This is an appeal from a circuit court order declaring that respondent’s operation of a gambling “day cruise to nowhere” (day cruise) is not in violation of any of nine existing state criminal statutes.1 We affirm.
Facts
Respondent brought this declaratory judgment action to determine whether any of its activities are unlawful, and to obtain a permanent injunction against appellants (the State).2 From a circuit court order declaring respondent’s actions not unlawful but denying the injunction, the State appeals.
Respondent’s day cruises begin and end at an Horry County port, and make no intervening stops. The United States flag vessel is equipped with gambling devices, including slot machines, blackjack tables, a roulette table, craps tables, and poker tables. Once the ship is beyond South Carolina’s three mile territorial waters, gambling is permitted. Before the vessel reenters the territorial waters, the equipment is secured and unavailable for use. The equipment remains on the vessel at all times.
At least one other cruise line operates “day cruises” out of Charleston County. No prosecution has been made or threatened against the cruise line(s) operating out of Charleston, *380while respondent has been threatened with criminal prosecution and seizure of its gambling devices.
The issue in this case is whether respondent’s operations violate any existing state criminal statute.
Federal Law
In order to explain our decision, we find it necessary to briefly review federal law in this area. Prior to 1992, federal law prohibited gambling on any United States flag ship. See 18 U.S.C § 1081 (2000)3; 15 U.S.C. § 1175(a).4 The effect of these federal statutes was to put U.S. flag vessels at a competitive disadvantage in the passenger cruise industry, since the statutes did not prevent foreign flag vessels from offering gambling once the ship was beyond state territorial waters. See Casino Ventures v. Stewart, 183 F.3d 307 (4th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1077, 120 S.Ct. 793, 145 L.Ed.2d 669 (2000); United States v. One Big Six Wheel, 987 F.Supp. 169 (E.D.N.Y.1997).
In 1992, Congress amended § 1175 of the Johnson Act and created several exceptions to its general prohibition on the use or possession of any gambling device on a U.S. flag vessel. 15 U.S.C. § 1175(b). Pursuant to the amendment, the possession or transport of a gambling device within state territorial waters is not a violation of § 1175(a) if the device remains on board the vessel and is used only outside those territorial waters. § 1175(b)(1). Although the effect of this subsection was to permit the operation of “day cruises,” another section provided states with a method for having “day cruises” remain a federal offense. § 1175(b)(2)(A). Thus, “day cruises” such as that operated by respondent may be subject to federal criminal prosecution under § 1175(a) if they begin and end in a state that “has enacted a statute the terms of which prohibit that use....” Id.
As noted above, the issue in this case is whether respondent’s operations violate any existing state criminal statute. The amendments to the Johnson Act do not preempt state laws prohibiting gambling and gambling devices, Casino *381Ventures, supra, and thus the Act has no direct bearing on the issues before the Court. However, while federal litigation pertaining to the meaning of the 1992 amendments was pending, the General Assembly amended several of the relevant state statutes. As explained below, the legislature’s expression of intent in amending these statutes is relevant to the issue we decide today.
State Statutes
This declaratory judgment action determined the applicability to respondent’s activities of nine criminal statutes. The circuit court held four of the statutes were inapplicable to respondent’s operations, and the State concedes that the three lottery statutes5 and the bookmaking statute6 are not implicated here. Two of the challenged statutes7 provide for the seizure and destruction of unlawful gambling and gaining devices. Since we agree with the circuit court that respondent’s possession and use of the devices on board its vessel are not unlawful under our substantive state statutes, we need not discuss these two seizure statutes.
We will explain below why respondent’s operations do not violate the remaining statutes, S.C.Code Ann. §§ 16-19-40; 16-19-50; and § 12-21-2710.
