Opinion
PANELLI, J.—I. Introduction
In this case we consider whether the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, §§ 21000 to 21177) (hereafter CEQA)1 applies to a plan by the Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc. (Wine Train), to carry passengers on an existing 21-mile railroad line through California’s Napa Valley. Believing that CEQA does apply, the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) ordered Wine Train not to begin passenger service until after submitting to an environmental review process. We hold, however, in accordance with an express statutory exemption, that CEQA does not apply to the institution of passenger service on rail rights-of-way already in use.2 (§21080, subd. (b)(ll) [hereafter the passenger-service exemption].)
*374II. Background
This case involves a railroad line in California’s Napa Valley, an increasingly popular destination for tourists who come to visit the many wineries along State Highway 29. Starting at the valley’s southern end in Rocktram, the line travels 21 miles north to Krug, roughly paralleling the highway. Wine Train plans to offer tourists an alternative to driving, operating as many as six trains daily and stopping at wineries along the way.
The railroad was first built over a century ago to carry tourists who arrived in ferries from San Francisco to the mineral baths in Calistoga. For most of its history, the line belonged to the Southern Pacific Transportation Company (SP). According to the parties, SP stopped transporting passengers on the line about 50 years ago. Transportation of freight, primarily wine from the area’s vintners, continued but declined over time.* *3
In 1985, SP applied to the ICC for permission to abandon the line between Rocktram and Krug. However, Wine Train offered to purchase the line from SP later that same year. Because of Wine Train’s offer, the ICC never granted SP’s application to abandon. Under federal law, when “a carrier and a person offering to purchase a line enter into an agreement which will provide continued rail service” the ICC must dismiss the application to abandon and approve the proposed transaction. (49 U.S.C. § 10905(e).)4 Acting under this statute the ICC dismissed SP’s application to abandon and approved Wine Train’s offer. The parties transferred ownership of the line in April 1987.
While its application to abandon was pending, SP stopped carrying freight on the line. SP’s last delivery took place around the beginning of 1985. In purchasing the line, however, Wine Train became successor in interest to SP’s license to operate and, as such, assumed federal statutory obligations not to discontinue service.5 Accordingly, Wine Train reinstituted *375freight service on January 10, 1988, bringing two carloads of furniture from Utah and Illinois to a vintner in the Napa Valley. Later, in early February, the train carried six carloads of wine vats to another vintner.
These freight shipments evoked relatively little interest. Real parties have not asked the PUC to halt them. Wine Train’s plan to institute passenger service, however, brought a storm of protest from residents of the Napa Valley, who feared that the train would bring additional tourists to their community. Local newspapers reported the debate. Opponents of the train feared that it would make the Napa Valley “an amusement park.” Proponents argued that it would alleviate traffic congestion caused by tourists on State Highway 29.
On March 7, 1988, several Napa Valley cities and towns, the Napa Valley Vintners Association, and other interested persons (collectively real parties) filed a complaint with the PUC. In their complaint, real parties claimed that Wine Train was subject to the provisions of CEQA and that its proposed passenger service was subject to the PUC’s regulatory jurisdiction. Real parties requested an order instituting investigation, “an order asserting the [PUC’s] jurisdiction over [Wine Train’s] passenger train service operations,”* ****6 and “an order requiring [Wine Train] to cease and desist from its operations until all environmental review and analysis of [Wine Train’s] proposed ‘project’ as required by CEQA and [the PUC’s rules] has occurred.”
On April 13, 1988, the PUC issued an order directing Wine Train “to show cause why it should not be required to submit to the jurisdiction of [the PUC] with respect to the proposed operation of a passenger train service . . . .” At that time, however, the ICC was already considering a petition by Wine Train for an order declaring that its operations were not subject to the PUC’s jurisdiction.
