dissenting.
The Fulton County assistant district attorney began his closing argument in appellant’s trial for the murders of Chauncey Fleming, Eddie McMillian and Nekeba Turner, with the following language:
Two 18-year-old kids, sleeping in their house, never done anything wrong, not bothering anybody, engaged to be married, recent graduates from high school, both working, promising careers, maybe college.
What must it have been like to be in that bedroom, minding your own business when five men come in there, order you get down face first? Do you scream? Well, they couldn’t do that because they’d stuffed socks in their mouth. Do you fight back? These men have guns.
What must it be like laying there next to the man you love, your face covered up so you can’t see but you can hear everything? What must it be like when that first shot was *894fired into Eddie Fleming’s [sic] back and she’s laying there right next to him? And he can still talk. He can still move his head and she has to sit there and listen. And then they wait.
And what must it be like while the men are deciding who the next shot is going to be fired from? She’s laying there waiting. The blood is pouring out of Eddie’s back, who’s right next to her. The men decide. A second shot is fired — she’s inches away from it — into the head of Eddie McMillian.
What must it have been like for Eddie McMillian as he lay paralyzed? And then what was it like when Nekeba Turner as she lay there waiting for her turn to die?
A few short statements later the ADA resumed this line of argument:
What was it like for Chauncey Fleming as he lay there all tied up listening to his friends being killed knowing his turn is coming? And one last piece of worthless metal takes Chauncey’s life. I mean the last images anybody has of him is laying there tied up at the ankles and the arms and around the head.
And what must it be like to be Eddie McMillian’s mother and find those bodies? . . .
Georgia law has long acknowledged in both civil and criminal trials that it is “highly improper” during closing argument to ask jurors to place themselves in the position of a party or of the victim. Doe v. Moss, 120 Ga. App. 762, 767 (172 SE2d 321) (1969) (civil); see Wolke v. State, 181 Ga. App. 635 (3) (353 SE2d 827) (1987) (criminal). “In a classic ‘golden rule’ argument, jurors are invited to place themselves in the victim’s place in regard to the crime itself. [Cit.]” Horne v. State, 192 Ga. App. 528 (2) (385 SE2d 704) (1989). Such an argument is impermissible because “it encourages the jurors to depart from neutrality and to decide the case on the basis of personal interest and bias rather than on the evidence.” (Footnote omitted.) 75A AmJur2d, Trial, § 650, p. 260. “A juror must preserve his objectivity if he is to perform his duty in rendering a fair verdict that will do justice between the parties.” Doe, supra at 767. Accordingly, “any argument, regardless of nomenclature, which importunes the jury to place itself in the position of the victim for any purpose,” Horne, supra at 529 (2), is strictly prohibited under Georgia law during closing argument in criminal or civil cases. See Doe, supra (civil); Wolke, supra (criminal).
The argument quoted above reveals that the prosecutor repeatedly and deliberately encouraged the jurors to place themselves in the murder victims’ place and imagine for themselves what it must
*895have been like as the crimes occurred, as the victims lay there helpless while shots were fired and friends and loved ones were murdered. The prosecutor even called upon the jurors to imagine themselves in the place of the mother of the murder victim who discovered the bodies. This language was not merely “vivid imagery of what a victim experienced” during a crime, as the concurrence would characterize it,49 but rather constituted an impermissible golden rule argument that “ ‘invited [jurors] to place themselves in the victim’s place in regard to the crime itself. (Cit.)’ [Cit.]” Burgess v. State, 264 Ga. 777, 785 (20) (450 SE2d 680) (1994). Under these circumstances there can be no question that the prosecutor’s use of a golden rule argument was error.
Although Georgia law is well established that use of a golden rule argument is clear error and despite the majority’s concession that an impermissible golden rule argument was made in this case, the majority concludes that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient for failing to object to this argument. Citing two cases that fail to support its position, the majority decides that because defense counsel deliberately “chose silence” as his response to the prosecution’s egregious argument, defense counsel’s performance cannot be deficient. According to the majority, such a decision, when deliberately made, becomes untouchable and any review of that decision is inappropriate “hindsight” and “second-guessing.”
