— I dissent.
There can be no doubt that a clinical program is valuable to law students. For that reason law schools understandably are ardent proponents of the scheme. Our inquiry, however, must be limited to whether the program is of any value to a criminal defendant, and in particular whether it was detrimental to this defendant who was charged with a felony.
At the outset, the issue must be phrased accurately. The State Bar describes the problem to be whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is impaired “when attorneys are assisted by law students.” The bar misconceives its own program: in general it is the law student who is assisted by the attorney of record and that is precisely what the record reveals here. The law student conducted the examination of witnesses and presented the entire argument to the jury; the attorney purported to assist him. Perhaps counsel performed some services that are not evident in the record, but the transcript indicates that while counsel was physically present throughout the 3-day trial, he uttered a total of 36 words. That averages out to 12 words per day, little more than required by a polite daily salutation to the judge hardly enough to suggest any contribution of substance.
Before proceeding further, we must review the dramatis personae. Carlos Perez is the defendant, charged with burglary, a serious felony; he is Spanish-speaking and required an interpreter throughout the trial. Edward Zinter, a deputy public defender, was his appointed counsel of record. Jack Loo was a law student, not a licensed member of the bar, who exceeded the minimum clinical program requirement of one and a half years of law study and approval of his school dean.
I
There is no question that Loo was in fact representing Perez before a judicial body, a function at the very peak of the practice of law. Yet Loo *147had not earned the right to practice law by meeting the State Bar qualifications and obtaining the approval of this court. His defense of a felony defendant thus constituted unauthorized practice of law. Actions much further removed from the heart of law practice have been subject to strict control and sanctions when attempted by nonlawyers. (See, e.g., Farnham v. State Bar (1976) 17 Cal.3d 605, 612 [131 Cal.Rptr. 661, 552 P.2d 445]; Bluestein v. State Bar (1974) 13 Cal.3d 162, 173 [118 Cal.Rptr. 175, 529 P.2d 599]; Crawford v. State Bar (1960) 54 Cal.2d 659, 668 [7 Cal.Rptr. 746, 355 P.2d 490].)
I do not suggest that Loo should be prosecuted for violating Business and Professions Code section 6126, for he acted in good faith and with the tacit approval of the trial court. But that approval does not by some ipse dixit transmute a law student into a lawyer for purposes of providing Perez with legal counsel. A competent law student is not the constitutional equivalent of a competent counsel.
The People attempt to justify Loo’s representation of Perez by citing the “Rules Governing the Practical Training of Law Students” first adopted by the State Bar in January 1970 and amended in May 1976. These rules permit qualified students, under supervision of a practicing lawyer, to engage in a variety of practice-related activities including, under specified conditions, participation in trials or in hearings before courts and administrative agencies.
The short answer to this purported justification is that the State Bar is authorized to adopt such regulations “as may be necessary or advisable for the purpose of making effective the qualifications prescribed” for admission to the practice of law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6047). The State Bar is not authorized to admit a person to the practice of law. That is exclusively a function of this court, a fact we recently emphasized in Merco Constr. Engineers, Inc. v. Municipal Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 724, 727-728 [147 Cal.Rptr. 631, 581 P.2d 636] (also see Brotsky v. State Bar (1962) 57 Cal.2d 287, 300 [19 Cal.Rptr. 153, 368 P.2d 697, 94 A.L.R.2d 1310]). At no time have we admitted Loo, or any other student, to the practice of law. We will be abdicating our responsibility to protect the public if we do so.
II
The majority opinion is an enigma on the issue of defendant Perez’s consent to representation by the law student Loo. On the one hand the opinion declares that no waiver of right to counsel was required, and on the other hand it relies upon the written consent signed by Perez.
*148It seems elementary to me that when the most crucial aspects of trial proceedings — examination of witnesses and argument to the jury — are conducted by a layman, not a licensed attorney, defendant is not being represented by competent counsel, even though an attorney of record may be in the courtroom. The constitutional requirement is for zealous, not perfunctory, advocacy. (Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287 U.S. 45, 57-58 [77 L.Ed. 158, 164-165, 53 S.Ct. 55, 84 A.L.R. 527].) Consequently, under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 835 [45 L.Ed.2d 562, 581-582, 95 S.Ct. 2525], Walton v. Arkansas (1962) 371 U.S. 28, 29 [9 L.Ed.2d 9, 10, 83 S.Ct. 9], Carnley v. Cochran (1962) 369 U.S. 506, 516 [8 L.Ed.2d 70, 77, 82 S.Ct. 884], and a host of other cases, if such proceedings are to be valid defendant must knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel.
Thus our duty is to examine the record to determine if Perez knowingly and intelligently consented to waiver of counsel in connection with the significant aspects of his trial. Apparently he did sign the form described in footnote 12 of the majority opinion.