The PUC appeared in the ICC proceeding but also continued to claim jurisdiction for itself. Ultimately, the federal and state agencies issued *376conflicting orders on the same day, July 8, 1988. The ICC held that Wine Train was “immun[e] from [the PUC’s] jurisdiction over the franchising, scheduling and pricing of freight or passenger operations.” (ICC Decision, supra, at p. 5.) Interpreting California law, the ICC also held that CEQA did not apply, “since [the PUC] has no power to regulate Wine Train’s operations and thus has no decision making role here . . . .” (Id., at pp. 5-6.) In direct contradiction, the PUC ordered that “[t]he rail passenger service proposed by [Wine Train] is subject to the jurisdiction of [the PUC]” and ordered Wine Train not to “institute any passenger service until it complies with all applicable requirements of [CEQA] . . . .” (City of St. Helena v. Napa Valley Wine Train (1988) 28 Cal.P.U.C.2d 352 (Dec. No. 88-07-019, p. 12) [hereafter PUC Decision].) After the PUC denied Wine Train’s application for rehearing, we issued a writ of review.7 (Pub. Util. Code, § 1756.)
III. Discussion
CEQA’s Exemption for the Initiation of Passenger Service
The fundamental purpose of CEQA is to promote “[t]he maintenance of a quality environment for the people of this state now and in the future . . . .” (§ 21000, subd. (a).) Since its enactment in 1970 we have acknowledged that the act’s purpose is an important one. In Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 8 Cal.3d 247 [104 Cal.Rptr. 761, 502 P.2d 1049], construing CEQA for the first time, we “conclude[d] that the Legislature intended [it] to be interpreted in such manner as to afford the fullest possible protection to the environment within the reasonable scope of the statutory language.” (Id., at p. 259.)
However, in the 19 years since CEQA was enacted the Legislature has, for reasons of policy, expressly exempted several categories of projects from environmental review. (See § 21080, subd. (b)(l-16).) This court does not sit in review of the Legislature’s wisdom in balancing these policies against the goal of environmental protection because, no matter how important its original purpose, CEQA remains a legislative act, subject to legislative limitation and legislative amendment.
*377In 1978, the Legislature amended CEQA to include the predecessor of the exemption at issue here. As originally enacted, the exemption provided that “[a] project for the institution or increase of passenger or commuter service on rail lines already in use, including the modernization of existing stations and parking facilities, shall be exempt from [CEQA].” (Stats. 1978, ch. 791, § 1, pp. 2541-2542, formerly codified as § 21085.5.)8
In 1982, the Legislature amended the exemption by deleting the term “rail lines” and substituting “rail or highway rights-of-way. ” (§ 21080, subd. (b)(l 1), as amended by Stats. 1982, ch. 1553, § 3, p. 6077, italics added.) The amendment was part of a bill that sought in various ways to further the transportation of passengers by rail. Most of the bill concerned a mechanism for financing rapid rail transit systems.9 Since that time, the Legislature has repealed those CEQA exemptions that were specifically intended to facilitate rapid rail projects.10 However, the passenger-service exemption (§ 21080, subd. (b)(l 1)), whose broader language exempts a wider variety of projects, has not been repealed and still is in force today.
In order to apply the passenger-service exemption in this case, we must first determine what it means for a right-of-way to be “already in use.” If the Rocktram-Krug right-of-way is already in use, then CEQA does not apply to Wine Train’s “initiation of passenger . . . services.”* 11 (§ 21080, *378subd. (b)(ll).) The PUC, noting that “freight service had not been performed for three years prior to February 1988,” held that Wine Train was not entitled to the benefit of the exemption because “the rail right-of-way used by [Wine Train] was not already in use prior to its acquisition of the line from SP . . . .” (PUC Decision, supra, at p. 10.) This holding, which the PUC labeled a “finding of fact,” in reality contains the implicit conclusion of law that the passenger-service exemption applies only when there has been uninterrupted rail traffic. In our view, the PUC misinterpreted the exemption, which refers to “rights-of-way” and not traffic statistics.12 The existence of a railroad line on the Rocktram-Krug right-of-way suffices to demonstrate that the right-of-way is “already in use.” (§21080, subd. (b)(ll).)
We reach this conclusion based upon the Legislature’s decision in 1982 to change the language of the passenger-service exemption from “rail lines” to “highway or rail rights-of-way. ” (§ 21080, subd. (b)(ll), italics added.) The new language is substantially broader. A rail line is the arrangement of *379facilities and equipment that makes rail transportation possible. A right-of-way is a real property right—the easement on which a line is built. (Civ. Code, §§ 801, 802.)13 The effect of the passenger-service exemption, as amended, is to permit the institution or increase of passenger service on land already burdened by a highway or rail right-of-way—an easement for transportation purposes—so long as the right-of-way is already in use.
