dissenting.
*616I agree with the majority that Defendant’s trial was free of prejudicial error, based on the evidence there presented. Insofar as the majority implicitly recognizes that Defendant was entitled to an instruction on common law robbery, based on evidence existing at the time of his trial, I agree also with that conclusion. See State v. Joyner, 312 N.C. 779, 784, 324 S.E.2d 841, 845 (1985) (common law robbery instruction required when there was evidence rifle used during robbery was unloaded and missing firing pin). I disagree, however, that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s Motion for Appropriate Relief (“MAR”). I disagree also that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1420 does not require the trial court to enter a written order ruling upon Defendant’s MAR.
Defendant was tried and convicted for armed robbery based on his admitted involvement in the 13 June 2009 robbery of T&B Amusements in Winston Salem. Defendant’s accomplice in the robbery, Dorsey Lemon, carried the gun that elevated this crime from common law robbery to robbery with a dangerous weapon. The gun used was never recovered. The day before Defendant’s trial, prosecutors interviewed Lemon and learned that the gun he carried during the robbery was unloaded and inoperable.
The prosecutor created a report detailing Lemon’s statement and left it in Defense counsel’s mailbox at the courthouse the afternoon before Defendant’s trial. Defense counsel interviewed Lemon during a recess after the first day of trial, but Lemon did not tell Defense counsel what he had told the prosecutor regarding the gun. Based on the information he.leamed from Lemon, the prosecutor chose not to call him at trial. Instead he stated to the trial court:
I think there is absolutely no evidence of anything other than robbery with a dangerous weapon in this case. There’s no evidence that it was inoperable, no evidence that it was unloaded. The only evidence we have is that there was a gun displayed and they felt threatened and scared by that. I think there’s no grounds for a common law instruction.
Defense counsel did not discover the report until after Defendant had been convicted. Défendant filed an MAR alleging that he was entitled to a new trial on the basis of new evidence. The trial court denied the motion.
On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by (I) denying his motion to dismiss the charges; (II) denying his request for an *617instruction on common law robbeiy; (III) denying his MAR; and (TV) failing to file a written order with findings of fact and conclusions of law.
I & II
As the majority recognizes, Defendant’s arguments regarding errors at his trial rest on evidence which Defendant did not obtain until after his trial.
“Common law robbery is a lesser included offense of armed robbery[.]” State v. Tarrant, 70 N.C. App. 449, 451, 320 S.E.2d 291, 293 (1984).
The critical difference between armed robbery and common law robbery is that the former is accomplished by the use or threatened use of a dangerous weapon whereby the life of a person is endangered or threatened. The use or threatened use of a dangerous weapon is not an essential element of common law robbery.
State v. Peacock, 313 N.C. 554, 562-63, 330 S.E.2d 190, 195 (1985) (citations omitted).
When a person commits a robbery with what appears to be an operable firearm, and there is no evidence presented to the contrary, the law presumes that the firearm is a dangerous weapon. Joyner, 312 N.C. at 782, 324 S.E.2d at 844; State v. Thompson, 297 N.C. 285, 288-89, 254 S.E.2d 526, 528 (1979) (basing the presumption on the Court’s reluctance to intimate “that a robbery victim should force the issue merely to determine the true character of the weapon.”). When there is no evidence the gun is not dangerous, a defendant is not entitled to an instruction on common law robbery. Joyner, 312 N.C. at 783, 324 S.E.2d at 844. But,
[i]f there is some evidence that the implement used was not a firearm or other dangerous weapon which could have threatened or endangered the life of the victim, the mandatory presumption disappears leaving only a permissive inference, which permits but does not require the jury to infer that the instrument used was in fact a firearm or other dangerous weapon whereby the victim’s life was endangered or threatened.
State v. Allen, 317 N.C. 119, 124, 343 S.E.2d 893, 897 (1986).
