. “[Ajbsolute certainty of causation is not required in a product liability case and ... ‘probative facts’ established by circumstantial evidence ... pointing to the desired conclusion with enough certainty to be reasonable and probable is sufficient.” Duke v. Gulf & W. Mfg. Co., 660 S.W.2d 404, 410 n. 3 (Mo.App.1983) (citing Lifritz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 472 S.W.2d 28, 32-33 (Mo.App.1971)).
GM presented evidence that incidents of sudden acceleration are normally caused by pedal (driver) error. However, all seven witnesses testified that they had not inadvertently pressed on the accelerator. This jury could have found that testimony credible. The other possible cause of sudden acceleration in these accidents is pedal misapplication. Although none of the witnesses specifically ruled it out as the cause of their accidents, the fact that pedal misapplication rarely causes sudden acceleration combined with the fact that several of the witnesses testified to multiple occurrences of sudden acceleration would allow a reasonable inference that their vehicles had defective cruise control systems. Because of the wide discretion that a trial court has in the admission of evidence and the fact that reasonable minds could differ on the issue, this court should not say that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the jury to hear these witnesses.
The majority holds that the trial court could not reasonably conclude that the in*30cidents of sudden acceleration resulted from the same cause that Mr. Peters asserted. Because six of the witnesses testified that they applied the brake pedal when the car suddenly accelerated and Sero testified that applying the brake pedal would have disengaged a malfunctioning cruise control, the majority holds that the incidents were dissimilar. What the majority discounts is that all seven of the witnesses testified that the accidents they were involved in occurred because the car suddenly accelerated, that they did not place their foot on the gas pedal, and that the incident occurred as they shifted the car from park into reverse. The similar cause here is sudden acceleration. Given that this court is required to allow a trial court wide discretion on admitting evidence of similar incidents, “[o]ur review is limited to a finding that the trial court first satisfied itself that the evidence was relevant to an issue of the case and that the occurrences bore sufficient resemblance to the injury-causing incident, while weighing the possibility of undue prejudice or confusion of issues.” Pierce v. Platte-Clay Elec. Coop., Inc., 769 S.W.2d 769, 774 (Mo. banc 1989). The trial court did as much here, and this court should not say that the decision shocks a sense of justice. There are enough similarities between the incidents that reasonable minds could conclude that evidence of the incidents should be admitted.
2. Reports of complaints made to GM (called 1241 reports)
As to only the 139 reports admitted where there was no cruise control, I would agree with the majority; they should not have been admitted. However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the admission of these reports resulted in prejudice to GM.
The consumer complaint forms were only admitted as to notice. Seventy-four reports of similar incidents are still more than sufficient to establish that GM knew of its allegedly dangerous cruise control system. While the trial court erred in admitting the reports involving cars without cruise control systems, doing so was not prejudicial to GM in light of the 74 reports properly admitted.
The majority takes issue with Peters’ counsel for arguing during closing argument that the reports should be used as substantive evidence. There was no objection to the arguments. The matter is not preserved. The jury had before it a limiting instruction which outlined the use of the reports and an instruction that closing argument is not evidence. Therefore, no prejudice resulted.
B. Exclusion of GM’s Rebuttal Evidence
The majority holds that the trial court erred in excluding a line of testimony from GM’s accident reconstruction expert, Dr. Charles Moffatt, which was offered in rebuttal to Peters’ characterization of GM’s theory on the cause of the accident. GM specifically argues that since Peters stated in opening statement that GM’s entire case “hinged on” only one tire of the Peters’ car climbing the planter, Dr. Moffatt’s testimony should have been allowed to rebut this alleged miseharacterization. While this may be the case, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion because this point is not reviewable as GM failed to provide this court with Dr. Moffatt’s deposition transcript. Consequently, this court cannot review the point.
