dissenting.
Donald C. McCaskill (“petitioner”) appeals the trial court’s 23 February 2009 Order affirming the Final Decision of the Board of Trustees of the Teachers’ and State Employees’ Retirement System (the “Board of Trustees” or “respondent”), which determined that petitioner was not eligible for long-term disability benefits because he had not accumulated five years of membership service in the Teachers’ and State Employees’ Retirement System (“Re*400tirement System”). The Board of Trustees’ decision accepted in part, rejected in part, and modified the Decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). The majority opinion of this Court affirms the trial court’s order.
Due to my belief that the trial court erred and that the contract entered into between petitioner and the State of North Carolina was a lawful contract that in effect granted petitioner five years of membership service in the Retirement System, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding. The trial court’s order should be reversed and remanded with instructions for the trial court to remand this case to the Board of Trustees for modification of its Final Decision.
Analysis
I. Standard of Review
The trial court in this matter reviewed a Final Decision for the Board of Trustees in which the Board did not accept the recommendation of the ALJ.
In reviewing a final decision in a contested case in which an administrative law judge made a decision, in accordance with G.S. 150B-34(a), and the agency does not adopt the administrative law judge’s decision, the court shall review the official record, de novo, and shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law. In reviewing the case, the court shall not give deference to any prior decision made in the case and shall not be bound by the findings of fact or the conclusions of law contained in the agency’s final decision. The court shall determine whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief sought in the petition, based upon its review of the official record. The court reviewing a final decision under this subsection may adopt the administrative law judge’s decision; may adopt, reverse, or modify the agency’s decision; may remand the case to the agency for further explanations under G.S. 150B-36(bl), 150B-36(b2), or 150B-36(b3), or reverse or modify the final decision for the agency’s failure to provide the explanations; and may take any other action allowed by law.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-51(c) (2009).
When this Court reviews appeals from superior court either affirming or reversing the decision of an administrative agency, our scope of review is twofold...: (1) whether the superior court applied the appropriate standard of review and, if so, (2) whether the superior court properly applied this standard.
*401Corbett v. N.C. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 190 N.C. App. 113, 118, 660 S.E.2d 233, 237 (2008). “Because the case before us involves a situation where the final agency decision rejected the decision of the ALJ, the appropriate standard of review for the trial court was de novo. The trial court stated the correct standard of review in its order. . . . We must now decide whether the trial court properly applied that standard of review.” Granger v. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, -N.C. App. -, -, 678 S.E.2d 715, 717 (2009) (internal citation omitted).
II. Requirements for Long-Term Disability Benefits
As a preliminary matter, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 135-106(a) (2009) sets out the requirements for receipt of long-term disability benefits as follows:
Upon the application of a beneficiary or participant or of his legal representative or any person deemed by the Board of Trustees to represent the participant or beneficiary, any beneficiary or participant who has had five or more years of membership service may receive long-term disability benefits from the Plan upon approval by the Board of Trustees ....
As to the requirement of five years of membership service, any participant or beneficiary who does not have five years of membership service within the 96 calendar months prior to conclusion of the short-term disability period or cessation of salary continuation payments, whichever is later, shall not be eligible for long-term disability benefits.
(Emphasis added.) “ ‘Membership service’ shall mean service as a teacher or State employee rendered while a member of the Retirement System.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 135-1(14) (2009). Accordingly, it is unquestioned that petitioner was required to render “membership service” for five years in order to qualify for long-term disability benefits.
Petitioner was granted leave without pay for portions of January 2002 through September 2002, interspersed with his accrued vacation and sick leave, so that he would be considered a full-time employee and reach his five years of membership service. It is undisputed that the Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) authorized this leave in order to comply with the terms of the settlement agree-*402merit. Respondent claims that petitioner did not have five years of membership service because he was not accruing membership service while on leave without pay. Conversely, petitioner argues that he was accruing membership service from January 2002 through September 2002 despite the fact that he was on leave without pay for a part of each month. I agree with petitioner and would hold that the contract at issue was lawful and binding between petitioner and the State of North Carolina.
III. Petitioner’s Contract with DHHS
Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that:
Notwithstanding Petitioner’s argument that he had a binding agreement with an agency of the State, the Retirement System was not a party to that agreement, nor was DHHS acting as the agent of the Retirement System. . . . Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to enforce the terms of the agreement against the Retirement System.
