dissenting.
In 1975, this three-judge court held that the Pennsylvania statutes providing for the voluntary admission and commitment of juveniles to mental health facilities pursuant to the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 are unconstitutional. Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F.Supp. 1039 (E.D.Pa.1975). I dissented from that decision. Id. at 1054. On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for further consideration on the ground *48that subsequent to this Court’s decision, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted the Mental Health Procedures Act of 1976 which gives substantially greater procedural protections to the mentally and emotionally distressed admitted to mental health facilities. Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 97 S.Ct. 1709, 52 L.Ed.2d 184 (1977).
In remanding, the Supreme Court stressed that “careful attention must be paid to the differences between mentally ill and mentally retarded.” Id. at 135-6, 97 S.Ct. at 1718. Although courts and legislators have in many instances failed to distinguish between the mentally and emotionally ill and the mentally retarded, there is no question that mental illness and mental retardation are separate and distinct conditions which require different treatment and/or habilitation. In keeping with the Supreme Court’s mandate, we will discuss first the mentally retarded.
Mental retardation is an impairment in learning capacity and adaptive behavior. The legislation in question and the professionals in the field consider retardation as being distinct and separate from mental and emotional illness. There is no question, however, that the retarded, just as all members of society, may also suffer mental and emotional illnesses. The habilitation of the mentally retarded is primarily an educational and training process. Mental retardation is not an illness to be treated with drugs and the therapies which have been developed for the mentally and emotionally ill. Today, all experts in the field of mental retardation agree that with proper habilitation, the level of functioning of every retarded person is capable of improvement.
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, 50 P.S. §§ 4101 et seq.
The statutes and regulations with respect to the voluntary admission and voluntary commitment of the retarded are the same statutes and regulations which were considered by this Court in the Bartley case. Sections 402 and 403 of the Act, which are presently applicable to the retarded only, provide that retarded individuals, age eighteen or younger, may be admitted or committed to a mental health facility upon the application of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco parentis, and such a retarded juvenile is not free to withdraw from the facility without the consent of the parent, guardian, or person standing in loco parentis or his or her successor. Upon receipt of such an application on behalf of a juvenile for voluntary admission or commitment, the director of the facility must cause an examination to be made, and if it is determined that the retarded juvenile is in need of care or observation, he or she may be admitted to the facility.1
Section 402 provides that at least annually, the admission must be reviewed by a committee, appointed by the director from the professional staff of the facility, to determine whether continued care is necessary, and at least every sixty days the juvenile is to be informed of the voluntary nature of his or her status at the facility.
The 1973 regulations, promulgated pursuant to the Act, specify the procedural rights of the retarded aged eighteen or younger. 3 Pa. Bulletin 1840 (1973). These regulations provide that the retarded juvenile must be referred to the mental health facility by a mental health professional, pediatrician, general physician, or psychologist, and such referral must include a psychiatric, medical or psychological evaluation stating specifically the reasons why the retarded juvenile requires “institutional care.” The regulations also provide that the “Director of the Institution or his delegate, shall have conducted an independent examination of the proposed juvenile, and if his *49results disagree with the professional’s opinion, the Director, or his delegate shall discharge the juvenile.” The regulations do not specify when this examination must be conducted. They do, however, provide that a retarded juvenile thirteen years of age and older must receive, within twenty-four hours after admission to a mental health facility, written notification explaining his or her rights and furnishing him or her with the telephone number of counsel whom the juvenile may call for representation. In the event such a retarded juvenile objects to remaining at the institution, the director of the institution must notify within two business days the parent, guardian, or person standing in loco parentis, the referral unit and the above designated counsel in order that an involuntary commitment proceeding may be instituted pursuant to § 406 of the Act. Neither the regulations nor the statutes provide when the § 406 hearing shall be held. Nor do they make provision for the situation in which the retarded individual is unable to understand, and hence utilize, these protections.
