ON REHEARING
HUNTLEY, Justice.This appeal presents two main issues. The first is whether the trial court applied the correct standard in deciding whether a new trial should have been granted. The second is, despite which standard the court applied in deciding the propriety of granting a new trial, whether the record establishes that a new trial should have been granted as a result of errors occurring during the trial which deprived the plaintiffs of a fair trial. We hold that the district court did not apply the correct standard for determining whether a new trial should be granted, and, further, that errors occurred in the course of the trial that require a new trial. Therefore, we reverse and remand for new trial.
Leah Robertson was involved in a car accident and received multiple injuries. She was taken to the Idaho Falls Consolidated Hospital emergency room. Dr. Hansen, the doctor in charge when Robertson arrived at the emergency room, made a cursory examination and ordered that a *652side-view neck x-ray and a chest x-ray be taken. Dr. Hansen then called Dr. Richards, the defendant, to perform a complete physical examination and take over the case. Dr. Hansen also called upon Dr. Bjornson to perform an orthopedic evaluation for the purpose of treating a broken leg. Dr. Richards testified that he and Dr. Bjornson examined the neck and chest x-rays, and that Bjornson, skilled in the diagnosis of neck injuries, did not indicate any abnormalities in the neck x-ray. Although the neck x-ray did not show all seven vertebra, Dr. Richards ruled out a broken neck. Dr. Bjornson testified that he was never asked to review the neck x-ray and that he confined his efforts to the fractured leg, but evidence is conflicting as to whether he ever did examine the x-rays.
There is also conflicting evidence as to whether reliance upon a single lateral neck x-ray meets the applicable medical standard of care. The Robertsons’ experts all testified that at least five x-rays, taken from different angles of the neck, were required before a broken neck could be ruled out of the diagnosis. Dr. Richards himself admitted that at least three x-rays from different angles are needed before making a final .determination, yet the record reflects that only one neck x-ray was taken, which was a fact well known to Dr. Richards.
Dr. Richards excused his failure to require that at least three x-rays be taken by asserting that he had relied upon Dr. Bjornson’s expertise to diagnose whether Mrs. Robertson’s neck was broken. Dr. Richards argues that, by relying on Bjom-son’s expertise, he satisfied the requisite standard of care. Dr. Bjornson, however, testified that he never assumed responsibility for diagnosing Robertson’s neck injury; this was a highly contested and close issue at trial.
During surgery, Dr. Richards performed an endotracheal intubation upon Robertson and cleaned and stitched her facial wounds while Dr. Bjornson set her broken leg. Pri- or to the surgery, Dr. Richards ordered the sandbags — which the paramedics had put in place to prevent neck movement — be removed from either side of Robertson’s neck. Dr. Richards claimed that he reviewed the neck x-ray with Radiologist Newell Richardson after the surgery. Richardson, however, did not recall discussing the neck x-ray with Dr. Richards. Subsequently, Richardson reviewed the x-rays and dictated an x-ray report. Richardson’s radiological report stated that the neck x-ray was unsatisfactory and that additional x-rays were necessary, but Dr. Richards claims his procedure was to have the nurse destroy his copy of the report and, therefore, he never read it.
During the following three days, Robertson began to exhibit a loss of neurological function. Richards asked Dr. Amick, a neurologist, to assist with the case. As Robertson’s condition deteriorated in the ensuing eight weeks, the doctors concluded that Robertson could not be removed from the respirator since she was unable to breath on her own. Additionally, Robertson could not move her arms or legs, her eyes were crossed, and she had lost bowel and bladder control. In mid-May, Richards, as attending physician, advised the family to consider terminating Leah Robertson’s life support system. The family decided that they wanted a brain scan before making such a decision. The CT Scan revealed water on the brain.
Dr. Heilbrun, a neurosurgeon from the University of Utah Hospital, was called in to consult with the Robertson family. In reviewing the medical records, Dr. Heil-brun noted that Dr. Richardson’s x-ray report had recommended that additional neck x-rays be taken but, in fact, none were ever taken. Also, several doctors, including Dr. Bjornson, testified at trial that the original x-ray clearly showed a fractured neck vertebra.
Additional x-rays were then taken which revealed that Robertson’s neck was broken.1 Heilbrun put Robertson in cervical traction in order to properly position her spine and her neck fracture was then *653fused. The traction and fusion enabled Robertson to breathe again on her own, and she regained the use of both the left and right sides of her body; however, due to neurological damage, Robertson’s eyes were permanently crossed. At the University of Utah Hospital, it was also discovered that Robertson had a broken hip. After three-and-a-half months at the University of Utah Hospital, Robertson returned home. Within five months, Robertson returned to the University of Utah for physical rehabilitation which enabled her to regain control of her bowels and bladder as well as learn to walk with the aid of a walker.
The Robertsons brought suit against Dr. Richards and seven other defendants. All of the defendants, except Dr. Richards, were insured by the same company and settled before trial. The jury returned a verdict declaring that Dr. Richards was not negligent. The Robertsons moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and in the alternative, for a new trial. The court denied the motions and the Robert-sons appeal.
I.
