dissenting.
In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Black and other named plaintiffs brought suit against appellants, the City of Atlanta and several of its police officers. Prior to trial, the City, through its attorneys of record, and the plaintiffs, through their attorneys of record, entered into an agreement settling all issues in the litigation. In reliance upon representations of counsel, the district court entered a consent order delineating the terms of the settlement. The consent order was signed by counsel for the parties and provided, in part, as follows: “The parties have executed and agree to the provisions of this consent order by and through their undersigned counsel of record.” (Emphasis supplied.) Relying entirely upon OCGA § 45-6-5, this court holds that the certified question concerning the validity of that settlement must be answered in the af*430firmative. In my opinion, OCGA § 45-6-5 has no applicability here and the certified question should be answered in the negative. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent.
An attorney in the employ of a governmental entity may be a “public officer” in the same general sense as any other governmental employee. “Any one is a public officer who is appointed by the government and has any duty to perform concerning the public.” Tem-pleman v. Jeffries, 172 Ga. 895, 901 (2) (159 SE 248) (1931). However, the applicability of OCGA § 45-6-5 cannot be determined by considering only the fact, that one occupies the general status of a “public officer.” By its terms, OCGA § 45-6-5 relates only to the “powers” and “acts” of one who occupies that status. Thus, although a governmental employee may occupy the general status of a “public officer,” OCGA § 45-6-5 is applicable only to the extent that he or she purports to exercise “powers” and perform “acts” in that general capacity.
In my opinion, the “powers” and “acts” of an attorney engaged in representing a governmental entity in a legal proceeding are in no way equivalent to the “powers” and “acts” of a “public officer” as that term is employed in OCGA § 45-6-5. Until today’s decision, the “powers” and “acts” of such an attorney have always been deemed to be those of an “officer of the court.” “An attorney does not hold an office or public trust, in the constitutional or statutory sense of that term, but is an officer of the court.” (Emphasis supplied.) Sams v. Olah, 225 Ga. 497, 504 (7) (169 SE2d 790) (1969). Thus,
[a]n. attorney at law, even if he be also a city attorney, acting for a client in a legal proceeding is not an “officer of the city” .... He is then an officer of the court, and all of the presumptions of that office attach to him.
City of Atlanta v. Frank, 120 Ga. App. 273, 275 (2) (170 SE2d 265) (1969). Contrary to the majority opinion, an attorney who undertakes to represent a governmental entity in a legal proceeding must necessarily be considered an “officer of the court,” rather than a “public officer.” The status of “attorney” is entirely a function of the professional service that is being performed and is in no way dependent upon the nature of the client for whom that service is being rendered. Thus, when an “attorney” undertakes to represent a governmental entity in a legal proceeding, he or she occupies the specific status of an “officer of the court” and cannot simultaneously hold the general status of a “public officer.” At that point, the status of the “attorney” has been elevated from that of a “public officer” in general to that of an “officer of the court” in specific.
*431The lawyer stands in a unique position in our society. He is by virtue of the practice of his profession an officer of the court. [Cits.] . . . “The office of attorney is indispensable to the administration of justice and is intimate and peculiar in its relation to, and vital to the well-being of, the court.”
Sams v. Olah, supra at 504 (7). It necessarily follows that, when an attorney undertakes to represent a governmental entity in a legal proceeding, his or her “powers” and “acts” must be deemed to be those of an “officer of the court” and not those of a “public officer” within the ambit of OCGA § 45-6-5.
Since OCGA § 45-6-5 clearly does not apply in this case, the controlling authority is Brumbelow v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 251 Ga. 674 (308 SE2d 544) (1983). Under Brumbelow, an attorney’s authority to settle “may be considered plenary unless it is limited by the client and that limitation is communicated to opposing parties. [Cits.]” Brumbelow, supra at 675 (2). By its terms, Brumbelow does not contemplate the publication of a general limitation on authority, but rather a communication which is specifically directed to opposing parties in the litigation. There is no contention that either the existence of the ordinance or the non-compliance therewith was specifically communicated to the plaintiffs.
Moreover, the ordinance here in question specifies that only settlements for amounts over $500 must first be specifically approved by the City Council. Thus, that ordinance does not impose any limitation on counsel’s authority to settle a case on behalf of appellants. To the contrary, the ordinance constitutes an expansion of counsel’s authority in that regard by providing that all settlements for less than $500 are deemed to be pre-approved by the City Council. Therefore, the majority errs in concluding that plaintiffs had equal knowledge that the settlement was unauthorized. Even if the existence of the ordinance had been communicated, the plaintiffs would have known only that counsel’s offer to settle their claims for $37,500 was not a pre-approved offer from the City Council, but was one which counsel was authorized to make after obtaining the approval of the City Council. Notwithstanding such a disclosure, plaintiffs and the district court still would have been entitled to assume that counsel had obtained the City Council’s necessary approval of the settlement offer before signing the consent order in their capacity as the City’s attorneys of record, unless plaintiffs had actual knowledge to the contrary. See Wilson v. Anderson, 194 Ga. App. 167 (390 SE2d 86) (1990). “The legislature has provided and the courts of Georgia have held that an attorney should be able to rely upon the authority of the other attorney of record.” Lennon u. AECK Assoc., 157 Ga. App. 294, 295 (277 SE2d 289) (1981). To hold that it would be incumbent upon plaintiffs *432to verify that counsel, who are officers of the court, had obtained the City Council’s necessary specific approval would mean that there can be no enforceable settlement agreement without proof that the client himself gave his express approval. Such a holding would be contrary to Georgia’s long-standing recognition that attorneys have apparent authority to enter into enforceable agreements on behalf of their clients. Brumbelow v. Northern Propane Gas Co., supra at 676 (2).
Decided May 30, 1995. Joe M. Harris, Overtis H. Brantley, June D. Green, Clifford E. Hardwick IV, Robin J. Shahar, Amy R. Snell, Willie J. Lovett, Jr., for appellants. Boyce, Ekonomou & Atkinson, Andrew J. Ekonomou, Howell A. Hall, Jay A. Sekulow, John D. Etheriedge, James M. Henderson, Sr., Keith A. Fournier, for appellees.Regardless of the degree of actual authority extended by a principal to his agent as between the two of them, nonetheless the principal will be liable for certain acts of his agent within the scope of the agent’s apparent authority. [Cit.]
City of Gainesville v. Pritchett, 129 Ga. App. 475, 477 (3) (199 SE2d 889) (1973). “Accordingly, [the City’s] contention that the settlement is invalid . . . because [the City Council], [it]self, did not sign anything is without merit.” Davis v. Davis, 245 Ga. 233, 235 (1) (264 SE2d 177) (1980).
By answering the certified question in the affirmative, this court, in effect, holds that the City’s attorneys are not “officers of the court” upon whose authority and representations the trial court and opposing counsel were justified in placing their reliance. With this holding, I cannot agree. “The client’s remedy, where there have been restrictions not communicated to the opposing party, is against the attorney who overstepped the bounds of his agency, not against the third party.” Brumbelow v. Northern Propane Gas Co., supra at 675 (2). In my opinion, the question certified to this court by the United States Court of Appeals should be answered in the negative.
I am authorized to state that Justice Thompson joins in this dissent.