Thus, North Carolina law states that when there is evidence that the implement used during a robbery was not in fact a dangerous weapon, the trial court is required to instruct the jury on common law *618robbery. Joyner, 312 N.C. at 784, 324 S.E.2d at 845-46 (instruction on common law robbery must be given when there was some evidence that the rifle used during a robbery was unloaded and the firing pin was missing); State v. Alston, 305 N.C. 647, 651, 290 S.E.2d 614, 616 (1982) (instruction required when witness identified the gun used during a robbery as a BB gun); State v. Frazier, 150 N.C. App. 416, 419-20, 562 S.E.2d 910, 913-14 (2002) (instruction required when evidence was presented that gun used' during robbery was unloaded). Without such an instruction, there is a possibility that a defendant could be convicted of a crime he did not commit. See State v. Joyner, 67 N.C. App. 134, 136, 312 S.E.2d 681, 682 (1984) (stating evidence gun was unloaded and inoperable “tended to prove the absence of an element of the offense charged”), aff’d, 312 N.C. 779, 324 S.E.2d 841 (1985). It is axiomatic that the State must satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the offense charged. State v. McArthur, 186 N.C. App. 373, 380, 651 S.E.2d 256, 260 (2007).
In the present case, the prosecutor at the time of Defendant’s trial possessed evidence that the gun used during the robbery was unloaded and inoperable, evidence which tended to prove the absence of an element of the offense charged. Notwithstanding, the prosecutor told the trial court “there is absolutely no evidence of anything other than robbery with a dangerous weapon in this case.” Based on the precedent discussed above, I must agree with the majority that there was no evidence introduced at Defendant’s trial to support an instruction on the lesser-included offense of common law robbery. Likewise, there was no evidence at trial to indicate that Defendant was entitled to a dismissal of the charge of armed robbery.
Ill
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in denying his MAR on the basis of newly discovered evidence.
To determine whether a defendant should prevail on an MAR on the basis of newly discovered evidence, the trial court must consider the following factors:
(1) that the witness or witnesses will give newly discovered evidence, (2) that such newly discovered evidence is probably true, (3) that it is competent, material and relevant, (4) that due diligence was used and proper means were employed to procure the testimony at the trial, (5) that the newly discovered evidence is not merely cumulative, (6) that it does not tend only to contradict *619a former witness or to impeach or discredit him, (7) that it is of such a nature as to show that on another trial a different result will probably be reached and that the right will prevail.
State v. Stukes, 153 N.C. App. 770, 773, 571 S.E.2d 241, 244 (2002). Defendant has the burden at an MAR hearing of establishing the facts essential to his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1420(c)(5) (2009).
In the present case, the trial court ruled that Defendant did not satisfy (1) the second factor: that the evidence is probably true; (2) the fourth factor: that due diligence was used to procure the testimony at trial; or (3) the seventh factor: that the evidence was of such a nature that a different result would probably have been reached on another trial. The majority discusses only the second and the fourth factor, upholding the trial court’s order on the basis of the trial court’s determination of probable truth and due diligence. Because I would reverse the trial court, my review is perforce more expansive.
1
Regarding the second factor: that the evidence is probably true, we have recognized that “[t]he trial court is in the best position to judge the credibility of a witness.” State v. Garner, 136 N.C. App. 1, 14, 523 S.E.2d 689, 698 (1999), appeal dismissed, disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 477, 543 S.E.2d 500 (2000). Our Courts have accordingly upheld the trial court’s ruling on whether the probably true factor is met when there is conflicting evidence upon which to make such a determination.3 See, e.g., State v. Eason, 328 N.C. 409, 435, 402 S.E.2d 809, 823 (1991) (recanted confession); Britt, 320 N.C. at 717, 360 S.E.2d at 666 (recanted testimony); Garner, 136 N.C. App. at 13, 523 S.E.2d at 698 (recanted confession); State v. Riggs, 100 N.C. App. 149, 156, 394 S.E.2d 670, 674 (1990) (conflicting testimony), disc. review denied, 328 N.C. 96, 402 S.E.2d 425 (1991); State v. Hoots, 76 N.C. App. 616, 618-19, 334 S.E.2d 74, 76 (1985) (recanted statements); State v. Carter, 66 N.C. App. 21, 31, 311 S.E.2d 5, 11 *620(recanted testimony), disc. review denied, 310 N.C. 745, 315 S.E.2d 705 (1984); State v. Thompson, 64 N.C. App. 485, 492, 307 S.E.2d 838, 843 (1983) (conflicting testimony), cert. denied, 313 N.C. 513, 329 S.E.2d 399 (1985).
