concurring in the judgment only.
I concur in the judgment only, because I cannot agree with the conclusion reached by the majority in Division 4. I realize the Georgia appellate courts have gone a long way with probation revocation decisions. See Johnson v. State, 142 Ga. App. 124 (235 SE2d 550) (1977) in which I dissented; affirmed Johnson v. State, 240 Ga. 526 (1978). But to hold that an individual violates that portion of his probation that prohibits him from associating with *883persons of known criminal repute and character when he lives in his mother’s home with his brother and cousin is unrealistic. As pointed out by the majority, to do so would require a husband and wife to separate if the husband should be on probation and his wife happened to be a convicted felon. Inasmuch as there is ample ground set out in Division 3 for revoking the probation, I concur in the judgment only.