OPINION OF THE COURT
NIX, Justice.Appellee, Fred Gullett, was arrested and indicted on the charges of murder, so’domy and rape upon the person of his next door neighbor, Mrs. Elizabeth Sciorilli. A hearing was held upon a petition for suppression filed on appellee’s behalf and an order was entered suppressing physical evidence obtained pursuant to two search warrants and all statements, oral and written, made by the appellee to police authorities. The Commonwealth now appeals from a portion of this order.1
*435It is settled law within this jurisdiction that the Commonwealth may appeal from an adverse ruling below where it appears either that the order of suppression will necessitate the termination and conclusion of the prosecution or that the adverse order will substantially impair the prosecution in the presentation of its case. Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 910, 84 S.Ct. 204, 11 L.Ed.2d 149 (1963). See also, Commonwealth v. Washington, 428 Pa. 131, 236 A. 2d 772 (1968); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 422 Pa. 134, 221 A.2d 115 (1966); Commonwealth v. Warfield, 418 Pa. 301, 211 A.2d 452 (1965); American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Criminal Appeals § 1.4(a) (iii) (Approved Draft, 1970).
In this appeal the Commonwealth does not challenge the order suppressing appellee’s in custody admissions but rather confines their objections to the order of the court below suppressing the physical evidence seized during the search. Both sides are in agreement that the sole issue presented is whether there was probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrants.
It is admitted that a portion of the information contained within the affidavits is within the purview of that part of the suppression order which is not contested. The inclusion of evidence subsequently determined to be inadmissible will not invalidate a search warrant if the warrant is also based upon other competent sources and is sufficient to constitute probable cause. In Commonwealth v. Thomas, 444 Pa. 436, 447, 282 A.2d 693, 699-700 (1971) we stated:
“ ‘[T]he law is quite clear that the inclusion of illegally obtained evidence does not vitiate a search warrant *436which is otherwise validly issued upon probable cause reflected in the affidavit and based on proper sources. Clay v. United States, 246 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 863, 78 S.Ct. 96, 2 L.Ed. 269; Chin Kay v. United States, 311 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1963)’: United States v. Sterling, 369 F.2d 799, 802 (3d Cir. 1966). Accord, James v. United States, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 314, 418 F.2d 1150 (1969).”
Excising from the affidavits supporting the warrants that information found to be within the ambit of that portion of the suppression order which is not contested, we are satisfied that there nevertheless exists sufficient facts independently obtained which supplies probable cause for the warrants’ issuance. The affidavits establish that the police were aware of witnesses who could identify the voice of the appellee as being the anonymous caller who first advised police officials that there was a body in the premises where the deceased was discovered lying on the kitchen floor after having been strangled and sexually assaulted. The caller also stated that there would be more bodies when they (the police) arrived. Upon arriving at the scene, the police found the property to be secure and there.was no sign of forceable entry. Thus, it could be concluded that the intruder was admitted by the deceased who was the only occupant of the residence present at the time in question. The police learned that the appellee, a next door neighbor, had been in the home in the past for the purpose of doing plumbing repairs. They were also advised of the deceased’s reluctance to admit persons when she was home alone, giving rise to the inference that the person admitted was known to her and accustomed to being in the dwelling.
Before entering the premises by forcing open the rear shed door the police officer peered through the shed window and observed an arm of an individual lying on the kitchen floor. When the officer related this information to appellee,, who had accompanied the officer to the rear *437of the house,2 Gullett, although he had not looked in the window stated: “Momma Momma, they didn’t have to do this.” It was also known that the appellee called the deceased “Momma” and that other individuals resided within the premises, including one other adult female. The police also ascertained that Gullett had previously been arrested for sex crimes including buggery and rape. The medical examiner reported that the victim had apparently been sexually molested by buggery. Finally, it had been determined from an interview with appellant’s wife that he was not home at the time this incident was determined to have occurred.
“Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the affiant’s knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a search should be conducted.” Commonwealth v. Thomas, 448 Pa. 42, 52, 292 A.2d 352, 357 (1972).
From the foregoing facts the Issuing Authority was made aware that the victim had been murdered and sodomized by buggery; that the killing had been probably perpetrated by someone known to the victim and who had been admitted with the permission of the victim; that the appellee was the first to have known of the death; that Gullett was aware of the identity of the body before he was supposed to have had an opportunity to make such an identification; that he was the unidentified caller who notified the police; that he was absent from his home at the time of the incident; that he was known to the victim and would probably have been admitted by her; and that there was reason to believe that he had previously engaged in the type of sexually errant *438behavior herein involved. This information clearly supplied to the Issuing Authority the probability of culpability on the part of appellee that would justify the warrant’s issuance. Commonwealth v. Marino, 435 Pa. 245, 253, 255 A.2d 911 (1972).