I do not agree with the majority that error by trial counsel is unréviewable merely because the error was intentional. A deliberate decision by trial counsel can constitute deficient performance just as easily as an inadvertent lapse. Invoking the words “tactics” and “strategy” does not automatically immunize trial counsel against a claim that a tactical decision or strategic maneuver was an unreasonable one no competent attorney would have made under the same circumstances. “Tactics” and “strategy” provide no talismanic protection against an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Nor can invoking the phrases “hindsight” and “second-guessing” justify an appellate court’s failure to perform its function as a reviewing court to deter*896mine whether the “tactical judgment of [trial counsel] was outside the wide range of reasonably effective assistance. [Cit.]” Jefferson v. Zant, 263 Ga. 316, 320 (3) (b) (431 SE2d 110) (1993) (addressing Jefferson’s habeas corpus claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in regard to their strategy and tactics).
Applying the appropriate analysis to this case, trial counsel’s decision to remain silent in the face of the prosecutor’s prolonged and egregious golden rule argument was a decision no reasonable defense counsel would have made under the same circumstances. The Fulton County Assistant District Attorney deliberately used this prohibited argument as part of a strategy designed to undermine the fairness of Braithwaite’s trial by importuning the jury at length to review the evidence not from a dispassionate distance but from the subjective viewpoint of the crime victims and their families. This was not an instance in which only a “short portion” of the prosecutor’s statement contained an improper golden rule argument. Compare Caylor v. State, 255 Ga. App. 362 (2) (566 SE2d 33) (2002) (tactical decision not to object to limited golden rule argument in opening statement held not deficient). The improper argument was not a single reference or erroneous comment that could justify counsel’s decision not to object and draw attention to the error. See, e.g., Hines v. State, 248 Ga. App. 752 (3) (548 SE2d 642) (2001) (one statement); see also Carr v. State, 275 Ga. 185, 186 (2) (563 SE2d 850) (2002) (one “erroneous comment” harmless error). The golden rule argument in Braithwaite’s case was the polar opposite of these accidental lapse or momentary reference types of situations: the prohibited argument was a prolonged and significant portion of the State’s closing that the prosecutor placed at the very beginning of his remarks for the purpose of focusing the jury on how they should review the evidence adduced at trial.
Nor was this an instance in which any reasonable attorney could have seen the improper argument as favorable to Braithwaite in any manner. Compare Graham v. State, 251 Ga. App. 395 (2) (d) (554 SE2d 528) (2001) (defense counsel reasonably believed it benefitted client to remain silent when State commented in closing argument that client had originally been charged with burglary but due to lack of proof the State had reduced the charge to theft by receiving). Although the majority hypothesizes about counsel listening to “inflection” and observing “jurors’ reactions,” this was not an instance in which any reasonable defense counsel could have thought the jury would ignore the impassioned conduct of the prosecutor and “see through” the improper argument, compare Hudson v. State, 250 Ga. 479, 486 n. 11 (299 SE2d 531) (1983), because the jurors in Braithwaite’s case had no reason whatsoever to believe the prosecution’s argument constituted “rantings and ravings” they needed to “see through.” Absent objection by defense counsel, there was nothing *897to clue the jury into realizing they should ignore or discount as improper a golden rule argument so commonly used in popular entertainment. See, e.g., the golden rule argument from the closing argument in the movie “Class Action” cited in Johnson, Boom to the Skilled, Bust to the Overzealous, 69-May Florida Bar Journal 12 (1995). See also Montz, Why Lawyers Continue to Cross the Line in Closing Argument: An Examination of Federal and State Cases, 28 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 67 (2001).
There was no reasonable tactical advantage to remaining silent in the face of a golden rule argument that inaccurately informed the jury that it was fair and proper for them to review the evidence from the perspective of the crime victims and their families. There was no reasonable tactical advantage to be gained by abetting the State’s deliberate strategy to subvert the jury’s duty to render a fair and impartial verdict based upon an objective application of the law to the facts. No reasonable attorney hearing this prolonged and egregious violation of the rule against golden rule arguments would remain silent because no reasonable attorney under the same circumstances would believe that a jury would “ignore” this persuasive but improper argument. Certainly no reasonable attorney could possibly believe any injury to bis client would result from “drawing attention” to a misleading and damagingly erroneous standard of evidentiary review.
In assessing the strategic decisions of trial counsel, this Court is not concerned with what the best lawyer might have done or even what most good lawyers might have done. “ We ask only whether some reasonable lawyer at the trial could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel acted at trial . . . [. W]e are not interested in grading lawyers’ performances; we are interested in whether the adversarial process at trial, in fact, worked adequately.’ [Cit.]” Jefferson v. Zant, supra, 263 Ga. at 318 (3) (a). It is not “us[ing] hindsight to second-guess” trial counsel’s decisions when we perform this constitutionally-mandated analysis. When that analysis is applied to this case, it is patently obvious that trial counsel’s decision to “choose silence” rather than protect his client’s fair trial rights by raising an objection, thereby alerting the jury that it could not assess the evidence through the eyes of the crime victims, constituted deficient performance under the first prong of the Strickland v. Washington analysis.
