I dissent.
In construing section 27428 as requiring “private attorney general” plaintiffs to pay attorneys fees incurred by successful defendants, the majority ignore the cardinal principle of statutory interpretation, which mandates that statutes be construed to effectuate the legislative purpose underlying the enactment. Although the language of section 27428, read in isolation, is susceptible to the majority’s interpretation, it is equally susceptible to the interpretation that attorneys fees are to be awarded only to persons who have brought actions to enforce the act. The statute is not unambiguous. When the ambiguous statutory language is construed in conjunction with the accompanying statutory provisions and with a view to the section’s manifest purpose of encouraging private attorney general enforcement actions, it becomes clear that the section should be interpreted as authorizing an attorneys fee award only to persons who successfully prosecute enforcement actions under the 1972 coastal act. In reaching the contrary conclusion, the majority fail to heed Justice Frankfurter’s wise admonition that “[statutes ... are not inert *159exercises in literary composition. They are instruments of government, and in construing them ‘the general purpose is a more important aid to the meaning than any which grammar or formal logic may lay down.’ ” (United States v. Shirey (1959) 359 U.S. 255, 260-261 [3 L.Ed.2d 789, 793-794, 79 S.Ct. 746].)
Analysis of the statutory interpretation issue before us should properly begin, I believe, by placing section 27428 in its proper legislative setting. Section 27428 was adopted as part of the 1972 Coastal Zone Conservation Act initiative, an initiative measure sponsored by a coalition of environmentalist organizations after the state Legislature had repeatedly failed to adopt. proposed bills that would have provided for the preparation of a long-range plan to govern development and conservation of California’s precious coastal 'region. (See generally Adams, Proposition 20—A Citizens' Campaign (1973) 24 Syracuse L.Rev. 1019.)
In State of California v. Superior Court (Veta) (1974) 12 Cal.3d 237, 253 [115 Cal.Rptr. 497, 524 P,2d 1281], we briefly summarized the purpose and operation of the 1972 initiative: “The Act declares that the coastal zone is a valuable resource belonging to all of the people, that its permanent protection is a paramount concern to the citizens of the state, and that in order to protect this valuable resource it is necessary to study the coastal zone, prepare a comprehensive plan for its orderly, long-range conservation and management, and insure that any development which occurs in the permit area during the study and planning period will be consistent with the objectives of the Act. [Citation.] . . . Among the objectives of the coastal zone plan are the avoidance of irreversible and irretrievable commitments of coastal zone resources. [Citation.] In order to assure that the purposes of the Act are not impaired during the period in which the plan is in the process of formulation, those who seek to perform any development within the permit area are, with certain exceptions, required to seek a permit from the Commission.” (See also Brown v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 52, 54 [123 Cal.Rptr. 377, 538 P.2d 1137].)
Recognizing that the policing of on-going development and other activities along California’s lengthy coastline to ensure compliance with the act was certain to pose substantial problems for the limited staff of public officials charged with that task, the draftsmen of the coastal initiative, taking their cue from similar provisions contained in earlier *160federal civil rights and environmental protection legislation,1 included in the initiative a series of provisions (Pub. Resources Code, §§ 27425-27428) aimed at enlisting the aid of public-minded citizens in the role of “private attorney general,” to help in the critically important enforcement effort.2 Eliminating traditional “standing” restrictions, these sections explicitly authorized “any person” to maintain an action to enjoin a violation of the act or to bring suit on behalf of the state to recover civil penalties under the act. (Id., §§ 27425, 27426.) The sections also specifically suspended the bond requirement normally imposed in injunction actions (id., § 27425), recognizing the need to remove such an economic barrier if citizens and public interest organizations, who would reap no monetary rewards from such actions, were to be encouraged to play a major role in enforcing the act.
Section 27428 was included as one of the provisions in this “private attorney general” segment of the act. The principal purpose for its inclusion is, I think, quite clear. At the time the initiative was drafted, experience with the private attorney general concept had demonstrated that when no potential monetary recovery was available to defray the extensive costs of litigation, private citizens were seriously inhibited from instituting “public interest” actions if they inevitably were required to bear their own attorneys fees. As the United States Supreme Court observed in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises (1968) 390 U.S. 400, 402 [19 L.Ed.2d 1263, 1265-1266, 88 S.Ct. 964]: “If successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorneys’ fees, few [private attorneys general] would be .in a position to advance the public interest by invoking the injunctive power of the federal courts.” (See generally King & Plater, The Right to Counsel Fees in Public Interest Environmental *161Litigation (1973) 41 Tenn.L.Rev. 27; Note, Awarding Attorney and Expert Witness Fees in Environmental Litigation (1973) 58 Cornell L.Rev. 1222.)