It is certain that the Legislature, in amending the passenger-service exemption, was using the term “right-of-way” in its technical, real property sense. In the same bill, the Legislature added to the Civil Code’s chapter on “Servitudes” a section intended to describe the legal attributes of rights-of-way that have been granted to railroad corporations.14 Moreover, if the Legislature had wanted the application of the exemption to turn on traffic statistics rather than on the status of rail “rights-of-way,” there would have been no need to amend the language of the exemption to refer to such easements or to define them in the same bill.
Railroad tracks are relatively durable things. Once a railroad company has made use of its right-of-way by constructing a line, it ordinarily makes sense to assume that the land is permanently dedicated to transportation. For this reason, courts have refused to hold that rail rights-of-way have been lost simply because rail traffic has temporarily lapsed. “A right of way or easement granted to a railroad ‘ “ ‘is not that spoken of in the old law books, but is peculiar to the use of a railroad which is usually a permanent improvement, a perpetual highway of travel and commerce, and will rarely be abandoned by non-user. ... [11] The right acquired by the railroad company, though technically an easement, yet requires for its enjoyment a use of the land permanent in its nature and practically exclusive.’ [Citation.]”’” (Cash v. Southern Pacific R.R. Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 974, 978 [177 Cal.Rptr. 474], quoting from San Gabriel v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co. (1933) 129 Cal.App. 460, 464-465 [18 P.2d 996].) More specifically, it has been held as a matter of law that a railroad right-of-way is not destroyed by the discontinuance of passenger service and the continuation of desultory freight service on an “on call” basis. (Tamalpais etc. Co. v. N. W. Pac. R.R. Co. (1946) 73 Cal.App.2d 917, 924-927 [167 P.2d 825]; Faus v. *380City of Los Angeles (1967) 67 Cal.2d 350, 360 [62 Cal.Rptr. 193, 431 P.2d 849].) Although a railroad’s tearing up of its tracks may raise a question of fact about the destruction of its right-of-way, a decrease in traffic or a change from passenger to freight service does not. (73 Cal.App.2d at p. 927.)
Thus, real property law preserves a rail right-of-way from destruction so long as it has been put into use by the construction of a rail line, and so long as the operator has not intentionally abandoned it.15 Because such a right-of-way also amounts to a disruption of the natural environment, the Legislature could reasonably have decided that any additional disruption due to the institution of passenger service was acceptable without further environmental review. Policy choices such as this are for the Legislature, not the courts. Accordingly, because the Rocktram-Krug right-of-way was put into use over a century ago by the construction of a rail line that still exists today, we hold the right-of-way is sufficiently “in use” for the purpose of section 21080, subdivision (b)(ll).16
*381In opposition to this conclusion, the PUC and real parties argue that the Legislature’s substitution of the term “right-of-way” had no significance. They do not, however, purport to find any support for their argument in the language or the legislative history of the statute. Rather, the PUC and real parties in effect challenge the Legislature’s wisdom. They urge us, in order to avoid the possibility of significant environmental effects, to read the statute to require “continuous” or “substantial” rail traffic before passenger service can be added.17 However, “[i]n construing the statutory provisions a court is not authorized to insert qualifying provisions not included and may not rewrite the statute to conform to an assumed intention which does not appear from its language.” (People v. One 1940 Ford V-8 Coupe (1950) 36 Cal.2d 471, 475 [224 P.2d 677]; see also Burnsed v. State Bd. of Control (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 213, 217 [234 Cal.Rptr. 316].) Moreover, it defeats the very purpose of the exemption to apply it only to projects that will have no significant environmental effects. The determination that “a project may have a significant effect on the environment” is the finding that, absent an exemption, ordinarily triggers the environmental review process. (§ 21082.2, subd. (a).) It is precisely to avoid that burden for an entire class of projects that the Legislature has enacted the exemption.