In denying the motion for a new trial, the district court stated:
[T]he evidence was conflicting and depending upon the weight and credibility, the jury chose to give to the evidence, they could have gone either way in rendering their verdict. The fact that the court might have differed and would have weighed the evidence in a different way does not open the way for a new trial.
This finding by the trial court is at issue. We hold that the trial judge, by failing to recognize his power to evaluate the evidence and determine whether a new trial should be granted, erred by applying the wrong standard. Based upon the record, this Court does not rule on whether the conduct of Doctor Richards comported with the applicable standard of care, but notes that this issue is one which requires the trial court to weigh the testimony in making its determination of whether or not to grant a new trial.
It has long been the rule in Idaho that the trial court is given broad discretion in granting a new trial. Jacksha v. Gilbert, 4 Idaho 738, 44 P. 555 (1896). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6) permits granting a new trial when the judge determines the evidence insufficient to justify the jury’s verdict.2
In Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986), we described the power which I.R.C.P. Rule 59(a)(6) vests in the trial court to grant a new trial:
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6) permits the trial court to grant a new trial on all or part of the issues in an action by reason of the “[ijnsufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against the law.” It is well established that the trial judge may grant a new trial based on I.R.C.P. Rule 59(a)(6) where, after he has weighed all the evidence, including his own determination of the credibility of the witnesses, he concludes that the verdict is not in accord with his assessment on the clear weight of the evidence. Sheets v. Agro-West, Inc., 104 Idaho 880, 883, 664 P.2d 787, 790 (Ct.App.1983).
Id. at 766, 727 P.2d at 1194.
In Blaine v. Byers, 91 Idaho 665, 429 P.2d 397 (1967), this Court formulated a two-pronged analysis which the trial court must use in determining whether to grant a new trial. The characteristics of the first prong of the analysis are as follows:
The rule that where there is any competent evidence, though conflicting, to sustain the verdict, the verdict will not be set aside has no application to a trial court in passing upon a motion for a new *654trial. Grimm v. Harper, 84 Idaho 220, 870 P.2d 197; Coast Transport v. Stone, 79 Idaho 257, 313 P.2d 1073. See also Warren v. Eshelman, 88 Idaho 496, 401 P.2d 539. Rather the discretion with which the trial judge is entrusted is a sound legal or judicial discretion, and the trial court may grant a new trial when it is satisfied the verdict is not supported by, or is contrary to, the evidence, or is convinced the verdict is not in accord with the clear weight of the evidence and that the ends of justice would be sub-served by vacating it, or when the verdict is not in accord with either law or justice. (Citations omitted).
Id. at 670-671, 429 P.2d at 402-03.
The first prong directs the trial judge to consider whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and if the ends of justice would be served by vacating the verdict. In Quick, this Court noted that “the judge is free to weigh the conflicting evidence for himself.” 111 Idaho at 767, 727 P.2d at 1194. The Court further emphasized the role the trial judge plays in preventing a miscarriage of justice:
The trial judge is not required to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict-winner. Although the mere fact that the evidence is in conflict is not enough to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial, when a motion for new trial is based on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the judge is free to weigh the conflicting evidence for himself In fact, as Wright & Miller note in their treatise discussing the similar Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, “the granting of a new trial on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence ‘involves an element of discretion which goes further than the mere sufficiency of the evidence. It embraces all the reasons which inhere in the integrity of the jury system itself.’ ” Wright & Miller, supra § 2806 at 45 (citing Tidewater Oil Co. v. Waller, 302 F.2d 638 (10th Cir.1962)).
The trial judge is sitting at the heart of our trial process, a position we on the appellate level cannot duplicate. On the one hand, he does not sit to approve miscarriages of justice when they occur in his courtroom. His authority to set aside the verdict on a new trial motion is supported by clear precedent at common law. Indeed, far from being a denigration or usurpation of the right to a trial by jury, trial judges have always been regarded as an integral part of that right. Wright & Miller, supra § 2806, at 49. On the other hand, respect for the collective wisdom of the jury and the function entrusted to it under our constitution suggests the trial judge should, in most cases, accept the jury’s findings even though he may have doubts about some of their conclusions. Id. Certainly, all that can be expected of our trial judges as they exercise their discretion in this area is that they balance these conflicting principles in light of the particular facts of each case. Id. “If, having given full respect to the jury’s findings, the judge on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, it is to be expected that he will grant a new trial.” Id.; U.S. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948).
Id. at 767-68, 727 P.2d at 1195-96. (Emphasis added).
It is clear under Idaho case law that the trial court has the responsibility to weigh the evidence and make an independent determination as to whether the evidence supports the verdict. Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 733 P.2d 1234 (1986); Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 603 P.2d 575 (1979); Meissner v. Smith, 94 Idaho 563, 494 P.2d 567 (1972); Rosenberg v. Toetly, 93 Idaho 135, 456 P.2d 779 (1969); Mendenhall v. MacGregor Triangle Co., 83 Idaho 145, 358 P.2d 860 (1961); Checketts v. Bowman, 70 Idaho 463, 220 P.2d 682 (1950) (overruled on separate issue in Meissner v. Smith, 94 Idaho 563, 494 P.2d 567 (1972)).
