dissenting, with whom RAPER, Chief Justice, joins.
I dissent. I agree with the contention of the defendants that this matter is prematurely in the courts, and that the board of control should first apply its expertise in passing on the issues.
“Beneficial use” of water is paramount. Water is a precious commodity in this state. It has always been so, but with the advent of new uses, the changes in the relative importance of the varied uses, and the increased demands on its use, the necessity to achieve beneficial use of every drop is an overriding concern. As stated by Justice Raper in his dissent in State By and Through Christopulos v. Husky Oil, Wyo., 575 P.2d 262, 275 (1978):
“The concept of beneficial use may thus be characterized as the ultimate foundation and measure of every water right held under the priority appropriation system prevailing in this and other arid states. Budd v. Bishop, Wyo.1975, 543 P.2d 368, 373; Lincoln Land Co. v. Davis, U.S.D.C.Wyo.1939, 27 F.Supp. 1006, 1008; McNaughton v. Eaton, 1952, 121 Utah 394, 242 P.2d 570. * * * ”
All issues involving water must be controlled by this concept of beneficial use. The concept is simple in principle, but it is complex in application. This complexity and the continuing and long time future ramifications resulting from implementing it mandate attention and direction by those who have experience and expertise in the area.
The necessary expertise and experience in water matters are with the board of control and the office of the state engineer.1 They are conversant with the new problems occasioned by increased industrial and municipal needs for water; additional use of water for recreational purposes; transbasin diversions; interstate aspects of water availability and control; intrusion into underground acquifers; diversions of underground streams; development of chemical and physical methods for control of initial flow, for control of return flow and for control of storage of water; pollution; and waste. And they are conversant with the interplay of these new problems on customary and historical use of water.
The overriding importance of beneficial use of water and the primary authority of the board of control and of the state engineer over such use have recognition in our *959constitution. Section 31 of Art. 1, Wyoming Constitution,2 provides:
“Water being essential to industrial prosperity, of limited amount, and easy of diversion from its natural channels, its control must be in the state, which, in providing for its use, shall equally guard all the various interests involved.”3
All of Art. 8, Wyoming Constitution, has to do with irrigation and water rights.4 Section 3 of Art. 8, Wyoming Constitution, provides that “[priority of appropriation for beneficial uses shall give the better right.” Portions of § 2 of Art. 8, Wyoming Constitution, are emphasized as follows:
“There éhall be constituted a board of control, to be composed of the state engineer and superintendents of the water divisions; which shall, under such regulations as may be prescribed by law, have the supervision of the waters of the state and of their appropriation, distribution and diversion, and of the various officers connected therewith. Its decisions to be subject to review by the courts of the state.” (Emphasis supplied.) ■
The emphasized portions of the foregoing reflect two things: The supervision of the board of control in appropriation, distribution and diversion of water is primary, and the decisions resulting from such supervision are subject to review by the courts.
Considering these two things in reverse order, this court has held that this section of the constitution directs that “[t]he jurisdiction of the courts is (aside from appeals) confined to determine the rights of the parties in individual cases to the extent that the board has not acted.” Campbell v. Wyoming Development Co., 55 Wyo. 347, 100 P.2d 124, 134, reh. den. 102 P.2d 745 (1940). We said in White v. Wheatland Irrigation District, Wyo., 413 P.2d 252, 258-259 (1966):
“ * * * The board has broad powers, direct and implied. [Citations.] It has long been recognized that orders of the board establishing such rights are clothed with the dignity of decrees entered by the courts. [Citation.]
“ * * * the board is no doubt better equipped than a court to determine such intricate and involved matters. [Citation.]
“ * * * adjudicated water rights of long standing * * * will not be set aside unless the proof of just cause is ‘clear, cogent and convincing,’ [Citation.]”
