Dissenting Opinion by
Judge PELLEGRINI.I respectfully dissent from the majority’s rationale that Section 1361 of the Public School Code of 1949 (School Code)1 does not require the School District of the City of Pittsburgh (School District) to continue busing non-public school students to both morning and afternoon kindergarten classes when its own morning and afternoon kindergarten session had been expanded to full-day programs.
Section 1361(1) of the School Code2 provides that once a public school district *697implements busing at the kindergarten, elementary or secondary school level, it also must provide identical transportation services to non-public schools located within the school district or within a ten-mile radius of the school district. As required by Section 1361(1) of the School Code, the School District provided busing services for students attending both public and non-public half-day kindergarten sessions. Prior to the commencement of the 2000-2001 school year, however, the School District chose to expand its half-day kindergarten programs to full-day sessions, and by memorandum dated March 31, 2000, informed private and parochial schools that all of its mid-day busing services would be suspended as a result of the expansion. In the memorandum, the School District noted that it would only transport students attending half-day kindergarten programs either to school at the regular start time or from school at the regular dismissal time.
Parents of children attending the half-day kindergarten programs in private and parochial schools (Parents) filed a suit in equity in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court) seeking a preliminary injunction to enjoin the School District from discontinuing its mid-day busing services. Finding that the School District was required by Section 1361(1) of the School Code to continue its mid-day service to the private and parochial schools, the trial court subsequently granted Parents’ injunction. The trial court determined that once free busing was provided by the School District to all kindergarten students, Section 1361 specifically required the School District to adhere to the non-public school calendar and not its own in establishing busing schedules.
While purportedly affirming the trial court’s grant of a preliminary injunction and agreeing with the School District’s position, the majority states that the “identical provision” in Section 1361(1) only requires a school district to provide nonpublic school kindergarten students with the same full-day transportation it provides its own students, and because it has eliminated mid-day transportation services for its students, those services provided to private and parochial schools must also be eliminated. The majority determined that although Section 1361(1) did not require private and parochial schools to follow the School District’s exact busing schedule in order to be eligible for transportation services, it was required to set “regular school hours” consisting of one round-trip rather than a multitude of busing options not offered by the School District at their own schools.
The majority places great reliance on the fact that private and parochial schools that have half-day kindergartens have not established “regular school hours” when, in fact, the half-day programs recognized as “regular school horn’s” were not even a subject of dispute until the School District decided to eliminate its half-day programs. In effect, what the majority is saying is that when the public schools change their *698“regular school hours,” so must all private and parochial schools if they want their students to be able to avail themselves of transportation services. To the contrary, Section 1361(1) requires that non-public school students receive transportation opportunities that are identical to public schools. What “identical” means is that it is of no moment as to what time of the day these services are provided or that they are provided at various times of the day, as long as both public and private and parochial school students are provided with the same service, i.e., transportation to and from kindergarten.
Accordingly, I dissent.
. Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, as amended, 24 P.S. § 13-1361(1).
. Section 1361(1) provides in pertinent part:
The board of school directors in any school district may, out of the funds of the district, provide for the free transportation of any resident pupil to and from the kindergarten, elementary school, or secondary school in which he is lawfully enrolled, provided that such school is not operated for profit and is located within the district boundaries or outside the district boundaries at a distance not exceeding ten miles by the nearest public highway ... When provision is made by a board of school directors for the transpor*697tation of public school pupils to and from such schools ... the board of school directors shall also make identical provision for the free transportation of pupils who regularly attend nonpublic kindergarten, elementary and high schools not operated for profit to and from such schools ... Such transportation of pupils attending nonpublic schools shall be provided during regular school hours on such dates and periods that the nonpublic school not operated for profit is in regular session, according to the school calendar officially adopted by the directors of the same in accordance with provisions of law. The board of school directors shall provide such transportation whenever so required by any of the provisions of this act or of any other act of Assembly.
24 P.S. § 13-1361(1) (Emphasis added).