According to GM, Dr. Moffatt testified at his deposition that he believed Mrs. Peters’ ear reached its final point of rest on its own momentum. Dr. Moffatt stated he reached this conclusion by calculating *31the speed at which the car would have had to be traveling in order to hit and “spin off’ the tree in the yard across the street, accelerate back across the street into the Peters’ yard, and ultimately come to rest with one tire in the planter. Because Peters’ theory of how the accident occurred was based on two tires of the car climbing the planter, he highlighted this distinction in his opening statement.
When called at trial, Dr. Moffatt again testified that Mrs. Peters’ car traveled to its resting point on its own momentum and stated that he based his analysis on one tire entering the planter. GM then sought to dispel the importance of the one-tire versus two-tire distinction previously emphasized by Peters. Dr. Moffatt attempted to explain that while his analysis was indeed based on the fact that only one tire climbed the planter, his ultimate conclusion would have remained the same even had he assumed that two tires climbed the planter. Peters objected, arguing that this testimony was a new opinion and the trial court sustained their objection.
Determination of whether Dr. Moffatt’s trial testimony did, in fact, constitute a new opinion, depends on the exact nature of what he stated in his deposition. GM failed to include a copy of Dr. Moffatt’s deposition transcript in compiling the record on appeal. Absent its inclusion, this court cannot evaluate the alleged discrepancy between Dr. Moffatt’s deposition testimony and trial testimony. City of Joplin v. Flinn, 914 S.W.2d 398, 401 (Mo.App.1996) (citing Rule 81.12, which requires appellant to compile a record consisting of all evidence necessary to the determination of all questions presented). Specifically, “evidentiary omissions will be taken as ... unfavorable to the appellant.” Sydnor v. Dir. of Revenue, 876 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Mo.App.1994) (quoting Delf v. Cartwright, 651 S.W.2d 622, 624 (Mo.App.1983)). Point denied.
C. Damages
I would hold that that there was substantial evidence for the jury to find that GM possessed the requisite knowledge needed to submit punitive liability to the jury. I would remit the compensatory damages to $10,000,000 and the loss of consortium claim to $2,000,000. Finally, I would remit the punitive damages to $5,000,000.
GM claims that the compensatory and punitive damage awards were excessive. A jury verdict on damages will not be disturbed unless grossly excessive or inadequate. Sandifer v. Thompson, 280 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Mo.1955). In reviewing the question of an excessive verdict, an appellate court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Triplett v. Beeler, 268 S.W.2d 814, 819 (Mo.1954). There are two situations in which an appeal of an excessive verdict arises: (1) when the verdict is disproportionate to the injury and results from an honest mistake by the jury in assessing the evidence and may be corrected by remittitur without resorting to a new trial; and (2) when the excessiveness is engendered by trial misconduct and results from bias and prejudice and may be corrected only by a new trial. Barnett v. La Societe Anonyme Turbomeca France, 963 S.W.2d 639, 655 (Mo.App.1997).
“Where the jury errs by awarding a verdict that is simply too bountiful under the evidence, injustice may be prevented by ordering a remittitur.” Letz v. Turbomeca Engine Corp., 975 S.W.2d 155, 175 (Mo.App.1997). Section 537.068 provides, “A court may enter a remittitur order if, after reviewing the evidence in support of the jury’s verdict, the court finds that the jury’s verdict is excessive because the *32amount of the verdict exceeds fair and reasonable compensation for the plaintiffs injuries....” Remittitur is intended to result in equitable compensation and to eliminate the necessity and expense of retrial. Letz, 975 S.W.2d at 175.
1. Amount of Compensatory Damages
Compensatory awards adopted by the trial court will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and the amount must be so grossly excessive that it shocks the conscience and convinces the court that the trial judge and the jury have abused their discretion. Willman v. Wall, 13 S.W.3d 694, 699 (Mo.App.2000); Hatch v. V.P. Fair Found., Inc., 990 S.W.2d 126, 141 (Mo.App.1999).
