I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeal.
The majority ignores the plain language of section 1032.1 Section 1032 refers to “spouse,” not to “imminent spouse.” Courts will give effect to a statute according to the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used in the statute. (West Covina Hospital v. Superior Court (1986) 41 Cal.3d 846, 850 [226 Cal.Rptr. 132].) In natural and ordinary usage, “spouse” means a person’s wife or husband. (Webster’s New Internat. Dict. (3d ed. 1961) p. 2208.) “When statutory language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, and courts should not indulge in it.” (West Covina Hospital, supra, at p. 850 (italics added); Palos Verdes Faculty Assn. v. Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified Sch. Dist. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 650, 658 [147 Cal.Rptr. 359, 580 P.2d 1155].) To paraphrase Anthony Trollope’s often-quoted observation, a spouse is a spouse, and it is worse than useless to say that it is something else. (Trollope, The West Indies and the Spanish Main (1859) p. 123.) The majority, on its own initiative and without the need to do so, interprets section 1032 so as to redefine the plainly understood word “spouse” to include “imminent spouse.”
Section 1032 was in existence in its present form, in all respects material here, in 1982 when the Legislature amended section 1256 and stated in an uncodified portion of the amendment that spouses and “imminent spouses” should be treated differently from other persons for purposes of section 1256. (Stats. 1982, ch. 1073, § 13, p. 3873.) The majority assumes that, if the Legislature had considered the relationship between sections 1032 and 1256, it would have amended section 1032 in 1982 to comport with the majority’s interpretation of that section. I disagree with the majority’s assumption. There are three possible reasons why section 1032 was not amended in 1982: | (1) The Legislature did not consider the effect on section 1032 of the amendment to section 1256. If that is the case, the majority opinion imputes to the Legislature a nonexistent intent.
(2) The Legislature did consider section 1032 and decided not to amend it. If that is what occurred, the majority opinion is contrary to legislative intent.
(3) The Legislature intended to amend section 1032 but inadvertently failed to do so. If so, the Legislature can easily clarify its intent. This court should not usurp the Legislature’s function.
*240If sections 1032 and 1256 are as closely related as the majority believes they are, one must assume that the Legislature was aware of that relationship and would have made a corresponding amendment to section 1032 in 1982 if the Legislature had intended the two sections to coincide. The Legislature declined another opportunity to adopt the majority’s view in 1983 when it amended section 1032 in a respect not material here. (Stats. 1983, ch. 1169, § 4, p. 4438.) “ ‘[Fjailure to make changes in a given statute in a particular respect when the subject is before the Legislature, and changes are made in other respects, is indicative of an intention to leave the law unchanged in that respect.’ ” (Bishop v. City of San Jose (1969) 1 Cal.3d 56, 65 [81 Cal.Rptr. 465, 460 P.2d 137].) Similarly, the selective silence of the Legislature is significant in tending to show that it had a different intent as to each section. (People v. Drake (1977) 19 Cal.3d 749, 755 [139 Cal.Rptr. 720, 566 P.2d 622].) If the difference between sections 1032 and 1256 is not what the Legislature intended, it can eliminate the difference. What need is there for us to do so?
The majority concludes that sections 1032 and 1256 are in pari materia and that the Legislature’s express amendment in 1982 of section 1256 was an amendment by implication of section 1032. This reasoning violates two established rules of statutory construction. First, “[t]here is no rule of law that necessarily requires the same meaning to be given to the same word used in different places in the same statute.” (Sunset Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Pasadena (1911) 161 Cal. 265, 275 [118 P. 796].) “Spouse” need not mean the same thing in section 1032 as it does in section 1256.
Second, even with statutes in pari materia, courts have long been reluctant to find an implied amendment of one statute by the express amendment of another. A court can find an implied amendment only when there is no reasonable basis for harmonizing the former statute with the latter statute as amended. (People v. Leong Fook (1928) 206 Cal. 64, 69-70 [273 P. 779].) The Court of Appeal found a reasonable basis for harmonizing sections 1032 and 1256. In distributing among all employers the cost of benefits paid to employees who leave employment to accompany their spouses, the Legislature may have considered this circumstance more easily verifiable and thus less susceptible to fraudulent or otherwise invalid claims than other types of so-called domestic quits, e.g., a quit to join an “imminent spouse.” In the latter instance, the Legislature may have considered it more effective to continue the employer’s incentive to monitor such claims. The majority acknowledges the Court of Appeal’s reasoning on this point but declines to explain how the reasoning is flawed.
I believe there is another, equally reasonable basis on which to harmonize sections 1032 and 1256. The fact that all persons who leave employment to *241join their “imminent spouses” may be entitled to benefits under section 1256 does not mean that all employers should share in subsidizing those benefits by having them charged to the pooled fund. For various demographic reasons, some employers may be more likely than others to have employees who quit and move to marry. For example, it appears to be a demographic fact that certain types of employers tend to employ relatively young employees. A fast food restaurant comes to mind. Other employers, for example, a senior citizens workshop, may employ persons who are likely to be older and statistically less likely to be facing an “imminent” marriage, especially one combined with a long-distance move that would require a change of employment. The Legislature apparently determined that each employer should bear the reserve account charges for its employees who quit for “imminent” marriages because it would be unfair to charge those costs to the pooled fund and thus increase the cost to employers who seldom or never have employees quit for “imminent” marriages.
The majority’s opinion is a well-meaning effort to resolve what the majority deems to be a statutory inconsistency. I am not persuaded there is one, but, if there is, the Legislature should resolve it. The effect of the majority’s decision is to substitute this court’s judgment for that of the Legislature.
All statutory references are to the Unemployment Insurance Code.