The second prong of the Blaine analysis directs the trial court to consider whether a different result would follow upon retrial:
*655Additionally, the general rule which prevails in this jurisdiction is that a motion for a new trial should not be granted unless it appears that a different result would follow a retrial.
Id. 91 Idaho at 671, 429 P.2d at 403.
Although the trial court did not specifically address the second prong, since it was not considering and applying the Blaine standard, there is language in the memorandum decision which indicates the court might have felt that “a different result would follow a retrial”:
Plaintiffs claim that the overwhelming weight of evidence produced at trial was that Dr. Richards was at fault, in part at least, in not diagnosing and treating the broken neck. Without question there was evidence presented that would justify a finding of fault on the part of Dr. Richards. If this had been a bench trial, the court could make findings and conclusion that would support a finding of fault in spite of the testimony of Dr. Hansen, Dr. Fazio, and Dr. Barth. (Emphasis added).
However, the trial judge failed to apply either prong of the two step analysis because of his mistaken belief that he did not have the authority to review and reevaluate the evidence in order to determine whether a new trial should be granted. As noted above, the district court does have the power to grant a new trial in such situations. In fact, in Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 603 P.2d 575 (1979), this Court recognized that a trial court’s misconception of the law is an abuse of its discretion:
It is clear, then, that this court has been consistent in (1) recognizing the trial court’s important function in passing on motions for new trial, and (2) upholding the trial court’s grant or denial of such a motion unless the trial court has manifestly abused the wide discretion vested in it, or, as in Meissner, supra, misconceived the law, or, as suggested in Blaine v. Byers, supra, unless the trial judge has applied a “question of law” rule to a decision which must be made as question of fact. That doctrine is sound, it is well established, and will be adhered to.
Id. at 625, 603 P.2d at 580.
In assuming that it did not have the power to grant a new trial based upon an independent evaluation of the evidence, the trial court “misconceived the law” by failing to apply the correct standard as expressed in Blaine, supra, and thus, abused its discretion. Hence, the trial court’s decision is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial for the reasons set forth hereafter in Part II.
II.
The Robertsons claimed there was error requiring a new trial because the trial court did not instruct the jury on the definition of proximate cause.
During the jury instruction conference, the court approved Plaintiffs’ Requested Instruction No. 9, which was identical to IDJI 230:
When I use the expression ‘proximate cause,’ I mean a cause of which, in natural or probable sequence, produces the damage complained of. It need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it concurs with some other cause acting at the same time, which in combination with it, causes damage. (Emphasis added).
This instruction was inadvertently misplaced and, as a result, the jury was never instructed on the definition of proximate cause. Consequently, and of particular importance to the trial, the jury was not informed that the acts of two or more persons can each be a proximate cause of an injury. Neither the court nor counsel for either party noticed the omission of the instruction until well after the end of trial.
While the jury was deliberating, however, it submitted the following written question to the court:
Can Question Number 1 be deleted, and Question Number 3 be substituted? Number 1 is so worded as to imply 100 percent negligence, and the testimony is contrary to a yes answer.
*656The “questions” to which the jury was referring were those in the Special Verdict Form:
QUESTION NO. 1. Was there negligence on the part of the Defendant James Richards which was a proximate cause of an aggravation of injuries to Leah Robertson?
Answer: Yes_No_
If you answered the above question “No,” then simply sign the verdict form and inform the bailiff that you are done. If you answered the above question “Yes,” please answer Question No. 2. QUESTION NO. 3. We find that the parties contributed to the aggravated injuries in the following percentages:
(a) The defendant Dr. Richards %
(b) Other health care providers %
TOTAL 100%
The court notified counsel for both parties who then presented argument on how the jury’s confusion on Question No. 1 should be handled. After lengthy discussion, the court amended Question No. 1 to read: “Was there any negligence on the part of the Defendant James Richards which was a proximate cause of an aggravation of injuries to Leah Robertson?” (Emphasis added). No changes were made to Question No. 3. The jurors were called into the courtroom and the judge read the modified question to them.
The term “proximate cause” was specifically mentioned in seven separate jury instructions. However, as the jury’s question to the court suggests, none of the references to proximate cause clarified the meaning of this legal term and the jury was never informed in the basic instructions that there can be more than one proximate cause of an injury. Clearly, the court’s continuing reference to proximate cause without the aid of any definition would not reduce the jury’s confusion. This is especially true when there was more than one possible proximate cause of Mrs. Robertson’s injury.
Furthermore, the court instructed the jury in three separate instructions (similar to the instruction below) that the jury must make its determination “based upon these instructions” and the definition of proximate cause as contained in these instructions:
INSTRUCTION NO. 16
In regard to your determination of whether other health care providers were negligent, you will make that determination based upon these instructions, and in order to conclude that other health care providers were negligent, you must so find by a preponderance of the evidence as defined in these instructions. In regard to your determination of whether the negligence of other health care providers proximately caused injuries sustained by Plaintiff Leah Robertson, you will make that determination based upon these instructions, and in order to conclude that the negligence of other health care providers proximately caused injuries, you must so find based on the definition of proximate cause as contained in these instructions and by a preponderance of the evidence as contained in these instructions. (Emphasis added);
Although we cannot presume to know precisely what was in the minds of the jurors when they submitted their question to the court, it is apparent that there was a definite doubt in the minds of some of the jurors whether Richards was 100% negligent. In other words, the jury’s request to substitute Question 3 for Question 1 on the Special Verdict Form indicates their concern with how negligence should be broken down in this case. Plaintiffs’ Requested Instruction 9 would have eliminated the confusion by explaining that the negligence of separate individuals can combine to cause harm to the plaintiff and, thus, there could be two or more proximate causes of a plaintiff’s injury.