“In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved.
“ ‘The substance of all the definitions’ or probable cause ‘is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.’ McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. 63, 69, quoted with approval in the Carroll opinion. 267 U.S. at 161, 45 S.Ct. 280. And this ‘means less than evidence which would justify condemnation’ or conviction, as Marshall, C. J., said for the Court more than a century ago in Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch 339, 348, 3 L.Ed. 364. Since Marshall’s time, at any rate, it has come to mean more than bare suspicion: Probable cause exists where ‘the facts and circumstances within their [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or is being committed. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543.
“These long-prevailing standards seek to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s protection. Because many situations which confront officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the mis*439takes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability. The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating these often opposing interests. Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers’ whim or caprice.”
(Footnotes omitted).
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-176, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1310-1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949).
The appellee further argues that the fact of his past criminal record could not properly be considered for this purpose. We do not agree. The reasons for our determination to exclude defendant’s prior criminal conduct as substantive evidence of guilt at trial are not operative at this stage of the proceeding and need not require a similar result here. In discussing the rationale for our evidentiary rule excluding testimony of past crimes as proof of guilt we recently stated:
“As this Court has recently stated: ‘It is a fundamental precept of the common law that the prosecution may not introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior criminal conduct as substantive evidence of his guilt of the present charge. It has been succinctly stated that “[t]he purpose of this rule is to prevent the conviction of an accused for one crime by the use of evidence that he has committed other unrelated crimes, and to preclude the inference that because he has committed other crimes he was more likely to commit that crime for which he is being tried. The presumed effect of such evidence is to predispose the minds of the jurors to believe the accused guilty, and thus effectually to strip him of the presumption of innocence.” ’ Commonwealth v. Allen, 448 Pa. 177, *440181-182, 292 A.2d 373, 375 (1972) (footnote omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. Trowery, 211 Pa.Super. 171, 173-174, 235 A.2d 171, 172 (1967)). In Allen, we stated that the constant reference to police photographs of the accused permitted the jury to infer that the appellant had a prior criminal record.” Commonwealth v. Clark, 453 Pa. 449, 452, 309 A.2d 589, 590 (1973).3
The reason for the rejection of this evidence is not because it fails to have any probative value on the probability of the accused’s guilt but rather that the presumed effect is to predispose the minds of the jury to an extent that it would unduly overshadow the presumption of innocence. Here the presumption of innocence is not operative; the only issue is whether the investigating authorities had a reasonable basis for determining the probability of this accused’s guilt. In United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 2081, 29 L.Ed. 2d 723 (1971) Mr. Chief Justice Burger observed:
“We cannot conclude that a policeman’s knowledge of a suspect’s reputation — something that policemen frequently know and a factor that impressed such a ‘legal technician’ as Mr. Justice Frankfurter — is not a ‘practical consideration of everyday life’ upon which an officer (or a magistrate) may properly rely ”4
*441It cannot be argued with serious conviction that the fact of appellee’s prior history for a rather unique type of sexual deviancy, of the very type involved in the crime, does not meet the “more likely than not” relevancy test on the question of the probability of his implication. While, clearly his past criminal history alone would not justify a finding of probable cause regardless how similar the circumstances, it clearly can be considered as one of the factors leading to that determination.
Nor, do we suggest that evidence of every past arrest or conviction is necessarily relevant in an inquiry of probable cause. To so conclude would be a determination that the malevolence involved in the commission of any crime, no matter how unrelated, has probative value upon the accused’s connection to the crime in question. The absurdity of such a proposition is evident. Our conclusion here merely expresses the view that where the past criminal conduct bears a sufficient similarity either because of the nature of the crime or the manner of its execution to the act in question, so as to give rise to a reasonable inference that the same person committed both acts, this fact can be considered along with the other available information in a determination of probable cause.
Lastly, appellee argues that the voice identification from the tape recording made by the police without the consent of the caller was a violation of the Pennsylvania anti-wiretapping statute, Act of July 16, 1957, P.L. 956, No. 411, § 1, 18 P.S. § 3742 (Supp.1972-73) 5 and *442thus inadmissible as evidence in support of a finding of probable cause.