§ 16-19-40
Section 16-19-40 provides:
[From and after July 1, 2000,8 this section reads as follows:]
If any person shall play at any tavern, inn, store for the retailing of spirituous liquors or in any house used as a place of gaming, barn, kitchen, stable or other outhouse, street, highway, open wood, race field or open place at (a) any game with cards or dice, (b) any gaming table, commonly called A, B, C, or E, O, or any gaming table known or distinguished by any other letters or by any figures, (c) any roley-poley table, (d) rouge et noir, (e) any faro bank (f) any *382other table or bank of the same or the like kind under any denomination whatsoever or (g) any machine or device licensed pursuant to Section 12-21-2720 and used for gambling purposes, except the games of billiards, bowls, backgammon, chess, draughts, or whist when there is no betting on any such game of billiards, bowls, backgammon, chess, draughts, or whist or shall bet on the sides or hands of such as do game, upon being convicted thereof, before any magistrate, shall be imprisoned for a period of not over thirty days or fined not over one hundred dollars, and every person so keeping such tavern, inn, retail store, public place, or house used as a place for gaming or such other house shall, upon being convicted thereof, upon indictment, be imprisoned for a period not exceeding twelve months and forfeit a sum not exceeding two thousand dollars, for each and every offense, (emphasis added).
Section 16-19-40 has two clauses; the first prohibits the playing of games in certain locations and the second provides for punishment of the person “keeping” that location. Since it is a criminal statute, it must be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the defendant. State v. Blackmon, 304 S.C. 270, 403 S.E.2d 660 (1991) (strict construction of §§ 16-19-40 and 60). Ironically, the current statute does not cover respondent’s video poker machines. The 1999 amendment added clause (g), which prohibits gambling on a machine licensed pursuant to § 12-21-2720. Video poker machines can no longer be licensed, and consequently are not covered by this statute.9 State v. Blackmon, supra. At most, then, § 16-19-40 may apply to respondent’s gaming tables. For the reasons given below, however, we conclude that it does not.
We first consider the portion of the statute that criminalizes the playing of certain games. The statute lists numerous specific locations at which the playing of games are prohibited. Since the list of prohibited locations does not include any term such as Vessel,’ ‘ship,’ or ‘boat,’ we hold that *383the “playing” clause does not apply to respondent’s operations. See Brown v. State, 843 S.C. 342, 540 S.E.2d 846 (2001) (where criminal statute very specifically lists locations covered, those not mentioned are excluded, applying maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius).
Further, because a ‘vessel or float’ is not a prohibited location under the “playing” clause of § 16 — 19—40, but is a named location under the bookmaking statute, § 16-19-130, and because both statutes are part of the anti-gambling criminal statutes, we hold that the circuit court properly concluded this portion of the statute was inapplicable to respondent’s operations. See, e.g., Great Games, Inc. v. South Carolina Dep’t of Revenue, 339 S.C. 79, 529 S.E.2d 6 (2000) (statutes which are part of the same legislative scheme should be construed together).10
The portion of § 16-19-40 criminalizing the “keeping” of a gaming location uses slightly different language and arguably could be read to cover respondent’s gaming table activities. While the “playing clause” lists specific locations, the “keeping clause” punishes “every person so keeping such tavern, inn, retail store, public place, or house used as a place for gaming----” (emphasis added) Respondent’s vessel is a public place, and therefore seemingly covered under the literal language of this clause. Reading the statute as a whole, however, we conclude this ‘public place’ language is a refer*384ence back to the locations listed in the “playing” part of the statute. The “keeping” clause does not literally track the language of the “playing” clause, but does refer to “keeping such” a location. To read the “keeping” clause otherwise would result in “playing” being a criminal act in more and different locations than would “keeping.” This, in turn, would lead to the absurd result that the person running the game could not be prosecuted if, for example, he was operating in a private street, field, or open wood while a person playing there would be prosecuted. The absurdity of this result is heightened by the fact the General Assembly has chosen to punish a “keeper” more harshly than a “player.” See Broadhurst v. City of Myrtle Beach Elec. Comm’n, 342 S.C. 373, 537 S.E.2d 543 (2000) (no matter how plain statutory language is, it will be construed to avoid absurd result). Respondent’s vessel is not a “public place” within the meaning of § 16-19-40.