Nothing in the cases cited by the majority supports its contrary holding. In Holmes, supra, defense counsel’s decision to remain silent served to avoid emphasizing damaging evidence that showed his cli*898ent had committed other, uncharged crimes.50 Milner, supra, lacks any information about the nature of the prosecutor’s closing argument and its analysis consists of the single statement that “trial counsel’s failure to object further to the prosecutor’s closing argument or the trial court’s instructions to the jury was not deficient or prejudicial.” Id., 271 Ga. at 579 (2). Stripped of all facts or analysis, Milner provides no persuasive support for the majority’s position and serves only to highlight how the majority, by following Milner’s lead, seeks to insulate its holding from informed review by stripping its opinion of all details of the State’s egregious argument and providing only bare conclusions rather than a balanced analysis of Braithwaite’s claim.
Accommodating this dissent, the majority purports to analyze the second prong of Braithwaite’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim only to sweep the error under the umbrella of “overwhelming evidence.” In assessing the prejudice component, the standard is whether a defendant has shown that there is “a reasonable probability (i.e., a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome) that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Smith v. Francis, 253 Ga. 782, 783 (325 SE2d 362) (1985), applying Strickland v. Washington, supra. In Braithwaite’s trial, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability the verdict would have been different had the prosecution not been allowed to repeatedly and deliberately importune the jury to place itself in the position of the victims and had the jury not been allowed to deliberate on the evidence in this case under the mistaken understanding that it was fair and proper to review that evidence while imagining themselves in the place of the crime victims and their families.
The majority, in its assessment of the prejudice component, once again follows the lead of Milner by providing such an abbreviated recital of the facts that its conclusion sounds unchallengeable. What the majority’s synopsis of the evidence at trial fails to reflect, however, is that the “overwhelming” evidence adduced by the State at trial consisted only of testimony by two of the men involved in the murders, Ward and Davis, and testimony by Braithwaite’s estranged *899wife, who purportedly was told by Braithwaite of his involvement in the crimes during an argument between the couple over the wife’s love affair with witness Davis. Davis testified at trial that he had a sexual relationship with Braithwaite’s wife and the estranged wife testified that, although not divorced, she was no longer using Braithwaite’s name. Both Davis and Ward received favorable sentences in exchange for their testimony: Ward was sentenced to a total of 22 months (time served) for his involvement in the three murders; Davis, who admittedly participated in the planned robbery and murder of Fleming and personally shot Eddie McMillian in the back, was allowed to plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter and received a 25-year sentence.
While the credibility of these witnesses was for the jury, see Jenkins v. State, 269 Ga. 282 (5) (498 SE2d 502) (1998), and I fully concur with the majority that the evidence against Braithwaite was sufficient under Jackson v. Virginia, supra, the evidence adduced at trial could not reasonably be considered to be “overwhelming.” There were no fingerprints, no blood splatters or other forensic evidence to connect Braithwaite to the crimes. No stolen goods were found in his possession; the murder weapon was recovered from another person. There was no testimony by a disinterested third party and no incriminating statements to police. Braithwaite’s conviction rested solely on details provided by an adulterous wife who could have obtained her information from her lover Davis, and the testimony of Davis and Ward, given in exchange for more lenient jail time.51 This evidence was sufficient to support the guilty verdicts but it was by no means “overwhelming.”
As the majority’s holding in this case amply demonstrates, “overwhelming evidence” no longer depends upon the amount and quality of evidence of guilt adduced at trial. Instead, “overwhelming evidence” has become the catch phrase that excuses all error. No matter how excessive the argument or how impassioned the prosecutor’s plea, all is forgiven because “overwhelming evidence” was adduced. Despite the perversion this makes of our Court’s rulings, the continued abuse it encourages among prosecutors, and the hypocrisy it *900foments between words and deeds, the bottom line is that when the evidence adduced at trial meets the Jackson v. Virginia standard, this Court will not reverse a criminal conviction over a prosecutor’s use of any golden rule argument, no matter how extensive or damaging that argument is.
