In July, 1972, J & L Oil Company, asserting that an ordinance of the City of Carrollton is (1) unreasonable, (2) unconstitutional, (3) contrary to Georgia law, and that (4) the city is estopped, sought mandamus to compel the city to issue to it a license to operate a self-service motor fuel station within the city *818limits. After a hearing the trial judge denied the relief sought. J & L appeals.
The controversy involves an abandoned service station in Carrollton two blocks from the city hall which J & L purchased in 1970. On May 1, 1971, J & L commenced renovating it for the purpose of operating a self-service station.
On April 10, 1971, the Governor approved an Act of the General Assembly (Ga. L. 1971, pp. 683,684; Code Ann. §§ 23-2713, 23-2714) providing: "Section 1. The governing authority of each county and municipality is hereby authorized to license the operation of self-service motor fuel dispensing pumps, and to charge a fee for each said license. If the governing authority determines that the operation of self-service motor fuel dispensing pumps will not be injurious to the health or welfare of the residents of the political jurisdiction affected, it shall grant a license to any applicant, not otherwise disqualified by law, who shall make application on a form prescribed by the governing authority. The license shall be effective from January 1 to December 31 of each year. [Code Ann. § 23-2713]. Section 2. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to operate a self-service motor fuel dispensing pump unless an attendant is present at the pump’s location and such person, firm or corporation shall have obtained a valid license from the governing authority of the political jurisdiction affected. [Code Ann. § 23-2714.]”
On June 7, 1971, the City of Carrollton adopted the ordinance under attack, effective immediately, which states in substance that upon consideration of the highly flammable nature of motor fuels and the necessity for extreme safety precautions by persons dispensing same, it shall be unlawful for anyone other than the owner of a service station, manager, operator, or his agent, servant, or employee, to dispense motor *819fuel to the general public in the city limits, any violation being punishable as provided by the charter and ordinances of the city. Held:
The State "local option” law, supra, approved on April 10, 1971, became effective on July 1,1971. See Code Ann. § 102-111. It is not under attack in the present case, and the trial judge recognized this fact in his order. (See Munford, Inc. v. Georgia Oilmen’s Association, Civil Action No. 2655, U. S. District Court, Middle District of Georgia, for a construction of the constitutionality of this statute.) As a law of general application throughout the state it must be viewed as controlling over any ordinance enacted by a municipal corporation operating under powers derived from the state and subject to control of the state. This general law purports to pre-empt the area of regulating self-service motor fuel dispensing pumps, by first delegating under Section 1 the power to license to the governing authority of each county and municipality, subject to the condition precedent that each local authority must determine "that the operation of self-service motor fuel dispensing pumps will not be injurious to the health or welfare of the residents of the political jurisdiction affected,” and then prohibiting under Section 2 the operation of self-service dispensing pumps without an attendant and without a valid local license. Thus, even if we should declare the ordinance of June 7, 1971, invalid for any reason, such a declaration would not entitle the appellant to the relief sought, for there is nothing in the state law requiring the local governing authority to give further consideration to the matter and issue a license for said operation. The case of Heard v. Bolton, 107 Ga. App. 863 (131 SE2d 835), is not applicable here since the General Assembly had not passed a general law governing the operation of coin operated laundries.
Moreover, we do not consider the city ordinance invalid *820for any reason argued and insisted upon. At the time enacted it represented a legitimate exercise of the police power of the municipality. It also represents a determination consonant with the "local option” policy adopted by the state under the statute which became effective some three weeks later.
Argued April 9, 1973 Decided June 28, 1973 Rehearing denied July 12, 1973. Willingham, Smith, Robertson & Sparrow, George T. Smith, for appellant. Wiggins & Camp, William J. Wiggins, for appellees.Able counsel for appellant cites cases from foreign jurisdictions showing a trend toward judicial sanction of this type service station operation. His argument is persuasive that this modern and efficient manner of operation is the trend of the future. But such argument must be made in the legislative halls of this state. Instead of giving full and free sanction in this area, the legislature through the statute here involved, has restricted such operations to a "local option” basis.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Nichols, Undercofler and Hawes, JJ, who dissent. Gunter, J., concurs specially.