concurring in the result:
At the conclusion of the State’s case-in-chief, Cannon moved for dismissal on the ground that the State had failed to prove a prima facie case. Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b).1 One of the facts which Cannon claimed the State had not proved was that the property owner knew about or consented to the illicit use of the property. By raising this issue in the context of a motion to dismiss, Cannon contends that the State bears the burden of proving knowledge or consent in a forfeiture action brought under section 58 — 37—13(l)(i). Rather than addressing the issue of whether the State bears a burden of proving knowledge or consent, the majority merely concludes that the State met its burden of proving a prima facie ease through Cannon’s introduction of evidence in her case-in-chief. By failing to address the issue, the majority leaves intact the prior statement of this court that the State bears a burden to prove “the owner of the property interest knew about or willingly consented to the act which made the property subject to forfeiture” in order to prove a forfeiture under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13(l)(i). State v. 392 South 600 East, Nephi, 886 P.2d 534, 538 (Utah 1994) (emphasis added). I write separately because I believe that the statute does not place any such burden upon the State.
It is axiomatic that the State need not introduce evidence in its case-in-chief that is *932not required to establish the cause of action. The relevant portions of the forfeiture statute in effect at the time provided:
(1) The following are subject to forfeiture, and no property right exists in them:
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(i) all warehousing, housing, and storage facilities, or interest in real property of any kind used, or intended for use, in producing, cultivating, warehousing, storing, protecting, or manufacturing any controlled substances in violation of this chapter, except that:
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(ii) an interest in property may not be forfeited under this subsection if the holder of the interest did not know of the act which made the property subject to forfeiture, or did not willingly consent to the act; and
(iii) unless the premises are used in producing, cultivating, or manufacturing controlled substances, a housing, warehousing, or storage facility or interest in real property may not be forfeited under this section unless cumulative sales of controlled substances on the property within a two-month period total or exceed $1,000, or the street value of any controlled substances found on the premises at any given time totals or exceeds $1,000.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13(l)(i)(i)-(iii).2 In addition to the statutory requirements, case law mandates that the State prove that forfeiture would not violate the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993); Nephi 886 P.2d at 541.
However, neither the statute nor the Eighth Amendment requires the State to prove knowledge or consent. Indeed, the only reference in the statute to knowledge or consent is found in subsection (ii), which affords an exception to forfeiture where the property owner “did not know of the act which made the property subject to forfeiture, or did not willingly consent to the act.” Utah Code Ann. § 58 — 37—13(1 )(i)(ii) (emphasis added).3 The Nephi court correctly referred to this language as affording a property owner an “innocent-owner defense”:
We are persuaded that the analysis in Austin applies equally to section 58-37-13(l)(i). As pointed out in Austin, “forfeiture statutes historically have been understood as serving not simply remedial goals but also those of punishment and deterrence.” In addition, as was true of the federal statutes at issue in Austin, section 58-37-13(1) (i) contains an “innocent-owner” defense.
Nephi 886 P.2d at 540 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Austin, 509 U.S. at 622 n. 14, 113 S.Ct. at 2812 n. 14). Because the exception is an affirmative defense, it must be raised and proved by the property owner who claims the exception, not by the State. Neither the Eighth Amendment nor any other constitutional provision requires the State to prove knowledge or consent. See, e.g., Bennis v. Michigan, — U.S.—, —, 116 S.Ct. 994, 998, 134 L.Ed.2d 68 (1996) (“[A] long and unbroken line of cases holds that an owner’s interest in property may be forfeited by reason of the use to which the property is put even though the owner did not know that it was to be put to such use.”).4 Nor has Cannon argued that *933proof of knowledge or consent is constitutionally required to establish a forfeiture under section 58-37-13(l)(i).
The Nephi court’s statement that section 58-37-13(1)© requires the State to prove that a property owner “knew about or willingly consented to the act which made the property subject to forfeiture” is clearly an inaccurate statement of the statutory requirements for forfeiture. The legislature did not require proof that a property owner “knew about or willingly consented to the act which made the property subject to forfeiture.” It required the exact opposite (proof that the property owner “did not know” or “did not willingly consent” to the act which made the property subject to forfeiture). The Nephi court’s interpretation of the statute reads the word “not” out of the statute and incorrectly imposes a burden upon the State to prove knowledge or consent. This is inconsistent with the clear and unambiguous language of the statute.
The circumstances where a property owner did not know about the use of the property or did not willingly consent to its use are clearly identified as exceptions to forfeiture. Placing a burden of proving knowledge or consent on the State is therefore inconsistent with the clear and unambiguous language of the statute. Placing a burden of proof on the State is likewise inconsistent with the notion that one who claims an exception to a general rule must bear the burden of proving that he or she comes within the exception. Therefore, I would conclude that the State does not bear any burden to prove knowledge or consent as a prerequisite to forfeiture under section 58-37-13(1)©. Knowledge and consent become relevant only if the property owner raises the innocent-owner defense; in which case, the property owner must bear the burden of proving that he or she “did not know” or “did not willingly consent.”
Because there is no statutory or constitutional requirement that the State introduce evidence concerning knowledge or consent, I would hold that the exception to forfeiture provided by subsection (i)(ii) is an affirmative defense that must be raised and proved by Cannon. Nevertheless, because the majority sustained the trial court on other grounds, I concur in the result.
. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) states:
After the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the Plaintiff has shown no right to relief....
A prima facie case is proven when evidence has been introduced which, in the absence of contrary evidence, would entitle the party with the burden of proof to judgment as a matter of law. State v. Brady, 91 N.W. 801, 805 (Iowa 1902), quoted in State v. Wood, 2 Utah 2d 34, 38, 268 P.2d 998, 1001 (1954). Therefore, the State's failure to prove a prima facie case would entitle Cannon to dismissal under rule 41(b).
. This section has been amended since the date of this incident. The current forfeiture provision is found in section 58 — 37—13(2)(i).
. The current version of the statute similarly requires proof that the property owner "did not know or have reason to know of the conduct which made the property subject to forfeiture, or did not willingly consent to the conduct." Utah Code Ann. § 5 8-37 — 13(2)(i)(ii).
. In Bennis, the co-owner husband used the family car to engage in sexual acts with a prostitute. The car was forfeited under a Michigan statute as a public nuisance, even though the co-owner wife did not know of or consent to the misuse of the car. The Michigan statute did not require the state to prove knowledge or consent as a condition for forfeiture, nor did the statute allow the property owner to interpose an innocent-owner defense. Although the trial court possessed equitable powers to award one-half of the proceeds after sale to an innocent co-owner, the trial judge in Bennis did not exercise this equitable power. Therefore, the wife did not receive any portion of the proceeds from the sale of her car. The co-owner wife argued that she was constitutionally entitled to an innocent-owner defense where she *933was not aware of the use which subjected her car to forfeiture — a right which is statutorily provided to an innocent owner in Utah where the owner "did not know of the act which made the property subject to forfeiture, or did not willingly consent to the act.” Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13(l)(i)(ii). The Supreme Court found no constitutional infirmity in Michigan's failure to allow an innocent-owner defense.