I would hold the 15-day notice requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 594 (section 594)1 applies only to the original trial date. Thereafter, a party must exercise reasonable diligence to keep himself informed of any changes to this date. (People ex rel. San Francisco Bay Conservation etc. Com. v. Smith (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 113, 126 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 488] [“April 14 was a continued trial date to which [section 594] did not apply . . . (Original italics.)]; City etc. of San Francisco v. Carraro (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 509, 518 [33 Cal.Rptr. 696] [After “notice has been given in the first instance, it is the duty of all parties to keep themselves informed by diligent inquiry of all subsequent continuances . . . .”]; Capital National Bank v. Smith (1944) 62 Cal.App.2d 328, 338 [144 P.2d 665] [after due notice of the original trial date it becomes the attorney’s duty “to exercise diligence to inform himself of subsequent continuances of the trial”]; see In re Estate of Bell (1943) 58 Cal.App.2d 333, 336 [136 P.2d 804].) I therefore respectfully dissent.
Here, defendant does not claim he failed to receive proper notice of the original August 12, 1993, trial date. Indeed, both parties were present and ready for trial. Nor does defendant dispute he received notice of and filed no opposition to plaintiff’s June 14, 1995, motion for an order advancing the *968case for trial. However, he chose not to appear at the July 14, 1995, hearing on this motion, or ascertain what ruling had been made. Had he done so, he would have learned of the subsequent status conferences and ultimately the new trial date. Indeed, the record reveals defendant was given 12 days’ notice of the new trial date. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 964, fn. 2.)
The majority concludes that nevertheless defendant is entitled to a new trial because section 594 applies to each and every trial date set. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 963-964.) In apparent recognition of the enormous practical difficulties of such an interpretation (the existence of which should persuade it to question the efficacy of its interpretation), the majority then immediately attempts to distinguish continuances from advancements. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 964-965.) Of course, the question of continuances is not before us. More importantly, as defendant himself argues, if section 594 requires 15 days’ notice for every trial date set, nothing in the language of the statute supports an exception for continuances.
The majority reasons, however, that if a “trial date is initially set more than 15 days in the future and then is further continued, a party has had notice of the trial more than 15 days before it actually begins.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 965.) That is true whenever there is 15 days’ notice of the original trial date as well. Whenever the trial occurs after this time, the defendant has received at least 15 days’ notice. In this case, defendant had more than two years’ notice.
The majority further states that when a trial is continued, “the absent party’s opportunities to plan and prepare for trial and to be present at trial are unlikely to be harmed, for it will have completed its preparations by the previously scheduled date.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 965.) Of course, that is again true whenever the original trial date has passed. As noted, both parties were ready to proceed with this case in August 1993.
More importantly, section 594—which has been on the books for more than 100 years—is not concerned with preparation, but with sufficient notice to appear. (Sheldon v. Landwehr (1911) 159 Cal. 778, 782 [116 P. 44].) For this reason, if a party has notice by other means, or actually appears at trial, section 594 does not apply. (159 Cal. at p. 782 [section 594 has no application when “both parties are represented when the case is called for trial”]; Elliano v. Assurance Co. of America (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 170, 175 [119 Cal.Rptr. 653] [section 594 simply inapplicable when party appears for trial even if party states it does not intend to waive notice by appearing]; 7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Trial, § 87, pp. 106-107; see Parker v. Dingman (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1016 [122 Cal.Rptr. 309] [“Actual *969notice, however acquired, is sufficient.”].) If a party needs greater time for preparation, the proper procedure is to move for a continuance, not object under section 594. (Sheldon v. Landwehr, supra, 159 Cal. at p. 782.) The case the majority relies on for the proposition that section 594 concerns preparation does not even cite section 594 and involves not a superior court civil trial but the Sacramento City Council acting as a trial board to adjudicate a police officer’s alleged misconduct; indeed, the officer appeared at and participated in the “trial.” (Horstmyer v. Trial Bd. of Sacramento (1937) 21 Cal.App.2d 533, 536-538 [69 P.2d 1021]; maj. opn., ante, at p. 962.) Its relevance is questionable.2
The majority further supports its distinction by stating that if a trial is continued, “simply by appearing” at the time previously scheduled for trial a party “will learn of the new time for trial.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 965.) Of course, here, if defendant had attended the scheduled motion hearing and status conferences, he would have likewise learned of the August 10 trial date. Moreover, under the majority’s logic, if a party fails to appear at a trial date that has since been continued, and hence does not learn the trial has been continued, an adverse party is then obligated to give that party 15 days’ notice of the new date. Such an arbitrary notice requirement cannot comport with the Legislature’s intent.