While the credibility of witnesses remains the exclusive province of the trier of fact, I can discern no valid basis upon which a witnesses’ uncontradicted testimony might be dismissed by the trial court as incredible as a matter of law at an MAR proceeding. Recognizing the potential impact of cross-examination, I recognize also that a defendant’s right to exculpatory evidence does not turn on any judicial determination that it is more likely true than not. See State v. Elliott, 360 N.C. 400, 415, 628 S.E.2d 735, 745-46 (recognizing prosecutor’s duty to turn over favorable and material evidence), cert. denied, Elliott v. North Carolina, 549 U.S. 1000, 166 L. Ed. 2d 378 (2006).
In the present case, the trial court was confronted with no conflicting evidence regarding the condition of the gun.4 There was therefore no valid basis under the precedents examined above for the trial court to conclude that Lemon’s testimony was not probably true. The majority agrees that the trial court’s determination of probable truth must be predicated on some conflicting evidence. The majority insists, however, that Lemon’s “evidence at the MAR hearing was not uncontradicted.” It is significant to point out that despite reciting two pages of testimony, the majority does not locate any evidence that contradicted Lemon’s statement that the gun was not loaded or operational.
In sum, the determination of whether Lemon was telling the truth — i.e. whether the gun was in fact unloaded and inoperable— should be determined by a jury in a criminal proceeding, not by a trial judge using a preponderance of the evidence standard. See Allen, 317 N.C. at 125, 343 S.E.2d at 897 (“If . . . there is any evidence that the weapon was, in fact, not what it appeared to the victim to be, the jury must determine what, in fact, the instrument was.”). Accordingly, I would hold, that the trial court erred in ruling that the new evidence was not probably true.
*6212
Regarding the fourth factor: that due diligence was used and proper means were employed to procure the testimony at the trial, the trial court noted that Lemon did not mention in his 5 May interview with Defendant’s counsel that the gun was inoperable and unloaded. The trial court noted also that Defendant’s counsel did not see the notice that was put in his mailbox on 4 May until after Defendant was convicted. The trial court concluded that it could not find that due diligence was employed.
Our Supreme Court has indicated that in requesting a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence, “both counsel and litigants are presumed to have been properly advised in preparing for trial, and this presumption is not to be lightly overthrown or rebutted.” State v. Lea, 203 N.C. 316, 322, 166 S.E. 292, 295, cert. denied, Lea v. North Carolina, 287 U.S. 668, 77 L. Ed. 576 (1932). In defining the proper standard by which to test this presumption of diligence, the Court stated, “[i]f it should appear that the newly discovered evidence, ‘by ordinary diligence, could have been discovered and used at the hearing, or was in possession of the counsel or agent of the party,’ the application will be denied.” Id. at 322, 166 S.E. at 295-96 (quoting Matthews v. Joyce, 85 N.C. 258, 267 (1881)).
In State v. Stanley, 74 N.C. App. 178, 327 S.E.2d 902, disc. review denied, 314 N.C. 546, 335 S.E.2d 318 (1985), this Court considered a challenge to the trial court’s denial of a defendant’s MAR. Id. at 184, 327 S.E.2d at 906. The defendant presented new testimony at the MAR hearing of a witness who had testified at trial. Id. This Court affirmed the denial of the defendant’s MAR in part because the defendant had already had an opportunity to question the witness during the trial about the issue, and failed to do so. Id. at 185, 327 S.E.2d at 907. We concluded that this represented a lack of due diligence. Id.; see also State v. Dixon, 259 N.C. 249, 251, 130 S.E.2d 333, 334 (1963) (no error in denying MAR when defendant failed to question a testifying witness regarding the evidence).