The PUC and real parties defend their artificially narrow interpretation of the passenger-service exemption as necessary to achieve harmony with CEQA’s broad environmental goals. However, we do violence to the Legislature’s intent if the so-called harmony can be achieved only by rewriting the statute. Nor is it necessarily correct, in any event, to assume that a harmony must exist between CEQA’s general purpose and the purposes of each of its statutory exemptions. The exemptions reflect a variety of policy goals. Perhaps some, like the exemption for thermal power plants (§ 21080, *382subd. (b)(6)), reflect long-term environmental strategy. Others, however, like the exemption for hosting the Olympic Games (subd. (b)(7)), are designed to further the state’s financial interests and other nonenvironmental goals. The exemption for passenger service (subd. (b)(ll)) may reflect elements of environmental strategy,18 but it may also reflect a desire simply to preserve the rail transportation system. As a practical matter, the statutory exemptions have in common only this: the Legislature determined that each promoted an interest important enough to justify forgoing the benefits of environmental review.
Legislative committee analyses of Senate Bill No. 1894, which became the passenger-service exemption, show that the Legislature deliberately weighed the benefit of increased passenger service against the risk of forgoing environmental review under CEQA.19 (Sen. Bill No. 1894 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.).) The Senate Committee on Public Utilities, Transportation and Energy, in its analysis of the bill, summarized debate on the proposed passenger-service exemption this way: “Proponents argue that the reluctance of railways to improve passenger service requires the State to make extraordinary effort to realize any progress at all. The cost, in time and legal fees, can be reduced if . . . improvements in passenger and commuter rail service on existing lines are exempted statutorily from [environmental impact report] requirements .... Opponents feel the State should not be allowed additional powers to overcome the objections to increased passenger rail service because delays in improving service result in more careful consideration of the broader effects and costs of improvement.” (Sen. Com. on Public Utilities, Transportation & Energy, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1894 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) p. 3.) Similarly, the Senate Ways and Means Committee identified the issue presented as “whether it is good policy to exempt certain classes of activities from provisions of CEQA . . . .” (Sen. Ways & Means Com., Staff Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1894 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) p. 1.) These stark presentations of the choice the Legislature faced leave no doubt that the Legislature understood the consequences of exempting a class of projects from environmental review and intended to do so.
We need not dwell on three additional interpretations of the exemption that real parties have proposed. Each disregards an important part of the *383statutory language. First, real parties argue that the exemption applies only if the right-of-way is already in use for passenger service, as opposed to freight. But this argument reads out of the statute the Legislature’s express reference to the “institution” of passenger service. (§ 21080, subd. (b)(ll).) Both logic and respect for the limits of judicial power require us to give “[significance ... ‘to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act.’ ” (Mercer v. Perez (1968) 68 Cal.2d 104, 112 [65 Cal.Rptr. 315, 436 P.2d 315], quoting People v. Western Air Lines, Inc. (1954) 42 Cal.2d 621, 638 [268 P.2d 723].) Moreover, as already discussed, application of the exemption does not require any particular type or level of rail traffic so long as the right-of-way is already in use.
Second, opposed to a possible influx of tourists, real parties argue that the exemption applies only to “commuter” services. To the contrary, the exemption expressly applies to “passenger or commuter services.” (§ 21080, subd. (b)(ll), italics added.) Clearly, passengers can include tourists.
Finally, noting that Senate Bill No. 1894 also reappropriated funds to improve the Los Angeles-San Diego rail corridor, real parties argue that the Legislature had only that one project in mind. The uncodified reappropriation provision, however, is completely separate from the passenger-service exemption and clearly refers to a particular project.20 In contrast, the language of the exemption provision does not refer to any particular project. The provision declares generally that CEQA “shall not apply to the following: . . . (11) [a] project for the institution or increase of passenger or commuter services . . . .” (§21080, subd. (b)(ll).)
Accordingly, we hold that section 21080, subdivision (b)(ll), exempts Wine Train’s institution of passenger service on the Rocktram-Krug line from the requirements of CEQA. The PUC’s order, which is predicated on an erroneous interpretation of the statute, is contrary to law. Accordingly, the PUC has not “regularly pursued its authority.”21 (Pub. Util. Code, § 1757.)
*384IV. Disposition
The decision of the Public Utilities Commission is annulled.
Lucas, C. J., Eagleson, J., and Kennard, J., concurred.
All further statutory citations, unless otherwise noted, are to the Public Resources Code.
This case also touches on a jurisdictional conflict between the PUC and the federal Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). Both the ICC and the PUC have asserted jurisdiction over Wine Train’s passenger service. At the time this opinion is filed, the ICC is reconsidering its decision.
