dissenting:
The majority holds that the defendant is not entitled to presentence confinement credit on the Pitkin County sentence for the 181 days that he spent in the Mesa County jail while being held on warrants from both Pitkin and Mesa Counties. I respectfully dissent.
On September 15, 1982, the defendant was arrested on warrants from both Pitkin and Mesa Counties. While awaiting disposition and sentencing on the charges underlying both warrants, the defendant was held in the Mesa County jail for a period of 181 days. The defendant pleaded guilty to reduced charges in both Mesa and Pitkin Counties and was originally given concurrent sentences of probation. After violating the conditions of both probationary sentences, the defendant was given concurrent sentences of imprisonment. The district court judge in Pitkin County did not award the defendant presentence confinement credit for the 181 days spent in the Mesa County jail, although the district court judge in Mesa County did award the defendant such credit on the Mesa County sentence.
As the majority acknowledges, a defendant is entitled to presentence confinement credit “for each charge that was an actual cause of the defendant’s incarceration prior to the imposition of the sentence.” Majority op. at 21. See Schubert v. People, 698 P.2d 788, 795 (Colo.1985). In determining whether a charge is an actual cause of the confinement, it is not necessary to show that the charge was the exclusive cause of the confinement. Rather, “there must be a substantial nexus between such charge or conduct and the period of confinement for which credit is sought.” Schubert v. People, 698 P.2d at 795. Accord Torand v. People, 698 P.2d 797, 800 (Colo.1985).
In the present case, the Pitkin County charges were as much an actual cause of the defendant’s confinement as were the Mesa County charges. The record discloses that his arrest on September 15, 1982, was based upon both warrants. It is logically inconsistent and contrary to common sense to say that one warrant, the Mesa County warrant, was the basis of his confinement but that the other warrant, the Pitkin County warrant, was not. The defendant was confined in the Mesa County jail as a direct result of both warrants, not only the Mesa County warrant. Under these circumstances, the fact that the defendant was confined in the Mesa County jail instead of the Pitkin County jail simply as a matter of administrative convenience should have no bearing on whether he should receive presentence confinement credit on the Pitkin County sentence.
I also disagree with the majority’s wholly artificial distinction between concurrent sentences for multiple charges filed in the same jurisdiction and concurrent sentences for multiple charges filed in different jurisdictions. I can perceive no logical or principled reason, and none is advanced by the majority, for treating the latter situation different from the former in determining presentence confinement credit. In neither case is there a danger of granting a defendant duplicative credit — one of the primary concerns underlying our interpretation of section 16-11-206 in Schubert v. People, 698 P.2d at 794-95. The question is not whether the charges are related to each other in the sense that they are filed in the same jurisdiction, but whether the charges are both related to, or have a “substantial nexus” to, the confinement. Majority op. at 23.
In summary, I believe that the Pitkin County warrant was as much an actual cause of the defendant’s confinement as was the Mesa County warrant. Also, I believe that there is no logical basis to award a defendant presentence confinement credit on concurrent sentences for multiple charges in a single jurisdiction but not on concurrent sentences for multiple charges filed in different jurisdictions, at least so long as there is no possibility of awarding duplicative credit. Accordingly, I *25would hold that based on the record before us, sparse though it is, the defendant was entitled to an additional 181 days of presen-tence confinement credit on the Pitkin County sentence for the period he spent in the Mesa County jail on both the Mesa County and Pitkin County warrants.
I am authorized to say that Justice DUBOFSKY joins in this dissent.