concurring in part and dissenting in part:
NRS 126.141 was enacted over two decades ago to permit the court to initiate and approve compromise agreements to dispose of suits brought for support of children born out of wedlock. As the majority observes, it was to obviate the need for a trial when the evidence of paternity was strong. But, it was also to provide a mechanism to enable the mother and child to receive some assistance from the putative father by way of compromise when the evidence of paternity was weak. It permitted a mother and child to get “half a loaf’ of claimed support rather than run the risk of none at all. Of course, this law was passed at a time when DNA testing was unknown and determining parentage was an inexact science. The law was enacted with the best interests of the child in mind.
The mother and child’s guardian entered into such a stipulation for support in this case, obviating a formal determination of paternity, and the stipulation was approved by the district court. Although the record does not establish whether the district court initiated this compromise or specifically found that the agreement was in the interests of the child, we should presume that the law was followed and that the district court made the appropriate findings.
Now, the majority concludes that the stipulation and order were not conclusive on all parties and should be set aside because of present public policy reasons. The compromise and order confirming it benefited Zachary and his mother, and it is res judicata as to the issues determined as explained by the majority opinion, but we should not override the res judicata effect of this judgment because of a present day public policy that cuts differently than a public policy that existed twenty years ago. The comments of the model Parentage Act cited by the majority foresaw the future when it was stated that the great majority of *28cases will be settled consensually “as soon as reliable blood test evidence becomes available on a large scale.” 9B U.L.A. § 13. The model act did not contemplate that when this happened, all compromises would then be of no binding effect.
However, for the reasons expressed by the majority, I do believe that NRS 125B.010 does permit the modification of the obligation specifically undertaken by Willerton. I conclude that while paternity should not be determined for the sole basis of modifying the payment obligation, this obligation can be modified pursuant to NRS 125B.010, but such modification should take into account the policy reasons that permitted such a compromise, as well as the present status of the parties.