It is the rule in Idaho that where there is evidence in support of the allegations that the negligent acts of several individuals caused the injury complained of, the jury should be instructed that there may be two or more proximate causes of an injury. Pigg v. Brockman, 85 Idaho 492, 381 P.2d 286 (1963). In Pigg, the proximate cause *657instruction given by the court was determined to be erroneous because it might have misled the jury into thinking that only one act of negligence could be the cause of an injury.
Although Pigg was concerned with an erroneous proximate cause instruction, the same underlying concern in Pigg is relevant to this case. It is critical that juries are properly instructed with regard to fundamental legal definitions. There is little difference between the error promulgated by an erroneous instruction and the error promulgated by utterly neglecting to give that same essential instruction to the jury altogether. In Hickman v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 114 Idaho 545, 758 P.2d 704 (1988), we held that a defense verdict would not be overturned and new trial ordered and that we would not address the appropriateness of the proximate cause instruction where the jury found no negligence. This case is distinguishable from Hickman in that in the instant case Instruction No. 16, supra, which provided that guidance to the jury as to how it was to determine the presence or absence of negligence, specifically directed the jury to do so with reference to the requirements of the missing proximate cause instruction. Therefore, the missing instruction would have a direct influence on the determination of negligence in the first instance, which was not the case in Hickman, supra. Thus, the failure to include the essential proximate cause instruction requires the granting of a new trial.
III.
It is required that we pass upon and determine all questions of law presented upon appeal the resolution of which are necessary to the final determination of the case. I.C. § 1-205; Garrett Freightlines, Inc. v. Bannock Paving Co., 112 Idaho 722, 703, 735 P.2d 1033, 1041 (1987). Herein, we shall address two pertinent issues.
(A)
The Robertsons argued that the district court committed reversible error by improperly defining the standard of care in its instructions and by refusing to use their general instructions which define negligence. However, I.C. § 6-1012 establishes the applicable standard of care in Idaho medical malpractice cases, and the district court’s instructions correctly apprised the jury that the defendant was required to meet that standard.3 If the court’s instructions adequately and correctly instruct the jury on the law, no error may be predicated upon failure of the trial court to give a requested instruction. McPheters v. Peterson, 108 Idaho 107, 697 P.2d 447 (1985).
Idaho Code § 6-1012 states in part that “individual providers of health care shall be judged in such cases in comparison with similarly trained and qualified providers of the same class in the same community, taking into account his or her training, experience and fields of medical specialization, if any.” The court’s instructions were based upon the legislative standards set forth in I.C. § 6-1012 and accordingly, the trial court committed no error by giving Instructions 12 and 13 nor by refusing to accept the Robertsons’ requested negligence instructions. McPheters v. Peterson, supra.
*658(B)
The Robertsons argue that defense counsel engaged in intentional prejudicial conduct which entitles them to a new trial. The conduct of which they complain took place during defense counsel’s cross examination of Dr. Bjornson, who was called as plaintiffs’ witness to support their claim that Dr. Richards was negligent. Dr. Bjornson had also been sued by the plaintiffs but settled prior to trial. When Dr. Bjornson testified that his treatment of Robertson was entirely appropriate, Dr. Richards’ counsel, Mr. Quane, asked the doctor why the Robertsons had sued him for $5,000,000. The Robertsons assert that this question addressed to Dr. Bjornson violated the strictures of I.C. § 10-1114 and, therefore, they should be granted a new trial.
In Rojas v. Lindsay Manufacturing Co., 108 Idaho 590, 701 P.2d 210 (1985), we were presented with an issue similar to the one in the instant case. In Rojas, one of the defendants settled with the plaintiff at the beginning of the second day of trial. The trial court informed the jury:
... As you probably have noticed, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Marshall is no longer at the counsel table. And I can advise you that Mr. Marshall and Mr. Rojas have compromised their difficulties and have settled their portion of this case. Therefore, Mr. Marshall is no longer a party defendant.
In final summation, defense counsel utilized the court’s statement as a means of persuading the jury of that defendant’s negligence being the cause of the minor plaintiff’s severe injuries:
Now, you will be asked on the verdict form whether Mr. Marshall was negligent; and I submit to you that he was negligent. And I submit to you that his, his action was what caused this accident. Otherwise why would he have settled?
Anything can hurt you if used improperly. And we submit that the cause of the accident was the improper use of the machine by Kenneth Marshall; and Kenneth Marshall recognized the use of the machine when he injured Pedro Rojas because he settled this case. He got out.
This Court held that failure to object or move for a mistrial did not preserve the issue for appeal.