Neither of these cases involved evidence that would have entitled the defendant to a different instruction at trial. In Stanley, the defendant sought to introduce evidence of a similar sexual encounter by another male with the female he was accused of raping. Stanley, 74 N.C. App. at 184, 327 S.E.2d at 906. This Court held that the new evidence was not relevant. Id. at 185, 327 S.E.2d at 907. The defendant in Dixon was convicted of driving while under the influence, and *622sought a new trial after learning that his blood sample had been destroyed prior to trial. Dixon, 259 N.C. at 250, 130 S.E.2d at 334. Our Supreme Court held that the defendant did not establish a single one of the seven factors. Id. at 251, 130 S.E.2d at 334.
In State v. Saults, 299 N.C. 319, 261 S.E.2d 839 (1980), our Supreme Court considered a challenge to the trial court’s denial of a defendant’s MAR. In that case, the defendant was convicted as an accessory to arson. Id. at 320, 261 S.E.2d at 840. He later filed an MAR, presenting affidavits of witnesses which tended to contradict the evidence against him. Id. at 321, 261 S.E.2d at 840. The trial court denied the defendant a new trial on the basis of his lack of due diligence in discovering or utilizing the evidence. Id. at 322, 261 S.E.2d at 841.
On appeal, our Supreme Court recognized the new evidence as relevant to the defendant’s guilt. Id. at 322-23, 261 S.E.2d at 841. The Court then framed the issue in terms of “whether [defendant] had sufficient information so that he should have talked to [the newly offered witnesses] some time before” his conviction. Id. at 323, 261 S.E.2d at 841. Considering the evidence in terms of when it became known to the defendant, the Court concluded that the defendant had no additional “reason to believe that [the new witnesses] had relevant information that could aid him in his defense.” Id. at 323, 261 S.E.2d at 842. The Court therefore held that the defendant was entitled to a new hearing. Id. at 325, 261 S.E.2d at 843.
Our Supreme Court considered another MAR in State v. Jones, 296 N.C. 75, 248 S.E.2d 858 (1978). The Jones defendant was tried for arson based on the testimony of a witness who claimed that defendant threw kerosene on the floor of their shared apartment and started a fire. Id. at 76, 248 S.E.2d at 859. The defendant maintained that he returned home to find the apartment in flames. Id. at 77, 248 S.E.2d at 859. After his conviction, the defendant learned of a police report that indicated his clothing (which had been seized) showed no evidence of the presence of kerosene or other flammable accelerants. Id. at 78-79, 248 S.E.2d at 860.
The State argued on appeal that the defendant failed to show due diligence because he did not make a motion to compel discovery. Id. at 79, 248 S.E.2d at 861. Our Supreme Court disagreed, stating that there was nothing to put the defendant on notice of the report, and that the prosecutor “was under a continuing duty to disclose relevant, discoverable information as he received it.” Id. at 79-80, 248 S.E.2d at *623861. The Court concluded that “[t]he report was clearly, on these facts, a factor which defendant was entitled to have the jury consider.” Id. at 80, 248 S.E.2d at 861. The Court therefore granted the defendant a new trial. Id.
In the present case, the State did not obtain Lemon’s statement until the day before Defendant was tried. At so late an hour, Defendant had no reason to believe that the State had obtained any other relevant information that could aid him in his defense. Furthermore, the report was clearly a factor which Defendant was entitled to have the jury consider. Unlike Stanley and Dixon where the defendant had an opportunity at trial to question the witness, once the prosecutor here learned of Lemon’s statement regarding the gun, he chose not to call Lemon to testify in Defendant’s trial. Also unlike Stanley and Dixon, the evidence in this case would have required a different instruction at trial. Allen, 317 N.C. at 124, 343 S.E.2d at 897; Joyner, 312 N.C. at 784, 324 S.E.2d at 845. On the basis of Saults and Jones, I would hold that the trial court erred in concluding that Defendant failed to show due diligence in discovering the evidence.