I agree with petitioner and would hold that respondent is required to comply with the terms of the settlement agreement signed by petitioner and DHHS, which allowed petitioner to accumulate five years of membership service in the Retirement System by using his sick and vacation leave as well as leave without pay.
In this instance, petitioner had a binding contract with DHHS that provided him five years of membership service in the Retirement System through exhaustion of his leave and periods of leave without pay. Harris v. Ray Johnson Constr. Co., 139 N.C. App. 827, 829, 534 S.E.2d 653, 654 (2000) (“A compromise and settlement agreement terminating or purporting to terminate a controversy is a contract....”). The State of North Carolina is bound to fulfill the terms of a valid contract entered into by an agent of the State authorized by law to enter into such a contract. Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 320, 222 S.E.2d 412, 423-24 (1976). Respondent does not contend that Secretary Odom was not authorized by law to enter into a contract with petitioner. In the notarized settlement agreement, Secretary Odom “warranted that she was vested with the authority to execute the foregoing document.” DHHS has not breached this contract; however, respondent refuses to recognize the validity of the contract and claims that it violates North Carolina statutes and regulations. I disagree. Respondent has not pointed to any statutes or regulations that expressly prohibit the type of agreement at issue here. The majority acknowledges this *403fact, but still holds that the contract is not binding on the Retirement System because “ ‘membership service’ for purposes of determining eligibility for long-term disability benefits does not include periods when an employee is on unpaid leave.” Accordingly, the majority holds that membership service is granted based on a “day-for-day credit approach.” I disagree with the majority’s position. I will address each of the statutes and regulations which respondent points to in support of its argument that the contract was unlawful. None of these arguments have merit.
First, as respondent points out, 25 N.C.A.C. § lB.0436(a) states that “[a]ny settlement or consent agreement in a grievance or contested case which requires the processing of personnel action forms by the Office of State Personnel must be approved by the Office of State Personnel before such personnel action forms will be processed.” However, 25 N.C.A.C. § lB.0436(a) goes on to say, “[t]his provision shall also not be construed to require approval of any settlement the terms of which allow an employee to substitute a resignation for a dismissal and to withdraw a grievance or a contested case action.” While the settlement agreement in this case went further than simply substituting a resignation for a dismissal, I still find that this provision is not applicable to the present situation. Petitioner did, in fact, substitute a resignation for a dismissal and withdrew his grievance against DHHS. Bill Guy, DHHS’ Human Resources Assistant Director and Employee Relations Manager, testified at the hearing that it was his understanding that 25 N.C.A.C. § lB.0436(a) was not applicable for that very reason. Accordingly, I disagree with the majority’s position that the Office of State Personnel was required to approve the contract between petitioner and DHHS.
Respondent also cites N.C. Gen. Stat. § 135-4(v) (2009),9 which allows retroactive membership service to be granted to a member “who had service as an employee,” but whose service was “omitted from contributing membership through error.” Respondent contends that at the time the settlement agreement was signed, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 135-4 did not provide for retroactive membership service to an individual who was reinstated after wrongful termination, and, therefore, there was no means by which petitioner could be awarded retroactive *404membership service. Respondent’s argument is without merit. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 135-4(v) does not prohibit a contractual remedy for an aggrieved employee who was omitted from membership service due to involuntary termination. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, petitioner was retroactively reinstated as a full-time employee. Petitioner never' sought retroactive membership service under this statute. The majority and I are in agreement that this statute does not provide much assistance in interpreting the meaning of membership service.
Finally, respondent contends, and the majority agrees, that short term leave under 25 N.C.A.C. § lE.1112(a) is meant to be used when an employee has no accumulated leave, and, therefore, petitioner was not allowed to take unpaid leave until he had exhausted his sick and vacation leave. 25 N.C.A.C. § lE.1112(a) specifies the purpose behind short term leave without pay — “to account for time that an employee is absent and has no accumulated or advanced leave credits.” However, an employee may be granted “Other Types of Leave Without Pay” “for any other reasons deemed justified by the agency head.” 25 N.C.A.C. § IE.1101.
