concurring specially.
I reluctantly concur with the decision here to remand for arbitration as to EG & G’s contractual duty to use best efforts to influence DOE rulings. My preference would be to remand for arbitration of the grievances filed by the Union.
This case is not about what work is covered by the Davis-Bacon Act. It is about arbitration. As I understand the Union’s position, it is not that EG & G subcontracted out work that was not covered by the Davis-Bacon Act, but rather whether EG & G has the right to subcontract out work previously performed by employees covered under the collective bargaining agreement. EG & G lured the district court into litigating the very issue that the Union wishes to arbitrate. Our opinion here falls into the same trap.
The Union asserts that neither article 111(B) of the EG & G-DOE contract nor DOE procurement regulation 970.-2273(b)(1), both cited in the lead opinion, dictate that the work that was the subject of the grievances by the Union may not be done by EG & G and that EG & G must' subcontract the work. The Union also asserts that the portion of the collective bargaining agreement stating that bargaining unit personnel shall perform certain types of work, “except work which qualifies under Davis/Bacon Act determination as being work for others,” does not clearly require subcontracting out work projects determined by DOE to be work covered under *676the Davis-Bacon Act. The key factual issue that relates to these assertions was raised in the affidavit of the president of the Union:
My understanding of the phrase “except work which qualifies under Davis-Bacon Act determination as being work for others” is that, within the meaning of the Davis-Bacon Act, work is required to be paid for at minimum wages set by the [Department of Labor], and if the bargaining unit wage rates do not comply with those rates, then the work could not be performed by them. The bargaining unit operations and maintenance employees who would have performed the work in the grievances filed .., are, on information and belief, being paid wage rates that meet applicable Davis-Bacon standards.
Affidavit of Gerald P. Oliver, ¶ 4, Supp.R. 50, 54. (Emphasis added.) This factual allegation was not refuted by EG & G.
In my view, the Union was entitled to arbitrate the questions raised by their grievances. In each of those grievances the Union asserted: “Work that has historically been performed and rightfully belongs to OCAW Local 2-652 has unilaterally been removed from same and been allowed to go to construction under the guise of the Davis-Bacon Act.” Exhibits A-D to Affidavit of Gerald P. Oliver, Supp.R. 66-71.
As the Supreme Court made clear almost three decades ago:
The courts ... have no business weighing the merits of the grievance, considering whether there is equity in a particular claim, or determining whether there is particular language in the written instrument which will support the claim. The agreement is to submit all grievances to arbitration, not merely those the court will deem meritorious. The processing of even frivolous claims may have therapeutic values of which those who are not part of the plant environment may be quite unaware.
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 1346-47, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1960).
When requested to enforce an arbitration clause of a collective bargaining agreement, a court “should view with suspicion an attempt to persuade it to become entangled in the construction of the substantive provisions of a labor agreement, even through the back door of interpreting the arbitration clause, when the alternative is to utilize the services of an arbitrator.” Steelworker’s v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 585, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1354, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960).
The decision of the district court should be reversed and the case be remanded with directions that EG & G be required to carry out arbitration of the grievances filed by the Union. Reluctantly, I concur in the partial relief that is offered by the lead opinion.
SHEPARD, C.J., concurs.