The factors utilized by an appellate court in determining excessiveness in personal injury cases are: (1) the loss of present and future income; (2) medical expenses; (3) age; (4) the nature and extent of injuries; (5) economic factors; (6) awards in comparable cases; and (7) the superior opportunity of jury and trial court to appraise the injuries and other damages. Barnett, 963 S.W.2d at 657.
The ultimate test on the amount of compensatory damages is whether the amount awarded fairly and reasonably compensates the plaintiff for the injuries suffered. Willman, 13 S.W.3d at 699. The issue here is whether the amount was “grossly” excessive, which indicates bias and/or prejudice and would necessitate a new trial, or “merely” excessive, in which case the mistake can be corrected by a remittitur of the excess amount. Ince v. Money’s Bldg. & Dev., Inc., 135 S.W.3d 475, 478 (Mo.App.2004).
In this case, the jury awarded Peters $20 million. The evidence was that there would be $8,360,319 in lost income and expenses for Mrs. Peters’ care over her remaining fifteen-year life expectancy. However, under the factors listed in Barnett, and particularly in view of awards in other cases, I believe the compensatory award is excessive and should be remitted to $10 million.
Peters’ consortium claim is separate and independent of his wife’s claim. The verdict amount on this claim, $10 million, is excessive and should be remitted to $2 million. Similar to the defendant’s argument in Blond v. Overesch, 527 S.W.2d 663, 671-72 (Mo.App.1975), the appellant in this point does not question the nature and extent of the injuries but merely argues that the verdict is excessive.
I believe the compensatory award of $20 million is excessive and should be reduced $10 million. The loss of consortium award of $10 million is also excessive and should be remitted to $2 million.
2. Punitive Damages
A. Punitive Liability
The majority holds that Peters failed to prove a case for punitive damages and, therefore, the trial court erred when it submitted punitive liability to the jury. I disagree in light of the seven witness’ testimony, the seventy-four accident reports and the former GM engineers’ testimony. Review of submission of punitive damages is conducted in a light most favorable to non-moving party, and should not be withdrawn from the jury unless facts in evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, are so strongly against the plaintiff that reasonable minds could not differ. Barnett, 963 S.W.2d at 659.
In a product liability action based on negligence, punitive damages may be awarded if the defendant showed a complete indifference to or a conscious disregard for the safety of others. Stojkovic v. Weller, 802 S.W.2d 152, 155 (Mo. banc 1991). In a strict liability case, the plain*33tiff must also show that the defendant introduced the offending product into the stream commerce with actual knowledge of its defect. Angotti v. Celotex Corp., 812 S.W.2d 742, 746 (Mo.App.1991). The purpose of punitive damages is to inflict punishment and to serve as an example and a deterrent to similar conduct. Vaughan v. Taft Broad. Co., 708 S.W.2d 656, 660 (Mo. banc 1986).
The factors in determining the propriety of the amount of a punitive damage award include the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, the relationship between actual and punitive damages, and the difference between the award and any civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996). Missouri’s additional factors include: (1) aggravating and mitigating circumstances of defendant’s conduct; (2) degree of malice or outra-geousness of defendant’s conduct; (3) defendant’s character, financial worth, and affluence; (4) age, health, and character of injured party; (5) nature of the injury; (6) awards in comparable cases; and (7) superior opportunity for the jury and the trial court to appraise the plaintiffs injuries and other damages. Letz, 975 S.W.2d at 178.
An abuse of discretion in a punitive damage award results when an appellate court determines the award shows “improper motives or a clear absence of the honest exercise of judgment.” Id. at 174-75 (quoting Call v. Heard, 925 S.W.2d 840, 849 (Mo. banc 1996)). There is no bright line test for determining whether or not the punitive award is grossly excessive so as to be obviously disproportionate to the injury shown, where such award may be the result of anger or sorrow. Barnett, 963 S.W.2d at 661-62.