There are grave questions concerning the constitutionality of any statute which provides for the “commitment” of a retarded child. Throughout history the retarded have been mistreated and their dire need for education and training ignored. Wolfensberger, The Origin and Nature of Our Institutional Models 3 (1975). Retarded children, children mentally and emotionally ill, and children adjudged delinquent, in many instances have been confined to the same institution. Only in relatively recent years have our legislative bodies and our courts recognized the distinction between the retarded, the mentally and emotionally ill and the law breakers. Mental retardation is not a violation of the law. Being mentally retarded does not make juveniles or adults dangerous to themselves or to others. The mentally retarded are persons who, because of circumstances beyond their control, are unable to function at the same educational and behavioral levels as others in society. They do require specialized education, training and care. This Court in Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 343 F.Supp. 279 (E.D.Pa.1972), recognized that they have a constitutional right under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to receive at least as much education and training as being given by the Government to others not retarded. All of this raises the question as to whether the retarded- — -persons who have not violated any laws, who are not dangerous to themselves or society and whose only need is for education, training and care — should be subjected to a court proceeding the end result of which is “commitment”.2 I readily agree that this question has not been briefed in this litigation and has not been presented for determination; but it does lend focus to the issues herein presented.
The majority opinion concludes that §§ 402 and 403, as supplemented by the 1973 regulations, are unconstitutional in that they do not provide sufficient due process safeguards. I am in complete agreement that the retarded have a constitutional right to education and training in the least restrictive setting. As found in Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital, 446 F.Supp. 1295, 1318 (E.D.Pa. 1977), institutionalization in an institution such as Pennhurst State School and Hospital (one of the two institutions in which named retarded plaintiffs reside) is not the least restrictive setting for the habilitation of the retarded and minimally adequate habilitation cannot be provided there. However, saddling retarded juveniles with the additional due process protections mandated by the majority’s order will do little if anything to assure that retarded juveniles will receive minimally adequate education and training in the least restrictive setting, particularly in view of the limited availability of such facilities.
The procedures mandated by the majority requiring a probable cause and full commit*50ment hearing with the appointment of counsel go beyond the due process requirements of our law and is not in the best interests of the retarded juvenile whose sole need is for education, training and care. The majority opinion sets forth several reasons for mandating a probable cause and a full commitment hearing together with the appointment of counsel. One reason given is that there may be instances in which the parents’ interests will be in conflict with the child’s right to minimally adequate education and training. There may be instances where this is so, but the overwhelming majority of parents are committed to obtaining an habilitation program which will improve the level of functioning of their retarded child. Furthermore, the Act and regulations under the Act make it impossible for the parents acting alone to have their retarded child admitted to a mental health facility. The regulations make it necessary that the retarded juvenile be referred to the mental health facility by a mental health professional, pediatrician, general physician, or psychologist, and that the referral must include a psychiatric, medical or psychological evaluation setting forth what is needed by the retarded child. The regulations also require the Director of the mental health facility to conduct an independent examination of the retarded child and if he or she does not agree with the opinion of the professional recommending the referral, the retarded child must be discharged from the facility immediately. I do not share the concern of the majority that the irresponsibility of a few parents provides sufficient reason for declaring unconstitutional these statutes which establish a voluntary procedure whereby parents acting in concert with the professionals in the field of retardation, together with the Director of the mental health facility, may obtain habilitation for a retarded child.
Another reason offered by the majority in support of its due process mandate is that a stigma attaches to a child who is classified “mentally retarded”. There is no question that there are some who consider retardation to be a stigma. We are also aware that today a majority of our enlightened citizens recognize that mental retardation and mental and emotional illness should not be considered a stigma; handicap yes, stigma no. In any event, requiring the appointment of an attorney to represent the retarded juvenile and mandating a court proceeding will not alleviate the so-called stigma problem.
The majority also reasons that its due process order is necessary to protect juveniles who are not retarded from being admitted to a facility for the retarded. Such a juvenile would, of course, be the victim of an error by the professionals in the field. The mandated procedures will do little to eliminate such errors. I do not deny the wisdom of an appeal to the legal system when parties have a dispute. However, mandating a legal proceeding for the determination as to the kind of education, training and care which will be most beneficial to the retarded juvenile is a decision more appropriately left to the professionals outside the judicial process.
We are here concerned with the procedures for the voluntary commitment and admission of the retarded juvenile to a facility providing minimally adequate habilitation in the least restrictive setting. The due process procedures mandated by the majority has, in effect, abolished the voluntary admission and commitment procedures for retarded juveniles, turning each admission into a court commitment procedure almost identical to the involuntary commitment procedure provided in § 406 of the Act. The involuntary commitment procedure for juveniles, which has existed for many years, has certainly not eliminated nor alleviated those problems — irresponsible parents, stigma, errors in diagnosis, inadequate habilitation in restrictive facilities— upon which the majority bases its reasoning for declaring unconstitutional the voluntary admission and commitment procedures for retarded juveniles.
