This action was brought to challenge the constitutionality of RCW 66.28.080 and Lynden city ordinance 633, § 5.04.035, each of which set some limitations on the right of persons to dance on premises licensed to serve alcoholic beverages. After we had accepted review and scheduled the action for oral argument, a motion to dismiss was filed alleging that the case is now moot. We postponed judgment on the motion pending a hearing on the merits and now dismiss.
Appellant, Harvest House Restaurant, Inc., operated as a restaurant and lounge in the city of Lynden, Whatcom County, with a class H liquor license. In late February 1981, appellant instituted live music and dancing. The music and dancing continued at Harvest House for almost a month. *371On March 16, 1981, in response to the dancing at Harvest House, the Lynden City Council passed ordinance 633, pursuant to the enabling statute, RCW 66.28.080.1 Ordinance 633 provides, in pertinent part:
5.04.035 Dancing Prohibited — When. Dancing, either singly, or in groups of two (2) or more persons, is prohibited in any establishment where beer, wine or other intoxicating beverages are sold for on-premises consumption.
5.32.120 Penalty for Violation. Any person or corporation found guilty of a violation of any provision of this chapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished as set forth in Section 1.24.010 of the Lynden City Code.
Appellants challenged the constitutional validity of ordinance 633, § 5.04.035, in superior court on grounds that it unduly restricted protected expressive conduct under U.S. Const. amend. 1. After considering appellants' arguments, the court noted that the City could reasonably conclude that "[allowing dancing at [appellant's restaurant and] cocktail lounge could cause police related problems in addition to the police problems currently handled by the City of Lynden Police Department." Clerk's Papers, at 6. It then held the ordinance valid due to the power given the City by RCW 66.28.080 to regulate dancing at licensed premises. Appellants appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which certified the case to this court on February 6, 1984. After we had accepted certification, respondent filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the case was moot.
The supporting affidavit established that appellant Harvest House had leased the subject restaurant and trans*372ferred its liquor license to the Inland Fish Company, Inc. on October 7, 1983. Appellant does not now hold a license to sell liquor by the drink in any Lynden establishment.
Appellants responded to the motion by submitting the affidavit of an officer of Harvest House and the affidavits of two owners of a Lynden tavern. Harvest House's officer stated that it retained a sufficient interest in the present case to avoid mootness because, if the Inland Fish Company were unsuccessful, Harvest House would retake the license and premises. At that time it would, again, want the right to permit dancing. This statement is insufficient to contradict respondent's allegation of mootness. The effect that a determination of this case might have upon appellant Harvest House is vague and uncertain. This court cannot rely on appellant's speculation that it might have a sufficient interest to raise this issue in the future. The question as to Harvest House Restaurant, Inc.'s right to permit dancing at its former restaurant and lounge in Lynden is purely academic and we need not pass upon it. Grays Harbor Paper Co. v. Grays Harbor Cy., 74 Wn.2d 70, 442 P.2d 967 (1968).
The two tavern owners stated, by affidavit, that they, too, would like the right to permit dancing in their premises. Yet, because these persons were never joined as parties to the suit, there are no facts in the record which might enable us to determine the ordinance's validity as to them.
Although counsel for Harvest House has not addressed the issue whether appellant, Richard De Golier, has a sufficient interest to withstand the mootness challenge, we are compelled to do so. Appellant De Golier was included as a plaintiff in the original motion for temporary injunction and declaratory relief against respondent. We can find no subsequent mention of him in the record, other than as a nominal party. The complaint alleged that he was manager of the Harvest House Restaurant and desired to dance to the music played there. He alleged that ordinance 633 unconstitutionally prohibited him from engaging in protected activity. The trial court made no finding with regard *373to Richard De Golier. He did not appear at trial and the record is unclear as to whether he was represented by counsel for Harvest House. Assuming his allegations to be true and that he appeared through counsel at trial, there is nothing in the record to save his suit from mootness. He alleged only that he desired to dance at the Harvest House Restaurant. Because the restaurant no longer exists, his suit must also fail. State v. Turner, 98 Wn.2d 731, 658 P.2d 658 (1983); Grays Harbor Paper Co. v. Grays Harbor Cy., supra.
"It is a general rule that, where only moot questions or abstract propositions are involved, or where the substantial questions involved in the trial court no longer exist, the appeal . . . should be dismissed." Sorenson v. Bellingham, 80 Wn.2d 547, 558, 496 P.2d 512 (1972). An exception to this rule exists where we determine the moot issue to be of substantial or continuing public interest. Sorenson, at 558. The governing criteria in this determination are whether: (1) the issue presented is of a public or private nature, (2) it is desirable to provide guidance to public officers, and (3) the issue is likely to recur. Sorenson, at 558.
The instant issue, although of notable academic interest, does not meet this test. Appellants admit that Lynden is the only city in Washington state to prohibit ballroom dancing where liquor by the drink is sold. Although the issue is undoubtedly of great interest to its residents, it is not of sufficient importance to the public at large to warrant our review under these circumstances.
The appeal is dismissed.
Brachtenbach, Dolliver, Dimmick, and Pearson, JJ., and Cunningham, J. Pro Tern., concur.
RCW 66.28.080 provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation holding any retailer's license to permit or allow upon the premises licensed any music, dancing, or entertainment whatsoever, unless and until permission thereto is specifically granted by appropriate license or permit of the proper authorities of the city or town in which such licensed premises are situated, or the hoard of county commissioners, if the same be situated outside an incorporated city or town: Provided, That the words 'music and entertainment,' as herein used, shall not apply to radios or mechanical musical devices."