concurring in part and dissenting in part:
The majority holds that the interests of a minor child who is the subject of a custody dispute incident to a dissolution of marriage proceeding are adequately protected by an attorney appointed by the court under section 14-10-116, 6B C.R.S. (1987). Accordingly, as I understand the majority opinion, a minor has no right to be represented by his or her own counsel, and a trial court has no discretion to permit such representation. I agree that the issue is not moot, see maj. op. part II, and that a minor child does not have the right to participate through the child’s own counsel in every case. I would hold, however, that a trial court has the discretion to permit a child to be separately represented by counsel where such representation appears to the court to be necessary to a fully informed custody determination based upon the child’s best interests. Because the trial court did not apply this standard, I would reverse and remand for reconsideration of the motion of the Children’s Legal Clinic to enter its appearance as counsel for the minor child Eric Hartley.
I.
This case presents the issue of the ability of a minor child to be represented by counsel in a custody dispute arising out of a dissolution of marriage proceeding. The basic facts and procedural history are set forth in the majority opinion. They reflect ongoing disputes concerning the proper custody and visitation rights as to Erie Hartley.
Eric was born on September 15, 1977, and was twelve years of age when his father filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on November 1, 1989.17 Shortly thereafter, based on a stipulation by the parties, the court appointed an attorney to represent Eric’s interests with respect to his custody, support, and visitation, pursuant to section 14-10-116, 6B C.R.S. (1987). (I refer to this attorney as the “GAL,” an abbreviation for guardian ad litem, to correspond to the term used in the majority opinion). After a hearing on February 15, 1990, the father and mother were awarded temporary joint custody. Then, at a hearing on June 25, 1991, the parties stipulated to sole custody in the mother with visitation rights for the father. The hearing was continued, however, and was not completed until December. In the meantime, Eric sent a letter to the GAL expressing great dissatisfaction with his services. Eric detailed incidents of alleged physical and psychological abuse by his mother, expressed the strong desire to live with-his father, complained that the GAL was not helping him and was saying that Eric did not understand and that he had no choice but to live with his mother, and purported to “fire” the GAL. Eric sent a copy of the letter to the judge and asked to talk with him.
On October 3, 1991, the trial court “sua sponte,” based “upon a telephone conversation with the [GAL] ” found that “the immedi*677ate physical safety and emotional well being dictate that the minor child Eric Lee Hartley be allowed to reside full time on an interim emergency basis with his father” pending review at a hearing scheduled for October 29, 1991. After that latter hearing, however, the court established an interim divided custody schedule placing custody with the mother during the week and with the father on weekends. On December 4, 1991, the court completed the hearing begun in June and entered a decree of dissolution of marriage granting sole custody of Eric to the mother.
The dissolution decree did not resolve the underlying problems, and Eric continued to have altercations with his mother, some of which resulted in police intervention. Eric also experienced difficulties with his mother’s live-in boyfriend, against whom criminal assault charges were filed but later dismissed based on an incident of alleged verbal and physical abuse of Eric. In addition, the father and mother each sought and received temporary restraining orders in other courts restraining the other from specified actions with respect to Eric, and the mother initiated contempt of court proceedings against the father for alleged violations of visitation orders relating to Eric. As a result of the post-decree turmoil, the court ordered a custody evaluation of Eric.
It was against this background of continuing conflict that the Children’s Legal Clinic, at Eric’s request, moved to enter its appearance as counsel for Eric and to modify custody to grant sole custody of Eric to the father. After an April 10, 1992, hearing on the motion for entry of appearance, the trial court found that it had appointed the GAL pursuant to section 14-10-116 to represent Eric’s interests, that each parent had been “vigorously represented” by counsel, that the GAL had attended and made recommendations at each hearing, that the GAL “clearly repeatedly acknowledged to the court that Eric has disagreed with his recommendation” that custody be granted to the mother, that the court had interviewed Eric and ordered a custody evaluation, and that the court previously had determined that Eric’s best interests mandated that sole custody be placed with the mother.
The court then observed that it had been referred to “no authority by which an allegedly independent advocate for the child may seek to enter an appearance for the child in these proceedings.” It construed the statutory framework as providing for attorneys for the father and mother, who represent their clients’ wishes with respect to custody and visitation, and an attorney appointed for the child under section 14-10-116, who is bound to formulate custody recommendations by application of the criteria to determine the “best interests of the child” as set forth in section 14-10-124, 6B C.R.S. (1987). The court concluded that although the wishes of the child are one element to be considered in applying those criteria, the child’s wishes are not dispositive.
The court found that the GAL had adhered to the role prescribed by statute and determined that simply because Eric disagreed with and purportedly fired the GAL “the court is not compelled to permit entry of yet another attorney in these proceedings.” The court therefore denied the motion of the Children’s Legal Clinic for entry of appearance.
II.
The Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act, §§ 14-10-101 to -133, 6B C.R.S. (1987 and 1994 Supp.) (cited herein as UDMA), specifically requires a trial court to make a custody determination based on a child’s best interests. When read as a comprehensive whole, I would interpret the various provisions of the UDMA as providing implied authority for a trial court to allow a child to be represented by independent legal counsel when necessary to evaluate what constitutes a particular child’s best interests.