Mental Health Procedures Act of 1976, 50 P.S. §§ 7101-7503 (Supp.1978-79).
The Mental Health and Procedures Act of 1976 has drastically changed the statutory *51scheme dealing with the mentally and emotionally distressed from that which was presented to this Court during the Bartley case. As a result of the new Act, we are presented solely with the due process claims of mentally and emotionally ill juveniles under the age of fourteen. Those mentally and emotionally distressed juveniles fourteen years of age and older, for purposes of the Act, are treated substantially the same as adults.
The Act provides that a parent, guardian or person standing in loco parentis to a child less than fourteen years of age may subject the child to examination and treatment under the Act. § 201. Upon acceptance for voluntary examination and treatment, the Act provides that the individual “shall be given a physical examination. Within 72 hours after acceptance . an individualized treatment plan3 shall be formulated by a treatment team4. . The treatment plan shall state whether inpatient treatment is considered necessary, and what restraints or restrictions, if any, will be administered, and shall set forth the bases for such conclusions.” § 205.
A person under the age of fourteen may withdraw from the facility upon application of his or her parent, guardian or person standing in loco parentis. Additionally, “any responsible party” who believes that it would be in the best interests of the child to be withdrawn from inpatient treatment or afforded treatment constituting a less restrictive alternative may petition the Juvenile Division of the court of common pleas for the county in which the child resides and request withdrawal or modification of treatment. The Act provides that once such a petition is filed, the court must appoint counsel for the child and schedule a hearing within ten days to “determine what inpatient treatment, if any, is in the minor’s best interest.” § 206(b).
The regulations promulgated pursuant to the 1976 Act give further procedural protections to the mentally or emotionally disturbed child under the age of fourteen. They provide that each individual shall be re-examined and his or her treatment plan reviewed not less than once every 30 days, and that on the basis of the re-examination and review the treatment team must either authorize continuation of the existing treatment plan, if appropriate, formulate a new individualized treatment plan, or recommend to the director the discharge of the juvenile. The regulations specifically provide that the child “shall not remain in treatment or under any particular mode of treatment for longer than such treatment is necessary and appropriate to his or her needs.” § 7100.1.6.3.C.
The regulations also provide for a “clearly defined” appeal system whereby any patient who wishes to voice objections concerning his or her treatment shall be heard, and shall have his or her treatment plan reviewed by a mental health professional independent of the treatment team who shall make a report of his or her review to the director of the facility. § 7100.1.6.4.
Finally, the regulations establish a “Patient Bill of Rights” which is to be given to the child upon admission to the facility, and is to be posted in each resident’s living unit and treatment area. When the individual is unable to read, the regulations provide that *52the Bill of Rights is to be read and explained to the patient. Attached to the Bill of Rights are the names, addresses and telephone numbers of legal and other available advocacy services. The Bill of Rights provides:
YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO BE TREATED WITH DIGNITY AND RESPECT
YOU SHALL RETAIN ALL CIVIL RIGHTS THAT HAVE NOT BEEN SPECIFICALLY CURTAILED BY ORDER OF COURT
1. You have the right to unrestricted and private communication inside and outside this facility including the following rights:
a. To peaceful assembly and to join with other patients. To participate in or organize a body of patient government when patient government has been determined to be feasible by the facility.
b. To be assisted by any advocate of your choice in the assertion of your rights and to see a lawyer in private at any time.
c. To make complaints and to have your complaints heard and decided promptly.
d. To receive visitors of your own choice at reasonable hours unless your treatment team has determined in advance that a visitor or visitors would seriously interfere with your or others treatment or welfare.
e. To receive and send unopened letters and to have outgoing letters stamped and mailed. Incoming mail may be examined for good reason in your presence for contraband. Contraband means specific property which entails a threat to your health and welfare or to the hospital community.
f. To have access to telephones designated for patient use.
2. You have the right to practice the religion of your choice or to abstain from religious practices.
3. You have the right to keep and to use personal possessions, unless it has been determined that specific personal property is contraband. The reasons for imposing any limitation and its scope must be clearly defined, recorded and explained to you. You have the right to sell any personal article you make and keep the proceeds from its sale.
4. You have the right to handle your personal affairs including making contracts, holding a driver’s license or professional license, marrying or obtaining a divorce and writing a will.