To overcome this problem, section 27428 was drafted to guarantee that any person who successfully prosecuted an action either to enjoin a violation of the act or to recover civil penalties (payable to the state) for violation of the act could recover his attorneys fees from the party who was found to have violated the act. The prior cases and numerous academic commentaries that have discussed the question uniformly agree that section 27428’s main purpose was “to encourage private plaintiffs to enforce the act.” (Sanders v. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 661, 673 [126 Cal.Rptr. 415]; see, e.g., Klittgaard & Jones v. San Diego Coast Regional Com. (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 99, 109 [121 Cal.Rptr. 650]; Miller, Enforcing the Coastal Act—Citizen Suits and Attorney’s Fees (1974) 49 State Bar J. 236, 240-241; Comment, Coastal Controls in California: Wave of the Future? (1974) 11 Harv.J.Legis. 463, 476; Note, Saving the Seashore: Management Planning for the Coastal Zone (1973) 25 Hastings L.J. 191, 201.)
The majority do not deny that the principal purpose underlying section 27428 was to facilitate “private attorney general” suits, but they reason that in light of the “plain language” of the statute, the trial court’s conclusion that the section accords attorneys fees to prevailing defendants as well as to prevailing plaintiffs is irrefutable. The majority emphasize that section 27428 provides simply that “[a]ny person who prevails in a court action brought to enjoin a violation of this division or to recover civil penalties shall be awarded his costs, including reasonable attorneys fees” (italics added), and that the 1972 coastal act itself contains a broad definition of the term “person” which does not limit that term to “plaintiffs.”3 Inasmuch as the respondent corporation and cities are clearly “persons” under the act’s definitional section, the majority conclude that, read “literally,” section 27428 unambiguously authorizes the attorneys fee awards rendered in the instant case.
This conclusion is flawed in a number of respects. First, I cannot agree that the language of section 27428, even when read in isolation, “unambiguously” supports the trial court’s conclusion. Although the statutory language is susceptible to the trial court’s interpretation, the section’s wording is equally susceptible to the interpretation that *162attorneys fees are to be awarded to “any person who prevails in an action [which he has] brought to enjoin a violation of this division or to recover civil penalties....”
Moreover, our cases have long made clear that a statutory provision cannot be interpreted in a vacuum but must “be construed with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part....” (Stafford v. L.A. etc. Retirement Board (1954) 42 Cal.2d 795, 799 [270 P,2d 12].) When read in conjunction with its accompanying statutory provisions, it becomes clear that section 27428’s “plain language” does not indicate a legislative intent to authorize attorneys fees for both plaintiffs and defendants.
Sections 27425, 27426 and 27428, read in sequence, provide: “Any person may maintain an action for declaratory and equitable relief to restrain violation of this division. No bond shall be required for an action, under this section.” (Italics added.) “Any person may maintain an action for the recovery of civil penalties provided in Sections 27500 and 27501.” (Italics added.) “Any person who prevails in a civil action -brought to enjoin a violation of this division or to recover civil penalties shall be awarded his costs, including reasonable attorneys feés.” (Italics added.)4 In this context, the “any person” terminology of section 27428 appears clearly to refer to the identical “any person” language of sections 27425 and 27426, i.e., persons who have been granted broad standing rights to institute actions for injunctive relief or for the recovery of. statutory penalties. Thus, viewing these related provisions as a w;hole, I believe that the statutory language of section 27428 supports Great Lakes’ contention that the provision was intended to authorize attorneys fees only to plaintiffs who prevail in actions instituted pursuant to sections 27425 and 27426.
In this' regard, it is significant that in designating the persons entitled to recover attorneys fees, the draftsmen of section 27428 utilized the “any person” language of sections 27425 and 27426, rather than the phrase “any party” or “prevailing party.” Statutes which contemplate the recovery of attorneys fees by prevailing plaintiffs or defendants commonly utilize the “prevailing party” terminology (see, e.g., Civ. Code, §§ 1811.1, 2984.4), and if the draftsmen had actually intended to authorize the recovery of attorneys fees by both plaintiffs and defen*163dants, they would probably have written the statute in such terms. Because section 27428 does not accord attorneys fees to the “prevailing party,” the majority’s reliance on Kalico, Inc. v. Dooley (1961) 198 Cal.App.2d 379 [17 Cal.Rptr. 799]—a case construing a statutory provision which specifically utilized su.ch language—is clearly misplaced.5
Finally, even if a literal reading of section 27428 supported the trial court’s interpretation, respondents’ suggestion that the legislative purpose of the provision must give way to such literal reading flies in the face of a cardinal principle of statutory construction long recognized by this court. As we have explained on many occasions: “The fundarfiental rule of statutory construction is that the court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.” {Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645 [335 P.2d 672]; Cal. Toll Bridge Authority v. Kuchel (1952) 40 Cal.2d 43, 53 [251 P.2d 4]; Dickey v. Raisin Proration Zone No. 1 (1944) 24 Cal.2d 796, 802 [151 P.2d 505, 157 A.L.R. 324].) “Once a particular legislative intent has been ascertained, it must be given effect ‘ “even though it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute.” ’ [Citations omitted] . . . ‘ “The mere literal construction of a section in a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed to the intention of the legislature apparent by the statute; and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other construction it is to be adopted to effectuate that intention. The intent prevails over the letter, and the letter will, if possible, be so read as to conform to the spirit of the act.” ’ ” {Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 8 Cal.3d 247, 259 [104 Cal.Rptr. 761, 502 P.2d 1049].)