See Farm Investment Co. v. Carpenter, 9 Wyo. 110, 61 P. 258 (1900); Kearney Lake, Land & Reservoir Company v. Lake DeS-met Reservoir Company, Wyo., 475 P.2d 548 (1970), supplemented 487 P.2d 324 (1971); Hamp v. State, 19 Wyo. 377, 118 P. 653 (1911). In Laramie Irrigation & Power Co. v. Grant, 44 Wyo. 392, 13 P.2d 235, 240 (1932) the court said:
“ * * * The term ‘stream’ has not been defined by the Legislature. Nor is there any provision that, in order for the board of control to proceed to determine or adjudicate water rights, it must proceed to determine those of a whole watershed or of a whole stream at the same time. Taking all these facts into consideration, we think that the board was given a discretion in deciding the meaning of the term ‘stream.’ ”
This is not to say that the courts are without jurisdiction in water matters. Anita Ditch Company v. Turner, Wyo., 389 P.2d 1018 (1964); Simmons v. Ramsbottom, 51 Wyo. 419, 68 P.2d 153 (1937); Farm Investment Co. v. Carpenter, supra. However, except in those instances where the unusual or emergency nature of the matter dictates otherwise, a party should be compelled to obtain final available administrative action *960before seeking judicial action. State ex rel. Mitchell Irr. Dist. v. Parshall, 22 Wyo. 318, 140 P. 830 (1914). The purpose of such was set forth in United States v. Zweifel, 10th Cir., 508 F.2d 1150, 1156 (1975), cert. den. sub nom. Roberts v. United States, 423 U.S. 829, 96 S.Ct. 47, 46 L.Ed.2d 46, reh. den. 423 U.S. 1008, 96 S.Ct. 438, 46 L.Ed.2d 379:
“ * * * ‘When there is a basis for judicial action, independent of agency proceedings, courts may route the threshold decision as to certain issues to the agency charged with primary responsibility for governmental supervision or control of the particular industry or activity involved.’ [Citations.] The principal reason behind the practice of so routing certain issues to agency tribunals is the need for orderly and sensible coordination of the work of agencies and of the courts. ‘Whether the agency happens to be expert or not, .a court should not act upon subject matter that is peculiarly within the agency’s specialized field without taking into account what the agency has to offer, for otherwise parties who are subject to the agency’s continuous regulation may become the victims of uncoordinated and conflicting requirements.’ 3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 19.01 (1958).”
In the past, the water and the water rights here involved were subject to board action in determination of beneficial use. Appropriations were granted on Sugar Creek. The board has, therefore, determined it to be a stream. The city’s appropriation was obtained from the board. It cannot be said that the board has not acted on the core of the problem — beneficial use. It should be permitted to augment that action and apply its expertise to the issues here presented. In the words of Justice Raper in State By and Through Christopulos v. Husky Oil, supra:
“ * * * This court has encouraged use of the board of control and mentioned, ‘[t]he ludicrous spectacle of learned judges solemnly decreeing water rights.’ Louth v. Kaser, Wyo.1961, 364 P.2d 96.” 575 P.2d at 282.
The majority opinion has here invalidated certificates of appropriation issued by the board of control — and this is done in a proceeding which is collateral to the proceeding in which the appropriations were granted. The majority opinion has here countermanded the determination by the board of control that Sugar Creek' is a stream — again in a collateral proceeding to that determination. These determinations by the board should have been subject to reexamination and reanalysis by the board, whereby its expertise could be applied to gauge the effect of new developments on them and to insure maximum beneficial use of the waters involved. The result could well be the same as that reached by the majority opinion. But the application of the expertise of the board may have identified serious shortcomings in this result. Whatever result reached, it would be subject to court review. The court could approve or disapprove, but the court would have the benefit of the expertise of the board. It may not agree with the application of the expertise, but the decision of the courts would be made in the manner circumscribed by statute, court rules and precedent in the normal legal context. Review would be in conformity with principles established for appeal and error.
The other item emphasized in the foregoing quotation from § 2, Art. 8 concerns that which is placed under the supervision of the board of control, i. e, “the waters of the state and of their appropriation, distribution and diversion.” This supervision is extensive. It is not limited to appropriation of water — although historically appropriation and that immediately incident thereto was the first task for the board and was a major interest of the board. The constitutional provision directs five areas for such supervision: (1) generally of the waters of the state; (2) appropriation of such; (3) distribution of such; (4) diversion of such; and (5) of the various officers connected therewith.5 This direction is not one which may be waived by the board or by the state *961engineer. Nor can they avoid the constitutionally imposed obligations by delay in favor of court disposition before taking action. The duties are not permissive. They are mandatory.
Supervision of “distribution and diversion” includes supervision of water which is not appropriated, and it includes supervision of appropriated water at times and places other than those involved at the initial distribution or diversion. It includes supervision of individual appropriations, of transbasin appropriations, of trans-state deliveries, of underground water — in short, of all water. Sussex Land & Live Stock Co. v. Midwest Refining Co., 8th Cir. 1923, 294 F. 597, 603, on appeal from U.S.D.C., Wyoming, has been said to stand for the proposition that, pursuant to §§ 1 and 3 of Art. 8 of the Wyoming Constitution, a priority of right in water includes the quality as well as the quantity. Quality is a proper concern of the board of control. In the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act, § 35-11-101 et seq., W.S.1977 the legislature was careful to preserve the preeminence of the jurisdiction of the state engineer and the board of control in water matters by providing:
“Nothing in this act:
“(c) Limits or interferes with the jurisdiction, duties or authority of the state engineer, the state board of control, * * Sec. 35-11-1104, W.S.1977.