The Act provides, in part, that:
“No person shall intercept a communication by telephone . . . without permission of the parties to such communication. No person shall install or employ any device for overhearing or recording communications passing through a telephone . . . with intent to intercept a communication in violation of this act. No person shall divulge or use the contents or purport of a communication intercepted in violation of this act. . . . The term ‘divulge’ includes divulgence to a fellow employe or official in government or private enterprise or in a judicial, administrative, legislative or other proceeding. Except as proof in a suit or prosecution for a violation of this act, no evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful interception shall be admissible in any such proceeding. . . . ”
The statute is designed to secure the integrity of this particular means of private communication. This Court has interpreted the Act as mandating that no person shall without the consent of all parties to the conversation surreptitiously intercept or record the communication. Nor shall any evidence obtained from the aforesaid prohibited intrusion be admissible in any judicial proceeding. As was observed in Commonwealth v. McCoy (Papszycki), 442 Pa. 234, 275 A.2d 28 (1971),
“Unlike the majority of other jurisdictions, which either have no anti-wiretapping statute or ones similar to the federal statutes which require only the consent of one of the parties, Pennsylvania’s anti-wiretapping statute clearly demands that the consent of all parties be given before any device for overhearing or recording is installed or utilized. The statute contains no exceptions even for interceptions by governmental authorities engaged in an attempt to apprehend a criminal. Hence the Legislature has determined as a mat*443ter of state public policy that the right of any caller to the privacy of his conversation is of greater societal value than the interest served by permitting eavesdropping or wiretapping. Such a determination, when within constitutional limits, is solely within the discretion of the Legislature.”
Id. at 238-239, 275 A.2d at 30-31 (footnotes omitted); see also, Commonwealth v. Murray, 423 Pa. 37, 223 A.2d 102 (1966).
It is the consent of all the parties to the questioned communication that is determinative and in the instant appeal we must determine whether the appellee supplied that consent which would legalize what would otherwise be a prohibited intrusion. The gist of the call to the police put them on notice as to the occurrence of a homicide, the location of where the body would be found and the possibility that this would be but one in a series of killings. From the nature of the call, the non-confidential quality of the information conveyed, the emergency atmosphere the communication engendered, and the particular agency to which the disclosure was directed, it is apparent that the caller did not intend the privacy of the communication to be maintained. Rather, the conclusion is inescapable that a call made under these circumstances carried with it the permission of the caller to divulge the communication to authorized police personnel other than the officer who happened to take the message and to use the communication to investigate the reported crime by any reasonable means. We thus hold that on these facts there was no violation of the Act of 1957.
Accordingly, the order of the court below, suppressing the physical evidence obtained pursuant to the search warrants, is reversed. The cause is remanded, for proceedings consistent herewith.
ROBERTS, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which MANDERINO, J., joined.. Jurisdiction for the appeal under the murder indictment is pursuant to Act of July 31, 1970, P.L. 673, No. 223, art. II, § 202(1); *43517 P.S. i 211.202(1) (Supp. 1974-75). Jurisdiction for the appeals under the nonfelonious indictments arise under Act of July 31, 1970, P.L. 673, No. 223, art. V, § 503(a); 17 P.S. § 211.503(a) (Supp. 1974-75).
. When the police arrived and were unable to gain admittance through the front entrance of the premises they went to the home of the appellee, who permitted them to go through his home to the rear of the dwelling in question. There was no fence separating the two rear yards.
. “For a variety of reasons relating not only to probative value and trustworthiness, but also to possible prejudicial effect upon a trial jury and the absence of opportunity for cross-examination, the generally accepted rules of evidence throw many exclusionary protections about one who is charged with and standing trial for crime. Much evidence of real and substantial probative value goes out on considerations irrelevant to its probative weight but relevant to possible misunderstanding or misuse by the jury.” Brinegar v. United States, supra, 338 U.S. at 173, 69 S.Ct. at 1309.
. Unlike the issue presented in Harris, supra, we need not here consider whether this information may be relied upon in assessing the reliability of an informant’s tip. Cf. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964). The *441instant discussion focuses upon the quantum of knowledge required to be possessed by police officials to satisfy the requirements of probable cause; more particularly, whether the knowledge of a prior arrest can be assessed as a part of that information.
. This act was repealed and substantially reenacted by the Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, §§ 1-4, 18 C.P.S.A. §§ 5701-5704 (1973).