concurring and dissenting.
I concur in that portion of what is evidently a plurality opinion which affirms the *1082action of the trial court, giving plaintiff-appellant Sanchez the option of accepting a reduction in the jury verdict, or in the alternative granting a new trial.
As to that portion of the opinion which awards “post-judgment interest,” I dissent.
The genesis of this prolonged litigation was the accident suffered by plaintiff-appellant Sanchez in November 1982. Action was initiated by Sanchez, resulting in a jury verdict upon which judgment was entered in October 1984 in the amount of 1.35 million dollars. By order dated January 25, 1985, defendant’s motion for a new trial was granted “unless a remittitur was accepted,” reducing the verdict and the judgment entered thereon to the sum of $950,-000.00. -As is correctly set forth in the opinion of Bistline, J. quoting the trial court’s ruling, “[t]he order dated February 25, 1985 ... which granted a new trial unless a remittitur was accepted, effectively vacated the judgment and amended judgment previously entered on the jury’s verdict.”
Plaintiff-appellant Sanchez then initiated an interlocutory appeal, asserting error in the trial court’s action in vacating the jury verdict, and in the alternative ordering a reduction or the granting of a new trial. It has not been until today’s opinion that either the parties or the trial judge have known the outcome of that original interlocutory appeal. It should be noted, as correctly pointed out in the opinion of Bist-line, J., that at a later time the defendant Galey joined as a cross-appellant, asserting error at trial. However, in the opinion of this Court of October 1986, the actions of the trial court were affirmed as they related to the cross-appeal of Galey.
With all due respect, it is my view that from that point forward the cause entered a Lewis Carroll type of world. Nothing is as it appears to be, and sense becomes nonsense. The majority appears to uphold the order of the trial court reducing the jury verdict to $950,000.00, or the trial court will order a new trial. More than four years have passed since the entry of that trial court order. There is still no indication in the record before us whether or not plaintiff will accept that remittitur, or whether a new trial will be granted. While the record does not so indicate, the question raised is, of course, academic. As a result of what I perceive to be the intransigence of this Court, “post judgment” interest has now been decreed by this Court which will, within a few dollars, restore plaintiff Sanchez not only the original jury award of 1.35 million dollars, but add another $200,000.00.
Thus, as best I perceive the result mandated by the opinion of this Court, the non-existent “judgment” of the district court awarding $900,000.00 to the plaintiff is affirmed, together with interest in the amount of approximately $620,000.00. (See 1981 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 157; 1987 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 278.) Upon remand I will await the actions of the parties and the court with more than the usual curiosity.
Will plaintiff withdraw its motion for a new trial? Will defendant now move for a new trial? Will the trial court, on its own motion, grant a new trial? What are the time strictures on any such actions? I suggest that the opinion of this Court has placed itself, the trial court, and the parties in an imbroglio from which none can be extricated.