5. You have the right to participate in the development and review of your treatment plan.
6. You have the right to receive treatment in the least restrictive setting within the facility necessary to accomplish the treatment goals.
7. You have the right to be discharged from the facility as soon as you no longer need care and treatment.
8. You have the right not to be subjected to any harsh or unusual treatment.
9. If you have been involuntarily committed in accordance with civil court proceedings, and you are not receiving treatment, and you are not dangerous to yourself or others, and you can survive safely in the community, you have the right to be discharged from the facility.
10. You have a right to be paid for any work you do which benefits the operation and maintenance of the facility in accordance with existing Federal Wage and Hour Regulations.
The 1976 Act and its accompanying regulations, including the Bill of Rights quoted above, provide sufficient due process protections to a mentally or emotionally ill juvenile under the age of fourteen. They provide that within 72 hours after admission, the mentally or emotionally ill child will be examined and a treatment plan formulated, the primary purpose of which is to determine what treatment, if any, is appropriate for the child. It provides for re-examinations of the juvenile and a review of his or her treatment plan at least every 30 days. An internal appeal mechanism is created whereby the juvenile may challenge *53the modalities of his or her treatment. A “Bill of Rights” has been drafted and circulated to insure that those admitted to mental health facilities are aware of their constitutional rights, and of mechanisms available to secure any rights which might be infringed. Finally, the Act provides that “any responsible party” who believes that it would be in the best interests of the child to be withdrawn from inpatient treatment or afforded treatment constituting a less restrictive alternative, may petition the court of common pleas and request withdrawal or modification of treatment. Once such a petition is filed, the court must appoint counsel and schedule a hearing within 10 days to “determine what inpatient treatment, if any, is in the minor’s best interest.”
Due process does not require a full judicial hearing in every conceivable case of governmental impairment of private interest. Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 98 S.Ct. 948, 952, 55 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972). “[T]he very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.” Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 98 S.Ct. at 953.
As justification for the procedures which its order mandates, the majority stresses the potential for conflict between parent and child; the risks of misdiagnosis and stigma. As to the potential of conflict between a parent and child, the comments heretofore made in the discussion concerning retarded juveniles are equally applicable to mentally and emotionally ill juveniles. In addition, the due process procedure mandated by the majority, setting up, as it does, an adversary court proceeding, may discourage parents from seeking treatment for a child suffering a mental or emotional illness. These due process procedures might retard the progress which has been made encouraging parents to seek early treatment for a mentally ill or emotionally disturbed child. The comments made with respect to the risks of misdiagnosis and stigma, heretofore discussed in connection with mentally retarded juveniles, are likewise applicable. The possibility of a misdiagnosis and the fact that some people still consider mental and emotional illness a stigma should not subject all juveniles to the elaborate due process procedures ordered by the majority in today’s enlightened society which has at last begun to recognize that mental and emotional illness is not a stigma to either the parents or child and should be considered and treated on the same basis as society accepts and treats physical illness, i. e., with compassion and understanding. Moreover, as stated in connection with the mentally retarded, it is difficult to perceive how the procedures mandated by the majority will mitigate or eradicate the alleged conflicts between parent and child, misdiagnosis and the alleged stigma attached to the mental and emotional problems of juveniles.
As stated in the Bartley dissent, the majority has prescribed “an overdose” of due process which in effect abolishes the voluntary admission and commitment procedures for mentally and emotionally ill juveniles under fourteen years of age and for all retarded juveniles.
ON MOTION TO STAY JUDGMENT
HUYETT, District Judge.Defendants have moved pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 62(c) to stay pending appeal this Court’s May 25, 1978 Judgment and Order. In that Order, we declared unconstitutional sections 402(a)(2), 402(c) and 403(a)(2) of the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 (1966 Act), and sections 201, 206(b), and, to the extent it applied to juveniles under the age of 14, section 205 of the Mental Health Procedures Act of 1976 (1976 Act). We also enjoined the operation of these statutory provisions and ordered defendant Secretary of Public Welfare to initiate procedures to assure that all juveniles unlawfully committed to mental health or mental retardation facilities in Pennsylvania under the provisions declared unconstitutional are discharged, released, or recommitted within *54180 days of the date of the Order. The Order provided, however, that an extension of the 180-day period could be granted upon a showing of good cause.
