dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority that as between Banks and Lunsford, Banks had an ownership interest in the car. However, that is not the issue in this case; this is not a dispute between Banks and Lunsford. In my view, Banks’s claim to the car must *833fail not because he did not comply with certain provisions of the Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act, but because he did not comply with the statutory requirements for asserting a claim during these forfeiture proceedings.
OCGA § 16-13-49 (a) (7) sets forth those requirements. It provides that in order to assert a claim one must meet three requirements. One must not be a secured party, one must have an interest in the property, and one must be “in compliance with any statute requiring its recordation or reflection in public records in order to perfect the interest against a bona fide purchaser for value.” Id.
Clearly, Banks meets the first two requirements: he is not a secured party, and he has an interest in the car, as both the majority and I agree. However, if the Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act (the Act), OCGA § 40-3-1 et seq., is the type of statute contemplated by OCGA § 16-13-49 (a) (7), he does not meet the third requirement because he failed to register the car in his own name as required by OCGA § 40-3-32 (b), (d). Therefore, despite his conceded interest in the car, he may not assert a claim to the car in the forfeiture proceeding.
In enacting OCGA § 40-3-1 et seq., the legislature’s “manifest purpose . . . was to provide a comprehensive system, with few specific exceptions, for central recordation of ownership, security interests and liens in all motor vehicles registered and regularly in use in this State.” First Nat. Bank &c. Co. v. Smithloff, 119 Ga. App. 284, 287 (167 SE2d 190) (1969). This court has held that the Act is a recording statute that both perfects the interests of owners against purchasers and protects bona fide purchasers. See May v. Macioce, 200 Ga. App. 542, 543-544 (1) (409 SE2d 45) (1991); Gen. Fin. Corp. v. Hester, 141 Ga. App. 28 (232 SE2d 375) (1977). In my view, therefore, the Act is of the type contemplated by OCGA § 16-13-49 (a) (7). Since the absolutely clear language of the latter statute requires that before asserting a claim as the “true owner” of a forfeited motor vehicle one must comply with the Certificate of Title Act, it follows that Banks is not entitled to assert his claim of ownership in this proceeding.
As pointed out by the State, it has long been held that when a statute is plain and has but one reasonable construction, our courts may not construe it differently. Hollowell v. Jove, 247 Ga. 678, 681 (279 SE2d 430) (1981). A majority of this court, however, does just that by totally ignoring the statutory requirement for asserting a claim set forth in OCGA § 16-13-49 (a) (7), despite the clear and unambiguous language of the statute.
Hallman v. State of Ga., 141 Ga. App. 527 (233 SE2d 839) (1977), relied upon by the majority, does not require a contrary result here. The holding in Hallman is simply not applicable to the facts of this case because Hallman involved the claim of a secured party, *834rather than one claiming ownership. The issue addressed in Thorp v. State of Ga., 264 Ga. 712 (450 SE2d 416) (1994), regarding whether the forfeiture of the car was excessive, is not reached here, because Banks does not meet the threshold requirements for asserting a claim. In addressing this issue, the majority is holding, in effect, that OCGA § 16-13-49 (a) (7) is unconstitutional. Even assuming that is correct, it is not for this court to decide.
Decided December 2, 1994 Reconsideration denied December 20, 1994 Peter J. Skandalakis, District Attorney, Jeffrey W. Hunt, Anne C. Allen, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellant. Cummins, Booth & Kneidel, D. Scott Cummins, for appellee.Because Banks’s failure to meet the clear requirements set forth in OCGA § 16-13-49 (a) (7) prevents the assertion of his claim, the trial court’s ruling was in error. I would reverse the judgment below.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Pope and Judge Andrews join in this dissent.