The majority opinion overlooks this primary jurisdiction and the extensive control of quantity and quality of water in the board of control for the purpose of securing beneficial use of it. The majority opinion lays its cornerstone on the proposition that an importer of water has the unobstructed right to reuse, successively use and make disposition of imported waters. The importer, then, would have supervision over the appropriation, distribution and diversion of such water. Imported water is no less precious than any other kind of water. The mere fact that it is transported from one basin to another does not make it more subject to waste, more subject to the whims of any private citizen, less subject to the requirement of beneficial use, or less subject to the constitutional supervision of the board of control. If there is case law to the contrary, I would reverse it. If there is statutory law to the contrary, I would hold such to be unconstitutional.
Since the supervision by the board of control is subject to court review, it cannot be arbitrary or characterized by an abuse of discretion. It is also subject to regulations prescribed by law. Section 2, Art. 8, Wyoming Constitution.
Constitutional aspects of the issues here presented make proper the conclusions reached in this dissent. But the application of legislative enactments relative to permit requirements, beneficial use, relative rights of appropriators, changing and enlarging use, preferred uses, storage and reservoir requirements, and change in points of diversion and in place of use would result in the same. In support thereof, it is sufficient for the purpose here to refer to the dissents of Justices Raper and Guthrie in State By and Through Christopulos v. Husky Oil, supra,6 wherein the situation is fully analyzed and properly reasoned.
Neither these constitutional aspects nor these statutory aspects are addressed to conclusion in the majority opinion. It stops short of considering the issues of change in use or change in place of use. And it does not direct referral of such issues to the board of control. It backs into its holding. It does not concern itself with the rights of all users to the water in question. The loss of use of water by appellants is to it immaterial. It does not address the question of whether or not the city had relinquished control of the water discharged over the years into Sugar Creek. If it were a relinquishment, rather than reuse or recapture *962before losing control, there would be no question but that Sugar Creek is a stream and that appellants’ appropriations were independent of the city’s use. See Lasson v. Seely, 120 Utah 679, 238 P.2d 418 (1951) where the court held that a deposit of sewage back into a stream channel after having been used to full extent intended by the city becomes part of state water and again subject to appropriation on the basis of priority.
The majority opinion was predicated entirely on the proposition that an importer of water has the unrestricted right to change its use and point of discharge without reference to beneficial use. Its reliance on Bower v. Big Horn Canal Association, 77 Wyo. 80, 307 P.2d 593 (1957) and on Binning v. Miller, 55 Wyo. 451, 102 P.2d 54 (1940) to sustain this proposition is without recognition of the fact that the seepage water recaptured by the appropriators in those cases was water escaping inadvertently from them and was not water which was intentionally abandoned and to which control was relinquished, as in this case. Likewise, reliance on City and County of Denver Board of Water Commissioners v. Fulton Irrigating Ditch Company, 179 Colo. 47, 506 P.2d 144 (1972) is misplaced. The Colorado constitutional and statutory provisions relative to procedural water law are so different from those of Wyoming that they cannot logically be used as precedent. Further, the many problems resulting in Colorado from the transbasin diversion involved in that case are to be avoided in Wyoming, if possible.
Once the relinquishment by the city of the control of the discharge into Sugar Creek is recognized, it follows that Sugar Creek is a natural stream and that appellants’ appropriations are valid and vested. The city project would then be subject to the statutes relative to change of use and change in place of use. The board of control would make the determination relative thereto on the basis of beneficial use.
The parties to this action spent considerable effort addressing the issue of whether or not Sugar Creek is a natural stream. The desirability and necessity of bringing available expertise to this issue is obvious. As already indicated, the board has recognized it to be such in the past, issuing certificates of appropriation from it. It appears as a stream on maps of the U.S. Geological Survey. Also as already indicated, the board has been given discretion in deciding the meaning of the word “stream.” Laramie Irrigation & Power Company v. Grant, supra. In making its determination, the board may apply that set out in one case decided by this court as the elements of a natural stream, i. e., consisting of a channel, well-defined bed and banks, and a current of water. State v. Hiber, 48 Wyo. 172, 44 P.2d 1005 (1935), but it should note the court cautioned at p. 1009 that:
“ * * * Too much stress ought not, perhaps, be placed upon any one of the elements mentioned, and all should be given due consideration. * * * ”
The board could note that the court recognized a “water course” created by man to be a natural stream in Binning v. Miller, supra. A composite dictionary definition of the words “natural” and “stream” could be “water, on or under the surface, pertaining to, produced by or conferred by nature (in contrast to that which is artificial) which has a flow or a current.” The board might find that Sugar Creek is no longer a natural stream — or, perhaps, never was such. The definition used in the majority opinion of an ephemeral stream, i. e., one that runs only in direct response to rainfall and high snow-melt, is not very helpful. It would apply to the Mississippi River. An ephemeral stream (one running for a very short time) could be a natural stream. In our arid country, there are many of them. The point is that the board of control should exercise its expertise in making this determination. It would then be subject to court review.
