dissenting:
At the time that this case was originally briefed and argued to this Court, the controlling federal authority interpreting a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action was the case of Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 *191S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), which held that mere negligent conduct on the part of police officers could implicate the remedial provisions of § 1983. However, following the argument in this case, but prior to the release of our initial opinion, the United States Supreme Court, in two very significant opinions, reversed the ruling in the Parratt case and concluded that mere negligence does not implicate the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We granted rehearing to permit the parties to brief and reargue the effect that these two recent United States Supreme Court cases, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986); and Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 106 S.Ct. 668, 88 L.Ed.2d 677 (1986), should have on the appellant’s claim in this case. The majority of this Court now concludes that these two cases do not change the result which we arrived at in our original opinion in this case, asserting that plaintiff Anderson’s complaint alleges more than a negligence cause of action. However, a careful analysis of the plaintiff’s complaint, and the submissions in support of and in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, clearly establish that the plaintiff’s claim is basically for negligent conduct which does not reach to the level necessary to constitute a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as most recently interpreted in Daniels and Davidson. For that reason, I dissent.
I.
In his complaint before the trial court and in his brief on appeal to this Court, Anderson asserts a § 1983 cause of action against both the City of Pocatello and the individual police officers involved in the shooting incident at issue in this case. He asserts that the conduct of the officers and the city deprived him of his constitutional rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. In both those documents, the § 1983 claim is premised on a theory of negligence. In his complaint, Anderson alleges as follows:
“The conduct of the [police officers] in their investigation was negligent and failed to conform to accepted police standards ... in ways including, ... the improper manner of awakening the plaintiff and aprizing [sic] him of the investigation, ... the failure of the police officers to indentify [sic] themselves in the course of an investigation of this nature, ... the negligent shooting and wounding of the plaintiff, and similar acts and omissions which constitutes negligence. Defendant City of Pocatello was further negligent in their failure to properly screen, hire, train and supervise its police officers.” (Emphasis added.)
And in his brief on appeal, Anderson’s argument focused solely on his assertion that: “[n]egligence can state a § 1983 claim. Parratt vs. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908 [68 L.Ed.2d 420] (1981) ... Here there is an issue of negligence in the officers’ pre-dawn investigation of a minor misdemeanor, their failure to identify themselves, and their over-reaction and use of excessive force.” Appellant’s Brief at 4 (emphasis added).
In the recent case of Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986), the United States Supreme Court reversed the holding of the Parratt case that negligence will support a cause of action under § 1983 where the constitutional rights involved are those found in the fourteenth amendment. The court in Daniels found no remedy existed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “for injuries inflicted by governmental negligence____” 106 S.Ct. at 666. Thus, to the extent that appellant Anderson asserts a § 1983 claim premised on negligence, his claim must fail and the majority errs in failing to so hold.
As the Supreme Court noted in Daniels v. Williams, supra, and in the companion case of Davidson v. Cannon, supra, the purpose served by a § 1983 action is to “requir[e] the government to follow appropriate procedures when its agents decide to ‘deprive any person of life, liberty, or property’____” Daniels v. Williams, 106 S.Ct. at 665. The remedy provided under § 1983 serves to prevent affirmative abuses of *192governmental power; “it serves to prevent governmental power from being ‘used for purposes of oppression.’ ” Id. The holdings of the Supreme Court in the Daniels and Davidson cases effectively require a plaintiff such as appellant Anderson to allege that the governmental officials’ actions against him constituted an abuse of governmental power, or that the officers’ conduct did not conform to appropriate governmental standards, practices or procedures; in short, that the officers acted with “deliberate or callous indifference to” his constitutional rights. Davidson v. Cannon, supra. Anderson has failed to allege such conduct either in his complaint or in his affidavit in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. In both those documents, and particularly in his complaint, Anderson merely alleges that the officers’ actions evidenced a lack of due care under the circumstances. In that portion of his complaint where issues regarding police procedure are discussed, Anderson’s allegations are couched solely in terms of negligence.