A hearing was held before me on July 5, 1978 to permit the defendants to present additional testimony to substantiate their contention that a stay should be granted, and to present argument on their behalf. The findings made herein are based upon the entire record of this case, including the record of the initial trial and of the proceedings following remand, in addition to the record made at the July 5th hearing.
In determining whether or not a stay under Rule 62(c) is warranted, we must consider four factors: a. the likelihood of the movant’s success on appeal; b. the likelihood of irreparable injury to the movant if the stay is denied; c. the likelihood of similar injury to plaintiffs if the stay is granted, and d. the public interest. Belcher v. Birmingham Trust National Bank, 395 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1968); Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo, 429 F.Supp. 222 (E.D.Pa. 1977). In considering each of the factors, we have looked to the record before us to see what facts are revealed therein and whether those facts support or undermine the defendants’ position.1 After considering the record before us, we believe that the defendants have not carried their burden of showing that, based upon the above stated factors, a stay should be granted. Therefore, we deny the defendants’ motion for a stay.
Likelihood of Success on Appeal
Defendants have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on appeal. The two prior opinions of this court in Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F.Supp. 1039 (E.D.Pa.1975) and Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Public Welfare, supra at 30 (D.C.1978) provide an analysis of the statutory provisions and state clearly the substantive basis for our belief that these provisions are unconstitutional. We stand by these opinions.
We are aware that the Supreme Court granted a stay pending appeal of the Order issued on November 17, 1975 which implemented the Bartley decision. 423 U.S. 1028, 96 S.Ct. 558, 46 L.Ed.2d 402. Defendants contend that the stay represented the Supreme Court’s consideration of the applicable standards for granting of a stay and judgment based upon those standards that a stay was necessary. Because our May 25, 1978 opinion in Institutionalized Juveniles is similar to our Bartley decision, the defendants contend that we should be bound by the prior decision of the Supreme Court and grant a stay pending appeal. Unfortunately, since no opinion accompanied the Supreme Court’s grant of the stay, we have no way of knowing what the reasoning of the Court may have been. However, our May 25, 1978 Order is different from our earlier Order in several crucial respects.2 These differences, we believe, are substantial enough to make the Supreme Court’s decision not to grant a stay of our prior Order inapposite.
In sum, we do not believe that the defendants have demonstrated a likelihood of success on appeal.
Irreparable Injury to Movants
The record fails to show a likelihood of irreparable injury to defendants if the stay is denied. Defendants presented two witnesses at the July 5, 1978 hearing: one representative from the Department of Public Welfare and one from the Devereaux Foundation, a state-licensed mental health facility. Testimony offered by defendants revealed that the following number of juveniles, plaintiff class members, *55are currently receiving inpatient residential treatment in Pennsylvania: 132 allegedly mentally ill juveniles in state-operated institutions; 250 allegedly mentally ill juveniles in state-licensed institutions; 911 allegedly mentally retarded juveniles in state-operated institutions; and 2,692 allegedly mentally retarded juveniles in state-licensed institutions, 1,892 of whom have their care paid for by the state. The total number of plaintiff class members affected by Paragraph 19C of the May 25, 1978 Order, which provided for release or recommitment of class members already confined under the invalid statutory provisions, amounts to 3,985.
Defendants presented no evidence as to the number of juveniles for whom commitment might be sought in the future under the invalidated statute. Furthermore, since the defendants had no estimates of the number of juveniles who might be released from mental health facilities due to regular turnover, or those who might waive a hearing, there was no way to estimate the number of hearings which might be required in order to comply with Paragraph 19C of the Court’s Order. It is reasonable to assume, however, that the total number of hearings would be considerably less than 3,985. In fact, the witness who testified on behalf of the Devereaux Foundation stated that he believed that the majority, if not all, of the 300 class members at Devereaux are content and, given the choice, would choose to remain there. In the case of many of these juveniles, a hearing might be waived.
The Commonwealth defendants were able to give no concrete estimate of the cost of complying with the Order or the manpower needs they might have because of the Order. Additionally, the Commonwealth had no firm estimates of the length of time it would take to comply with the Order, but believed that it would be possible at least to file petitions for recommitment of the children in state-operated institutions within the 180 days provided by the Court Order. Therefore, the only real harm alleged by the Commonwealth amounted to speculative estimates of inconvenience and cost.