The degree of reprehensibility of a defendant’s conduct is, perhaps, the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award. BMW, 517 U.S. at 575, 116 S.Ct. 1589. The majority states that Peters failed to prove GM’s actual knowledge. However, in viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the judgment, there was substantial evidence for the jury to find that GM knew of the propensity of cruise control malfunction resulting in sudden acceleration. Four different GM engineers testified at on behalf of Ms. Peters. One acknowledged that GM knew of the likelihood of a defect in the early 1980s; and certainly subsequent to a study performed by GM in 1988, GM knew that there was a potential for electrical faults in the cruise control system. Instead of recalling the part, this particular engineer and GM decided that the appropriate course of action was to redesign the system. Another engineer, who was head of the Cruise Control Center of Expertise, testified that during a study in 1992 he found that an electrical fault could actuate the throttle on the current cruise control model. Yet, when he recommended that GM adopt a new system, with additional security measures, he received a great deal of opposition from GM executives and the security objectives were never adopted.
A third engineer testified that GM has been using the recommended stepper-motor system in some of its vehicles since 1988, a system which has better standards for cruise control security than the three-mode cruise control system then used that was known to uncontrollably accelerate. But not until 1994 (the car in question was manufactured in 1993) did GM begin using the stepper-motor cruise control system in the Oldsmobile Cutlass (Peters’ car). Moreover, there was evidence that GM’s motive not to repair/replace the part was influenced by a desire to save money. A fourth engineer testified that the Cutlass *34was the lead vehicle in a project created by GM to cut $1,800 worth of cost off each vehicle production. The potential cost for eliminating the current cruise control and replacing it with the more secure system was $12-$21 million plus engineering costs. Additionally, there were seventy-four properly admitted customer complaints introduced at trial, involving sudden acceleration incidents in W cars. Even though this is a close call, there was sufficient evidence to submit punitive liability to the jury.
B. Amount op Punitive Damages
The jury award here was $50 million. Because punitive damages are extraordinary and harsh, “clear and convincing” evidence is required to prove such damages. Rodriguez, 986 S.W.2d at 111. Based on the factors to be considered in remitting the jury’s punitive award on the basis of excessiveness as outlined in this court’s cases of Letz, 975 S.W.2d at 177-79, and Barnett, 963 S.W.2d at 661-67, and based on the de novo review, Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 440 n. 14, 121 S.Ct. 1678, 149 L.Ed.2d 674 (2001), the jury amount is excessive. The punitive awards of the Letz and Barnett cases, which were each remitted on appeal to $26.5 million, were based on much more egregious conduct than by this defendant.
Wealth of the defendant is indeed a factor in determining punitive damages, but not the sole justification for punitive damages. BMW, 517 U.S. at 585, 116 S.Ct. 1589. Therefore, I would remit the amount of punitive damages to $5 million.
C. Instructional ErroR
GM asserts that the trial court erred by submitting two separate instructions on punitive damages, MAI 10.02 (negligence) and MAI 10.05 (strict liability-both product defect and failure to warn) instead of just one, MAI 10.06 (both negligence and strict liability submitted). The Notes on Use for 10.06 state that this instruction is the appropriate punitive instruction where negligence and strict liability claims are both submitted.
The Notes on Use are given the same mandatory effect as the instructions themselves, Roth v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 912 S.W.2d 583, 591 (Mo.App.1995). Suffice it to say, 10.06 should have been submitted. If there is an applicable MAI, it shall be given to the exclusion of all others. Id. “Failure to follow MAI is error, with the prejudicial effect of the error subject to judicial assessment. Rule 70.02(b). It is not enough to show erroneous deviation unless prejudice also appears.” Chase Third Century Leasing Co. v. Williams, 782 S.W.2d 408, 413 (Mo.App.1989) (citing Hudson v. Carr, 668 S.W.2d 68, 71 (Mo. banc 1984)). Submission of multiple instructions in violation of express MAI instructions constitutes error, and is presumed prejudicially erroneous unless it is made “perfectly clear” that no prejudice has resulted from the repetitive instructions. Beers v. W. Auto Supply Co., 646 S.W.2d 812, 815 (Mo.App.1982); Royal Indem. Co. v. Schneider, 485 S.W.2d 452, 458 (Mo.App.1972); Gormly v. Johnson, 451 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Mo.1970).