“The conduct of the defendants [police officers] in their investigation was negligent and failed to conform to accepted police standards, practices, procedures, in ways including, but necessarily [sic] limited to, the improper manner of awakening the plaintiff and aprizing [sic] him of the investigation, ... the failure of police officers to indentify [sic] themselves in the course of an investigation of this nature, ... the negligent shooting and wounding of the plaintiff, and similar acts and omissions which constitutes negligence.” (Emphasis added.)
The only allegation regarding use of excessive force is that found in Anderson’s brief on appeal1 and, again, it is cast solely in terms of negligence. “Here there is an issue of negligence in the officers’ predawn investigation of a minor misdemean- or, their failure to identify themselves, and their over-reaction and use of excessive force.” At no point has Anderson alleged that the officers in the present case intentionally violated or callously disregarded “appropriate procedures” or that, regardless of procedures utilized, the officers used governmental power “for purposes of oppression.” At most, Anderson has alleged that the officers’ actions amounted to a lack of due care under the circumstances.2 However, as the Supreme Court held in Daniels, such allegations do not state a cause of action under § 1983.
II.
The plaintiff in a § 1983 action bears a difficult burden of pleading and proof. His burden may be greater than that required of him in an ordinary tort action. As the United States Supreme Court held in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2739, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982):
“In Butz [v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978)], we admonished that ‘insubstantial’ suits against high public officials should not be allowed to proceed to trial. 438 U.S. at 507, 98 S.Ct. at 2911. (Citation omit*193ted.) We reiterate this admonition. Insubstantial lawsuits undermine the effectiveness of government as contemplated by our constitutional structure, and ‘firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’ is fully warranted in such cases. 438 U.S. at 508, 98 S.Ct. at 2911.”
Several federal courts have held that this additional burden requires the plaintiff to prove the absence of good faith on the officers part or that their actions were unreasonable. See Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261, 266 (9th Cir.1981) (“Thus, to recover the plaintiff must clear two hurdles: probable cause must be shown not to have existed; the officers must be shown not to have reasonably believed in good faith that probable cause did exist.”); Whitley v. Seibel, 613 F.2d 682, 685 (7th Cir.1980) (“The burden of proof ... is on the plaintiff to prove the officer’s lack of good faith or reasonable cause to believe he was acting unconstitutionally.”). Cf. Zeigler v. Jackson, 716 F.2d 847 (11th Cir.1983) (once defendant has shown that he was acting within scope of his discretionary authority when allegedly wrongful acts occurred,3 the burden shifts to plaintiff to show lack of good faith); Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1121 (5th Cir.1981) (“Once the official has shown that he was acting in his official capacity and within the scope of his discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to breach the official’s immunity by showing that the official lacked ‘good faith.’ ”). The majority in this case fails to recognize and then properly analyze Anderson’s alleged cause of action under this higher and more difficult burden of pleading and proof.
The only allegations made by Anderson regarding the officers’ failure to follow “appropriate procedures,” or regarding any abuse of governmental power, center on Anderson’s contentions that (1) the officers never identified themselves and (2) that he never aimed his firearm at the officers. However, these allegations cannot withstand close scrutiny even when examined under the summary judgment standard of construing all permissible inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson’s first contention, that the officers never identified themselves, is meaningless unless it is shown that such identification was required under clearly established state law or federal constitutional law. Sprague v. City of Burley, 109 Idaho 656, 710 P.2d 566 (1985). Both Anderson and the majority opinion assume, without citing to any supporting authority, that the officers were required to identify themselves under the facts and circumstances of this case.4 In the absence of specific allegations that the officers’ failure to identify themselves constituted an intentional or callous disregard of “appropriate governmental procedures” and not merely negligent failure to follow any such procedures, Anderson fails to state a cause of action under § 1983.5 The majority errs in failing to so conclude.
