concurring.
I concur in the judgment of the Court and in the majority’s conclusion that the doctrine of transferred intent applies to the death of Kimberly notwithstanding the fact that James actually hit and wounded Karen. I write separately to make clear what I believe the Court is not holding.
I do not believe that the Court intends, by today’s decision, to endow the dicta in Part II.C of its opinion in Ford v. State, 330 Md. 682, 708-18, 625 A.2d 984, 996-1001 (1993), with the binding effect of a holding. The central issue in Ford was whether the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find the defendant possessed the specific intent to disable required for a conviction of assault with intent to disable. We concluded that the evidence was sufficient to affirm the conviction. The doctrine of transferred intent arose only as “a somewhat collateral issue,” id. at 708, 625 A2d at 1001, merely providing an alternative basis for affirming the conviction. See Ruffin v. *535United States, 642 A.2d 1288, 1293 (D.C.1994).1 Although Ford questioned the rationale for our decision in State v. Wilson, 313 Md. 600, 546 A.2d 1041 (1988), which recognized application of the transferred intent doctrine to attempted murder, Ford did not, and could not in dicta, overrule Wilson.2
I believe the majority’s assertion that “the doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to attempted murder when there is no death,” maj. op. at 529, is overly broad. I do not interpret Ford to preclude all applications of transferred intent to the offense of attempted murder. Reading the language in Ford together with our holding in Wilson, I believe the correct interpretation is that transferred intent should not apply to attempted murder if no one is injured. See Harrod v. State, 65 Md.App. 128, 137, 499 A.2d 959, 963 (1985); see also State v. Martin, 342 Mo. 1089, 119 S.W.2d 298, 302 (1938); but see State v. Gillette, 102 N.M. 695, 699 P.2d 626 (Ct.App.1985) (applying transferred intent to attempted murder where no one was injured).
The majority attempts to bolster its narrow interpretation of the doctrine of transferred intent by drawing an analogy between transferred intent and felony murder. Maj. op. at 529. The majority maintains that transferred intent and felony murder are essentially equivalent because they serve the same purpose, i.e., “to impose criminal liability for unintended deaths.” Id. Next, the majority asserts, correctly, that felony murder is inapplicable if no death results. Id. *536The majority therefore concludes that transferred intent is also inapplicable when no death results. Id.
Although this argument appears unassailable, it is unsound because it depends on a false premise. Therefore, while the deductive logic of the argument is valid, it leads to a false conclusion. The argument is based on the proposition that transferred intent and felony murder are interchangeable doctrines. On the contrary, although transferred intent and felony murder serve similar purposes in homicide cases, the doctrines are not interchangeable. See People v. Carlson, 37 Cal.App.3d 349, 112 Cal.Rptr. 321, 323-24 (1 Dist.1974); see also R. Perkins & R. Boyce, Criminal Law 922-24 (3d ed.1982). Transferred intent can only function to “shift” the defendant’s intent from one object to another, while felony murder may be used to imply an intent from the defendant’s act of committing a felony. See infra note 3; see also Carlson, 112 CaLRptr. at 323-24 (“the effect of the felony-murder rule is to withdraw from the trier of fact the issue of malice and thus relieve the trier of fact from the necessity of finding one of the elements of the crime of murder.”). Therefore, it does not follow that transferred intent is subject to the same limitations as felony murder.
Furthermore, neither history nor policy supports the majority’s limitation of transferred intent to cases resulting in death. Both English and American common law support applying the doctrine of transferred intent to situations where innocent third parties are non-fatally injured. In State v. Thomas, 127 La. 576, 53 So. 868 (1911), the Supreme Court of Louisiana traced the English common law history of the doctrine of transferred intent, citing a number of English cases that held transferred intent applied when bystanders received non-fatal injuries. Id. 53 So. at 871. The Thomas court quoted an opinion by Lord Coleridge, Regina v. Latimer, 17 Q.B.D. 359 (1886), which stated:
It is common knowledge that a man who has an unlawful and malicious intent against another, and, in attempting to carry it out, injures a third person, is guilty of what the law deems malice against the person injured, because the of*537fender is doing an unlawful act, and has that which the judges call general malice, and that is enough.