In this case, Secretary Odom, in her discretion, granted leave without pay to petitioner under the terms of the settlement agreement. I disagree with the majority’s assertion that there are only two types of leave without pay, short term leave and extended leave. 25 N.C.A.C. § 1E.1101 provides for leave for “any other reasons deemed justified by the agency head.” The wording of this personnel rule clearly grants the agency head, in this case Secretary Odom, the discretion to grant leave in situations outside of those defined in 25 N.C.A.C. § IE. 1111 and 25 N.C.A.C. § IE. 1112. At the hearing, Marshall Barnes, Deputy Director of the Retirement System," was unable to cite any rules or regulations that would require an employee to exhaust his or her leave continuously before taking leave without pay. (T pp. 573-74). Barnes was unable to do so because none exists. Accordingly, it is my position that 25 N.C.A.C. § 1E.1101 may be used in situations such as this to grant an employee leave without pay, so long as it is approved in the discretion of the agency head.
Regardless of the form of leave taken, the majority concedes that pursuant to 25 N.C.A.C. § ID.0114 “[p]eriods of leave without pay do not constitute a break in service,” therefore, petitioner maintained full-time employee status while on leave. The material dispute between the majority and I is that the majority holds that membership service should always be calculated on a day-for-day basis, while I *405believe that an employee should be granted membership service credit for the entire month in some circumstances, such as in the present case. At the hearing, Barnes testified that the practice of the Retirement System is to grant a full month’s retirement credit in some situations, particularly for the first and last month of employment. This testimony does not support a day-for-day calculation method; rather, it supports the opposite position — that in some circumstances an employee who contributes to the Retirement System for part of a month is awarded a full month’s credit of membership service. Clearly the Retirement System is not strictly following a day-for-day accounting system at this time. If the majority position is upheld, then the current policies of the Retirement System will be deemed unlawful, an untoward result that would require the Retirement System to prohibit the grant of membership service for the first and last month of employment where the employee did not work the entire month, or in those unique circumstances that Barnes alluded to in his testimony.10
As the majority notes, in Wiebenson v. Bd. of Trustees, State Employees’ Ret. Sys., 345 N.C. 734, 739, 483 S.E.2d 153, 155 (1997) (Wiebenson II), aff’g as modified, 123 N.C. App. 246, 250, 472 S.E.2d 592, 595 (1996) (Wiebenson I), our Supreme Court held that a state employee involved in a job sharing program did not have a break in service during the months she was on leave of absence. The majority points to the fact that Wiebenson was only granted .5 credits in the Retirement System for the six months she was actually working, despite the fact that she was a full-time employee while on leave. The Supreme Court did take note of that fact in the opinion, but the Court did not hold that membership service was calculated on a day-for-day basis. Furthermore, Wiebenson was on extended leave for six months of the year in which she was likely not contributing to the Retirement System.11 Petitioner in this case was granted leave without pay pur*406suant to 25 N.C.A.C. § 1E.1101 (he was not on extended leave) during which time he was contributing to the Retirement System.12
In sum, it is my position that petitioner did not have to exhaust his sick and vacation leave prior to taking leave without pay, and, contrary to the majority opinion, membership service is not always based on a day-for-day calculation method.13 Based on my interpretation of the applicable statutes and regulations, I see no prohibition against the settlement agreement entered into by DHHS with petitioner. This agreement reinstated petitioner so that he could achieve five years of membership service in the Retirement System. Additionally, respondent has not pointed to a statute or regulation that requires an employee to fully exhaust his or her leave prior to taking a leave of absence. Because no laws were violated, there was nothing illegal about this arrangement.
It is important to note that the language of the contract explicitly stated that the purpose was to reinstate petitioner “for the purpose of allowing him to use his accumulated sick and vacation leave hours to maintain his employment until he has attained five (5) years of contributing service in the Retirement System.” The agreement went on to state that petitioner’s sick or vacation leave would be equally apportioned to each month between January 2002 and September 2002 and the remaining days would be treated as leave without pay. There was no attempt to hide what petitioner bargained for and he received assurances from DHHS that the settlement agreement was in compliance with all statutes, rules, and regulations concerning retirement.
It is also important to recognize that, pursuant to this contract, petitioner relinquished his right to pursue his grievance against DHHS and that petitioner did not unilaterally propose this arrangement; rather, the State was involved in formulating the contract, which benefitted both the State and petitioner. Respondent is now attempting to invalidate a valid contract because it does not approve of the result.