*194Anderson’s second contention, that he never aimed his firearm at the police officers, is easily disposed of by application of the doctrine of res judicata, and in particular the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Factual issues necessarily decided in another action to which Anderson was a party may not be relitigated. In short, factual inferences are not “permissible” inferences for purposes of summary judgment where consideration of such is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The majority’s analysis of the collateral estoppel issue is misleading and, indeed, internally inconsistent. As correctly noted by the majority, Anderson was charged “for aggravated assault upon police officers in violation of Idaho Code § 18-915.” Ante at 174, Anderson was ultimately found guilty of the lesser included offense of intentionally aiming a firearm at others, I.C. § 18-3304. Anderson defended himself against the charge of assaulting police officers, and the jury’s verdict that he intentionally aimed his firearm at “others” is clearly a verdict that Anderson aimed his firearm at the police officers, as they were the only “others” whom he was charged with assaulting. Thus, the inference which Anderson would have this Court draw, and which the majority opinion implicitly draws, i.e., that Anderson did not aim his firearm at the police officers, is an impermissible inference. Anderson is collaterally es-topped from asserting that he did not aim his shotgun at the police officers in this civil action. Though properly stating the rule of collateral estoppel, the majority and special concurrence fail to properly apply it under the facts of the present case. The majority’s assertion that Anderson’s criminal conviction only establishes that he aimed the firearm at “someone” ignores the record. Anderson’s own testimony, elicited on direct examination by his attorney at the criminal trial, was nothing short of an admission that he pointed his firearm in the direction of the police officers.
“Q. Is it possible that in the position you were in, now knowing that there was someone on those stairs and by that chimney, [the positions occupied by Officers Black and Gentillon] that the muzzle of that gun may have been pointed in their direction?
“A. It was pointed in that direction.”
At no point did Anderson testify, as the majority asserts, ante at 180, that “he may have accidentally pointed it at someone at some point.” Anderson’s own testimony directly contradicts the majority’s assertion of aiming only at “someone,” and the jury verdict directly contradicts the assertion that the aiming was “accidental.” The majority’s attempts to recast the facts which were found at Anderson’s criminal trial constitutes an unfounded collateral attack on those proceedings.
Anderson also testified that except for his re-entry into his apartment the barrel of his gun was not pointed upward.
“Q. At any time did you raise the stock of the gun to level it or perhaps lowered the barrel?
“A. From this position, the only time that I raised the barrel was to get the barrel under the door jamb in my apartment to walk down the stairs.”
Furthermore, the uncontroverted testimony of Anderson at his criminal trial established that he was in a crouched position while holding the firearm and that he aimed the shotgun in a “360 degree radius.” The uncontroverted testimony at that trial also indicates that the port-arms position describes a position where Anderson is holding the barrel of the gun with his left hand while his right hand is on the stock of the gun, near to or holding the trigger *195mechanism. Anderson admitted at trial that the shotgun was in firing position when he exited his apartment.
Another important fact adduced at the criminal trial is that the events in question in this case took place in an extremely brief period of time. The uncontradicted and uncontroverted testimony of Officers Black and Gentillon is that anywhere from 5 to 15 seconds elapsed from the time Anderson first exited his apartment until the first shots were fired. Even testimony elicited from Officer Gentillon by Anderson’s attorney during cross examination regarding the possibility that Anderson was turning away from the officers at the time the shots were fired indicates that the time differential between the firing of the shots and Anderson’s possible movement back toward his apartment constituted fractions of a second.
“Q. So you actually fired before — he was still spinning at the time you fired or turning?
“A. That may have been possible. He was already in a position to where he could have fired the weapon at us. It’s so fast there, and you can’t say where one person is going to fire and another person is going to fire. It might be just split — I mean thousandths of seconds difference, which is almost nothing.”
This testimony was uncontroverted at the criminal trial and remains uncontroverted by the allegations found in Anderson’s affidavit. The majority’s assertion that the criminal action did not necessarily decide “that Anderson was pointing the shotgun at anyone at the time he was shot,” ante at 180, is entirely unwarranted. In short, the district court in the present case correctly concluded that “under the total circumstances and the brief [time] in which all relevant events took place, as the officers were faced with a shotgun reasonably known to them to be loaded and in firing position; and with that gun turning toward them in a port arms or lower position after they ordered otherwise, their actions ... cannot be said to be unreasonable.” (Emphasis added.)