As mentioned above, Perez spoke Spanish. The form is in English, in a style not readily comprehended by laymen fluent in English, let alone by one whose native tongue is Spanish. Most importantly, however, the record is totally silent as to whether Perez was given an explanation either by Zinter or by the court (1) that a certified law student is not qualified to practice law or to represent clients; (2) that Zinter planned to forego all examination of witnesses and all argument to the jury and proposed to assign that responsibility to the student; and (3) the nature of the limitation to matters “set out by the California State Bar as proper” for a student to engage in. If all those relevant details were explained to Perez in Spanish — and it is naive to believe they were — the record fails to so disclose. Thus there is not a scintilla of evidence in the record to confirm that Perez consented knowingly and intelligently to representation by a layman.1
There are some rights that will never be deemed waived unless the defendant is first expressly advised of their existence. (Michigan v. Mosley (1975) 423 U.S. 96, 108 [46 L.Ed.2d 313, 324, 96 S.Ct. 321] (conc. opn. of White, J.).) The right to assistance of counsel is such a right. (Boykin v. *149Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 242 [23 L.Ed.2d 274, 279, 89 S.Ct. 1709]; Carnley v. Cochran, supra, 369 U.S. at pp. 512-513 [8 L.Ed.2d at p. 75].) “The record must show . . . that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understanding^ rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver.” (Carnley v. Cochran, supra, at p. 516 [8 L.Ed.2d at p. 77]; accord, In re Haro (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1021, 1027 [80 Cal.Rptr. 588, 458 P.2d 500].) Since we must indulge iñ every reasonable presumption against waiver (Brookhart v. Janis (1966) 384 U.S. 1, 4 [16 L.Ed.2d 314, 317, 86 S.Ct. 1245]; Brewer v. Williams (1977) 430 U.S. 387, 404 [51 L.Ed.2d 424, 439-440, 97 S.Ct. 1232]), we may not presume from the silent record that Perez voluntarily and intelligently waived his constitutional right to have his trial conducted by a bona fide attorney. (Boykin v. Alabama, supra, 395 U.S. at p. 242 [23 L.Ed.2d at p. 279].)
Perez had the right to represent himself, i.e., waive counsel entirely. (Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 834 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 581]); and in certain jurisdictions, unlike California, it has been held that an accused may likewise waive his right to representation by one licensed to practice law. (E.g., People v. Cox (1957) 12 Ill.2d 265 [146 N.E.2d 19, 22, 68 A.L.R.2d 1134].) But in either case such waiver should be accepted by the court only after the defendant has been made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, or of representation by an unlicensed person if that is to be permitted, so that the record will establish “that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’ ” (Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 582]; accord, People v. Cox, supra, 146 N.E.2d at p. 22.)
Ill
Mr. Justice Staniforth, writing for a unanimous Court of Appeal in this case, well articulated the potential deficiency inherent in felony trials conducted by law students. I adopt his views as follows:
“Here, Perez’s writing authorized a nonlicensed person to try his case, to represent him, albeit under the direct supervision of a licensed lawyer; In the context of a felony jury trial such a consent triggers several Sixth Amendment alarms, for the right to counsel encompasses not only assistance of counsel but assistance of adequate counsel. The right to counsel as we have heretofore documented must be afforded in a real, not just a perfunctory, sense. The constitutional requirements are for ‘zealous and active counsel’ and representation in a ‘substantial sense’ not merely ‘pro forma.’ (Powell v. Alabama, supra, 287 U.S. 45, 57-58 [77 L.Ed. 158, 164-165, 53 S.Ct. 55, 59-60].)
*150“See also Anders v. California, ... 386 U.S. 738, 744 [18 L.Ed.2d 493, 498, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 1400].
“The dangers inherent in the practice of law by a student have been articulated thus: ‘[A]ny law student... is apt to overlook relevant facts, to base his opinion of the law on a century-old case in a minority jurisdiction, to be unaware of statutory or administrative regulation which has supplanted the common law, and to fail to recognize the available defenses. Because the law is, in fact, a “seamless web,” it is impossible to give competent advice in one area without a partial understanding of all the.law.’ (117 U.Pa.L.Rev. 970,... at p. 993, citing 36 Tex.L.Rev. 346, 348 (1958) Unauthorized Practice by Law Students: Some Legal Advice About Legal Advice.) We contrast the conceded premise of the incompleteness of the training of the law student with the competence requirements of the licensed attorney in the trial arena: ‘The competency of representation includes competency in advice, in the general knowledge of criminal procedure, in the ability to understand human relationships and in insight into everyday living that can separate sham from truth. Competency means, as well, adequate examination at the pretrial hearing, astuteness in discovering inaccuracy and faulty memory, in recognizing overuse of imagination and downright dishonesty. Competency should also include a full understanding of trial technique, of cross-examination and presentation before a jury. These concepts combined with a fertile knowledge of the law and a freedom to respectfully present objections and counsel’s views all add up to what competency and adequate representation should be.’ (117 U.Pa.L.Rev., supra, at p. 993, quoted from Brownell, Legal Aid in the United States, p. 142.)