To resolve this case, however, we need not resolve the jurisdictional conflict. Even if the PUC had the power to regulate Wine Train’s passenger service, the passenger-service exemption would nevertheless make CEQA inapplicable. Nor is there any other reason for us to resolve the jurisdictional conflict at this time. Although the parties’ briefs suggest that the PUC may someday attempt to regulate other aspects of Wine Train’s activities, such as franchis-
*374ing, scheduling, and pricing, no such order is currently before us. To date, the PUC has used its asserted power over Wine Train only to order compliance with CEQA.
According to the ICC, the Rocktram-Krug line handled 285 cars in 1982 and 269 cars in 1983. Traffic declined to 58 cars in the first 6 months of 1984. (Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc., Petition for Declaratory Order (1988) 4 I.C.C.2d 720 [hereafter ICC Decision].) Although SP continued to carry freight until approximately the beginning of 1985, the record does not disclose the precise volume of traffic after the first six months of 1984.
In this statute and others, federal law expresses a strong policy in favor of the “continuation of a sound rail transportation system . . . .” (49 U.S.C. § 10101a(4).)
Under 49 United States Code section 10905(f)(4), “[n]o purchaser of a line or portion of line sold under this section may transfer or discontinue service on such line prior to the end of the second year after consummation of the sale . . . .” Since transfer of ownership took *375place in April 1987, this statute obliged Wine Train to provide service on request until at least April 1989. Under 49 United States Code section 11101(a), “[a] common carrier providing transportation or service subject to the jurisdiction of the [ICC] . . . shall provide the transportation or service on reasonable request.” The PUC concedes that the ICC has jurisdiction over Wine Train’s freight transportation.
Real parties’ reason for asking the PUC to assert jurisdiction was to fulfill a statutory predicate for ordering Wine Train to comply with CEQA. Although section 21065 sets out a broad definition of “project,” no statutory provision makes CEQA’s substantive provisions applicable to a private project unless the project is to be “approved by [a] public agenc[y].” (§ 21080, subd. (a).)
After we granted review, Wine Train, the PUC, and real parties entered into a limited settlement agreement. Pursuant to the agreement, Wine Train has instituted limited passenger service and will prepare an environmental impact report on its institution of such service, whatever the outcome in this court. The settlement agreement does not make this case moot because the PUC, if CEQA applies, must conduct a full environmental review process, including, among other things, consideration of available measures to mitigate any environmental effects. (See § 21080.5, subd. (d)(2)(i).)
In 1979, as part of a reorganization of CEQA, the Legislature repealed former section 21085.5 and reenacted it, after insignificant changes, as section 21080, subdivision (b)(ll). (Stats. 1979, ch. 697, § 1, p. 2171.)
(See Gov. Code, §§ 92000-92353, added by Stats. 1982, ch. 1553, § 2, p. 6061.)
CEQA previously exempted projects “for the granting of an easement or franchise for the use of highway or street rights-of-way for high-speed intercity passenger rail purposes” and “for the granting of a certificate of public convenience and necessity for a railroad corporation whose primary business is the transportation of passengers . . . .” (Former § 21080, subd. (b)(17) & (18), added by Stats. 1982, ch. 1553, § 3, p. 6078, and deleted by Stats. 1985, ch. 392, § 2, p. 1567.)
In his dissenting opinion Justice Kaufman argues that, even if the institution of passenger service is exempt from CEQA, Wine Train still must submit that project to the environmental review process because the PUC has power to regulate the safety aspects of railroad operation. (Dis. opn. of Kaufman, J .¡post, at pp. 394-397.) Justice Kaufman places particular emphasis on the PUC’s power to regulate grade crossings and its duty to disburse federal funds for the construction of warning devices. Arguing that the construction of warning devices is part of the initiation of passenger service, Justice Kaufman concludes that a court should not “chop[ ] up” a project “into discrete activities for purposes of environmental assessment.” (Dis. opn. of Kaufman, J.,post, at p. 395.) The construction of warning devices enjoys a regulatory exemption from CEQA. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 20, § 17.1, subd. (h)(l)(A)(7).) Justice Kaufman, however, dismisses the regulatory exemption with a citation to another regulation, which states that regulatory exemptions should not be applied when there is a reasonable *378possibility that the exempted activity will have a significant effect on the environment. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15300.2, subd. (c).)