As already explained, considered in light of the general purposes of the 1972 coastal initiative and the related statutory provisions, it is clear that section 27428 was adopted to encourage and to facilitate private citizen enforcement suits under the act. (See, e.g., Sanders v. Pacific Gas *164& Elec. Co., supra, 53 Cal.App.3d 661, 673; Klittgaard & Jones, Inc. v. San Diego Coast Regional Com., supra, 48 Cal.App.3d 99, 109.) As a number of commentators have observed, however, the inevitable consequence of the majority’s interpretation would be to deter, and perhaps “effectively eliminate,” such private attorney general actions, for private citizens would not only lack any economic incentive to pursue such suits but would face the prospect of a sizeable attorney fee liability—in addition to their own attorneys fee—if they should lose. (See Comment, Coastal Controls in California: Wave of the Future? (1974) 11 Harv.J.Legis. 463, 476; Miller, Enforcing the Coastal Act—Citizens Suits and Attorneys Fees (1974) 49 State Bar J. 236, 342-343.)6 Thus, since the majority’s interpretation of the statute leads to results clearly at variance with the legislative intent in adopting the section, past cases establish that such an interpretation must be rejected. “ ‘Certainly the language of a statute should never be so construed as to nullify the will of the legislature, or to cause the law to conflict with the apparent purpose had in view by the lawmakers.’ ” {Dickey v. Raisin Proration Zone No. 1, supra, 24 Cal.2d 796, 802; see, e.g., East Bay Garbage Co. v. Washington Township Sanitation Co. (1959) 52 Cal.2d 708, 713 [344 P.2d 289].)
Accordingly, I believe that the trial court erred in interpreting section 27428 as according respondents a right to an attorneys fee award. I would reverse the trial court orders.
Sullivan, J.,* * concurred.
See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, section 204(b), 42 United States Code section 2000a-3(b); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, section 304, 42 United States Code section I857h-2; Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, section 105(g), 33 United States Code section 1415(g); Noise Control Act of 1972, section 12, 42 United States Code section 4911.
The importance of the role played by “citizen suits” in protecting the environment was recognized in a 1971 annual report by the United States Council on Environmental Quality: “Perhaps the most striking recent legal development has been the step-up in citizen ‘public interest’ litigation to halt degradation of the environment. In the face of a history of administrative decisions that ignored environmental impacts and against a tide of legislative delays in developing pollution control law, citizens concluded thát they must use the courts to cure the neglect. The citizen litigation has not only challenged specific government and private actions which were environmentally undesirable, it has speeded court definition of what is required of Federal agencies under environmental protection statutes.” (U.S. Council on Envir. Quality, 2d. Ann. Rep. (1971) pp. 155-156.)
Section 27105, a provision of the 1972 coastal legislation, provides: “ ‘Person’ includes any individual, organization, partnership and corporation, including any utility and any agency of federal, state and local government.”
Section 27427, the only intervening statutory provision, reads simply: “The provisions of this article shall be in addition to any other remedies available at law.”
The Kalico decision suggests that a statutory provision which provides for the recovery of attorneys fees by prevailing plaintiffs, but denies such recovery by prevailing defendants, would raise serious constitutional questions. (198 Cal.App.2d at p. 382.) In California, however, it has been clear for well over a half-century that such legislative differentiation is constitutionally permissible so long as it is “based upon some difference bearing a reasonable and just relation” to a permissible legislative purpose. (Engebretson v. Gay (1910) 158 Cal. 30, 32-33 [109 P. 880]; see also Beyerbach v. Juno Oil Co. (1954) 42 Cal.2d 11, 22 [265 P.2d 1]; Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Matthews (1899) 174 U.S. 96 [43 L.Ed. 909, 19 S.Ct. 609].) That standard is clearly met here and neither respondents nor the majority contend that Great Lakes’ suggested interpretation of section 27428 would raise any constitutional question.
Respondents suggest that their proposed interpretation of section 27428 would not undermine the statute’s principal purpose, but would merely protect defendants from the threat of frivolous lawsuits. Section 27428, however,, does not confine its reach to frivolous actions or grant a trial court discretion to award or withhold attorneys fees, but rather provides that a trial court “shall” award attorneys fees in all situations encompassed by the statute. Accordingly, if respondents’ interpretation were adopted, “private attorney general” plaintiffs who act in the highest good faith would inevitably face the ominous prospect of a large attorney fee liability if their claim should ultimately be rejected.
Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.