dissenting.
If this court had jurisdiction to hear the matter as it came to us, I could agree with the court that the respondent was guilty of unethical conduct in at least three instances. I dissent from the opinion of the court because I conclude that this court has no jurisdiction to hear the matter, and I believe that the restrictions announced by the majority limiting statements by lawyer candidates for judicial office are incompatible with the freedoms granted by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
JURISDICTION
The State Bar of Arizona assumed jurisdiction to conduct hearings on eight counts of unethical conduct charged against the respondent for his activities as a candidate for superior court judge. The proceedings were undertaken after the respondent became a judge of the superior court. It is my conclusion that the State Bar of Arizona has no jurisdiction to conduct hearings or make a recommendation for discipline of a superior court judge. The Bar’s action in this case results in an assumption of power by a lawyer group over the judiciary in a way that constitutes a threat to the independence of the judicial department.
Although the majority acknowledges that there is substantial authority which holds that an incumbent judge should not be subject to the jurisdiction of a lawyer discipline agency, ante, at 698; nevertheless, the majority concludes that the better and more workable practice is to allow the lawyer agency to proceed to hear the matter.
Over fifty years ago in the case of In re Spriggs, 36 Ariz. 262, 284 P. 521 (1930), the Arizona Supreme Court held that a judicial officer could be disbarred after leaving office for acts committed while a judicial officer if an ordinary attorney could be disbarred for the same acts. The court at that time left expressly undecided the question of the effect of disbarment if the respondent was still on the bench. At first blush this case would appear to be authority in support of the majority’s position except for one vital factor — the Constitution of Arizona was amended in 1970 to add Article 6.1. The provisions of Article 6.1 of the Arizona Constitution provide the exclusive remedy for any disciplinary action against justices of the peace, judges of the superior court, judges of the court of appeals, and justices of this court.
Whether the Judicial Qualifications Commission created by Article 6.1 would have jurisdiction over the acts of a judicial officer committed before the judge assumed the bench is a matter which is presently pending before us in another case. Irrespective of our answer to that question, it appears to me that there has been a gross violation of the Constitution in the method by which we have presumed to act in this case. The most that can be said for this court’s decision is that the conduct of the respondent may have compelled the majority to ignore the clear mandates of the Arizona Constitution.,
CRITICISM OF THE JUDICIARY
The respondent was found guilty of violating DR 1-102(A)(5), conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. The majority sustained the finding of the commit*618tee. The majority opinion, ante at 704, states that the comments of the respondent questioned the decisions of the court and the administration of justice. “This a lawyer cannot do, even in a campaign for judicial office.” Further, ante at 704, the court holds that lawyers who are candidates for judicial office may not impugn the integrity of the judicial system or question the decisions of the judge. The majority allows a lawyer to criticize a judge for unnecessary delay in reaching a decision, but the attorney may not question the decision itself except on appeal, ante at 704 and 705. The broad, sweeping generalities of these statements casts serious doubt on their constitutionality in view of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 6, Article II of the Arizona Constitution. If the court’s opinion had limited itself to statements by the lawyer candidate which were false, misleading, or concerning pending litigation, I could have joined in that portion of the opinion. The holding that a lawyer as a candidate for judge may not criticize the decisions of a sitting judge, however, is neither in harmony with the First Amendment nor with the necessities of a free society.
Judges are not unique in the realm of public officeholders. The record books regretfully show that some have been dishonest, incompetent, and prejudiced. A ruling that a lawyer as a candidate for the judiciary cannot bring such facts to the public notice, if such be the facts, is a threat to our constitutional system. Often the only way the deficiencies or prejudices of a judge can be shown is by referring to specific cases or categories of cases decided by that judge.
Although there are statements in some of the cases which seem to support the majority position, a closer analysis of the cases shows that the actual questioned conduct dealt with matters of misstatement and falsehood rather than general statements about the decisions of a judge. See 12 A.L.R.3d 1408, Attorney’s Criticism of Judicial Acts As Ground of Disciplinary Action.
Under the freedom guaranteed by the Constitution, we must begin with the proposition that “[l]ike other citizens, attorneys are entitled to the full protection of the First Amendment, even as participants in the administration of justice.” In re Hinds, 90 N.J. 604, 614, 449 A.2d 483, 489 (1982). A review of the cases in which attorneys were disciplined for campaign comments directed at an incumbent judge strongly suggests that, absent misrepresentation, courts should be most reluctant to impose discipline upon an attorney for comments during a judicial campaign except in egregious circumstances where a candidate seriously denigrates the judicial system, impugns the reputation of an incumbent judge, or in any way interferes with an ongoing proceeding. See In re Donohoe, 90 Wash.2d 173, 580 P.2d 1093 (1978); In re Baker, 218 Kan. 209, 542 P.2d 701 (1975); In re Gorsuch, 76 S.D. 191, 75 N.W.2d 644 (1956); State Board of Law Examiners v. Spriggs, 61 Wyo. 70, 155 P.2d 285 (1945); cf. In re Hinds, supra, State v. Russell, 227 Kan. 897, 610 P.2d 1122 (1980); cf. generally, Election Campaign Activities as Ground for Disciplining Attorney, 26 A.L.R. 4th 170. Campaign criticism of an incumbent judge’s decisions, voting record, courtroom demean- or, or work habits, however, should be considered fair comment.
Attorney discipline is clearly warranted where speech directed at an incumbent judge knowingly contains a false statement of fact. See In re Donohoe, supra, (censure for campaign advertisements misrepresenting opponent’s trial record); In re Baker, supra, (censure for advertisement misrepresenting incumbent judge’s eligibility for disability and retirement income), cf. State v. Russell, supra, (censure for advertisement misrepresenting opponent’s honesty in business transactions), Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Karst, 428 So.2d 406 (La.1983) (suspension for false accusation against judge). Thus, the public statements by the respondent that the incumbent judge would have been responsible for lowering indigent health care standards *619based upon his role in the McMullin v. Hargis case is an example of the type of misstatement for which sanctions may be imposed. The incumbent judge was following the mandates of the appellate court as he was required by law to do. The respondent’s statements about the incumbent judge’s responsibility were false and misleading.
While misstatement of fact by an attorney universally warrants sanction, the law is equally clear that an attorney may criticize the legal decisions of a judge without sanction, so long as these comments do not interfere with ongoing proceedings. See In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 79 S.Ct. 1376, 3 L.Ed.2d 1473 (1959). Accord In re Hinds, supra.
We are dealing with a delicate balancing of rights involving the public, the incumbent judge, and the lawyer candidate for judicial office. On the one hand the courts, as an institution, are entitled to the respect due to the office because the acceptance of judicial decisions ultimately depends upon the citizens’ belief in the integrity and impartiality of the courts. On the other hand, the members of the judiciary are subject to legitimate and accurate criticism and evaluation.
In re Donohoe, supra, 90 Wash.2d at 180, 580 P.2d at 1097. In a political system in which a premium is placed upon the free dissemination of information to allow the electorate to make an informed decision concerning choice of candidates, however, courts should be hesitant to impose rules restricting the flow of information.
The broad general statements in the majority opinion serve to stifle honest and truthful discussion about the decisions of a judge or court. As I read the majority opinion, a lawyer may appeal a case, but the lawyer may never comment after the case is finally resolved that the case made bad law, poor policy, or resulted in an injustice. Such a position is not only contrary to the Constitution, but it also deprives the public of necessary information to make an informed decision about the performance of their judges.