We affirm the circuit court’s conclusion that respondent’s operations do not violate § 16-19-40.
§ 16-19-50 and § 12-21-2710
These two code sections criminalize actions of a “person who shall set up, keep, or use [games used for gambling purposes]” (§ 16-19-50) and make it unlawful “to keep on your premises” any devices used for gambling (§ 12-21-2710). In determining the applicability of these two statutes, we look at the General Assembly’s expression of its legislative intent, as reflected in 1999 Act No. 125.
As noted above, in 1999 the Fourth Circuit held the Johnson Act did not preempt existing state gambling statutes. Casino Ventures, supra. This appellate decision reversed a district court opinion which had held that under the 1992 amendments to the Johnson Act, a state could ban “day cruises” only by enacting a statute which “opted out” of the Act by prohibiting the repair or use of gambling equipment on voyages. Casino Ventures v. Stewart, 23 F.Supp.2d 647 (D.S.C.1998).
While the appeal from that district court decision was pending before the Fourth Circuit, the General Assembly enacted comprehensive video poker legislation which, among other things, amended § 16-19-50 and § 12-21-2710.11 1999 *385Act No. 125. Act No. 125 contains an intent clause12 which states in part:
The General Assembly by enactment of this act has no intent to enact any provision allowed by 15 U.S.C. 1175, commonly referred to as the Johnson Act, or to create any state enactment authorized by the Johnson Act.
The intent of the legislature is determined in light of “the overall climate in which the legislation was amended.” State v. Thrift, 312 S.C. 282, 440 S.E.2d 341 (1994). At the time the legislature enacted Act No. 125, a federal district court had ruled “day cruises,” like those operated by respondent, were permissible unless and until the legislature “opted out” of the Johnson Act. While this ruling was later found to be erroneous by the Fourth Circuit, we agree with the circuit court that “in light of the overall climate” then existing, this intent clause in Act No. 125 must be read to evince a legislative intent not to make the cruises unlawful.
The State offers no alternative construction of this intent clause, but instead argues “[wjhatever may have prompted the insertion of [this intent language in Act No. 125], the Fourth Circuit’s subsequent decision made its purpose clear.” We do not agree that subsequent action by a separate entity can either alter or elucidate legislative intent.
In light of this language in the act amending §§ 12-21-2710 and 16-19-50, we conclude the legislature did not intend them to prohibit “day cruises.” Our conclusion that the General Assembly does not intend that any current statute be construed to ban “day cruises” is reinforced by its subsequent rejection of legislation which would have enacted new gaming statutes explicitly criminalizing them in 1999 and 2000. See House Bffl 3002 (1999); Senate Bill 0002 (2000).13
*386Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s conclusion that neither of these two “possession” statutes applies to respondent’s conduct.
Conclusion
We affirm the circuit court’s ruling that respondent is not in violation of any state criminal statute. As noted above, the applicability of the three lottery statutes (§§ 16-19-10; 20; 30) and the bookmaking statute (§ 16-19-130) is not at issue here. Further, § 16-19^40 is inapplicable because respondent’s vessel is not a prohibited location nor a public place as described therein. In light of the intent clause of 1999 Act No. 125, we agree with the circuit court that the legislature did not intend that either § 12-21-2710 or § 16-19-50 apply to “day cruise” operations. Further, we conclude that the General Assembly’s rejection of statutes which would explicitly criminalize day cruises is evidence of its understanding that none of our existing statutes applies to such operations. Since the devices are not unlawful, they are not subject to seizure under either § 12-21-2712 or § 16-19-120.