The majority asserts that a party who does not receive statutory notice but somehow learns of an improperly set trial date will not have “any incentive not to call the matter to the attention of the trial court and instead raise it on appeal” because at most the party will simply receive a trial with 15 days’ notice. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 966.) Of course, as already demonstrated, if the party appears at trial to make such an objection, or otherwise learns of the trial date, any section 594 notice required is waived. Moreover, as a result of the majority’s conclusion, a party with greater financial resources than its opponent might well fail to raise the issue of defective notice in the trial court. If the party fails to appear at trial, the opponent must prove its case at the uncontested trial, go through an appeal, and then bear the cost of a second trial.
The majority asserts that “the rule advocated by the dissent would encourage gamesmanship: a party who successfully moves for an advancement of *970the trial date would have every incentive to keep its opponent ignorant of the new trial date and thereby obtain an uncontested judgment when the opponent fails to appear.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 966.) Generally, however, a party must tell the opposing party when a motion will be argued, including a motion to advance the trial date. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1005, 1010; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 375(b) [motion to advance trial date shall not be granted unless notice given].) Thus, a party cannot move to advance the trial date ex parte and not tell anyone. The majority’s assertion is even more astonishing in this case where defendant does not dispute he received notice of the motion to advance, and failed to appear at the hearing on the motion, or ascertain what order was entered.
Indeed, were a party to somehow obtain an ex parte order advancing trial despite California Rules of Court, rule 375(b), and then proceed with that trial in its opponent’s understandable absence, no appellate court could reasonably conclude the opponent had failed to exercise due diligence. Simple due process requires the trial date be ascertainable. Thus, in Parker v. Dingman, supra, 48 Cal.App.3d 1011, the trial had started, but was then continued for approximately 11 days. (Id. at pp. 1016-1018.) The trial in fact resumed 48 hours later in Parker’s absence. While the clerk stated prior to resumption of trial that Parker had notice, “the record [did] not indicate when, how, in what form or to whom the alleged information was given,” and Parker’s attorney denied receiving any such notice. (Id. at p. 1017.) The Court of Appeal noted Parker’s attorney had acted “diligently in an effort to ascertain the date to which the case had been continued to no avail.” (Ibid.) It held that while section 594 was not applicable at this procedural point, Parker had a due process right to sufficient information “within a reasonable period prior to resumption of trial.” (48 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1016, 1018.)
Section 594 can only be interpreted in two ways. Either it requires 15 days’ notice for only the original trial date, or it requires such notice for every trial date, whether that trial is continued or advanced. I believe the former interpretation is the only reasonable and practical one. Indeed, the statute has been so construed, not only in the case law (People ex rel. San Francisco Bay Conservation etc. Com. v. Smith, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 126; City etc. of San Francisco v. Carraro, supra, 220 Cal.App.2d at p. 518; Capital National Bank v. Smith, supra, 62 Cal.App.2d at p. 338), but in the day-to-day workings of the state trial courts, which could not efficiently operate without the flexibility of trailing and advancing matters with far less than 15 days’ notice. (People ex rel. San Francisco Bay Conservation etc. Com. v. Smith, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 129 [15 days’ notice for every continuance would “cripple court efficiency”].)
This interpretation is further supported by the fact that section 594 requires the clerk of the court to give 20 days’ notice of the trial date. (§ 594, *971subd. (b).) It cannot be the case that the clerk is required to send such notice every time a trial is continued or advanced. Indeed, the legislative history of Senate Bill No. 847 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.), which in 1975 added the clerk’s notice obligation to section 594, reveals that the bill’s opponent was concerned about the fiscal constraints such a mailing obligation would impose on the counties. (Letter from Sen. Holmdahl to Governor Jerry Brown (Sept. 10, 1975) p. 2.) The bill’s sponsor was of the view that “enactment of this bill would not unduly [burden] any public agency.” (Ibid.) It seems unlikely such a concern will now be so easily dismissed.