For example, both sections 14-10-123.4 and 14-10-124(1.5), 6B C.R.S. (1987), require trial courts to determine custody in accordance with the best interests of the child. Additionally, section 14-10-123(2), 6B C,R.S. (1987), allows trial courts, in their discretion and on a showing of good cause, to “permit the intervention of other interested parties.” If a child’s basic right under the UDMA to be “safe from physical, psychological, and *678emotional harm”, maj. op. at 670, would be enhanced or better protected by allowing a child to be represented by independent counsel, the trial court should have the discretion to allow such representation. See generally Carl E.K. Johnson, The Role of Children’s Counsel in Contested Child Custody, Visitation and Support Cases, 15 Colo.Law. 224 (1986) (“In recent years, the proposition that children involved in contested child custody, visitation and support cases should be afforded independent legal representation has gained increasing favor.”).
To determine what constitutes the best interests of the child, a court must consider all relevant factors, including thirteen statutorily specified factors. § 14-10-124(1.5), 6B C.R.S. (1987); In re Marriage of Lester, 791 P.2d 1244, 1246 (Colo.App.1990). One such factor is “[t]he wishes “of the child as to his custodian.” § 14-10-124(1.5)(b). Other factors relate to intra family history and relationships of which a child may have particularly helpful knowledge. See § 14-10-124(1.5)(c) (interaction and interrelationship of child with parents, siblings and others), (f) and (h) (ability of custodian to encourage sharing of love, affection and contact with noncustodial parent), (g) (ability of parties to cooperate and make decisions jointly), (l) (history of child abuse), (m) (history of spouse abuse).
Certainly, this information may be available to the court from the GAL or other sources indirectly. The court may also obtain information directly from the child by court interviews with the child under section 14-10-126, 6B C.R.S. (1987). Such information, however, may be more persuasive when developed and presented by competent counsel committed to representing a child’s expressed interest in the custody determination. Moreover, what is involved is not simply the presentation of the child’s wishes or desires, as the majority suggests. See maj. op. at 671-672. Instead, there may well be serious issues as to the relevant • facts concerning intra family relationships and the conduct of parents toward their children. The GAL necessarily is in an evaluative role and may disbelieve factual representations made by a child. In case of such a conflict, a court might benefit from the efforts of counsel committed to representing the position of the child.
There are several factors that bear on the appropriateness of such representation. The trial court should consider the age, maturity, judgment and motivations of the subject child, the amount of time that the GAL has been able to devote to investigating the case, and whether significant facts pertaining to the child’s well-being are in dispute.18 Additionally, the trial court should have the authority to enter an order for the costs and fees incurred by the child’s attorney against any or all of the parties to the proceeding or, in the event that a party against whom such an assessment is made is indigent, to have the fees and costs borne by the state. See § 14-10-116, 6B C.R.S. (1987).
Further support for discretionary recognition of counsel for the child is contained in the Final Draft of Proposed GAL Standards of Practice approved by the Colorado Bar Association Board of Governors. Final Draft of Proposed GAL Standards of Practice, 22 Colo.Law. 1907, 1909 (1993). Section 4.1 of those standards provides in relevant part:
The GAL should formulate an independent position after considering all relevant information, including, but not limited to, the desires of the child or ... parents and relatives.
The GAL’s recommendations should result from independent investigation.... The GAL does not necessarily adopt or advocate for the child’s ... desires, unless it would serve his or her best interests. Unless there are compelling reasons concerning the child’s ... welfare, the GAL shall communicate the child’s ... desires to the court or arrange for him or her to do so directly. When appropriate, the GAL should recommend that the court *679appoint counsel to .advocate the child’s ... point of view.
(Emphasis added).19
The majority holds that the UDMA gives a trial court no discretion to permit a minor child to be represented by an attorney representing the child’s expressed interest in a custody dispute, even though acknowledging that there is no person more interested in such a dispute than the child. See maj. op. at 673. This, in my opinion, represents too rigid a construction of the statutory scheme and deprives the trial court of a resource that — while perhaps rarely necessary or appropriate — can provide critically important assistance to a court in a particular case in assuring that a custody determination truly serves the best interests of the child.
III.
The majority contends that “under existing statutory safeguards, Erie had a full and fair opportunity to be heard.” Maj. op. at 672. However, the majority also acknowledges problems inherent in the GAL-child legal relationship, problems that may, in fact, inhibit the opportunity for the child’s opinion and the factual basis for that opinion to be adequately and convincingly presented to the trial court.
