dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. Initially, it should be noted that I do agree with much of the majority’s analysis. I join the majority’s conclusion that Archuleta was not seized until the officer chasing him drew a weapon and approached, and I agree that the seizure at this point was an investigatory stop, despite the use of a weapon. I also agree with the majority that a person’s evasive actions and presence in a bad neighborhood may be relevant to, but are not themselves sufficient to establish, reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. However, I cannot join the majority’s conclusion that Archuleta’s conduct in this case was sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion that a crime was afoot.
The key question in this case is whether the various aspects of Archuleta’s evasive *517behavior after the commencement of the foot chase can combine with his initial act of evasion (fleeing) and his presence in a bad neighborhood to transform a mere hunch by a police officer into the more articulable reasonable suspicion of criminality required by the Fourth Amendment. Because I believe our former cases and the relevant decisions of the United States Supreme Court establish that, even in totality, the circumstances in the record before us do not justify the investigatory detention of a person at gunpoint, I would affirm the trial court’s order of suppression.
I.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution protect against unreasonable search and seizure. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993); People v. Salazar, 964 P.2d 502, 504 (Colo.1998); People v. Canton, 951 P.2d 907, 909 (Colo. 1998). A search or seizure made in the absence of a warrant is deemed unreasonable unless justified by an established exception to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. See Salazar, 964 P.2d at 504; Canton, 951 P.2d at 909. Further, an individual may not be subjected to arrest unless there is probable cause to believe that he or she has committed a crime. See People v. Tate, 657 P.2d 955, 958 (Colo.1983).
The United States Supreme Court has held, however, that police officers may conduct a brief investigatory stop upon something less than probable cause. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26-27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (“a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is not probable cause to make an arrest”). Because the investigatory stop doctrine is essentially a limitation on Fourth Amendment rights, it applies only where officers have a “reasonable suspicion” that criminal activity may be afoot. See id. at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868.
An officer’s suspicion is “reasonable” when it is based upon “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant” the belief that a crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed. Id. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (emphasis added); see United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); Salazar, 964 P.2d at 505 (“reasonable suspicion” inquiry rests on whether specific articulable facts and appropriate inferences, viewed in totality, can “justify the intrusion into the defendant’s personal security”). Although there may be circumstances in which “wholly lawful conduct might justify the suspicion that criminal activity is afoot,” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 5, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989), an officér may not make an investigatory stop based only on an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’ ” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868; see People v. Rahming, 795 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Colo.1990). Instead, there must be a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690. The constitutional interest at stake is “far from insignificant: it-is the right of every person to enjoy the use of public streets, buildings, parks and other conveniences without unwarranted interference or harassment by agents of the law.” Rahming, 795 P.2d at 1340-41.
A.
Before the reasonable suspicion analysis can come into play, there must be an initial determination of the point at which a Fourth Amendment seizure took place. I agree with the majority that, in this case, Archuleta was seized at the moment Officer Felkins approached him in the El Charrito dining room with his weapon drawn. The majority properly notes that the U.S. Supreme Court decision in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991), requires the reevaluation of our decision in People v. Thomas, 660 P.2d 1272 (Colo.1983). I agree with the majority’s view that Hodari D. requires only a limited modification of our precedent, and therefore, our discussion in Thomas pertaining to the insufficiency of *518reasonable suspicion in that case remains good law. See maj. op. at 515.
Thomas and Hodari D. both involve a defendant’s efforts to suppress evidence obtained by the police after the commencement of a chase, but before the apprehension of the defendant. Thus, these cases involve a'distinct and easily recognized fact pattern in which an individual throws away incriminating evidence while fleeing from authorities. Pursuant to Hodari D., a seizure does not take place at the commencement of a foot chase, contrary to our assumption in Thomas (a case discussed in more detail below). It is therefore clear that the officers in Thomas did not need reasonable suspicion to chase the defendant and seize the discarded evidence. See People v. T.H., 892 P.2d 301, 304 (Colo.1995). As the majority explains, however, Hodari D. does not affect our conclusion in Thomas that the information known by the officers did not rise to the level of a reasonable suspicion. See maj. op. at 515. Thus, the majority explicitly reaffirms the holding of Thomas on the issue of what constitutes reasonable suspicion. See id. I concur in this expressed adherence to Thomas.
Because the majority relies upon Thomas and its progeny to explain the constitutional threshold for reasonable suspicion in the investigatory stop context, a discussion of our holdings in those eases is essential.
