dissenting in part.
I concur in the result reached by the court in holding that the indeterminate life sentence is not excessive. However, I respectfully disagree where the court’s opinion holds that the enhanced term of the sentence, for use of a firearm, must be vacated.
I
At the outset, it is important to note that this case illustrates the difficult task of defining a coherent relationship among Idaho’s current statutes governing the correction of criminal offenders. During much of the twentieth century, Idaho’s sentencing scheme in noncapital cases consisted simply of external limits of punishment prescribed by the Legislature, coupled with broad grants of discretion to the courts and to correctional authorities in pronouncing and administering indeterminate sentences. However, since the late 1970’s our Legislature, responding to public insistence upon more rigorous treatment of offenders, has begun to change the shape of the system. For example, the Legislature has provided fixed term sentences as alternatives to indeterminate sentences under I.C. § 19-2513A; it has extended the time, prescribed in I.C. § 20-223, which some violent offenders must serve in custody before receiving parole consideration; and it has provided in I.C. §§ 19-2520A, -2520E mandatory minimum sentences, and enhancements of sentences, for certain violent or repeat offenders. As exemplified in the present case, the Legislature also has provided in I.C. § 19-2520 for enhancement of sentences imposed for enumerated crimes committed while using firearms.
These statutory changes have been grafted to the existing sentencing scheme. Consequently, instead of an integrated body of sentencing law, we now have disjointed statutes which occasionally seem to conflict with each other and which displace — or cast doubt upon — prior case law and correctional regulations. Of course, the disintegrated condition of our sentencing laws is not to be condemned; it reflects the efforts of responsive public officials to accommodate shifts in public policy. Nevertheless, until Idaho’s sentencing laws are comprehensively revised, our courts will continue to confront the difficult, and sometimes unpopular, task of identifying cracks in the system and patching them where possible.
II
In this case, the majority correctly has identified a conceptual inconsistency between a life sentence and an enhanced sentence. But it does not necessarily follow, as the majority suggests, that the enhancement in this case is meaningless and should be stricken from the sentence. Enhancing an indeterminate life sentence is not a meaningless act. Relatively few indeterminate life sentences are fully served in confinement. Most result in parole and even*506tually in discharge. I believe enhancement of such a sentence, for use of a firearm while committing a crime, carries important implications for any parole decision. The Commission for Pardons and Parole may— and should — require a portion of the enhanced term of the sentence, as well as part of the underlying life sentence, to be served before parole. Indeed, in. the present case, the district judge stated upon the record his expectation that enhancement of the life sentence would produce a longer minimum term of confinement than would otherwise result. Counsel for the state and for the appellant also made this assumption in oral argument before our court.
The enhancement statute reflects a determination by the Legislature and Governor, based upon their perceptions of public policy, that a person who uses a firearm while committing a crime should be punished more severely than one who does not. Firearms present a risk to life and safety far greater than the risks associated with most other instrumentalities of crime. The people of our state, who value the right to use firearms lawfully, are entitled to insist upon strict punishment of those who use them unlawfully. That message is embodied in I.C. § 19-2520. It is transmitted to parole authorities through the enhanced term of the sentence. Its implications for a parole decision should not be destroyed in a murder case, by striking down the enhanced term of a life sentence, simply because it presents a conceptual difficulty.
Moreover, I doubt that our court has authority to strike down part of a sentence unless it is excessive or legally defective. The majority does not contend that the enhanced sentence in this case was excessive. Neither does the mere existence of a conceptual difficulty render an enhanced sentence legally defective. The conceptual problem, simply stated, is if a life sentence is fully served without parole and discharge, then the enhanced term becomes superfluous. However, this problem is not restricted to enhanced sentences under I.C. § 19-2520. It inheres in any term of custody added to a life sentence, including a consecutive sentence for another crime. The majority suggests that such consecutive sentences are permissible, but that an enhancement like the one presented in this case must be stricken down. Although the majority maintains that consecutive sentences are distinguishable from enhanced sentences, I believe the distinction is without a difference as far as the issue here is concerned.
The majority further suggests that I.C. § 19-2520 somehow is ambiguous and that the enhanced term in this case should be vacated in the exercise of lenity. But I find nothing ambiguous about the statute. It plainly requires an enhanced term for use of a firearm; and it makes no exception for life sentences. I believe the court’s opinion confuses ambiguity — the existence of two or more meanings — with the majority’s notion that the statute is meaningless as applied to this case. The principle of lenity is invoked by a choice between meanings. The court’s opinion poses no such choice. Rather, it urges that the statute be given no meaning, and no effect, where indeterminate life sentences are concerned. The principle of lenity is inapposite.
Finally, to justify vacating the enhanced term in this case, the majority relies upon People v. Walker, 18 Cal.3d 232, 133 Cal. Rptr. 520, 555 P.2d 306 (1976). In. that case, the California Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged that there is no legal defect in the enhancement of a life sentence. The court also acknowledged that enhancement may affect parole decisions. Nevertheless, the California court struck down the enhancement of a life sentence, observing tersely that any legislative intent to affect parole decisions was not stated in the enhancement statute itself. I believe the California decision reflects judicial fiat rather than judicial reasoning. We need not, and should not, emulate it. The impact of a sentencing statute upon parole decisions is implicit. It need not be recited explicitly in each enactment by the Legislature in order to gain recognition by the courts.
*507In summary, the enhancement of an indeterminate life sentence is neither meaningless nor legally defective. Therefore, I would not vacate the enhanced term in this case.
Ill
Consequently, I am obliged to state my view concerning the reasonableness of the sentence, as enhanced. Unlike the majority, I would not assume that the appropriate measure of confinement, for determining whether the sentence is excessive, is only ten years. In State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 569, 650 P.2d 707, 711 (Ct.App.1982), we said that one-third of an indeterminate sentence would be treated — solely for the purpose of appellate review — as the duration of confinement, “unless the record indicates the contrary.” By parity of reasoning, I believe the ten-year measure of confinement applied to indeterminate life sentences, as noted in State v. Wilde, 104 Idaho 461, 660 P.2d 73 (Ct.App.1983), may be altered if there is a contrary indication in the record.
In this case, the contrary indication is manifest. The sentencing judge stated of record his intention, when fashioning the enhanced sentence, that Kaiser serve not less than fifteen years in confinement. Accordingly, I would review the sentence upon a presumption that confinement will extend for at least fifteen years, rather than ten years. Nevertheless, applying the Toohill sentence review criteria to the nature of the offense and the nature of the offender — as outlined in the majority opinion — I would hold the enhanced sentence not to be excessive. It should be affirmed in its entirety.