Dissenting opinion by
Justice GRAVES.Respectfully, I dissent. This case poses the question of first impression, “what constitutes acceptable ‘proof of insurance’ under KRS 186A.220(5)?” I believe that Holder had obtained sufficient proof of insurance to survive a motion for summary judgment.
As the majority notes, Holder knew that Booth had an insurance policy with Kentucky Farm Bureau from the prior sale of the 1995 truck. Furthermore, the 1995 vehicle was being financed with H & H Auto Sales. As such, Holder had knowledge of Booth’s insurance coverage through this previous course of dealing. The majority concludes that the “proof of insurance” requirement contemplates verification beyond mere assumption of knowledge, but does not explain what kind of verification would be acceptable. The majority is also swayed by the fact that insurance was not discussed at the time of the sale. What would be the effect of such a discussion? Is it sufficient verification for an auto dealer to simply ask a purchaser whether or not he or she is insured? I do not believe that such oral verification with the purchaser alone is sufficient, and I presume that the majority would agree. The experience of a “course of dealing” verification is more reliable than any discussion about insurance because it is actual knowledge that, at least at the time of the last dealing, that the purchaser was insured. Why, then, does it matter in this case whether Holder discussed insurance with Booth?
In reality, almost any form of proof of insurance carries an assumption. A “proof of insurance” card, for example, carries the assumption that the purchaser has not cancelled his insurance policy since the *639card was issued. The assumption through a “course of dealing” is that the purchaser is still insured after the parties’ last dealing; the assumption with a “proof of insurance” card is that the purchaser is still insured after the card was printed.
The public policy goal behind the “proof of insurance” requirement is to keep uninsured vehicles off the roads. Auto Acceptance Corp., supra, at 401; KRS 304.39-080. As the majority states, the General Assembly intended to place a burden on the car dealer to obtain verification. However, this burden is a means to achieve the statute’s policy goal. Requiring a dealer to verify insurance functions as a safeguard to ensure that vehicles are insured one way or another, and to prevent a dealer, who does not transfer title on a vehicle to a purchaser, from handing the keys over to an uninsured motorist. Thus, if a dealer learns that the motorist is uninsured, then he cannot deliver possession of the vehicle. If he does deliver possession of the vehicle to the uninsured motorist without first obtaining proof of insurance, then, consistent with the public policy rationale disfavoring uninsured motorists, the dealer is held responsible for insurance coverage because ownership on the vehicle will be deemed to have not been transferred.
The instant case does not involve an uninsured motorist. Kentucky Farm Bureau does not dispute insurance coverage, but claims secondary liability. Therefore, the harm that the statute seeks to prevent — uninsured motorists — does not exist in this case. While this fact alone does not absolve Holder from the statutory requirement, it provides important contextual information. To the extent that this requirement should be scrutinized, it should be considered with the underlying policy goal in mind.
The only definite way for a dealer to verify insurance coverage is to obtain verification directly from the insurance agency, either written or orally. This kind of direct verification would be difficult for dealers to obtain at the time of a sale, especially during weekends, and the words of the statute do not require it. Yet, Holder took such a step when he contacted Kentucky Farm Bureau to verify Booth’s coverage on the next business day, before the accident.
If there was a deficiency in Holder’s verification of insurance at the time of the sale, the transfer of ownership of the vehicle was completed when Holder directly contacted Kentucky Farm Bureau on the following Monday. Although this verification occurred after possession of the vehicle was transferred where KRS 186A.220 requires verification before the transfer of possession, it nevertheless cured any deficiency. “A statute should not be interpreted so as to bring about an absurd or unreasonable result. The policy and purpose of the statute must be considered in determining the meaning of the words used.” Kentucky Industrial Utility Customers, Inc. v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 983 S.W.2d 493, 500 (Ky.1998). It elevates form over substance to an unreasonable degree to hold an automobile dealer, who takes the necessarily remedial steps, indefinitely responsible for the insurance coverage on a vehicle that was transferred to an insured owner simply because verification did not occur in the proper sequential order.
Holder’s knowledge of insurance coverage from a previous course of dealing is certainly not a preferable means to obtain proof of insurance. However, when combined with the fact that he later verified insurance coverage on the next business day by calling Kentucky Farm Bureau, and in light of the public policy consider*640ations, there is sufficient evidence that Holder obtained proof of insurance to survive a motion for summary judgment.
COOPER and SCOTT, J.J., join this dissent.