The flaw in these arguments is that they ignore the existence of the statutory passenger-service exemption (§ 21080, subd. (b)(ll)), and the fact that the Legislature was obviously aware of the older railroad safety statutes at the time it enacted the exemption. The PUC’s power over grade crossings, for example, dates back to 1911. (See Pub. Util. Code, § 1201, and its predecessor statutes at Stats. 1911, ch. 20, § 15, p. 18, and id., ch. 386, § 1, p. 702.) The PUC’s more general power to require safety devices dates back to 1915. (See Pub. Util. Code, § 768, and its predecessor statute at Stats. 1915, ch. 91, § 42, p. 137.) If general safety statutes like these, which are not even a part of CEQA, made CEQA applicable despite the specific statutory passenger-service exemption, then the exemption would be a nullity. Unlike the dissenters, however, we are not willing to assume that the Legislature has enacted a nullity or to substitute our own view of rail and environmental policy for the Legislature’s. (Cf. dis. opn. of Mosk, J., post, passim [ignoring the statutory passenger-service exemption] and dis. opn. of Kaufman, J.,post, passim [ignoring the exemption’s legislative history].)
Although the point is not determinative in this case, we note that the PUC also erred in assuming that the time at which the exemption operated was the date on which Wine Train acquired the line from SP—April 1987. Instead, the time at which the exemption logically operates is the time at which the responsible agency must determine whether or not to require the affected person to file an environmental impact report. Whether the PUC’s first occasion to make such a determination was March 1988, when real parties filed a complaint claiming that Wine Train needed the PUC’s permission to carry passengers, or in the fall of 1987, as Justice Kaufman argues in his dissenting opinion (dis. opn. of Kaufman, J., post, at pp. 397-399), it is clear that the right-of-way at issue was already in use at the relevant time.
Contrary to the suggestion in the dissent (dis. opn. of Kaufman, J., post, at p. 398), this case does not present the situation of an agency seeking early environmental review while a project proponent seeks to delay. In fact, the PUC’s staff informed Wine Train by letter in November 1984, while Wine Train was negotiating the purchase of the Rocktram-Krug line from SP, that Wine Train would not need to apply for permission to conduct passenger service in the Napa Valley. The letter also noted that, “since no application is necessary, the California Environmental Quality Act. . . would not be automatically triggered” and no environmental assessment would be required.
Under Civil Code section 801, “[t]he following land burdens, or servitudes upon land, may be attached to other land as incidents or appurtenances, and are then called easements: ... 4. The right of way . . . .” Similarly, under Civil Code section 802, “[t]he following land burdens, or servitudes, may be granted and held, though not attached to land: ...[][] Five. The right of way.[ ]”
Under Civil Code section 801.7, subdivision (a), “[w]hen a right-of-way is granted pursuant to Section 801 or 802 to a railroad corporation whose primary business is the transportation of passengers, the grant shall include, but not be limited to, a right-of-way for the location, construction, and maintenance of the railroad corporation’s necessary works and for every necessary adjunct thereto.” (Added by Stats. 1982, ch. 1553, § 1, p. 6061.)
The circumstances of this case show that such a rule is realistic: The ICC’s decision to approve the sale of the Rocktram-Krug line, and the buyer’s federal statutory obligation to continue service (see fn. 5, ante), made it likely that rail traffic would eventually resume.
The PUC and real parties argue, based on one of the PUC’s findings, that the Rocktram-Krug right-of-way was not in use because the tracks “could not be used without first effecting substantial repairs and construction.” (PUC Decision, supra, at p. 10.) Justice Kaufman embraces this argument in his dissenting opinion. (Dis. opn. of Kaufman, J., post, at p. 387, fn. 6.) The PUC’s finding, however, does not show that the right-of-way was not in use. At most, the finding shows that there was a period of time during which trains were not running. The lapse in service might have been relevant under the former version of the passenger-service exemption, which, as we have discussed, could have been interpreted to require actual traffic on “rail lines.” But the current version of the exemption pointedly refers to “rights-of-way ” rather than lines. (§ 21080, subd. (b)(ll).) As we have also discussed, a right-of-way is put into use by the construction of a line, and it endures until it is abandoned. None of the cases cited in Justice Kaufman’s dissenting opinion holds to the contrary. (See dis. opn. of Kaufman, J., at pp. 389-391.)