In Thomas, we specifically recognized that police officers cannot rely solely on the furtive gestures of the defendant as the basis for reasonable suspicion. See Thomas, 660 P.2d at 1275. Significantly, we did not distinguish between running and other evasive conduct. See id. In view of the constitutional interests implicated, we declared it improper to base an investigatory stop on the evasive action alone, explaining:
It is only when a person’s effort to avoid police contact is coupled with an officer’s specific knowledge connecting that person to some other action or circumstance indicative of criminal conduct that the evasive action, whether running or otherwise, takes on a sufficiently suspicious character to justify a stop. An officer for example, who sees a person running from the scene of some reported or observed criminal activity would have a specific and articulable basis in fact to stop that person, as would an officer who comes upon evasive action which is linked to other observed conduct indicative of illegal activity.
Id. at 1275-76 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Even where officers observe evasive or secretive behavior in a high-crime area, this court has held that the threshold test for reasonable suspicion is not met without some further specific indicia of criminality. Thus, in People v. Wilson, 784 P.2d 325, 326-27 (Colo.1989), we affirmed a suppression order entered in a case involving both deliberate evasion and a locale known for criminality. Prior to a sting operation in an area that had been the subject of numerous complaints about drug trafficking, officers warned bystanders against interference with the undercover police operation. See, id. at 326. Notwithstanding this warning, one of the bystanders approached and contacted a group of three men who were nearing the area, causing one of the men to turn and run. See id. Based on this behavior, the fleeing individual was stopped, and illegal drugs were found on his person. See id. We affirmed the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence, finding these facts to be “even less supportive of the stop that was conducted than the action of the police officers in People v. Thomas.” Wilson, 784 P.2d at 327.
We have reached the same conclusion where the evasive behavior is significantly more extensive and police observe the subjects in an area that has specific ties to criminality. In Rahming, 795 P.2d at 1341-42, we considered whether officers conducted a constitutionally permissible stop where, upon seeing a police cruiser approach, two individuals took flight and three others hurried to a vehicle and drove away to a convenience store. Even though the initial incident took place in front of an apartment building known to be the residence of several gang leaders, and even though an officer testified that the clothing worn by at least one of the subjects was consistent with that worn by gang members, we concluded that the officers did not have the reasonable sus*519picion necessary to justify the stop. See id. Just as furtive gestures, standing alone, are too inchoate to sustain an investigatory stop, “[a] history of past criminal activity in a locality does not justify suspension of the constitutional rights of everyone, or anyone, who may subsequently be in that locality.” Id. at 1343.
The stop in Rahming occurred following evasive behavior that was fairly elaborate: after spotting the police, these individuals not only proceeded to them car at a fast pace, but they also drove away - going down the block, around a corner to another street, and proceeding still further to a convenience store where they were eventually stopped. See id. at 1341-42. In evaluating the propriety of the stop, however, we did not attribute any particular significance to the protracted or continued nature of the evasive conduct. To the contrary, we found that “the individuals did nothing to suggest that criminal activity was afoot.” Id. at 1343. Thus, it is clear that extensive evasion and the criminality of an area are not sufficient, even taken together, to raise a reasonable suspicion under our prior cases enforcing the Fourth Amendment.
The majority reaffirms the precedent discussed above, and reiterates that “the fact that a suspect flees from an officer, standing alone, does not support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” Maj. op. at 515. I agree.
B.
The majority also notes, correctly, that while “such circumstances [as presence in a high-crime area and fleeing from the police] individually cannot constitute reasonable suspicion,” they may combine with “other developments ” to form a sufficient basis for a valid investigatory stop. ' Id. at 515 (emphasis added). Indeed, where officers observe evasive or secretive behavior in a locale notorious for criminality, and have a specific and independent factual basis to reasonably suspect the sort of criminality for ivhich the subject individual is being stopped, we have found the constitutional test for reasonable suspicion to be satisfied. See Canton, 951 P.2d at 910 (in addition to area with reputation for drug trafficking and evasive behavior by those at the scene, police observed a large roll of currency in defendant’s hand and were acting on tip that defendant and others were engaged in drug activity); Ratcliff, 778 P.2d at 1378-79 (in addition to viewing a secretive exchange between two individuals in area prone to criminality, one of the participants was known by officers to be a user- and seller of illicit narcotics).
Consequently, in order to find reasonable suspicion present in this case, specific indicia of criminal activity independent from the mere presence in a high-crime area and the evasion of police must be identified. In this regard, the majority breaks the chase down into the various facts it believes to be supportive of a reasonable suspicion. See maj. op. at 515. In my view, however, the items enumerated by the majority are either subsumed within the general understanding of “evasion” or merely embody different iterations of the fact that the area was prone to criminality.