What makes this situation unique is that the instructions submitted, MAI 10.02 and MAI 10.05, were not modified in any way. No essential element was left out. E.A.U., Inc. v. R. Webbe Corp., 794 S.W.2d 679, 688 (Mo.App.1990). The direction to the jury was the same, except given in two instructions rather than one. The strict mandatory language of following MAI and submitting only the preferred single instruction would necessitate a new trial on the issue of punitive damages but not for the jury rendering a verdict for $20 and *35$10 million in respective compensatory awards.
Here, GM had notice of the three-mode cruise control system’s propensity to suddenly accelerate, yet delayed implementing the stepper-motor system in its W cars for several years despite the recommendation of its own engineers and the receipt of numerous customer complaints. Based on this evidence, it is hard to divine any prejudice from them submitting two instructions on punitives, when such a large sum had already been assessed in determining actual damages. This court should not presume the incorrect submission led to the punitive verdict, or its size.
D. Prejudgment Interest
Calculation of prejudgment interest is governed by Section 408.040:
In tort actions, if a claimant has made a demand for payment of a claim or an offer of settlement of a claim, to the party, parties or their representatives and the amount of the judgment or order exceeds the demand for payment or offer of settlement, prejudgment interest, at the rate specified in subsection 1 of this section, shall be calculated from a date sixty days after the demand or offer was made, or from the date the demand or offer was rejected without counter offer, whichever is earlier.
§ 408.040.2. Subsection one sets the rate of prejudgment interest at nine percent per annum. § 408.040.1.
In this case, Peters made a settlement demand on July 24, 2002. Therefore, interest should be calculated sixty days from this date — September 22, 2002 — until the date of the trial court’s entry of judgment, January 7, 2003, 107 days later. Peters does not dispute that the award should be offset by the $25,000 settlement with Mof-fett’s Auto Works. At a rate of nine percent per year, the prejudgment interest on Mrs. Peters’ $9,975 million award ($10 million less the $25,000 settlement amount) and Peters’ loss of consortium award of $2 million should be $263,176.03 and $52,767.12, respectively.
Regarding punitive damages, at the time of the judgment, prejudgment interest was not permitted and, therefore, could not be awarded on appeal.1
II. Conclusion
I dissent from the majority opinion in that I would hold that the testimonies of the seven witness’ accidents involving sudden acceleration are sufficiently similar to be admitted, and I disagree that this court can even review the exclusion of GM’s rebuttal evidence because this court was not provided with Dr. Moffatt’s deposition transcript.
I would hold that a submissible case was made on compensatory damages and on punitive damages, and finding no error, whether singly or in combination, which requires reversal, and having determined the damages in the judgment are excessive, I would affirm if Peters accepts re-mittitur. As this court said in Letz, 975 S.W.2d at 180, an appellate court may not compel remittitur but can give the plaintiff the opportunity to remit to a certain amount or accept the burden and expense of a new trial. Pursuant to remittitur, I would set the amount of $10 million on compensatory damages, $2 million on loss of consortium, and $5 million for punitive *36damages. I find no prejudicial error occurred by submitting two punitive instructions, rather than the one mandated by MAI. Finally, I would reverse that portion of the judgment dealing with prejudgment interest and remand for computation.
. Since then, however, the Supreme Court has held that prejudgment interest may be awarded for punitive damages. Werremeyer v. K.C. Auto Salvage Co., 134 S.W.3d 633, 636-37 (Mo. banc 2004). Because prejudgment interest is a procedural rule of law, subsequent changes by judicial opinion do not have a retroactive effect. Prayson v. Kansas City Power & Light, 847 S.W.2d 852, 855 (Mo.App.1992).