Nor does the PUC’s finding about the condition of the tracks demonstrate that the right-of-way had been abandoned. There was no abandonment in this case as a matter of law because the ICC never issued a certificate of abandonment. The ICC’s “exclusive and plenary” jurisdiction to regulate abandonments completely preempts state law on the subject. (Chicago &N.W. Tr. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co. (1981) 450 U.S. 311, 317-323 [67 L.Ed.2d 258, 264-269, 101 S.Ct. 1124]; see also Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1990) 494 U.S. _,_ [108 L.Ed.2d 1, 11, 110 S.Ct. 914].) Accordingly, if Wine Train’s efforts to refurbish the equipment it purchased from SP are relevant at all to the case before us, it is only because those efforts emphasize that Wine Train never intended to abandon.
Justice Kaufman correctly recognizes in his dissenting opinion that real property cases distinguish between “nonuse” and “abandonment.” (Dis. opn. of Kaufman, J., post, at pp. 389-391.) However, we cannot agree with Justice Kaufman’s further suggestion that these cases provide a definition of “use” that is applicable to the passenger-service exemption.
As we have already discussed, the real property cases do have a limited relevance to this case. The unusual permanence of a rail right-of-way under real property law, once put into use by the construction of a line, makes such a right-of-way a lasting disruption of the *381environment. Thus, the Legislature could reasonably have decided that any additional disruption due to the institution of passenger service was acceptable without further environmental review. However, the dissenting opinion makes too much of the real property cases when it assumes that the authoring courts were using the word “use” in the same sense that the Legislature would use it many years later. Unlike the term ’’right-of-way,” which has always been a term of art, and which the Civil Code has expressly defined since 1872, “use” is not a term of art, it is not defined by statute, and its meaning thus varies with the context. We should not import an undefined term from one area of the law to another without inquiring how the context has changed.
The record, as already discussed, shows that SP carried freight on the line for many years, ending approximately at the beginning of 1985, and that Wine Train resumed freight shipments in January 1988. The PUC and real parties dismiss this traffic as “sporadic.” Justice Kaufman, who makes the similar argument that “use” under the passenger-service exemption means actual rail traffic (dis. opn. of Kaufman, J., post, at pp. 389-391), dismisses this evidence as not constituting “use” at all. Although the point is not determinative, we find it impossible to characterize over a century of railroad operations, with barely a three-year interruption, as anything other than actual and substantial rail traffic.
For example, the exemption may reflect a desire to divert travelers from automobiles to passenger trains, thereby reducing exhaust emissions.
We have said with respect to committee materials that “[i]t is reasonable to infer that those who actually voted on the proposed measure read and considered the materials presented in explanation of it, and that the materials therefore provide some indication of how the measure was understood at the time by those who voted to enact it.” (Hutnick v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 456, 465, fn. 7 [253 Cal.Rptr. 236, 763 P.2d 1326].) *384“institution or increase of passenger services” and the “modernization of existing stations and parking facilities.” (§ 21080, subd. (b)(l 1).)
Real parties have expressed concern over CEQA’s application to local projects, including construction, in the Napa Valley. No such question is before us.
The text of the reappropriation provision, which has nothing at all to do with CEQA, appears at Statutes 1978, chapter 791, section 3, page 2542. It provides that “[a]ll funds appropriated [by a previous act]. . . are hereby reappropriated . . .for (a) the improvement of the railroad tracks and passenger facilities . . . between Los Angeles and San Diego, and (b) the purchase of rights-of-way and the realignment of that portion of the line between San Juan Capistrano and San Clemente, so that trains may operate safely on the line at a speed of 110 miles per hour.”
Lest there be any doubt that the passenger-service exemption does not apply only to the Los Angeles-San Diego corridor, we note that the later bill reenacting the exemption did not even refer to that project. (Assem. Bill No. 1534 (1979-1980 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 1979, ch. 697, § 1, pp. 2172-2173, codified at Pub. Resources Code, § 21080.)
We do not hold that every action Wine Train might undertake as an entity is necessarily exempt from CEQA. Subdivision (b)(ll), on which we rely, expressly exempts only the