While the majority attributes independent significance to (1) the fact that the El Charri-to bar had a bad reputation; (2) the fact that Archuleta and two others were “huddled” together in the alley of this bar; and (3) the fact that Archuleta returned to the very same bar following the chase, each factor implicates nothing more articulable than the notion that the El Charrito was known for drug activity, and Archuleta was present there. Therefore, I do not view the majority’s point-by-point recitation of the several aspects of the chase involving Archuleta’s presence at, departure from, and return to the El Charrito restaurant as adding anything significant to the inquiry. I do not believe that a person who simply returns to his original location after seeking to avoid unwarranted police attention has given officers new information indicative of criminality.
Similarly, the majority separately enumerates (1) Archuleta’s initial act of flight; (2) the fact he kept on running; and (3) the fact that hé hid under a table once inside the El Charrito. Breaking down the evasive behavior in this fashion, however, does not imbue it *520with any more articulable substance than that arising out of the mere fact of evasion itself. Moreover, analyzing the evasive behavior in this disjunctive fashion seems contrary to the reasoning of Thomas, Rahming and Wilson. In fact, because evasion and the criminal character of a neighborhood can only give rise to a reasonable suspicion when coupled with “other developments,” the majority’s separate enumeration of the different varieties of evasive behavior in this case draws a distinction that is somewhat illusory. The moment Archuleta took more than a single step in his attempt to avoid police contact, he can said to have “continued his flight,” and once he turned the first corner on his way around the block, he can be said to have engaged in “deliberate evasive action.” Hiding under a table is but another variety of evasive behavior, and adds nothing articulable to the reasonable suspicion calculus in the absence of some other development which is itself indicative of criminality.'
The majority’s suggestion that “continued evasive action that escalates beyond a chase can form one element of a basis for reasonable suspicion,” maj. op. at 515, is at odds with its earlier recognition that “the fact that a suspect flees from an officer, standing alone, does not support a reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 515 (citing Thomas, 660 P.2d at 1276). As noted above, I find no reason to draw a distinction between mere “evasion” and some “evasion plus more evasion” which can somehow transform the otherwise insufficient information known to the officer (i.e., a mere hunch) into a constitutionally sufficient reasonable suspicion. Significantly, the' majority relies upon the 1974 decision in People v. Martineau, 185 Colo. 194, 523 P.2d 126 (1974), as support for its analysis in this regard. Martineau is problematic, however, because the court there clearly relied upon post-seizure information as a retroactive justification for the seizure itself. The Marti-neau court rationalized its holding as follows: “[ajppellant’s flight from the officer’s spotlight at 4 a.m., and his attempt to hide himself, coupled with the fact that when he was apprehended he was identified as having been in the vicinity of the earlier break-in ... justified a reasonable inference in the officer’s mind that he might have been engaged in criminal conduct.” Id. at 198, 523 P.2d at 127-28 (emphasis added). To the extent the Martineau court relied on post-seizure information, its holding is erroneous and should be disapproved. See People v. Padgett, 932 P.2d 810, 816 (Colo.1997) (“[t]he articulable facts which justify the stop must preexist” the seizure). Because there is no indication that the court in Martineau would have found reasonable suspicion had it not improperly relied on post-seizure events, that case is of little assistance in the present context.1
Even if, as the majority suggests, Marti-neau can be read to allow a finding of reasonable suspicion based only on the evasive conduct (running and hiding) of the defendant there, such an interpretation would be facially inconsistent with our subsequent holding in Thomas, and the later decision must control. In either event, the attribution of additional weight to “continued evasion” in assessing the existence of reasonable suspicion does not withstand scrutiny.
Therefore, six of the seven factors listed by the majority merely reiterate Archuleta’s evasive behavior and his presence in a bad area. As a result, I do not view these matters as “other developments” supportive of reasonable suspicion. According to Thomas and its progeny (cases reaffirmed by the majority), the combination of these six factors did not provide an adequate basis for an investigatory stop.
