NORRIS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which STAMP, D.J., joined. MARTIN, J. (p. 405), delivered a separate concurring opinion.
OPINION
ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge.Paul Parsley, the former sheriff of Bul-litt County, Kentucky, fired deputy sheriff David Greenwell immediately after he learned through a newspaper article that his deputy intended to run against him in the next election. Greenwell responded by fifing suit against Parsley and his chief deputy Mack (Jim) McAufiffe. The only federal cause of action included in the complaint was an allegation that defendants violated Greenwell’s First and Fourteenth Amendment right to run for political office. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on this claim and on various state-law claims that are not at issue on appeal. Plaintiff then filed a motion to amend pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), which the district court denied. The only issue on appeal concerns whether Sheriff Parsley violated Greenwell’s First *403Amendment right to engage in political activity. Like the district court, we hold that Carver v. Dennis, 104 F.3d 847 (6th Cir.1997), a prior published decision of this court, controls the outcome of this case. We therefore affirm the grant of summary judgment.
I.
Greenwell served as a deputy in Sheriff Parsley’s office from 1999 until 2005. On September 7, 2005, an article appeared in the Louisville Courier-Journal announcing Greenwell’s candidacy for the sheriffs office:
Republican Dave Greenwell, a Bullitt County sheriffs deputy, has filed with the Kentucky Registry for Election Finance to run....
Greenwell has been a deputy for six years and spent eight years in the 1990s as a Bullitt County deputy jailer.
He said he’d like to become sheriff and create a public relations position.
A deputy in such a position, he said, would follow up with people who file police reports to make sure the department handled their complaint to their satisfaction. Doing so would hold deputies accountable and improve the department’s image....
While reading this announcement, Parsley highlighted the parts of the article that indicated that Greenwell was running, as well as the statements Greenwell made regarding changes he would make to the sheriffs department. Parsley summoned Greenwell to his office, and told him, “See in the paper here where you’re trying to take my job.” Parsley then asked him to step outside. After consulting with his attorney, Parsley emerged and handed the following termination letter to Greenwell:
Dear Mr. Greenwell:
This will confirm that as of September 7, 2005 you informed the public and me personally that you are running against me for Sheriff in the 2006 election. Therefore, I am terminating your employment with me and my office for obvious reasons.
Greenwell maintains, that Parsley fired him not only due to his candidacy, but because Parsley was upset that Greenwell had spoken out on a matter of public concern, namely, the operation of the sheriffs department. For his part, Parsley testified, “He wanted to take my job away from me.... He put it in the paper he was running for sheriff — was gonna take my job.”
In the end, neither man was elected sheriff. Parsley lost the Democratic primary to Donnie Tinnell, who then defeated Greenwell in the general election.
II.
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Lockett v. Suardini 526 F.3d 866, 872 (6th Cir.2008). Further, while the denial of a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion, to the extent the motion seeks reconsideration of a grant of summary judgment, the denial of the motion is reviewed de novo. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Limited Corp., 951 F.2d 110, 112 (6th Cir.1991). Summary judgment is proper if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact” such that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c).
In the Carver decision, upon which the district court relied in granting summary judgment to defendants, a county court clerk terminated her deputy clerk the day after the deputy announced her intention to run in the next election. The *404deputy presented no evidence that she had been dismissed because of her political beliefs. This court characterized the issue before it in these terms:
Stated narrowly, the issue before us is whether Carver, a deputy county clerk who was an at-will employee in a two-person office — the other person being the county clerk herself — had a First Amendment right to run against the incumbent clerk in the next election and still retain her job.
Carver, 104 F.3d at 849. While the First Amendment protects the right of public employees to speak out on matters of public concern, id. (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983)), it has not been extended to candidacy alone. Id. at 850-851. In short, “[t]he First Amendment does not require that an official in [an employer’s] situation nourish a viper in the nest.” Id. at 853.
Since the Carver decision, panels of this court have both questioned the wisdom of Carver and sought to read it narrowly. See Murphy v. Cockrell, 505 F.3d 446, 450 (6th Cir.2007) (“[W]e limited our holding in Carver to the question of whether the First Amendment recognized a government employee’s ability to run for office as a fundamental right.”); Myers v. Dean, 216 Fed.Appx. 552, 554 (6th Cir.2007) (collecting cases from other circuits in tension with Carver, but concluding that it continued to be the law of this circuit). Clearly, cases involving political speech by public employees proceed on a continuum; drawing a clear line between the simple announcement of a candidacy, which does not trigger protected political speech, and an announcement coupled with speech critical of one’s opponent (and boss), which does trigger constitutional protection, is not an easy task. In Murphy, the dissenting judge expressed the dilemma in these terms:
I am not persuaded by [plaintiffs] argument that Carver can be distinguished because she was discharged not only for the fact of her candidacy but also for the manner in which she campaigned. As the district court aptly observed, this turns “on the question of whether attacking your opponent’s political experience is akin to an expression of political beliefs.” As I see it, saying “I am a better or more experienced candidate than my boss” is nothing more than the assertion of a rival candidacy. I believe that the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn in this case is that [plaintiff] was discharged for her rival candidacy and not on account of her political beliefs or affiliations.
Murphy, 505 F.3d at 456 (dissent). In Murphy the plaintiff was only terminated after a “spirited” campaign. Id. at 448. Furthermore, “it [was] undisputed that [defendant] terminated [plaintiff] due to her political speech during the course of the campaign.” Id. at 449 (emphasis added). In the case before us, by contrast, Parsley terminated Greenwell at the moment that he learned of the candidacy from the newspaper. The fact that he may have highlighted certain implied criticisms of the department in the newspaper account does not transform this case into one of.political speech. As Parsley unequivocally told Greenwell, “you’re trying to take my job,” and there is nothing in the record to belie the conclusion that the termination was because of the candidacy. The announcement of candidacy “is nothing more than the assertion of a rival candidacy.” Id. at 456 (dissent). In our view, this ease cannot be meaningfully distinguished from Carver.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.