Counsel for Mrs. Robertson did preserve the issue by a timely objection, and by a motion for mistrial. Unlike the Rojas case, the objectionable question came early in the trial, and it would not have worked an inconvenience to select a new jury and commence anew. Instead, the trial proceeded for four weeks because the trial judge entertained a philosophy against granting mistrials in favor of his producing an instruction which would hopefully cure the prejudice already instilled in the minds of the jurors.
It is helpful to first examine the Robert-sons’ cause of action for alleged medical malpractice, which was not filed until long after the vehicle collision, the long period of hospitalization of Mrs. Robertson, her near death, and long convalescence.
Named as defendants were Dr. Richards, Dr. Richardson, Dr. Amick, Dr. Hansen, and Dr. Bjornson, who were thereafter re*659ferred to in the complaint and in the verdict form collectively as Health Care Providers; also named as defendants were the corporations owning and operating the River-view Hospital and the Parkview Hospital. The Health Care Providers were alleged to be responsible for Mrs. Robertson’s diagnosis, treatment, and care of her injuries, she allegedly becoming a patient of all upon her admission as an emergency patient. The Robertsons’ complaint alleged that “Defendant Health Care Providers, or one or more of them ” were negligent in their diagnosis and care of Mrs. Robertson and had breached their duty to her.
In such circumstances, neither the plaintiffs themselves, nor counsel who undertook their representation could be expected to know or learn which of the Health Care Providers was responsible for the near-fatal diagnosis. Nor could counsel learn the underlying facts until after the lawsuit was filed and discovery was utilized. Depositions were taken of all doctors, including Dr. Bjomson, and there was an abundance of interrogatories. Thereafter there were various dismissals entered of record, presumably upon the basis of subsequent discovery.
Early in the trial, the Robertsons called Dr. Bjomson as a fact witness and he gave the same testimony at trial that he did in his deposition. On cross-examination of Dr. Bjomson, Mr. Quane asked the following questions which were the source of the prejudicial misconduct in this case:
Q: To your knowledge, did your treatment of the fractures turn out okay, of her lower leg fractures?
A: I believe the fracture united, but that was after she left the hospital.
Q: But as far as you understand, she had a good recovery from the fracture?
A: The fracture united. I don’t know about her function.
Q: You haven’t seen her since she was transported to the Salt Lake City, have you?
A: No sir.
Q: Do you have any reason to believe that your reduction of the fractures was in any way inappropriate?
A: No.
Q: Do you feel that your care of her fractures was appropriate?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: If that’s the case, Dr. Bjomson, can you explain to the ladies and gentlemen on the jury why Mr. and Mrs. Leah Robertson sued you for 5 million dollars in this case?
A: I think because I was one of the physicians—
MR. ESPLIN: Objection, Your Honor, I think that that’s the type of evidence— calls for a legal conclusion. He has no way of—
THE COURT: Let’s take a recess. I think — on the objection, why, we’ll have the matters heard outside the presence of the jury. We’ll take a recess. (Emphasis added).
Mr. Quane’s prejudicial statement could obviously cause a multitude of questions to arise in any juror’s mind. It is foreseeable that jurors unfamiliar with civil lawsuits and settlements could reach the prejudicial conclusion that the Robertsons had already received damages for their injury and that it was, in fact, Dr. Bjomson who was solely liable for Mrs. Robertson’s injuries. This is especially true in light of the later jury confusion that developed with respect to the proximate cause issue, which was discussed above.
Obviously, it would be beneficial to his client if Mr. Quane raised the questions and conclusions in the minds of the jury, it is not difficult to deduce why he intentionally inserted the $5,000,000 figure into his question. All speculation triggered by such a prejudicial question was detrimental to Plaintiffs and a fair trial, while such speculation benefitted the defense.
Accordingly, Robertson’s counsel objected and immediately moved for a mistrial, costs and attorney fees on grounds of extreme unfair prejudice.
When the Robertsons stated to the court that Mr. Quane’s question was not a fluke or mistake, but was planned and calculated to cause prejudice for whatever advantage could be gained, Mr. Quane admitted:
*660I planned it, Your Honor, because it was legitimate as impeachment of the plaintiffs in my opinion, and I intend to impeach the plaintiffs by the Complaint if I can get to that point in the trial. (Emphasis added).
Brushing aside the statute’s prohibition, Mr. Quane justified his misconduct by claiming that according to “Bells Handbook” he was entitled to prove Dr. Bjom-son’s negligence and impeach the Robert-sons by showing the jury that the Robert-sons had previously alleged Dr. Bjomson was negligent in the Complaint. He also argued the mere fact Dr. Bjornson had been sued was relevant to show his bias against Dr. Richards, however, he never even attempted to explain that point.
Ultimately, the court sustained the Robertson’s objection to the question and stated that the question was improper. However, notwithstanding the clear language of I.C. § 10-111, the court erroneously ruled that the statute did not control the decision on whether to grant a mistrial.
After a lengthy recess, the court stated to the jury:
I am going to give you an instruction at this time, and I’ll state it to you, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, a question had been asked this doctor why he had been sued by the plaintiffs. The Court must be cautious in making any statement as to the procedures or approaches of a party who brings a lawsuit. But it is a fact that multiple parties may be named in a lawsuit, but at trial the claim may be only against part of any parties originally named. At this point of the trial it’s extremely immaterial that Dr. Bjomson may have been named as a party.
