concurring specially.
Because the child abuse registry statute limits the right of persons placed on the list to appeal their classification, I agree that it violates due process and, therefore, is unconstitutional.
1. OCGA § 49-5-183.1 governs challenges by persons who are deemed to be “an alleged child abuser” under the act establishing the central child abuse registry. Upon receiving a report of “confirmed” or “unconfirmed” child abuse, the county DFACS office must notify the alleged abuser of the report classification and of that person’s right to appeal the classification in an administrative hearing.7 The alleged child abuser may request a hearing within ten days of receipt of the notice.8 Any hearing is conducted before an administrative law judge under the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act.9 The ALJ must determine whether there was sufficient credible evidence to justify the investigator’s classification of the alleged abuse as confirmed or unconfirmed.10 The ALJ’s decision constitutes the final administrative decision and may be appealed to the superior court. OCGA § 49-5-183.1 (g) specifically provides: “The decision of the superior court under this subsection shall not be subject to further appeal or review.”
Although the plain language of the statute suggests that no appeal of the superior court decision may be taken in any case involving the abuse registry, this court must give a narrowing construction to statutes whenever possible to save the statute from a constitutional challenge.11 Interpreting OCGA § 49-5-183.1 narrowly, I would construe it to mean that the superior court’s decision is final only on the issue of the person’s classification on the child abuse registry as confirmed or unconfirmed. Under this interpretation, the statute would preclude both the state and the individual placed on the registry from appealing decisions of the superior court related to the sufficiency of the evidence, but would not preclude either party from appealing superior court decisions related to the interpretation of the statute and the constitutionality of its various provisions.
2. Given this construction, the issue becomes whether a person’s inability to appeal his or her classification on the registry violates due process. The Fourteenth Amendment protects citizens from deprivation of life, liberty, or property by the state without due process of law.12 A due process analysis involves determining, first, whether *315the state has deprived a person of a liberty or property interest and, if so, the amount of process that is due.13 I agree with the majority opinion that a person who is listed on the child abuse registry has a liberty interest that is constitutionally protected. Although injury to reputation alone is not enough to create a liberty interest,14 placement on the registry also affects a person’s interest in family privacy and autonomy, employment, and freedom from police surveillance.15 Because there are constitutional liberty interests involved, the state must provide adequate procedures before placing a person’s name on the registry. The amount of process that is due depends on (1) the private interest affected by the state’s action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest under the present procedure and the value of any additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the governmental interest involved.16
The registry statute implicates important interests of both the individual and the state. The state has a “significant interest in protecting children from abuse and maltreatment.”17 The individual has a privacy interest in not being labeled a child abuser for his lifetime. Placement on the registry may affect decisions related to an individual’s custody of children, employment opportunities, and criminal charges. The registry information is available to DFACS workers, law enforcement agencies, district attorney’s offices, medical examiners and coroners. Moreover, the statute provides weak criminal penalties for violating its confidentiality provisions and no civil remedies.
3. The critical factor in this case, however, is the risk of erroneous decisions under the statute. As the majority opinion points out, the statute prohibits compelling the appearance of any child under the age of 14, thus depriving the accused of the right to confront his accuser under the due process clause. This prohibition creates a risk since child abuse cases often depend on the credibility of witnesses and have little physical or other corroborative evidence.18 Under Georgia’s statute, the ALJ who makes the credibility determination may be relying on the hearsay testimony of a DFACS worker, coun*316selor, or parent who spoke with the child, rather than the child, because of the rule exempting children under 14 from testifying. This type of evidence prevents the accused from challenging his accuser and prevents the hearing officer from being able to judge the credibility of a key witness.19
Decided March 20, 1998 Reconsideration denied April 2,1998.Moreover, both the abuse investigators and the administrative judges are applying standards of proof that differ from the usual standards and have not been defined by a court of law: “If there is equal or greater credible evidence that the person committed the abuse than the person did not commit the abuse, the person’s name shall be listed as a ‘confirmed’; otherwise, the person’s name shall be listed as an ‘unconfirmed.’ ”20 In addition, a person who is classified as “unconfirmed” remains on the registry for two years based on a finding that there is “some credible evidence” that child abuse occurred.21 The Court of Appeals of New York has struck down the “some credible evidence” standard of proof as a basis for placement on its state registry as a violation of due process under the Federal Constitution.22 As one commentator explains, “The standard provides a safeguard only against bad faith or entirely unfounded reports of child abuse. It does not substantially safeguard against accusations that are reasonable but erroneous, because the same evidence that motivated the report will provide the basis for confirming it.”23
Based on these flaws, I conclude that the statute provides inadequate procedural safeguards and thus fails to ensure against the risk of wrongful placement on the registry. Because OCGA § 49-5-183.1 limits the right of individuals to challenge a finding of confirmed or unconfirmed child abuse that is based on a flawed procedure, I agree that the statute denies due process in violation of the Federal Constitution.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein joins in Division 3 of this special concurrence.
*317Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, William C. Joy, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Shalen A. Sgrosso, Assistant Attorney General, for appellants. Gilbert J. Murrah, for appellee.OCGA § 49-5-183.1 (b).
OCGA § 49-5-183.1 (d).
See OCGA §§ 49-5-183.1 (e); 50-13-1 to 50-13-23.
See OCGA § 49-5-183.1 (f).
See Gravely v. Bacon, 263 Ga. 203, 206 (429 SE2d 663) (1993).
I do not address whether the statute violates due process under the Georgia Constitution.
See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (92 SC 2593, 33 LE2d 484) (1972).
See Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693, 701 (96 SC 1155, 47 LE2d 405) (1976).
See generally Jill D. Moore, Charting a Course between Scylla and Charybdis: Child Abuse Registries and Procedural Due Process, 73 N.C. L. Rev. 2063 (1995).
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (96 SC 893, 47 L.E.2d 18) (1976).
Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F3d 992, 1003 (2nd Cir. 1994); see J.P v. Carter, 485 SE2d 162 (Va. App. 1997) (registry’s primary purpose is to protect the abused child and the community from offenders).
See A.Y. v. Commonwealth, 641 A2d 1148, 1151 (Pa. 1994) (finding expungement hearing inadequate when agency relied on its employees’ recitation of what the three-year-old child stated without producing the victim, any independent corroborative evidence, or any recording or transcript of the victim’s statement).
See id. at 1152.
OCGA § 49-5-183 (b) (3).
OCGA § 49-5-180 (10).
Lee TT v. Dowling, 664 NE2d 1243 (N.Y. 1996); see also Valmonte, 18 F3d at 1003 (striking down a registry statute based on the “some credible evidence” standard used in the initial investigation and at the non-deprivation administrative hearing).
Michael R. Phillips, The Constitutionality of Employer-Accessible Child Abuse Registries: Due Process Implication of Governmental Occupational Blacklisting, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 139, 188 (1993).