The witness from the Devereaux Foundation, speaking on behalf of private institutions, stated his opinion that the diversion of funds and personnel caused by compliance with the Court’s Order would irreparably harm the class members confined to his institution. In arriving at his opinion he assumed that hearings would be held for all children; this is clearly not the case. Supra at n. 48. We are able to give little credence to the opinion given by this witness because of his unfamiliarity with our Order and the requirements therein, his personal unfamiliarity with court commitment procedures (Devereaux presently has no court-committed juveniles), and the unfounded estimate he gave of the number of hearings that would actually take place. The remaining portion of the witness’ testimony related to the harm and confusion which would be inflicted upon a child by a hearing. This testimony was duplicative of much of the testimony we heard at the original trial and upon remand. See Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Public Welfare, supra, at 45. We stand by our original conclusion on the merits of such an argument.
Finally, the defendants testified that they were not aware of any juvenile in need of care who was unable to obtain care because of the Court’s Order. We conclude that the defendants are unable to make a showing of irreparable harm sufficient to warrant a stay of the Order.
Likelihood of Irreparable Injury to Plaintiffs if Stay is Granted
On the other hand, the potential injury of a stay to plaintiff class members is great. Such injury, which is discussed in detail in our earlier opinions in this case, flows from the dangers inherent in the confinement of plaintiffs without procedural due process: e. g., the danger of wrongful deprivation of liberty resulting in damage to self-image, loss of nonhandicapped role models, imposition of the stigma of institutionalization and so forth. Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Public Welfare, supra, at 38 40, 45; Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F.Supp. *561039, 1046-47 (1975). There is no way that the plaintiff class members could be compensated for the harm they would suffer should a stay be granted. Therefor we conclude that irreparable harm will befall plaintiff class if a stay is granted.
The Public Interest
Defendants presented no evidence concerning the benefit to the public interest if a stay were to be granted.
In sum, we conclude that the record before us cannot justify the grant of a stay in the instant case.3
Judge JOHN J. GIBBONS joins in this Memorandum and Order; Judge RAYMOND J. BRODERICK votes to grant the stay requested.. The legislature chose to pass two distinct statutes, one of which deals with voluntary admissions to a facility, § 402, while the other is concerned with voluntary commitments, § 403. Apparently, the main distinction in the two statutes is that under the latter section dealing with voluntary commitments, the initial commitment is for a period not to exceed thirty days, with successive periods not to exceed thirty days each, so long as care or observation is necessary. The section providing for voluntary admissions contains no corresponding time limitation following admission to a facility.
. See Herr, Rights into Action: Protecting Human Rights of the Mentally Handicapped, 26 Catholic University L.Rev. 203, 308 (1977).
. “ ‘Treatment plan ’ means an individualized plan of treatment formulated for a particular person in a program appropriate to his or her specific needs, and to the extent possible, made with the cooperation, understanding and consent of the person in treatment, and imposing the least restrictive alternative consistent with affording the person adequate treatment for his or her condition, on forms developed by facility and approved by Department.” Regulations implementing 1976 Act, § 7100.1.2, 6 Pennsylvania Bulletin, 2115, 2116 (1976).
. “ ‘ Treatment team ’ means an interdisciplinary team of at least three persons appointed by the facility director, composed of mental health professionals and others. At least one member of the team shall be a physician. The treatment team shall formulate and review an individualized treatment plan for every person who is in treatment under this Act. The treatment team shall consult with appropriate persons regarding the inclusion in the treatment plan of specific modalities not within the training and experience of the members of the treatment team.” § 7100.1.2, 6 Pennsylvania Bulletin, 2115, 2116 (1976).
. The findings herein are deemed to be findings of fact and conclusions of law in conformance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a).
. For example, in Bartley, we required the appointment of counsel in all cases, 402 F.Supp. at 1050, and mandated judicial hearings. Id. at 1049 and n. 18. By contrast, our opinion in Institutionalized Juveniles provided that counsel or other trained representative may represent the child’s interests, supra at n. 47, and gave the Commonwealth the option of providing administrative or judicial hearings. Id. at n. 53.
. Paragraph 19C of the May 25, 1978 Order provides that an extension of the 180-day time limit for release or recommitment of the juveniles may be granted upon a showing of good cause. When the defendants have progressed with their plans for implementation and are able to give us more concrete information concerning difficulties they may face in complying with our Order, defendants are, of course, free to petition this Court for modification in accordance with Paragraph 19C.