Moreover, cases in which a defendant’s failure to establish due diligence alone justified denying him a new trial consistently involve a defendant who knew of the evidence when he was tried. See State v. Powell, 321 N.C. 364, 371, 364 S.E.2d 332, 336, cert. denied, Powell v. North Carolina, 488 U.S. 830, 102 L. Ed. 2d 60 (1988); State v. Cronin, 299 N.C. 229, 244, 262 S.E.2d 277, 287 (1980). Generally, we have denied other defendants new trials only when additional factors were also lacking. See State v. Person, 298 N.C. 765, 771, 259 S.E.2d 867, 870 (1979) (defendant failed to establish new evidence was material, competent, or relevant, that it was not merely corroborative, a different result would be reached, and. due diligence); State v. Beaver, 291 N.C. 137, 144, 229 S.E.2d 179, 183 (1976) (defendant failed to prove new evidence would not be merely cumulative, and due diligence); Dixon, 259 N.C. at 251, 130 S.E.2d at 334 (defendant established not one of seven factors); Riggs, 100 N.C. App. at 156-57, 394 S.E.2d at 674 (defendant failed to prove evidence was probably true, not merely cumulative, a different result would be reached, and due diligence); Stanley, 74 N.C. App. at 185, 327 S.E.2d at 906-07 (defendant failed to establish new evidence was relevant, and due diligence); State v. Baker, 65 N.C. App. 430, 447, 310 S.E.2d 101, 113 (1983) (defendant failed to show a different result would be reached, new evidence tended only to contradict a former witness, and due diligence), cert. *624denied, 312 N.C. 85, 321 S.E.2d 900 (1984); State v. Clark, 65 N.C. App. 286, 293, 308 S.E.2d 913, 917 (1983) (defendant failed to show new evidence was not merely cumulative, different result would be reached, and due diligence), disc. review denied, 310 N.C. 627, 315 S.E.2d 693 (1984); Thompson, 64 N.C. App. at 492, 307 S.E.2d at 843 (defendant failed to show evidence was newly discovered, that it was not merely cumulative, that it was probably true, that a different result would be reached, and due diligence).
In the present case, there is no evidence that Defendant actually knew about Lemon’s statement when he was tried. Under the precedents examined above, I would hold that Defendant is entitled to a new trial.
3
Regarding element No. 7: that the evidence was of such a nature that a different result would probably have been reached on another trial, the State argues that the jury had ample evidence with which to ■ convict Defendant. At the end of the MAR proceeding, the trial court stated. “I think when you look at the balance, those two statements [i.e. Defendant’s confession] were so overwhelming that any mistake in not putting this evidence in was probably harmless.”
Harmless error analysis is not appropriate in evaluating a trial court’s failure, in an armed robbery prosecution, to provide an instruction on the lesser included offense of common law robbery. A defendant tried for armed robbery is entitled to an instruction on the lesser included offense of common law robbery when some evidence is presented that the apparent gun was not in fact a dangerous weapon. See Joyner, 312 N.C. at 784, 324 S.E.2d at 845. Granting that a trial court errs when it fails to provide such an instruction, an analysis that asks only whether the verdict was affected would render our review of such errors meaningless.
Our Supreme Court recognized this principle in State v. Alston. Defendants in Alston were tried for armed robbery. 305 N.C. at 648, 290 S.E.2d at 614. The Court held that when evidence was presented that the gun wielded was not in fact a dangerous weapon (but a BB rifle), the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of common law robbery. Id. at 651, 290 S.E.2d at 616. Defendants were granted a new trial on the basis of that error without any inquiry into whether the requested instruction would have affected the verdict. Id.) see also Frazier, 150 N.C. App. at 419-20, 562 S.E.2d at 913-14 (no harmless error analysis).