Therefore, I instruct you that the statement in its entirety should be disregarded by you. You need to cast it from your minds and not let it play any part in your deliberations in this case, and not have any bearing on your decision in the case. It should not be given any weight. I hope, with that instruction that you will be able to decide this case on its merits, and we’ll go ahead with the trial. (Emphasis added).
The morning after the Robertson’s request for mistrial was denied, defense counsel once again argued in chambers that he was entitled to ask Dr. Bjornson whether he was a defendant at the time of his deposition and at the time of trial, in order to show Dr. Bjornson’s bias and prejudice against Dr. Richards and inconsistency in his testimony. This conference was not recorded but it is recalled by all counsel. Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or for New Trial.
The Robertsons agreed that such testimony under some circumstances might be relevant to show bias or inconsistency. However, they argued that there was nothing to even hint at actual bias or inconsistency by Dr. Bjornson, and even if there were, admission of the evidence would be outweighed by the unfair prejudicial effect of indirectly disclosing to the jury that Dr. Bjornson had been sued for $5,000,000 and had settled. The court ruled in chambers that defense counsel would be permitted to ask Dr. Bjornson if he had been a defendant at the time of his deposition and if he was still a defendant.
Because of the in chambers ruling, no objection was made when the evidence came in, in order that less attention would be drawn to it. However, to prevent improper argument and similar testimony by other former defendant doctors, the Rob-ertsons subsequently filed a Motion in Li-mine.
As the trial came to a close, Mr. Quane once again tried to put the $5,000,000 question before the jury as revealed by Defendant’s Requested Jury Instruction Number 32. That instruction would have again specifically called the jury’s attention to the $5,000,000 prayer in the Complaint and even asked the jury to disregard the court’s prior instruction:
I previously instructed you to disregard in your determinations the question propounded to Dr. Bjornson, Plaintiffs’ witness, by Defendant’s Counsel, which stated: “Explain to the jury, then, why *661George and Leah Robertson sued you for over $5,000,000 for failing to diagnose the fractured odontoid process.” This instruction is withdrawn. You may consider in your determinations that the fact that Dr. Bjornson was at one time a defendant in this matter, and gave certain testimony in his deposition that may be interpreted to be inconsistent with the testimony he gave at trial. This evidence has been admitted. (Emphasis added).
The court properly refused the instruction. However, during closing, Mr. Quane again brought the pleadings before the jury by arguing that Dr. Bjornson must be negligent because the Robertsons sued him and he settled:
Well, I think the proof in the pudding, the real proof in the pudding, regardless of what Mr. Peck says, relates to the fact that Dr. Donald Bjornson was a defendant. And he was sued by Leah and George Robertson.
Why would they sue him? If, as they claim now, that he came to the emergency room only for the purpose of fixing a fractured leg and he had absolutely nothing to do with the treatment of her neck. To me that’s the acid proof oí why Dr. Bjornson was in the emergency room.
But really don’t actions speak louder than words? (Emphasis added).
The trial transcript shows Mr. Quane continued to belabor the point until the trial court sensed the prejudice and the court interrupted. The following argument ensued in the presence of the jury.
THE COURT: Mr. Quane, I guess I am going to have to interrupt at this point. Early in this trial the Court made a— gave an instruction from the bench, and it was in regard to the questions propounded to Dr. Bjornson in regard to him having been sued. And I told the jury at that time to disregard that question and the answer in its entirety. I told them that it was not to have any bearing on their decision in the case, and it should not be given any weight. And I think to bring it up now takes away from that instruction.
MR. QUANE: Your Honor, the next day, though, you allowed me, and counsel agreed, that I could ask him if he was a defendant when he testified in his deposition and he wasn’t when he testified in court. And that’s why I am basing this—
THE COURT: I mean, I would have to remind the jury that that was my instruction. That ...
MR. QUANE: Well—
THE COURT: Does not have any bearing in this case, and I told them to no — well, not to consider it.
MR. QUANE: Well, Your Honor, it came in the next day without objection from them and by agreement of everybody including the Court. You said I could ask that question if you recall.
THE COURT: No, I don’t recall that.
MR. QUANE: Well ... Your Honor, you said I could ask him on the witness stand if he was a defendant when he testified in his deposition, and that he wasn’t a defendant in the case when he testified in court. And that came without objection, Your Honor, and this is damaging to me to have this come up like this. And I represent to the Court that that was the ruling.
THE COURT: I don’t know if we can find it in the record. We might take a search.
MR. QUANE: They didn’t object.
MR. PECK: Your Honor, the reason I am not responding is because I don’t think it’s proper in front of the jury to argue my case or argue the motion.
MR. QUANE: I am sorry, but it just startled me.
MR. PECK: It is okay. I am just not going to talk about what was discussed, in chambers.
MR. QUANE: It came in without objection. You will agree with that, Mr. Peck?
MR. PECK: I am not going to comment on it in front of the jury.
*662MR. QUANE: Your Honor, I think — I think I’m entitled because you brought this up in this fashion, and I would like to have a recess and take it out of the record because it did.
