dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent from this Court’s holding, i.e., that the Ethics in Government Law is void because its provisions concerning financial disclosure are impermissibly vague.
1. Of course, because penal statutes must be strictly construed, any ambiguity in NRS 281.650 necessarily would be resolved in favor of anyone accused of violating its terms. See, for example: Sheriff v. Hanks, 91 Nev. 57, 530 P.2d 1191 (1975); Labor Comm’r v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 89 Nev. 21, 505 P.2d 288 (1973); Peck v. Womack, 65 Nev. 184, 192 P.2d 894 (1948); Orr Ditch Co. v. District Ct., 64 Nev. 138, 178 P.2d 558 (1947); Ex Parte Davis, 33 Nev. 309, 110 P. 1131 (1910). Moreover, strictly construing NRS 281.410 et seq., it appears to me that what the statutes make criminal is not an innocently or mistakenly incorrect statement, but a willfully false statement. Such an interpretation accords, not just with usual principles governing construction and interpretation of criminal statutes, but with NRS 193.190 which declares: “In every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation of act and intention, or criminal negligence.”
Thus, I do not believe persons governed by the act are required to guess at what NRS 281.650 requires, at their peril. Since that statute is enforced by criminal sanctions, they may know that any legitimate doubts about the statute’s sweep must be resolved in their favor, and that, in any event, they are culpable only if they act in bad faith. So viewed, I find NRS 281.650 unobjectionable, and sufficiently comprehensible.
2. I fully agree that the judicial branch of government, *268through this Court, has the right, power, and indeed the obligation, to govern its own affairs, without interference from the legislative and executive branches. In its new proposed Code of Judicial Conduct, the American Bar Association has suggested reporting provisions for judges, only arguably better than those of NRS 281.650; and I would hope that this Court will adopt those or similar reporting measures in due course, when our committee’s final report concerning the entire Code is received this fall. I agree that the Legislature’s decision to respect judicial autonomy, permitting the judiciary to address its own problems, was commendable and constitutionally mandated. Hence, in my view, the district court erred in determining that the Ethics in Government Law was somehow unconstitutional because the Legislature exercised appropriate restraint, and did not attempt to usurp powers pertaining to the judiciary. No more are the judiciary’s present canons — or the judiciary’s contemplated new Code of Conduct — void because they do not seek to control the Legislature.
I therefore respectfully submit that unconstitutionality of the Ethics in Government Law has not been demonstrated, by my brethren or by the district court.