(dissenting) — I would sustain the trial court’s finding that the action of the Plan Commission in approving the rezoning requested by the intervenors was arbitrary and capricious. As the trial -court pointed out, there was no evidence that the population of the area was growing; the evidence was that it had stabilized. The evidence -did not show that the shopping center was needed; the most the evidence showed was that it could be supported.
Zoning is tolerable to the property owner because although he gives up a valuable freedom in the use of his property, he is compensated by a certain assurance of stability in the character of his environs. Those who administer the zoning laws have, therefore, a responsibility to see that this stability is preserved until necessity and good planning demand that the character of the neighborhood be altered.
The comprehensive zoning ordinance provides (Sec. 320.10) that if the City Council finds an amendment is of *220public necessity, benefits the general welfare of the community, or constitutes good zoning practice, it may amend the ordinance accordingly.
While the formal recommendation of the Plan Commission may indicate that it made such supportive findings, the record does not show that the members of the council, exercising their independent judgment, were in agreement. The trial court concluded that the remarks of the councilmen indicated the uncertainty of the factual basis of the recommendation. I quote from the memorandum opinion.
The question is not whether or not a shopping center could be financially successful, but whether it is a public necessity of such magnitude so as to justify a rezoning, which amounts to the taking of property without the payment of compensation insofar as nearby home owners are concerned.
In the court’s opinion, the competent evidence of the facts necessary to be proved is insufficient to support a jury verdict favoring rezoning were this case triable to a jury.
After discussing the lack of findings and the statements of the councilmen voting in favor of the rezoning, the trial court said:
These were the four votes in favor of the rezoning. It is obvious from the remarks of the Councilmen that the motivation and reasoning upon which they based their votes was not concerned with necessity and good zoning practice, but upon the desire to close a controversy.
Councilman Jones was the only member who commented on the merits. He said that an area zoned Rl should remain Rl unless there were compelling and unusual reasons for a change. The need for a shopping center was less in 1962 than in prior years, the City was undergoing a decline in population and that there was no reason to further dilute the trade dollars in the area. There being no compelling or unusual reason for a change, the area should remain Rl. He voted against the rezoning.
Councilman Johnson voted against the rezoning without comment.
As the trial court said, in legislating a zone change, a city council has the duty to do so only for pertinent reasons; *221that is, because such zone change benefits the general welfare of the community and is of public necessity, or constitutes good zoning practice. There were no findings that such reasons existed, and had there been such findings, they would not have been supported by the record.
This rezoning will have an adverse effect on the property of adjacent residents. The courts have upheld the validity of zoning ordinances in spite of the fact that they do affect property values and restrict use of property, because of their compensating benefit to all the property involved and to the public welfare in general. It is therefore important that these factors not be disregarded when zoning changes are made; otherwise the justification for the permitted invasion of private property interests disappears. See 58 Am. Jur. Zoning § 16 (1948)
In cases of this kind it is axiomatic that the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the legislative body. The action of a city council will be sustained if the council acted upon due consideration of the facts, even though the court may believe that an erroneous conclusion has been reached. But where, as here, the facts do not support a finding that the public welfare would be served by a zoning change, or that necessity demands it, and no such finding was actually made by the council, I believe the court has the duty to set aside the ordinance as arbitrary and capricious. This court has held that it is warranted in setting aside such a determination if it is arbitrary and constitutes an abuse of discretion. State ex rel. Wenatchee Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses v. Wenatchee, 50 Wn.2d 378, 312 P. 2d 195 (1957).
I would affirm the trial court.