The GAL in the present case was appointed by the court pursuant to section 14-10-116, 6B C.R.S. (1987), of the UDMA. Section 14-10-116 provides:
The court may, upon the motion of either party or upon its own motion, appoint an attorney to represent the interests of a minor or dependent child with respect to his custody, support, and visitation. The court shall enter an order for costs, fees, and disbursements in favor of the child’s attorney. The order shall be made against any or all of the parties; except that, if the responsible party is indigent, the costs, fees, and disbursements shall be borne by the state.20
As the majority correctly notes, the relationship between a GAL appointed by the trial court pursuant to section 14-10-116 and a child whose interests the attorney represents is not the same as between an attorney and an adult client. See maj. op. at 671-672. In certain circumstances, this “difference” may militate in favor of having independent legal representation for a child. For example, an attorney appointed under section 14-10-116 must represent the child’s interests alone, but in doing so “is not simply to parrot the child’s expressed wishes.” In re Marriage of Barnthouse, 765 P.2d 610, 612 (Colo.App.1988). Rather, the attorney is charged with determining and recommending “those available alternatives which are in the best interests of the child,” and to do so requires “a higher degree of objectivity [by] a child’s attorney than that for an attorney representing an adult.” Id. The role may require investigation; interviews with the child, foster parents and other witnesses; participation in hearings; and recommendations to the court. Id. (characterizing the attorney’s functions as substantially similar to those imposed on guardians ad litem appointed under section 19-10-113(3), 8B C.R.S. (1986)).
It is apparent, therefore, that an attorney conscientiously performing responsibilities created by an appointment under section 14-10-116 may properly conclude that a custody award in accordance with a minor child’s expressed wishes would not be in the child’s best interests and may recommend a different custody arrangement to the court. The result, however, may be that the minor child *680feels unrepresented and perhaps even betrayed. Even though the GAL may be careful to advise the court of the child’s contrary opinion, the risk is high that the strength and earnestness of that opinion, and the factual basis for it, will be diluted or obscured by the GAL’s own opinion and recommendation. To ensure that the child’s own independent perspective, untainted by the opinions of others, is presented to the court, the retention of independent legal counsel in a particular case may assist the trial court to determine what that child’s best interests truly are with respect to custody, visitation, and support.
IV.
The facts of the present case provide a good example of how independent legal counsel may have prevented the events that culminated in the trial court’s ultimate custody award of Eric to his father.21 Eric’s letter to the GAL detailing incidents of physical and psychological abuse by his mother and the trial court’s emergency order awarding temporary interim custody of Eric to the father present compelling evidence of a deteriorating mother-son relationship. Perhaps if Eric had retained independent legal counsel to help him document these alleged incidents of abuse or to present other evidence as to why he should be allowed to reside with his father, the trial court would not have awarded Eric’s custody to the mother in its December 4, 1991 order. Moreover, the record reveals that both the mother and father were involved in numerous court proceedings to restrain the other from specified actions with respect to Eric, to the extent that issues regarding Eric’s well-being may not have been adequately presented to the trial court. Additionally, the relationship between Erie and his mother following entry of the December 4, 1991, order deteriorated to such an extent that the court felt compelled to order a custody evaluation of Eric. Again, if Eric had been allowed to retain legal counsel to help his voice be heard over the din of acrimony and recrimination and to help him present evidence as to why he should be allowed to reside with his father on a permanent basis, the court may have given more weight to Eric’s wishes at an earlier time. Finally, it should be emphasized that the GAL in this case did not oppose the appointment of independent legal counsel for Eric and specifically stated, at one of the hearings, that such an appointment might be advisable.
In the present case, the trial court’s order indicated that the court did not believe it had discretion to appoint counsel for Eric and expressed some concern about the introduction of an additional attorney to the cast of litigators. The trial court is in the best position to evaluate the matters referred to in the immediately preceding paragraph and to determine the appropriateness of an appointment of counsel to represent Eric under the standards discussed in this dissenting opinion. I would reverse the judgment of the Colorado Court of Appeals and remand the case to that court with directions to reverse the order of the trial court denying the motion of the Children’s Legal Clinic to appear on behalf of Erie. I would further require that the trial court reconsider the motion under the standards set forth in this dissenting opinion.
I agree that this case is not moot, but, for the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent on the merits.
ERICKSON and KIRSHBAUM, JJ., join in this concurrence and dissent.
. Eric's brother, Chad, then aged fourteen, was also involved in the custody proceeding. However, Chad’s custody was not at issue in this case.
. This list is not meant to be exhaustive, but rather should serve as a starting point in the trial court's analysis of whether independent legal counsel for a child should be allowed in a particular case.
. The standards were submitted to the Colorado Supreme Court for consideration but the Court elected not to give them the status of rules by official adoption.
. The statute makes no reference to the term guardian ad litem but rather describes the appointee as an attorney. Notwithstanding the absence of such a reference, one practicing attorney has noted: "In practice, however, Colorado district courts frequently refer to the children's legal representative in their orders of appointment as a guardian ad litem, rather than as an attorney for the child.” Carl E.K. Johnson, The Role of Children's Counsel in Contested Child Custody, Visitation and Support Cases, 15 Colo. Law. 224 (1986).
In 1993, the statute was amended to strike the word "his” and to substitute "parenting time” for “visitation.” Ch. 165, Sec. 8, § 14-10-116, 1993 Colo.Sess.Laws 575, 577.
. See maj. op. at 668, noting that on November 5, 1992, the court awarded sole custody of Eric to the father.