THE COURT: Well, let’s take a short recess at this time, ladies and gentlemen of the jury; remember the admonition previously given; go ahead and file out. (Emphasis added).
Again the jury was ushered out of the courtroom and, upon their return, the court instructed the jury that they had previously been told to disregard the improper question, but now they could consider Dr. Bjomson’s defendant status in their deliberations since that evidence had come in subsequently. The court did not limit the argument to the purpose of showing bias or inconsistency by Dr. Bjomson, but allowed it to be used for the improper inference that Dr. Bjornson was negligent because he had been sued and settled:
THE COURT: Jury is back in place after a short recess.
The Court needs to make a short explanation to you. It’s become necessary for the Court to make some check on the record as to some of the procedures that took place in initial court proceedings. And I apologize to Mr. Quane. I interrupted him and stopped the flow of his argument. But the Court did give you an earlier instruction in this case when a question was directed by Dr. Bjomson about why he had been sued by the Rob-ertsons. The Court feels that it must make some additional remarks from the bench.
I told you at that time that it was entirely immaterial that Dr. Bjomson may have been sued. The next day the Doctor was asked whether he was a defendant in the suit when he gave, his deposition, and that was allowed. Since that evidence did come in and was allowed, Counsel is entitled to discuss it in his closing argument.
So I apologize. May apologies to you Mr. Quane, and the Court did feel it necessary to do some checking in the record on that. But it did come in the next day. (Emphasis added).
The incident thus graphically re-emphasized in the jury’s mind Mr. Quane’s improper 5 million dollar question immediately before the jury was to begin deliberating. Defense counsel ended with another prejudicial and improper inference of Dr. Bjornson’s “guilt” because he had settled and was no longer “fighting” the case:
And I think it would be an unequivocal distortion of justice and an absolute fal-sery to say on that verdict form that Jim Richards was negligent and to condemn him. All he has is his practice and his pride, and this man has sat here for four weeks fighting this case and fighting. He can’t even practice medicine, but he’s here and he’s fighting. Dr. Donald Bjomson isn’t fighting. He isn’t here in this court, and he isn’t defending. J think his (Richards’) willingness to do this emphasizes his sincere and unabid-ing belief in his innocence. And if he’s guilty of anything, he’s guilty of saving her life. (Emphasis added).
The jury returned a verdict attributing no liability to Dr. Richards. There was no legitimate reason for defense counsel to tell the jury that $5,000,000 was the amount for which the Robertsons had sued Dr. Bjomson. During the arguments on plaintiffs’ Motions for mistrial and for new trial, counsel for defendant never articulated a justification for revealing the $5,000,000 figure, although he readily admitted that he had planned the question in advance.
Once the jury heard the $5,000,000 figure, the prejudicial questions and conclusions that naturally arose in their minds were so fixed that they could not be case aside or ignored based on any instruction by the Court. The prejudice was subsequently and constantly worsened by Mr. Quane’s persistent reference to Dr. Bjorn-son’s negligence. The Robertsons were unfairly prejudiced because they were in the awkward position of not being able to rebut Mr. Quane’s improper attacks by telling the whole story to the jury. Complete disclosure of the settlements with the other *663doctors would have had an equally powerful prejudicial influence upon the jury to either absolve Dr. Richards of all liability or adjust the damage award in line with the earlier settlements. As other courts note:
A jury might conclude that the settling Defendant was the party primarily responsible for the injury, and that the remaining Defendants should therefore be exonerated. De Lude v. Rimek, 351 Ill.App. 466, 473, 115 N.E.2d 561, 565 (1953). It might take the amount of a settlement as a measure of the Plaintiff’s damages. Orr v. Coleman, supra, 455 S.W.2d [59] at 61 [Ky.1970]. It might consider one Defendant’s settlement to be an admission of negligence, and then impute this negligence to a non-settling defendant. Azure v. City of Billings, [182 Mont. 234] 596 P.2d [460] 466 (Mont.1979). Slayton v. Ford Motor Co., [140 Vt. 27] 435 A.2d 946, 947 (Vt.1981).
In Young v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 539 F.Supp. 193 (E.D.Penn.1982), the court refused to allow a settlement to go before the jury, noting:
Implicit in Federal’s position must be the belief that a jury will be less likely to render a large damage award if they are aware that plaintiff has already been compensated by former Co-Defendant, viz Verson.
539 F.Supp. at 194.
The trial court’s attempt to cure the prejudice in this case may well have actually emphasized it. The objection, the lengthy recess, and the initial instruction by the court to disregard the question could naturally raise in the minds of the jury the feeling that they had not heard the whole story and that the Robertsons were keeping them from something important relating to the $5,000,000 question. This is the very quality that requires reversal:
It seems to be the invariable quality of questions the asking of which may require a reversal that in themselves, and without any answers made, they call to the attention of, or suggest to, the jury some fact or claim prejudicial to the opposite party and concerning which counsel has no right to inquire, and in almost every instance of such misconduct, opposing counsel is necessarily placed in the false light of suppressing significant circumstances and attempting to deceive the jury into rendering an unjust verdict. (Emphasis added).