Respondent is not subject to criminal prosecution under any existing criminal statute, and therefore we need not address its “selective enforcement” argument. We have construed these statutes as they apply to “day cruises to nowhere,” that is, cruises on United States flag vessels operating out of a South Carolina port, making no intervening stops, and permitting gambling only when the ship is beyond the State’s territorial waters.14 Our decision rests on the intent of the Legislature expressed in 1999 Act No. 125: nothing in that Act is indicative of any intent to otherwise restrict the scope *387and application of laws criminalizing gambling activities in this State. Further, we emphasize that the General Assembly is free to enact legislation which effectively bans or makes a state crime “day cruise” operations such as that operated by respondent.
For the reasons given above, the order of the circuit court is AFFIRMED.
TOAL, C.J., MOORE and WALLER, JJ., concur. BURNETT, J., dissenting in a separate opinion.. S.C.Code Ann. §§ 16-19-10; 16-19-20; 16-19-30; 16-19-40; 16-19-50; 16-19-120; 16-19-130; 12-21-2710; and 12-21-2712.
. The four appellants have been sued in their official capacities as state and county law enforcement officers and prosecutors. We will refer to them collectively as "The State."
. Part of the Gambling Ship Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1084.
. Part of the Johnson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1171-1178.
. S.C.Code Ann. §§ 16-19-10; -20; and -30 (1985 and Supp.2000).
. S.C.Code Ann. § 16-19-130 (1985).
. S.C.Code Ann. § 12-21-2712 (Supp.2000) and § 16-19-120 (1985).
. The amendment added subsection (g).
. Of course, possession or use of these machines, whether licensed or not, is absolutely prohibited under § 12-21-2710. State v. 192 Coin-Operated Video Game Machines, 338 S.C. 176, 525 S.E.2d 872 (2000). As explained later in this opinion, this statute does not apply to the machines located on respondent’s ship.
. The dissent ignores these principles of statutory construction and ” conflates the term "highway” in S.C. Const, art. XIV, § 4 with § 16 — 19— 40 to conclude that the playing clause of the statute prohibits playing on navigable waters. As this Court has held, art. XIV, § 4 is "hardly anything more than a constitutional sanction of the common-law rights of the public in navigable waters.” State ex rel. Lyon v. Columbia Water Power Co., 82 S.C. 181, 190, 63 S.E. 884, 889 (1909). Nothing in § 16-19-40 obstructs the rights of the public to use navigable waters. Furthermore, when construing the term ‘highway’ in a statute, we view it in context. Here, the statute lists eight building structures, then ‘street’ and ‘highway’ and then three outdoor spaces. In our view, the term ‘highway’ in § 16-19-40 refers only to dirt highways 'and not water highways. Compare Speights v. Colleton County, 100 S.C. 304, 84 S.E. 873 (1915) (term ‘highway’ means only dirt, and not water, highway). Finally, we note that § 16-19-50 and § 12-21-2710 prohibit gambling and possession of gambling devices anywhere in the State (including nonnavigable waters), save on a vessel operating a "day cruise to nowhere.”
. This act also amended § 16-19-40 and § 12-21-2712. Section 12-21-2712 is a "seize and destroy” statute which applies only if the *385devices are otherwise unlawful. As explained earlier, § 16-19-40 by its own terms does not apply to gaming tables located on respondent’s vessel.
. Section 22(B).
. The dissent’s reliance on Whitner v. State, 328 S.C. 1, 492 S.E.2d 777 (1997) is misplaced. Whitner holds that, "Generally, the legislature’s subsequent acts ‘cast no light on the intent of the legislature which enacted the statute being construed.’ ” (internal citation omitted). *386Here, we are concerned with bills rejected in 1999 and 2000, during the first and second sessions of the 113th Session of the South Carolina General Assembly. This is the same General Assembly which enacted Act No. 125.
. The dissent would mislead the casual reader to believe that we have legalized gambling devices on any contrivance capable of floating or use as water transportation, if controlled by a United States resident, citizen, or corporation. The only issue we decide is whether current law criminalizes the possession of gambling devices aboard U.S. flag vessels operating "day cruises to nowhere” out of South Carolina ports. The narrowness of our decision is the result of the issue before the Court, not disingenuousness on the part of the majority.