This Court has held that any use of an argument that calls upon a jury to place itself in the position of the victim “ ‘must be carefully scrutinized to ensure that no infringement of the accused’s fair trial rights has occurred.’ [Cit.]” McClain v. State, 267 Ga. 378, 383 (3) (a) (477 SE2d 814) (1996). When a “careful scrutiny” of this case is conducted, when all of the State’s evidence of guilt is considered, the prosecution’s golden rule argument is read in its entirety, and when defense counsel’s decision to “choose silence” is properly analyzed, the result reached is that Braithwaite’s fair trial rights were infringed upon by the State’s closing argument. Counsel’s decision not to object to the prosecutor’s deliberate strategy to subvert the jury’s duty to render a fair and impartial verdict based upon an objective application of the law to the facts was an unreasonable decision no competent attorney would have made under the same circumstance. Due to defense counsel’s failure to object, the jurors went to their deliberations believing without contradiction from counsel or court that they could weigh the evidence adduced at trial from the subjective viewpoint of the victims of these crimes. In a case founded solely upon the testimony of three credibility-challenged witnesses, there is a reasonable probability that the failure of Braithwaite’s counsel to object to the argument affected the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, I cannot agree with the majority that Braithwaite received effective assistance of trial counsel.
Policy considerations also demand reversal of Braithwaite’s case. It is well established in Georgia that use of a golden rule argument is strictly prohibited. Why, then, do prosecutors continue repeatedly to make these forbidden arguments? The answer is simple: this Court does not hold them accountable for their violation of our rulings. We gum the words of prohibition but there are no teeth to nip prosecutors into obedience. I cannot condone this Court’s abandonment of its obligation “ ‘to ensure that no infringement of the accused’s fair trial rights has occurred’” through the use of a prohibited golden rule argument, see McClain, supra, 267 Ga. at 383 (3) (a), in favor of a rubber stamp approach to the State’s improper behavior. Nor can I condone the continuing violations of prosecutorial duty, propriety and restraint in regard to the prohibited use of golden rule arguments. As stated by the Supreme Court of Florida in addressing this precise same problem, “[i]t ill becomes those who represent the state in the application of its lawful penalties to themselves ignore the precepts of their profession and their office.” Bertolotti v. State, 476 *901So2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1985).
Decided November 12, 2002 Reconsideration denied December 13, 2002. Charles H. Frier, for appellant. Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Bettieanne C. Hart, Christopher M. Quinn, Assistant District Attorneys, Thurhert E. Baker, Attorney General, Tammie J. Philbrick, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.For these reasons I must respectfully dissent to the majority’s affirmance of Braithwaite’s conviction.
I am authorized to state that Justice Benham and Justice Thompson join in this dissent.
The concurrence reaches this conclusion by viewing the above language “standing alone,” id., totally disregarding the well-established rule that closing argument is construed in the context of the argument as a whole. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 267 Ga. 592 (3) (481 SE2d 821) (1997); Thornton v. State, 264 Ga. 563, 567 (4) (a) (449 SE2d 98) (1994). By ignoring the context of the words and mischaracterizing the plain nature of the prosecution’s “what it must be like” argument, the concurrence’s conclusion is also contrary to well-established law prohibiting “any argument, regardless of nomenclature, which importunes the jury to place itself in the position of the victim for any purpose.” (Emphasis supplied.) Home, supra at 529 (2). The concurrence’s rationale would also adversely affect civil litigation, in that it would allow counsel for civil litigants to freely ask juries “what it must be like” for injured plaintiffs when determining monetary damages, a practice prohibited by our rules against golden rule arguments in civil cases. See Doe, supra.
The challenged closing argument consisted of the prosecutor’s reiteration of trial evidence showing that after Holmes shot the victim, he also struck the victim in the head. The prosecutor’s error was in arguing that by striking the victim Holmes committed aggravated assault, although Holmes had been indicted only for aggravated assault by shooting the victim. This Court speculated, in the absence of any evidence from defense counsel, that the attorney had decided not to “highlight” the additional assault (which the prosecutor would have been authorized to discuss under the evidence) by objecting on the legal technicality that Holmes had not been indicted on that particular assault. Holmes, supra, 273 Ga. at 648 (5) (c).
The majority also contends that defense counsel’s closing argument played a factor in its finding of no prejudice because counsel “refocused the jury’s attention on the specific evidence presented.” However, the problem with the prosecutor’s argument did not lie with any discussion of the “specific evidence presented”: it lay with the unrebutted exhortation to the jury regarding how to review that evidence. Nothing in defense counsel’s closing argument “refocused” the jury on the correct manner in which they should review the evidence; nothing contradicted the jury’s understanding that they could weigh the “specific evidence presented” from the subjective viewpoint of the crime victims and their families. Thus, contrary to the majority’s position, nothing defense counsel said or did ameliorated the prejudice caused by the State’s golden rule closing argument in this case.