Though there is no case law directly on point, it is my firm belief that when a party enters into a lawful contract with one agency of the State of North Carolina, all other agencies are bound to abide by its terms. Respondent may feel that petitioner circumvented the process *407of achieving five years of membership service, but that does not change the fact that petitioner was assured that the settlement agreement was sound and there is, in fact, no statute, regulation, or case law prohibiting this type of arrangement. If the legislature wishes to enact a statute expressly forbidding a contract of this nature, then it is free to do so. Moreover, the State itself may prohibit these types of contracts from being entered into by a state agency. However, as the laws and regulations currently exist, there is no prohibition in place that would make this contract unlawful.14
Upon fulfilling the terms of the contract, petitioner had five years of membership service and was, therefore, vested in the Retirement System. George v. George, 115 N.C. App. 387, 389, 444 S.E.2d 449, 450 (1994) (A pension “vests” when “ ‘an employee has completed the minimum terms of employment necessary to be entitled to receive retirement pay at some point in the future.’ ”) (quoting Milam v. Milam, 92 N.C. App. 105, 107, 373 S.E.2d 459, 460 (1988), disc. review denied, 324 N.C. 247, 377 S.E.2d 755 (1989)), cert. denied, 342 N.C. 192, 463 S.E.2d 236 (1995).
IV. Collateral Estoppel
Assuming, arguendo, that the contract violated an applicable statute or regulation, petitioner also alleges that the trial court erred in holding as a matter of law that no form of estoppel applied to this case. I agree.
It is elementary that when one, with no authority whatever, or in excess of the limited authority given him, makes a contract as agent for another, or purporting to do so as such agent, the supposed principal, upon discovery of the facts, may ratify the contract, in which event it will be given the same effect as if the agent, or purported agent, had actually been authorized by the principal to make the contract prior to the making thereof.
Wiebenson I, 123 N.C. App. at 250, 472 S.E.2d at 595 (quoting Patterson v. Lynch, Inc., 266 N.C. 489, 492, 146 S.E.2d 390, 393 (1966)).
The Supreme Court in Wiebenson II did not overturn this Court’s holding in Wiebenson I where we held that the Retirement System *408was estopped from denying Wiebenson her retirement benefits. This Court held:
Here, petitioner’s supervising ARC director indicated to her in his memo that he had discussed the possibility of petitioner and Ms. Brank sharing one position with the Department of Human Resources and that DHR had approved the job-sharing option. Petitioner’s director also explicitly stated to petitioner in his memo that petitioner would continue to be a participating member of the Retirement System. We conclude that the ARC director, by his statements, purported to be the Retirement System’s agent and that petitioner reasonably relied on his representations. The record includes copies of yearly statements that the Retirement System provided to petitioner for each year from 1985 through 1990 which indicated that she was continuing to accumulate retirement credit in the Retirement System. We conclude that the Retirement System ratified the director’s representations and statements to petitioner by continuing to accept her contributions to the Retirement System and by continuing to send petitioner yearly statements indicating that petitioner was still a participating member of the Retirement System. Accordingly, we also conclude that the Retirement System may not now assert that petitioner is not entitled to retirement credit for the years that she participated in the job-sharing program.
Id. at 250, 472 S.E.2d at 595 (emphasis added). Wiebenson I analogized the case, at least in part, to Fike v. Bd. of Trustees, 53 N.C. App. 78, 279 S.E.2d 910, disc. review denied, 304 N.C. 194, 285 S.E.2d 98 (1981). In Fike, the petitioner filed for retirement benefits on behalf of his ailing wife. Id. at 78, 279 S.E.2d at 911. Upon submitting the forms to Ruth Ellis, the Payroll and Benefits Manager employed by the University where his wife worked, petitioner believed that the forms would be filed and no further action was required on his part. Id. Petitioner then learned that Ellis had not filed the retirement disability forms with the Retirement System. Id. at 79, 279 S.E.2d at 911. Petitioner advised Ellis to file them, but by the time Ellis did so, the effective date was November 1978 and petitioner’s wife died in October 1978. Id. at 79, 279 S.E.2d at 912. The Retirement System claimed that petitioner’s wife was not retired at the time of her death and refused to grant petitioner her accrued benefits. Id. This Court held that even though the Retirement System did not have “sufficient control over Mrs. Ellis, or her employer, for her to be its actual agent” the Retirement System Handbook instructed prospective retirees to submit the forms to his or her personnel officer, in that case Ellis. Id. *409at 81, 279 S.E.2d at 913. Petitioner complied with that process. Id. In Wiebenson I, we found that Fike was “arguably distinguishable” in that Wiebenson had not reviewed a handbook that directed her to rely on her director’s representations; nevertheless, the Court found that ratification applied in that case because Wiebenson relied on assurances from a person who claimed to be knowledgeable about the Retirement System’s rules and regulations. Wiebenson I, 123 N.C. App. at 250, 472 S.E.2d at 595.