53 So. at 871 (emphasis added)3; see also W. Clark & W. Marshall, A Treatise on, the Law of Crimes § 5.04, at 274-75 (M. Barnes ed., 7th ed.1967). Based on a thorough review of the English law, the Thomas court concluded that the majority of cases permitted transferred intent to be applied in cases where no death resulted. 53 So. at 871.
Historically, American courts, following the English precedents, have also applied the doctrine of transferred intent to cases where a third party was injured but not killed. See, e.g., Thomas, 53 So. 868; McGehee v. State, 62 Miss. 772, 52 Am.Rep. 209 (1885); State v. Gilman, 69 Me. 163, 31 Am.Rep. 257 (1879). For example, in State v. Gilman, 69 Me. 163, 31 Am.Rep. 257 (1879), the Supreme Court of Maine was asked to determine whether the doctrine of transferred intent could be applied to the offense of assault with intent to kill. The defendant, Gilman,, shot into a crowd intending to kill Noyes, but instead wounded a bystander, Flood. Relying on the seminal English case of Regina v. Smith, Dears C.C. 559 *538(1855), the court held that transferred intent applied, and affirmed Gilman’s conviction of assault with intent to kill Flood. See also McGehee, 52 Am.Rep. at 210.
More recently, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals also concluded that the doctrine of transferred intent applied to the offense of assault with intent to kill. Ruffin v. United States, 642 A.2d 1288 (D.C.1994). In reaching this conclusion, the court relied in part on our decisions in Ford and Wilson.4 In Ruffin, the defendant participated in a drive-by shooting on a public street, which resulted in a non-fatal injury to the intended victim (Younger), a fatal injury to one bystander (Williams), and a non-fatal injury to another bystander (Walker). The defendant was convicted of assault with intent to kill Younger and, applying transferred intent, first-degree murder of Williams and assault with intent to kill Walker. The defendant argued, based on Ford, that he could not be convicted of assault with intent to kill Walker because he had completed the crime of assault with intent to kill against his intended victim, Younger. The court rejected this view, explaining:
[E]ven if we adopted the reasoning in Ford for the purpose of determining this appeal, we would not reverse appellant’s conviction for AWIKWA [assault with intent to kill while armed] against Dwayne Walker. This is because the Ford court does not abandon the result it reached in Wilson, supra, (upholding convictions for attempted murder vis-a-vis the intended victim and the injured bystander), but rather provides that ... a defendant can be convicted of murder or assault with intent to kill of bystander victims even where the defendant has been convicted of murder or assault with intent to kill against the intended victim ... ‘[w]here the *539means employed to commit the crime against a primary victim [e.g., a hail of gunfire] creates a zone of harm around that victim.’
642 A.2d at 1298. Thus, the court concluded that although neither the intended victim nor the unintended victim was killed, transferred intent could be applied to permit conviction for assault with intent to kill the unintended victim. Id. at 1293 n. 8.5
In addition, the policy rationale for the doctrine of transferred intent is to ensure proportionate punishment of criminal offenses, and to prevent criminals from escaping culpability due to “poor aim” or mistaken identity. See, e.g., People v. Birreuta, 162 Cal.App.3d 454, 208 Cal.Rptr. 635, 639 (5 Dist. 1984). This rationale supports application of the doctrine regardless of whether the resulting injury to a bystander is fatal or non-fatal.
If the majority’s opinion is interpreted to preclude any use of the doctrine of transferred intent in attempted murder prosecutions, the effect of the decision will be to substantially increase the difficulty of prosecuting criminals for the harm inflicted on innocent bystanders. For example, consider a hypothetical drive-by shooting similar to the incident in Ruffin: a defendant, A, participates in a drive-by shooting on a public street, intending to kill B, but instead non-fatally injuring B, and non-fatally injuring bystander C. Although A may be convicted of attempted murder of B, it will be difficult to convict A of the attempted murder of C, or of assault with intent to kill C. Without transferred intent, the State will be required to offer separate proof of intent for each victim, e.g., by demonstrating “depraved heart.” While firing a “hail of bullets” at a person on a busy street may be prima facie evidence of a depraved heart, numerous factual situations may *540arise where it will be difficult to demonstrate recklessness.6 See, e.g., State v. Gillette, 102 N.M. 695, 699 P.2d 626 (Ct.App. 1985) (poisoned soda can mailed to one person, but two other unintended victims also drank from it); People v. Carlson, 37 Cal.App.3d 349, 112 Cal.Rptr. 321 (1 Dist.1974); cf. People v. Gaither, 173 Cal.App.2d 662, 343 P.2d 799 (2 Dist.1959) (defendant sent poisoned candy to ex-wife; she ate none, but four of seven members of her household ate the candy), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 991, 80 S.Ct. 1082, 4 L.Ed.2d 1023 (1960).