The only other inference which the majority deems as permissible and which allegedly supports Anderson’s assertion that the officers’ actions were unreasonable is that Anderson allegedly was shot in the back. However, the majority misstates the facts established in the record. There is no support for the assertion that Anderson was shot in the “back.” Anderson’s own testimony at the criminal trial belies any contention that he was shot in the back.
“Q. Could you stand up, Mike, and point to the places where you were hit by the bullets?
“A. I was hit right here. This bullet went straight across, put three nicks in my small intestine, stopped on this side. I was hit right here in the hip.
“Q. Okay. Which one hit you first?
“A. I don’t recall which one hit me first. I just felt two sharp pains in my side.”
Both gunshot wounds were inflicted on Anderson’s left side. The wounds are entirely consistent with the facts established at the criminal trial. The uncontroverted facts established at that trial by Anderson’s own testimony are as follows. Anderson exited the stairwell to his apartment and when standing on the top landing to the stairwell he was facing north. With the shotgun at port-arms position (barrel held in Anderson’s left hand) Anderson’s body was at all times roughly parallel to the gun barrel. In other words, the end of the barrel and the left side of Anderson’s body would always face the same direction. (Anderson’s own testimony was that the gun never left the port-arms position except when reentering his apartment.) Once on the top landing, Anderson saw someone to his left (or west). That person was Mark Romriell.
“Q. ... When you came out of the top of the stairs, you saw someone to your left?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Were you able to determine who that was?
“A. No.
“Q. All right. You now know based on testimony who it was?
*196“A. Yes. It was Mark Romriell.”
Anderson then heard, off to the right (or east) the command from Officer Black to “freeze” and he turned partially in that direction.
“Q. Okay. What happened next that you recall?
“A. I heard “Freeze” off to the right, and I turned to the right.
“A. Okay. I turned to the north like this looking at the tree. Okay. I was looking at the tree.
“Q. Why did you look at the tree?
“A. Because that’s where I thought the ‘Freeze’ come from was the tree.”
After hearing the command to “freeze,” Anderson then, according to his testimony, started to turn back towards the stairwell (or south). It was at this point that the gun pointed at the positions of Officers Black and Gentillon.
“Q. All right. Did you hear anything after that [command to ‘freeze’]?
“A. No, I did not. I just — turned. I turned back around and headed back to the doorway. When I got about here, I heard a ‘Hold it.’
“Q. Now, about there, how far from the entryway to your apartment, the stairway 1
“A. I think this is about five feet. So I might have gone about another two feet back, taking one step when I heard—
“Q. Okay. So you’re probably still three feet from the doorway?
“A. I think it was probably closer to two feet from the doorway.
“Q. Where were you when you got shot?
“A. I think I was about two feet from the door when I got shot.
“Q. Okay. What direction were you facing when you got shot?
“A. South.
“Q. Towards your — the door to the stairway ?
“A. That’s correct.” (Emphasis added.)
Thus, with the firearm in the port-arms position and pointed at Officers Black and Gentillon, Anderson’s left side would have also been facing the officer, i.e., in the line of fire. (As indicated earlier, Anderson ■admitted that he pointed his shotgun at the sites where Officers Black and Gentillon were located, which was to the east of the top of the stairway. The only time this would have been possible with the gun in port-arms position was when Anderson was facing south, i.e., when he was facing the stairway.) Gentillon then ordered Anderson to “Drop it.” Seconds after this order, both officers, who were positioned nearly one behind the other, fired simultaneously. Anderson’s own testimony comports with the fact that he was shot in the left side. When the shots were fired he was turning to face south. (The uncontradicted testimony of Officer Gentillon, discussed earlier, was that the elapsed time from firing to Anderson’s turning back toward the stairwell was fractions of a second.) At that point the barrel of the shotgun, in port-arms position, would have been facing east or to his left, placing his left side directly in the line of fire from Officers Black and Gentillon. Anderson’s own testimony was that he was two to three feet from the doorway to the stairwell when the shots were fired.
In short, the facts, as established at the criminal trial by Anderson’s own testimony, clearly indicate that as Anderson was turning back toward the stairway leading to his apartment he was aiming his firearm at the officers. The jury verdict held that this aiming was not accidental, as asserted by the majority, but that it was intentional. The facts, as established at the criminal trial (indeed by Anderson’s own testimony), clearly indicate that Anderson’s aiming at the officers had not ceased when the shots were fired. There can be no conclusion except that appellant Anderson intentionally aimed the shotgun at the officers, and that therefore the officers’ actions were reasonable.