Similarly, as seen in Wiebenson I, Guy, who informed petitioner that his retirement vesting was secure, was not a member of the Retirement System, but purported to be knowledgeable and made assurances to petitioner. “[B]y his statements, [Guy] purported to be the Retirement System’s agent and ... petitioner reasonably relied on his representations.” Id. Additionally, as stated by the ALJ:
The preponderance of the evidence showed that Respondent accepted DHHS retirement benefit contributions on Petitioner’s behalf, and never returned those contributions to Petitioner. By accepting and never returning Petitioner’s retirement contributions, Respondent ratified DHHS’ retirement contributions for Petitioner, and indicated that Petitioner was still a participating member of the Retirement System.
Because petitioner relied on Guy’s assurances that the contract did not violate any rules or regulations of the Retirement System, and the Retirement System ratified Guy’s assertions by accepting the contributions from petitioner and not returning them, I would hold that respondent is now estopped from denying petitioner five years of membership service.15
I would also posit that the State as a whole is estopped from denying petitioner what he bargained for in the contract signed by DHHS, a State agency. The contract was lawful, clearly set out what petitioner bargained for, and yielded a benefit to the State (petitioner’s relinquishment of his right to pursue his action for wrongful termination). DHHS, the drafter of the contract, has never sought to have the contract declared unlawful and the Retirement System has no valid grounds for attempting to do so now.
*410Conclusion
In this case, the State of North Carolina entered into a valid contract with petitioner which respondent now seeks to avoid. As stated supra, Secretary Odom had the authority to enter into this contract and she had the authority to grant petitioner leave without pay for a portion of each month. Petitioner obtained five years of membership service by contributing to the Retirement System for each month he was employed.
Due to my determination on these issues, I would not address petitioner’s remaining assignments of error. Accordingly, under the unique facts of this case, I would reverse the order of the trial court and remand to the trial court with instructions to remand to the Board of Trustees to amend its Final Decision.
. Effective 1 August 2003, after the settlement agreement at issue was signed, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 135-4 was amended and now provides for retroactive membership service for a member who is reinstated subsequent to an involuntary termination. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 135-4 (ff). While the amended statute would arguably apply to the facts of this case, it was not in effect at the time the contract at issue was executed.
. Although the majority claims that it is not commenting upon the Retirement System’s current practices, the effect of its holding will certainly alter the Retirement System’s practices, particularly with regard to the first and last month of employment.
. To be clear, I recognize that being a full-time employee does not mean that the individual is automatically accruing membership service in the Retirement System. Clearly, Wiebenson was a full-time employee while on leave for six months; however, she was only accruing membership service during the months she was working and contributing to the Retirement System. As stated supra, that fact distinguishes Wiebenson from the present case. Here, petitioner was contributing to the Retirement System during the months in which he took leave without pay. In other words, petitioner, unlike Wiebenson, was a full-time employee and contributing to the Retirement System at all times he was employed.
. The State paid petitioner’s contribution retroactively.
. I am not, as the majority seems to imply, advocating a wholesale abandonment of the day-for-day credit approach.
. Clearly, a state agency may not act outside of the bounds of laws and regulations set up by our legislature or the State through its Administrative Code. For example, if one agency attempted to change the retirement benefits formula set forth by the State, then that action would not be acceptable. That is not the case here where DHHS acted in accord with state laws and regulations.
. The majority states that the Retirement System is not estopped because it never told petitioner that his contract was lawful. The majority ignores the fact that in Wiebenson and Fike, the purported assurances made to the petitioners were made by individuals not employed by the Retirement System. The Retirement System was estopped in those cases because it ratified the statements made to the petitioners, even where those persons were not officially agents of the Retirement System.