concurring in the judgment of affirmance. The appellant sought to compel by a mandamus action the issuance by a local governing authority of a license to operate self-service motor fuel dispensing pumps within the jurisdiction of the local governing authority.
A Georgia statute provides that "it shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to operate a self-service motor fuel dispensing pump unless . . . such person, firm or corporation shall have obtained a valid license from the governing authority of the political jurisdiction affected.” Code Ann. § 23-2714.
*821Since self-service motor fuel dispensing pumps are used to dispense inherently dangerous products to the buying public I consider this state statute prohibiting their use without licensing to be a valid and proper exercise of the state’s police power. This state statute also allows and directs each local governing authority within the state to exercise police power with respect to self-service motor fuel dispensing pumps within the territorial jurisdiction of each local governing authority.
As I interpret the state statute, each local governing authority within the state, in exercising the police power delegated to it, can decline to license self-service motor fuel dispensing pumps within its territorial jurisdiction. And this is true whether the local governing authority enacts an ordinance on the subject or not.
I then come to the question of whether or not the refusal by a local governing authority to issue licenses for the use of self-service motor fuel dispensing pumps within its territorial jurisdiction is an invalid exercise of the police power, or an abuse of the police power, in that such refusal is arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, and unrelated to the subject of safety.
This issue has been before the courts for many years. In the case of Nance v. City of Cheyenne, 56 F2d 453 (1931), the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming held that such refusal is a "fairly debatable question, ” and that the propriety or wisdom of such a refusal was a matter for the city council to determine in the exercise of its police power. That decision further held that such a refusal was not a violation of equal protection of the law or due process of law. Reaching essentially the same result were the cases of Reingold v. Harper, 6 N. J. 182 (78 A2d 54) (1951), and McCardle v. City of Jackson (Miss.), 260 S. 2d 482 (1972).
I conclude that the refusal of a local governing authority in Georgia to issue licenses for the operation of self-service motor fuel dispensing pumps within its *822territorial jurisdiction is not palpably unreasonable or unduly discriminatory. Such a decision by a local governing authority is also, in my opinion, reasonably related to the subject of safety within its territorial jurisdiction.
I think that the municipality in this case, in refusing to issue licenses for self-service motor fuel dispensing pumps within its territorial jurisdiction, has acted within its police power authorization; such refusal was not a violation of equal protection or due process of law; and such refusal was not arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or an abuse of the proper exercise of the police power with respect to an inherently dangerous product.
For the reasons stated, I concur in the judgment of affirmance.