“In the trial of a criminal case, whether jury or nonjuiy, the importance of manner, the timing, and the form of presentation of the defense is profound. Years of experience are required to hone the skills necessary to put the right question in a form and in a context to obtain the desired effect. Whether it be direct or cross-examination, the manner, the tone, of asking the question can be of significance. The unskilled asking of a too-broad question on cross-examination can result in the opening of a whole new field of inquiry not otherwise authorized — with possible disastrous effects. The failure to object, or to object timely, or to object on the right ground, may foreclose a possible defense.
“An experienced trial judge can only watch with horror as a neophyte destroys his own case by inept questioning. The immediate presence of the experienced lawyer cannot undo the harm done by a single disastrous question. He cannot unring the bell; he cannot rehabilitate the effect of *151clumsy or disastrous handling of a difficult witness. There may be but one moment of time in the course of a trial when the right act, word or decision can be made and the case won. A reasonable doubt may be created. If that moment of opportunity passes, no amount of post-verdict advice to or critique of the law student’s performance will give solace to a defendant in prison.
“In evaluating whether representation by a law student with a licensed attorney in silent presence is the functional equivalent of assistance of counsel, another factor should be considered. The admission to practice law in California depends upon moral fitness as well as demonstrated knowledge of the law. The State Bar not only scrutinizes the moral reputation of applicants, but also requires that they take and pass a Professional Responsibility Examination in which they must demonstrate an understanding of and ability to apply the ethical standards of the profession. Reason fully supports such admission requirements. ‘There is in fact, no vocation in life where moral character counts for so much or where it is subjected to more crucial tests by citizen and the public than is that of members of the bar. His client’s life, liberty, property, reputation, the future of his family, in fact all that is closest to him are often in his lawyer’s keeping. The fidelity and candor with which he performs his trust, point up reasons that distinguish the legal profession from other businesses.’ (State v. Murrell (Fla.) 74 So.2d 221, 224.)
“By contrast the certified law student’s moral standards and working knowledge of professional ethics are largely unknown. There is no requirement that such a student have taken a course in professional responsibility; certification requires merely ‘the student’s written certification that he or she has read and is familiar with the Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association, and the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California and will abide by the same in the activities permitted by these Rules.’ In Huckelbury v. State (Fla.) 337 So.2d 400, defendant pleaded guilty to first degree murder while he was represented by an employee of the public defender who had passed the Florida Bar Examination but who was deemed morally unfit to practice and had not been admitted. Recognizing ‘[t]he right to court-appointed counsel presupposes appointment of counsel fully accredited by competency and moral standards to practice law’ (id, p. 403; italics added), the court rejected the arguments of the state to the effect that the quality of legal services rendered is the only controlling factor in determining whether the defendant’s right to counsel was fulfilled.”
IV
One other troublesome factor plagues this student program. Obviously criminal defendants with resources will not engage a student to conduct *152their defense; they will retain and pay a fee to a licensed member of the bar, and for that fee they will expect their attorney to conduct the trial, to examine witnesses and to argue to the jury. Thus only indigent defendants will have students thrust upon them through assigned counsel, generally the public defender. This raises a potential problem of inequality of representation based upon a defendant’s economic status.
In Smith v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 547, 561 [68 Cal.Rptr. 1, 440 P.2d 65] we emphasized the importance of the attorney-client relationship: “it involves not just the casual assistance of a member of the bar, but an intimate process of consultation and planning which culminates in a state of trust and confidence between the client and his attorney. This is particularly essential, of course, when the attorney is defending the client’s life or liberty.” We also confirmed that the same intimate relationship must prevail whether the attorney is retained or appointed. “To hold otherwise would be to subject that relationship to an unwarranted and invidious discrimination arising merely from the poverty of the accused.” (Id., p. 562.)
V
I am not unsympathetic to law school clinical programs. They are a useful adjunct to the classroom and are likely to produce more able and resourceful practitioners in the future. But there are pragmatic limits to the professional services that students should be permitted to undertake. A felony trial transcends those limits.
It is doubtful that any patient would knowingly and intelligently consent to major surgery by a medical student with one and a half years of schooling, not even with a surgeon standing by. The patient’s life and health take precedence over the student’s training. So here, the defendant’s liberty for years into the future, at issue in a felony trial, cannot be jeopardized by placing a legal scalpel in the untested hands of a mere student. However desirable practical experience may be to the law student, protection of a defendant’s fundamental right to competent counsel prevents approval of a scheme to move the moot court program into the felony courtroom.
Like the Court of Appeal, I would reverse the judgment.
Indeed, a brief colloquy between the prosecutor and defendant suggests the latter believed Loo was an attorney and that he thus had two lawyers:
“By Mr. SIDDELL (the District Attorney) Q: You’re represented by counsel in this action; is that correct?
“By Mr. PEREZ A: An attorney? A lawyer? A lawyer?
“By Mr. SIDDELL Q: Yes, have you been contacted by an attorney?
“By Mr. PEREZ A: Just the two....”
At that point the reply was interrupted by the court and never completed.