There are other aspects of this matter which should be subject to the board’s expertise and determination before court review.
The board may pass on the extent to which principles and procedures applicable to water used for irrigation should be also applied, or should not be applied, to water used for municipal purposes under the cir*963cumstances here present. For example, return flow from irrigation is not the same as that resulting from municipal use. Return flow from irrigation is usually subsurface and passes through many channels, generally very small in size. The return flow from a municipality is generally a collection of discard from sanitary and storm sewers discharged in comparatively large volume in one or few channels. The considerations under which the two types of return flow are treated will probably differ substantially.
Beneficial use of appropriations for irrigation can be controlled by setting a limit in relation to the amount of land to be irrigated. This limit is statutorily set at one cubic foot per second for seventy acres. Section 41-4-317, W.S.1977.7 The use and reuse of the one cubic foot per second on the seventy acres before allowing return flow is proper if it is beneficially used. Even the limit cannot be taken if all of it is not beneficially used. Quinn v. John Whitaker Ranch Co., 54 Wyo. 367, 92 P.2d 568 (1939); Budd v. Bishop, Wyo., 543 P.2d 368 (1975); Farm Investment Co. v. Carpenter, supra. The appropriation, limitation, and beneficial use is controlled by observation and by measurement at the points of diversion and elsewhere. Here again appropriations for municipal use have different aspects. A municipal appropriation can exceed that for which the water can be put to beneficial use at the time of appropriation. Holt v. City of Cheyenne, 22 Wyo. 212, 137 P. 876 (1914). Domestic uses vary from day to day. They continue throughout the year, not only during an irrigation season. They do have seasonal variations. Some municipalities grow in size, some diminish. Municipalities have constitutional authority to acquire water rights of prior appropriators by eminent domain — paying just compensation therefor.8
These things are mentioned only to emphasize the necessity and desirability of having the board first consider such matters. Thus, uniformity and coordination in all water uses can better be obtained in addition to the application of expertise and experience to the problems.
Finally, the board and the state engineer should be addressing the varied water problems occasioned by recent changes in population and industry in the state. They cannot do so if they are bypassed by premature court action. One appropriator of an irrigation right cannot transfer it to another appropriator for an industrial right without full analysis by the board and the state engineer of the result on beneficial use. The same is true of a transfer by a municipality to an industrial use.
This case had its origin in a very worthy direction to the City of Rawlins to clean up its discarded water. To do so will cost money. It would be incongruous, in view of the value of water in Wyoming, to not also direct the city to preserve the water as it cleans it — preserve it for additional beneficial use. This may cost more money. Cleaning water is no more worthy than preserving it. The board of control should determine the relation of beneficial use to other aspects of the project. The board may authorize the project as now planned. It may direct pumping to the original place of discharge. It may direct a different method of cleaning. It may require payment of just compensation to the damaged appropriators.9 It may require change in reservoir construction to provide for a deeper but less extensive body of water so as to reduce evaporation. It may reach the same conclusion as did the district court.
In any event, the board of control should be afforded the opportunity to pass upon the beneficial use of the water involved in the project. The courts would have ample opportunity to review the decision, if necessary.
I would reverse and remand with directions that the plaintiff be ordered to *964submit the plans for the project to the state engineer for review and approval.
. Both the board of control and the office of the state engineer are constitutionally established. The state engineer is a member and president of the board of control. See §§ 2 and 5 of Art. 8, Wyoming Constitution.
. Art. 1, Wyoming Constitution, pertains to the “Declaration of Rights.”
. This section places all “water” under control of the state. Section 2 of Art. 8, Wyoming Constitution, gives supervision of “the waters of the state” to the board of control. Section 5 of Art. 8, Wyoming Constitution, gives “general supervision of the waters of the state” to the state engineer. Section 1 of Art. 8, Wyoming Constitution, makes some of the waters the “property of the state,” i. e., the “water of all natural streams, springs, lakes or other collections of still water.”
.Art. 8 is set out in full in footnote 3 of the majority opinion.
. This last area mandates the legislature to centralize control of all water matters in the board, rather than in some other independent agency or officer.
. This dissenting opinion is not only in conformity with the dissents in State By and Through Christopulos v. Husky Oil, supra, it is not contrary to the majority opinion therein. The majority opinion did not address the substantive issues involved, but remanded the case for joinder of the Board of Control and the City of Cheyenne as necessary parties.
. The limit is raised in surplus water situations. See §§ 41 — 4—317 through 41-4-324, W.S.1977.
. Section 5, Art. 13, Wyoming Constitution. Although the appropriator obtains the right to use water and not the ownership of water, the right obtained is a property right. Johnston v. Little Horse Creek Irrigating Co., 13 Wyo. 208, 79 P. 22 (1904).
.If just compensation is to be made, the board should refer the matter to the district court for determination of the award.