The burden was on Anderson to prove that the officers’ conduct was not reasonable or not taken in good faith. Anderson *197has failed in this burden. The factual allegations which he asserts in support of his claim are both legally insufficient and barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.6 The majority errs in its less than careful analysis of the facts on the record before us, and in its failure to properly analyze the two most recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court. The district court’s summary judgment should be affirmed.
SHEPARD, C.J., concurs.. The majority erroneously asserts that Anderson alleged in his complaint that the officers used unreasonable force against him. Ante at 175. Anderson’s complaint is completely devoid of any allegation of “unreasonable force.” That allegation in appellant’s brief on appeal was not before the trial court, and therefore even if the allegation was sufficient to raise a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it would not be entitled to any factual consideration on this appeal.
. Though not arguing the issue on appeal in his brief, Anderson did allege in his complaint that the officers intentionally shot him. However, when reading the complaint as a whole, Anderson's allegations of intentional acts are not inconsistent with his negligence theory. It ís readily conceded by all that the officers did intentionally shoot Anderson. Nevertheless, intentional acts do not necessarily equate with an intentional tort. For instance, an individual may intentionally drive in excess of the posted speed limit; yet this does not make his subsequent auto accident an intentional tort. See Griffith v. Schmidt, 110 Idaho 235, 715 P.2d 905 (1986) (violation of posted speed limit constitutes negligence per se). Though negligence often arises as the result of heedlessness or inadvertence, "it may also arise where the negligent party has considered the possible consequences carefully, and has exercised his own best judgment.” W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts, § 31 (1984).
. It is important to note that Anderson in his complaint specifically alleged that the acts taken by the officers were within the scope of their employment, i.e., within the scope of their authority. It is also interesting to note that the only evidence in the record concerning whether the officers acted within their authority (i.e., that their actions were in accord with police policy) is the affidavit of Anderson’s father, submitted in support of Anderson's opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss. In that affidavit, Anderson’s father testifies that he heard the Pocatello Chief of Police state that the officers had acted within department policy.
. Both the majority and special concurring opinions erroneously assert that the officers’ failure to identify themselves is somehow relevant to Anderson's § 1983 claim. Both opinions, however, fail to recognize the express holding of the United States Supreme Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra, that a plaintiffs § 1983 claim cannot withstand a motion for summary judgment unless he clearly asserts that the challenged conduct was "clearly unlawful,”, I.e., that the conduct was in direct violation of clearly established constitutional or statutory law. Thus, the officers' failure to identify themselves is only relevant if they were required by clearly established state statutory law or federal constitutional law to so identify themselves. The majority and special concurring opinions fail to follow the very rule of law they espouse, ante at 174.
.In contrast to Anderson’s assertions that the officers never identified themselves stands the uncontradicted testimony of the police officer who accompanied Anderson to the hospital after the shooting, Officer Scott. That officer *194testified that while at the hospital Anderson asked Scott who shot him. When the officer replied that the matter was under investigation, Anderson promptly responded that he knew that, "It was the cops who shot me.” That Anderson possessed such knowledge, even though the officers never identified themselves, is hardly astounding. After all, how many would-be assailants (which, according to Anderson, is what he thought the people outside his apartment were) order their victims to "Freeze” and to "Drop it”? Anderson’s assertion that he never knew the police were involved is belied by Officer Scott’s uncontradicted testimony and common sense.
. The special concurrence ignores the effect that collateral estoppel has upon the allegations found in Anderson’s affidavit. As the above discussion indicates, the facts established at the criminal trial by Anderson's own testimony are directly contrary to the allegations contained in his affidavit. The conflict between Anderson’s affidavit and his sworn testimony at criminal trial underscore the very need for application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The special concurrence would have us ignore Anderson’s own testimony at his criminal trial and the jury’s finding that he intentionally aimed his firearm at the officers.