Such an interpretation is also supported by the statutory framework. Section 594 is immediately followed by six sections addressing trial date postponement. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 594a, 595, 595.2, 595.3, 595.4, 596.) Not one of these sections states that when the trial is postponed, 15 days’ notice is again required under section 594. Indeed, section 594 is not even referenced.
Finally, even if section 594 applied to the trial date at issue here, the record in this case makes it an inappropriate vehicle for reaching the issue. The judgment below states, “Proof having first been made to the satisfaction of the court that defendant has had notice of the time and place fixed for trial of this action, evidence, both oral and documentary, then having been presented . . . .” (See Johnston v. Callahan (1905) 146 Cal. 212, 214 [79 P. 870] [“judgment recites that satisfactory evidence was before the court that defendant was notified more than five days prior to the trial of the cause that the same was set for trial on the day mentioned”]; Capital National Bank v. Smith, supra, 62 Cal.App.2d at pp. 338-339 [“Where the judgment recites that due notice of the time and place of trial was given to all parties ... we must assume that the provisions of the rule of court with respect to setting cases for trial was fully complied with.”].) Nor did defendant argue when he moved to set aside the judgment in the trial court that he was entitled to 15 days’ notice of trial, as opposed to any notice, or that plaintiff failed to adduce sufficient evidence of notice to satisfy section 594 before the August 10 trial began.
I appreciate the majority’s obvious concern that the defendant in this case was not represented by counsel. However, we cannot have a different rule for in propria persona defendants than for those represented by counsel. (Indeed, defendant is on appeal once again represented by counsel.) Nor can we fashion a rule that will dramatically alter the meaning of a statute and change the trial setting practices in this state merely to assist one person. Defendant’s burden here was infinitesimal. He only needed to make three telephone calls: one to learn what happened at the hearing on the motion to *972advance the trial date; one to learn what happened at the first status conference; and one to learn what happened at the second status conference, which of course is when the August 10 trial date was set. Solely to avoid the consequences of this defendant’s lack of diligence, the majority will require all future litigants, the courts, and the taxpayers to pay the price of inflexible trial scheduling and increased gamesmanship.
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Baxter, J., concurred.
Section 594 provides: “(a) In superior and municipal courts either party may bring an issue to trial or to a hearing, and, in the absence of the adverse party, unless the court, for good cause, otherwise directs, may proceed with the case and take a dismissal of the action, or a verdict, or judgment, as the case may require; provided, however, if the issue to be tried is an issue of fact, proof shall first be made to the satisfaction of the court that the adverse party has had 15 days’ notice of such trial... as specified in subdivision (b). If the adverse party has served notice of trial upon the party seeking the dismissal, verdict, or judgment at least five days prior to the trial, the adverse party shall be deemed to have had notice.
“(b) The notice to the adverse party required by subdivision (a) shall be served by mail on all the parties by the clerk of the court not less than 20 days prior to the date set for trial. . . . If notice is not served by the clerk as required by this subdivision, it may be served by mail by any party on the adverse party not less than 15 days prior to the date set for trial. . . . The time provisions of Section 1013 shall not serve to extend the notice of trial requirements under this subdivision for unlawful detainer actions. If notice is served by the clerk, proof thereof may be made by introduction into evidence of the clerk’s certificate pursuant to subdivision (3) of Section 1013a or other competent evidence. If notice is served by a party, proof may be made by introduction into evidence of an affidavit or certificate pursuant to subdivision (1) or (2) of Section 1013a or other competent evidence. The provisions of this subdivision are exclusive.”
Ironically, the majority questions the relevance of Capital National Bank v. Smith, supra, 62 Cal.App.2d 328, and In re Estate of Bell, supra, 58 Cal.App.2d 333 (see ante, at p. 967) because they do not cite section 594. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 965-966.) In Capital National Bank, supra, the defendant apparently contended she lacked adequate notice of trial and “the court erred in setting the case for trial” and “in continuing it to [a] later date.” (62 Cal.App.2d at pp. 338-339.) In re Estate of Bell, supra, which is cited as indirect authority, concerns a similar claim of lack of notice in probate court. (58 Cal.App.2d at pp. 336-337.) These cases seem far more relevant on the issue here than Horstmyer, which involved a city council proceeding.