The majority adds a seventh — presumably dispositive — factor to the analysis of reasonable suspicion in this case. The majority emphasizes the fact that Archuleta allegedly knocked over a bicyclist who was in the doorway of the El Charrito. See maj. op. at 516. The majority supposes that this en*521counter may amount to a third-degree assault on the bicyclist. See id. at 516. For a variety of reasons, this circumstance provides scant support for the majority’s finding of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
First of all, the suggestion that a criminal assault may have occurred was neither proffered by the People at the suppression hearing, nor considered by the trial court in its analysis. There is nothing in the record before us indicating that Officer Felkins followed Archuleta into the restaurant and held him at gunpoint in order to question him about the bicyclist. Further, there is no testimony that could objectively lead a reasonable 'officer to believe “bodily injury,” see § 18-l-901(c), 6 C.R.S. (1998), had been sustained by the bicyclist as a result of having been “knocked over.” While the bicyclist here may have been knocked sprawling to the ground suffering a bodily injury, it is equally possible that he may have been harmlessly knocked off balance.
Because none of the participants below attached any significance to the bicyclist, the record is completely undeveloped on this point. In fact, the single reference to the bicyclist in the testimony occurs during Officer Felkins’ description of the chase, when he notes: “[Archuleta] attempted to enter the bar, in the meantime knocking a person over who was on a bicycle at the doorway.” There is no other information.
Secondly, the majority does not view the incident as providing the officer with a reasonable suspicion that a criminal assault had taken place. Had the majority so concluded, the subsequent investigatory stop would have been justified on that basis alone. There would have been no need to delve into- the multiple aspects of the evasive behavior here or the criminal character of the area in question. Consequently, although there is no doubt that the commission of a crime during flight from police can provide sufficient grounds for an investigatory stop, the majority implicitly concedes that this is not such a case. Indeed, the majority’s concession that the bicyclist incident did not amount to criminal assault is the only conclusion the record will bear. During a colloquy with the attorneys at the suppression hearing, the trial court observed: “Here we have a chase, culminating in the defendant being basically stopped at gunpoint with no intervening evidence of criminal activity, other than his running from the police.” (Emphasis added.)
Accordingly, the majority' must view the bicyclist incident as merely another factor in the totality of circumstances which provide reasonable suspicion in this case. Of course, under the teachings of Thomas, Wilson and Rahming, the majority must regard the bicyclist factor as providing the (heretofore absent) independent indicia of criminal activity necessary for the existence of reasonable suspicion. That is to say, the majority concludes that the bicyclist incident, although so innocuous as to fail to provide even a reasonable suspicion of criminal assault, serves to swing the pendulum toward a finding of a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. I do not agree.
Simply adding this incident to otherwise legally insufficient considerations does not suffice to establish a reasonable suspicion. The fact that Archuleta apparently knocked over a bicyclist while running from the police demonstrates, at most, that Archuleta was earnest in his attempt to avoid police (although not so earnest as to have committed a crime during the flight). Thus, the bicyclist factor, although separately enumerated by the majority, is yet another expression of the conclusion that Archuleta was avoiding the police. I cannot distinguish this evasion from that which we found insufficient to create reasonable suspicion in Thomas, Wilson and Rahming.
In my view, Officer Felkins had nothing more than an inchoate and unparticularized hunch that Archuleta and his companions were up to no good. Archuleta’s vigorous attempts to avoid the officer may have strengthened this hunch, but the evasive actions were not legally sufficient, on this record, to ripen the officer’s gut feeling into the reasonable suspicion demanded by the Fourth Amendment. Officer Felkins had no more articulable indication that a crime “was afoot” at the point he stopped Archuleta at gunpoint than he did at the moment this defendant first took flight.
*522II.
In sum, I agree with the majority that a Fourth Amendment seizure did not occur in this case until the officer approached the defendant with his sidearm drawn, and that the seizure here was in the nature of an investigatory stop. I would find on this record, however, that the observations made and the information known by this officer were insufficient to sustain such a stop. Without more, Archuleta’s evasion and his presence in a bad part of town simply could not meet the constitutional threshold for reasonable suspicion. This is true whether the focus is on evasion in general, or on the sum of the individual evasive aspects of the flight in this case. In the absence of a more articulable and concrete basis for suspecting true criminal activity, “the balance between the public interest and [a person’s] right to personal security and privacy tilts in favor of freedom from police interference.” Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51-52, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979). Such a limitation is necessary “to assure that an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field.” Id. at 51, 99 S.Ct. 2637.
I would affirm the trial court’s order of suppression.
. In addition to its reliance on Martineau, the majority rests upon Professor LaFave’s treatise. See maj. op. at 515 (citing 4 LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 9.4(f) at 181 (1996)). However, a careful reading of LaFave suggests the treatise does not supply normative support for the position advocated by the majority. Instead, it appears that Professor LaFave is merely cataloging the inconsistent and sometimes widely divergent results reached in cases from various jurisdictions.