*625In the present case, the inquiry of how the requested instruction would affect whether Defendant is convicted of armed robbery or common law robbery is for a jury to decide. See Allen, 317 N.C. at 124, 343 S.E.2d at 897. Because Defendant’s request for an instruction on common law robbery would have been granted had the new evidence been considered, I would hold that the trial court erred in ruling that the evidence was not of such a nature that a different result would probably have been reached on another trial. The majority does not disagree that the trial court erred in applying a harmless error standard in considering this factor.
In light of the foregoing, I would hold that the trial court erred in ruling that Defendant failed to establish all seven factors of the relevant test. I would therefore reverse the trial court’s order denying Defendant’s MAR. Beyond the technical considerations of precedent addressed thus far, there is a more fundamental reason to grant Defendant a new trial in this case: to prevent manifest injustice.
The record demonstrates that the prosecutor obtained a statement from Dorsey Lemon that the gun he carried in the robbery was not operational. The prosecutor created a report detailing Lemon’s statement, and left it in defense counsel’s mailbox at the courthouse the afternoon before Defendant’s trial. Aware of what Lemon would say at Defendant’s trial, the prosecutor chose not to call him as a witness, and never mentioned his statement to defense counsel during Defendant’s trial. This sequence of events leads to an obvious conclusion: at the time the prosecutor told the court that there was “absolutely no evidence” that the gun was unloaded and inoperable, he was aware that defense counsel did not know of the existing evidence to the contrary.
That the prosecutor could rely on the defense attorney’s ignorance of exculpating evidence strongly suggests a patent unfairness in Defendant’s trial. See State v. Payne, 327 N.C. 194, 202, 394 S.E.2d 158, 162 (1990) (“[T]he purpose of discovery under our statutes is to protect the defendant from unfair surprise[.]”), cert. denied, Payne v. North Carolina, 498 U.S. 1092, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1062 (1991). I recognize that Defendant does not here allege any violation of his right to discovery under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963). I cannot ignore the fact, however, that of the available methods of delivery, the one chosen by the prosecutor here was the one calculated least likely to ensure Defendant’s actual notice. Though this practice may represent adherence to the strict letter of the law, it *626also comes very near to violating the spirit of fair dealing articulated in Brady: “Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.” Id. at 87, 10 L. Ed. 2d at 218. Indeed, the record in this case “casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a proceeding that does not comport with standards of justice.” Id. at 88, 10 L. Ed. 2d at 219.
The majority holds that defense counsel failed to establish that he exercised due diligence in discovering Lemon’s statement. This conclusion penalizes Defendant for the conduct of his own attorney with no consideration given to the conduct of opposing counsel. I have found no case defining due diligence where a prosecutor engages in a subtle but deliberate attempt to forestall a defendant’s discovery of existing exculpatory evidence. I believe that such a scenario demands a different calculus of due diligence than is here employed. The alternative is the perpetuation of such prosecutorial gamesmanship as appears in the facts of this case. If it is legal, that does not make it just.
IV
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in failing to file a written order with findings of fact and conclusions of law. I believe this error also militates against affirming the trial court’s disposition.
At the conclusion of the MAR hearing, the trial court instructed the prosecutor to draw up an order. Although the prosecutor indicated that such an order would be drafted, it does not appear that the order was ever filed.5 There is thus no order disposing of Defendant’s MAR in the record before us.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1420 deals with the procedure on motions for appropriate relief. That statute, in pertinent part, states:
(4) If the court cannot rule upon the motion without the hearing of evidence, it must conduct a hearing for the taking of evidence, and must make findings of fact. . . .
(7) The court must rule upon the motion and enter its order accordingly. When the motion is based upon an asserted violation *627of the rights of the defendant under the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States, the court must make and enter conclusions of law and a statement of the reasons for its determination to the extent required, when taken with other records and transcripts in the case, to indicate whether the defendant has had a full and fair hearing on the merits of the grounds so asserted.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1420(c) (2009). The State contends that the trial court is not required to make written findings of fact or conclusions of law when, as here, the motion is not based upon an asserted violation of the rights of the defendant under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.
