I respectfully dissent.
*729There is nothing inherently wrong with legislation which immunizes purveyors of alcohol from the consequences of their acts. (Cory v. Shierloh (1981) 29 Cal.3d 430, 437-441 [174 Cal.Rptr. 500, 629 P.2d 8].) Defendants’ problem in this case is that there is no law on the books which condones their conduct under the circumstances alleged in the complaint. I find it puzzling that notwithstanding this void the court feels compelled to grant absolution by an unnecessarily generous interpretation of the Legislature’s effort to turn the clock back to a time when it was not running properly.
When we, in Vesely v. Sager (1971) 5 Cal.3d 153, 167 [95 Cal.Rptr. 623, 486 P.2d 151], overruled such cases as Cole v. Rush (1955) 45 Cal.2d 345 [289 P.2d 450] and Lammers v. Pacific Railway Company (1921) 186 Cal. 379 [199 P. 523], we simply brought this area of the law into conformity with modern notions of proximate cause. (Id., at pp. 163-164.) Of course it was only to be expected that those who were adversely affected by Vesely and its spawn would attempt to undo legislatively what we had done judicially. Nothing wrong with that. The issue is, however, just how far they succeeded.
The efforts to bury Vesely culminated in the 1978 legislation which was embodied in chapters 929 and 930 of that year’s statutes. The five relevant provisions of these two chapters fall into three groups: (1) Two create true immunities from liability: these are subdivision (c) of section 1714 of the Civil Code and subdivision (b) of section 25602 of the Business and Professions Code. The former immunizes social hosts who ply their guests with alcohol, the latter benefits those who furnish drink to habitual drunkards or obviously intoxicated persons. Neither applies to the facts of this case. (2) Closely linked to each of these immunities are the two provisions of the 1978 legislation which the majority interprets as reinstating pre-Vesely law across the board by declaring that it is not the furnishing but the consumption of alcohol which proximately causes accidents. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25602, subd. (c) and Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (b).) I shall call these the two “anti-Vesely” declarations. (3) Finally, there is the fifth relevant provision which—believe it or not—declares that when the furnishing of alcohol is the proximate cause of personal injuries or death, a licensee who has furnished alcohol to an obviously intoxicated minor may be liable after all. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25602.1.)
One obvious conclusion from this parsing of the 1978 legislation is that the two anti -Vesely declarations did not purport to state a new insight into the nature of proximate cause. Were that the case, section 25602.1 would make no sense—how can a rule, newly written in the stars, that it is the consumption and not the furnishing which proximately causes the harm, peacefully coexist with a concurrently enacted statute which is predicated *730on the furnishing being the proximate cause after all? I submit that the purpose of the two anti -Vesely declarations is more modest and, therefore, also more sensible: they merely explain the reason for the two specific immunities to which they are linked. This is particularly obvious in the case of subdivision (c) of section 25602 of the Business and Professions Code, which begins: “The Legislature hereby declares that this section shall be interpreted so that the holdings in such cases as Vesely v. Sager . . . .” (My italics.)
What all this means is simply this: the revival of the pre-Vesely rule concerning proximate cause was limited to the situations covered by the two specific immunities: the social host and the person who serves common drunkards and obviously intoxicated persons. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25602, subd. (a).) For all other situations the rule of Vesely—which, after all, only brought this area of negligence law into harmony with the rest—was left untouched by the 1978 legislation.1
Since it is not disputed that but for that legislation plaintiff has stated a cause of action, I would reverse.
Bird, C. J., and Reynoso, J., concurred.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing ws denied February 14, 1985. Bird, C. J., and Reynoso, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
The majority opinion properly does not suggest that Cory v. Shierloh, supra, 29 Cal.3d 430 should be read to resolve the question at issue here. Cory is, in large part, a defense of the constitutionality of the 1978 legislation and, to that extent, not relevant to the points raised in this case. It does, however, also discuss the applicability of the legislation to the pleaded facts and reaches the conclusion that defendant was immunized by subdivision (b), section 25602, Business and Professions Code. Unfortunately, in quoting from that subdivision, the court omitted language indicating that its immunity only applies to violations of subdivision (a)—the furnishing of alcohol to common drunkards or obviously intoxicated persons. In the context of the facts pleaded in Cory—that plaintiff was obviously intoxicated—that omission was immaterial. No such facts, however, are pleaded in this case and there can be no contention that subdivision (b) is applicable. As noted in the text, if defendants are to prevail, they cannot do so on the basis of either of the specific immunities, but only because of an expansive reading of the anti -Vesely declarations.