75 Am.Jur.2d. Trial. § 194, p. 277 (1974); See also, Thomas v. Byron Tp., 168 Mich. 593, 134 N.W. 1023 (1912); Myers v. Moffett, 312 S.W.2d 59, 64 (Mo.1958).
This case illustrates why a violation of I.C. § 10-111 is a ground for mistrial; it creates prejudice usually incapable of correction. The court’s initial instruction only addressed the issue of Dr. Bjornson’s status as a former defendant. It did nothing to dispel Mr. Quane’s inference that $5,000,000 or some substantial amount had been obtained from Dr. Bjornson. Further, when the whole issue was brought up again in closing argument, the court revoked its initial instruction leaving the jury with the impression they could consider the improper question for purposes of liability and negating any cure that may have existed.
Idaho Code § 10-111 prohibits “any person” from disclosing to the jury the amount of damages sought in a civil case so that the amount will not have an influence on the jury in resolving the factual issues, including liability. Since the complaint, both in its body and prayer, sought the same $5,000,000 from each health care provider, jointly and severally, the mention of the figure as against one violated the statute directly if the jury were to surmise that each were sued for the like amount. On the other hand if, as argued by the defense, the jury might have speculated that Dr. Bjornson and Dr. Richards were sued for different amounts, then the question would be leading the jury to believe something which was not true. Once the statute has been violated, attempts to correct it only re-emphasize the improper influences raised in the minds of jurors.
Idaho Code § 10-111 originated as House Bill 474 in 1976, backed by the Idaho Medical Association and the Idaho Hospital Association. Eugene Thomas, attorney for the IMA explained the bills were designed *664to speak to the “sky-rocketing cost of insurance to doctors and hospitals” and create a “climate conducive to competition in the insurance field which will result in insurance at a fair price.” He also discussed the reason for House Bill 474:
Mr. Thomas explained that this bill would provide the means whereby a jury could render a verdict on the basis of the evidence rather than being influenced by the amount of the damages being sued for. Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Idaho House Judiciary, Rule and Administration Committee, and Health and Welfare Committee, p. 2 (February 5, 1976).
Mr. Thomas explained that this restriction provides that the portion of the complaint setting forth the dollar amount (The “ad damnum” portion) will not be allowed in the trial. The reason is that the insurance industry feels it distorts the jury’s view of the case. (Emphasis added).
Minutes of Idaho House Health and Welfare Committee, p. 1 (January 30, 1976).
The statute also protects the policy of Idaho law to encourage settlements. Rojas v. Lindsay Manufacturing Co., supra 108 Idaho at 592, 701 P.2d at 212. One-sided application of the statute would discourage settlements in cases with multiple defendants and, thus, be contrary to the statute’s purpose for reducing medical malpractice insurance costs.
An attorney’s intentional, inflammatory, and unfair tactic to violate the statute and confuse and unfairly prejudice the jury should not be tolerated. Such tactics require the firm application of I.C. § 10-111, which requires a mistrial and leaves no discretion to the trial court judge. Thus, a new trial is required under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(1) because this “irregularity in the proceedings” prevented the Robertsons “from having a fair trial.”
Reversed and remanded for new trial. Costs to appellant.
BISTLINE and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.. There was a fracture of the odontoid process of C-2 near the base of the skull. The fracture was displaced to the rear 10mm, striking Robertson’s spinal cord just below the brain stem.
. Rule 59(a)(6) provides in pertinent part:
New trial — amendment of judgment— grounds. — A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues in an action for any of the following reasons:
6. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against the law.
. Instructions 12 and 13 addressed the appropriate standard of care:
INSTRUCTION NO. 12
The plaintiffs in a medical malpractice case have the burden of proving, by direct expert testimony and by a preponderance of all competent evidence, that at the time and place of the alleged incident in question, the defendant negligently failed to meet the applicable standard of health care practiced in the community in which such care allegedly was or should have been provided as such standard then existed with respect to the class of health care provider to which the defendant belonged and in which he was functioning.
In addition, the plaintiffs have the burden of proving that the negligence of the defendant was a proximate cause of the injury and damage to the plaintiffs, and the amount thereof.
INSTRUCTION NO. 13
An individual provider of health care, such as the defendant in this case, shall be judged in comparison with similarly trained and qualified providers of the same class in the same community, taking into account training, experience, and field of specialization. (Emphasis added).
. Idaho Code § 10-111 states:
Amount sought for damages not disclosed to jury. — In any civil action for damages, the amount of general damages sued for shall not be disclosed to the jury by court, counsel or any party and it shall be grounds for mistrial for any person to violate the prohibition of this action whether by specific statements or generalized argument. In furtherance of the provisions of this act it is declared that it is the exclusive province of the jury in a civil action for money damages involving allegations of general damages to resolve such issues of fact and it is against the policy of the state of Idaho for the jurors required to make such determinations to be informed of the particulars of allegations of damages in the pleadings on file with the court, by the arguments of counsel or otherwise, the dollar amount appraisal or evaluation of such damages being the exclusive province of the trier of fact; provided, this act shall not be construed to prohibit proof of damages or presentation of arguments which are legally relevant and proper in view of the record and issues before the court in any action for money damages. (Emphasis added).