“When post-conviction relief is sought by way of a motion for appropriate relief in the Superior Court, that court ordinarily must make findings of fact and conclusions of law in its order granting or denying relief.” State v. Bush, 307 N.C. 152, 168, 297 S.E.2d 563, 573 (1982). Our Supreme Court considered the relevant statute in State v. McHone, 348 N.C. 254, 499.S.E.2d 761 (1998). In the context of determining whether defendant was entitled to a hearing, the Court there stated:
Subsection (c)(7) of the statute . . . provides that if a defendant asserts with specificity in his motion for appropriate relief that his conviction was obtained in violation of the Constitution of the United States, the defendant is entitled to have the trial court make conclusions of law and state its reasons before denying the motion. . . . [T]his provision is merely a directive to the trial court to make written conclusions of law and to give its legal reasoning for entering its order, such that its ruling can be subjected to meaningful appellate review.
Id. at 257, 499 S.E.2d at 762 (emphasis added). The Court thus read subsection (c)(7) to require a written order, although the word “written” does not appear in that subsection.
McHone does not, however, stand for the principle that a written order is required only where a constitutional violation is alleged, as the State contends. Rather, subsection (c)(4) must be read in conjunction with subsection (c)(7). See id. at 257, 499 S.E.2d at 763 (“[S]ubsection [(c)(7)] of the statute must be read in pari materia with the other provisions of the same statute.”). Subsection (c)(4) specifies that when a trial court conducts an evidentiary hearing, it *628must make findings of fact. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1420(c)(4). The first sentence of subsection (c)(7) states, without reference to any alleged constitutional violation, “[t]he court must rule upon the motion and enter its order accordingly.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1420(c)(7).
Following the reasoning in McHone, I believe that when the trial court makes findings of fact pursuant to subsection (c)(4), it must also file a written order stating those findings. It is only thereby “that its ruling can be subjected to meaningful appellate review.” McHone, 348 N.C. at 257, 499 S.E.2d at 762. No such order appears in the record before us.
Moreover, I disagree with the State’s assertion that the trial court’s findings which appear in the transcript provide a sufficient basis to overlook this error. As the State acknowledges elsewhere, the correct standard of review for the trial court’s disposition of an MAR requires us to consider an order entered by the trial court. See State v. Stevens, 305 N.C. 712, 719-20, 291 S.E.2d 585, 591 (1982) (“In reviewing orders entered pursuant to that act, this court held that the findings of fact of the trial judge were binding upon the petitioner if they were supported by evidence.”); State v. Baker, 312 N.C. 34, 40, 320 S.E.2d 670, 675 (1984) (“Findings of fact made by a court in its order granting or denying a motion for appropriate relief are binding on appeal if supported by evidence in the record.”). We are unable to follow the prescribed standard of review in the absence of a proper order.
It follows that the trial court erred in not filing a written order as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1420(c)(4) & (7). In the present case, this procedural error compounds the substantive errors discussed above. I would hold that the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s MAR. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion to the contrary.
. In this regard the probably true factor resembles the sixth factor: that the new evidence does not tend only to contradict a former witness. The probably true factor may thus be extraneous. See State v. Britt, 320 N.C. 705, 713, 360 S.E.2d 660, 664 (1987) (recognizing the test as “a modification of the ‘Berry’ rule, initially set forth in Berry v. State, 10 Ga. 511 (1851) (setting forth essentially the same prerequisites but lacking the requirement that the newly discovered evidence be ‘probably true’).”), superceded by statute on other grounds, as stated in State v. Defoe, — N.C. —, — 691 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2010).
. The trial court observed at the MAR hearing that Defendant had identified the gun as a .38. Detective Poe testified at the MAR hearing that a .38 is a revolver, not an automatic as Lemon described. This inconsistency of type does not constitute a contradiction of Lemon’s evidence that the gun was not loaded.
. Defendant asserts in his brief “[t]he Court requested a written order, which was never filed.” The State does not dispute that no order was filed, and does not explain the omission.