For the foregoing reasons, I believe it is important to clarify that our holding, as I understand it, simply means that transferred intent may be applied to first-degree murder of a bystander, regardless of whether the defendant also injured his intended victim. Although the majority’s explanatory dicta on the theory underlying the transferred intent doctrine provides useful clarification of our prior decisions, I do not believe the majority intends by these statements to overrule Wilson sub silentio.
I am authorized to state that Judges RODOWSKY and KARWACKI join in the views expressed herein.
. Judge McAuliffe’s concurring opinion in Ford (joined by Judges Karwacki and Rodowsky) described the Court’s "newly announced limitation on the doctrine of transferred intent” as dictum. 330 Md. at 726, 625 A.2d at 1005. Cf. Brooks v. United States, 655 A.2d 844, 846-47 & n. 7 (D.C.1995) (status of Wilson unclear in light of subsequent cases).
. Three years before Ford was decided, in State v. Earp, 319 Md. 156, 571 A.2d 1227 (1990), wc relied on Wilson for the proposition that ”[t]he specific intent that is required [for attempted murder] may be a ‘transferred’ intent, that is, the mens rea of a defendant as to his intended victim will be transferred to an unintended victim who suffers injury as a result of the defendant’s attempt.” Id. at 163, 571 A.2d at 1231.
. Lord Coleridge also noted in Latimer that “but for Regina v. Pembliton, there would not have been the slightest difficulty” in deciding the transferred intent issue. Thomas, 53 So. at 871 (quoting Regina v. Latimer, 17 Q.B.D. 359 (1886)). He distinguished Pembliton, 2 L.R., C.C.R. 119, [1874-1880] All E.R.Rep. 1163 (1874), because it involved not only a transfer of intent from one victim to another, but also a change in the nature of the intent. Thomas, 53 So. at 871 (citing Regina v. Latimer, 17 Q.B.D. 359 (1886)). In Pembliton, the defendant threw a rock at people standing in the street, but missed them and broke a window. [1874-1880] All E.R.Rep. at 1164. The court held that transferred intent could not be applied to the offense of unlawful and malicious property damage because the defendant never intended to damage property. Id. at 1163.
Perkins and Boyce similarly distinguish between transfers of intent involving the "same mental pattern,” i.e., where only the object of the intent is shifted, and transfers of intent involving a “different mental pattern,” i.e., where the crime intended differs from the crime committed. Perkins & Boyce, supra, at 922-23. Only the first category can accurately be described as "transferred intent.” In mathematical terms, transferred intent may be used to effect a “translation” of intent, but not a "transformation.” See D. Riddle, Calculus and Analytic Geometry 261 (3d ed. 1979).
. By statute, the District of Columbia has adopted the common law of Maryland as it existed in 1801. Ruffin, 642 A.2d at 1294, n. 9. The court in Ruffin did not address the issue of whether case law subsequent to 1801 also has binding effect under the statute, but the District of Columbia relied on our decision in Gladden v. State, 273 Md. 383, 330 A.2d 176 (1974), in adopting the doctrine of transferred intent. 642 A.2d at 1293 n. 8.
. The court relied on our decision in Wilson for the proposition that “the doctrine of transferred intent also applies to non-fatal assaults.” Ruffin, 642 A.2d at 1293 n. 8.
. As we observed in Robinson v. State, 307 Md. 738, 517 A.2d 94 (1986), "although 'depraved heart' murder does not require that more than one life be placed in imminent danger,” id. at 751, 517 A.2d at 101, more than "mere negligence” must be shown. We stated that:
'[D]epraved heart’ means something more than conduct amounting to a high or unreasonable risk to human life. The perpetrator must [or reasonably should] realize the risk his behavior has created to the extent that his conduct may be termed wilful. Moreover, the conduct must contain an element of viciousness or contemptuous disregard for the value of human life.
Id. at 745, 517 A.2d at 98 (quoting R. Gilbert & C. Moylan, Maryland Criminal Law: Practice and Procedure % 1.6-3 (1983)).