This is a wrongful death and personal injury action brought under the Oregon Tort Claims Act (OTCA). The issue is whether plaintiffs claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations.
On December 2, 1986, plaintiffs wife and minor child were travelling on a highway near Rainier Hill when an oncoming vehicle crossed the center line and collided with their vehicle. Plaintiffs wife died, and his child was injured. In investigating the cause of the accident, plaintiff sought to determine whether the highway had been sanded. He asked a police officer, who in turn asked defendant’s employees. The employees said that the highway in question had recently been sanded. The police officer relayed that information to plaintiff and wrote it in an accident report. Relying on those statements, plaintiff concluded that there had been no negligence by defendant.
In November, 1989, plaintiff discovered that the highway had not been sanded on the day of the accident. Immediately thereafter, he was appointed personal representative for his wife’s estate and guardian ad litem for his minor child. He commenced this action on December 1, 1989. His amended complaint alleged that the highway near Rainier Hill was icy and unsafe and that defendant negligently failed to warn motorists of the unsafe conditions, failed to place a barrier or other safety device between the lanes of traffic and failed to sand the road adequately.
Defendant moved to dismiss all claims on the grounds that plaintiff had failed to file a timely notice of tort claim and had failed to commence this action within the two-year statute of limitations. ORS 30.275(8).1 The trial court allowed the motion and entered a judgment of dismissal.
Plaintiffs wrongful death claim on behalf of his wife’s estate was filed more than two years after the decedent’s death. He acknowledges that such claims, when *565brought against a public body, generally must be commenced within two years. ORS 30.275(8). However, he contends that the OTCA limitation did not begin to run until he learned of defendant’s misrepresentation.
The discovery rule does not aid plaintiff in this case. His complaint alleged three specifications of negligence:
“(a) The surface of the highway on Rainier Hill was icy and there were no warnings to motorists as to the potential for icy conditions;
“(b) The highway had not been adequately sanded or otherwise prepared to reduce the risk of accident due to ice; and
“(c) There was no center barrier to prevent an out of control automobile from crossing the center line and traveling into the land of oncoming traffic.”
Regardless of defendant’s misrepresentation, plaintiff was aware, on the date of the accident, that road conditions had been hazardous. He also knew, or should have known, that the state was responsible for maintaining the highway in question. It was apparent that the state had not constructed a central barrier and had not provided signs to warn motorists of potentially dangerous driving conditions. Those facts provided a sufficient basis for an action against the state. Plaintiff knew that his wife had been killed, that her death could be attributed to defendant’s acts and that defendant arguably had been negligent in at least two respects.
A limitation is not tolled in order to allow a plaintiff “to develop facts to support or identify a theory of recovery or * * * to learn ‘all of the facts which they might ultimately be able to advánce to support their claim.’ ” Duyck v. Tualatin Valley Irrigation, 304 Or 151, 163, 742 P2d 1176 (1987). (Citation omitted.) On December 2, 1986, plaintiff had sufficient information to raise an issue of fact on each element of his wrongful death claim. Accordingly, his cause of action accrued on that date.2 The trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs wrongful death claim.
*566 Plaintiffs second claim for relief is for personal injuries sustained by his minor child as a result of defendant’s alleged negligence. He argues that OTCA’s two-year limitation and 270-day notice period for minors were tolled until a guardian ad litem is appointed for the child. That is correct. Perez v. Bay Area Hospital, 112 Or App 288, 294, 829 P2d 700, recon denied 114 Or App 635, 836 P2d 1358 (1992); Banda v. Danner, 87 Or App 69, 74, 741 P2d 514 (1987), aff’d by an equally divided court 307 Or 302 (1988). Plaintiff was appointed guardian ad litem in November, 1989. The complaint was filed in December, 1989, within the notice period and the two-year limitation. ORS 30.275(2)(b), (8). Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing the negligence claim brought on behalf of the child.
We now turn to the issues raised by the dissent. First, it contends that we have “fail[edj to analyze Banda v. Danner.” As it acknowledges, Banda says that the time limitation for personal injury claims filed under OTCA does not begin to run until the appointment of a guardian ad litem, and then only if the guardian knows sufficient facts to initiate the running of the limitation period. 87 Or App at 74. That holding was affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court. The dissent may well “disapprove, ’ ’ but it is the law in Oregon and it is on point.
Second, the dissent seeks to rely on Lawson v. Coos Co. Sch. Dist. # 13, 94 Or App 387, 765 P2d 829 (1988), as a rationale for tacitly overruling Banda. In Lawson, the plaintiff brought a personal injury action against the state on behalf of a minor ward. Although the plaintiffs claim was filed after the expiration of OTCA’s limitations period, ORS 30.275(8), the plaintiff proposed a novel interpretation that, if accepted, would have made ORS 12.160, a mm-OTCA statute that extends the period within which minors may bring a tort claim, applicable to ORS 30.275(8). ORS 30.275(8) provides that, “[ejxcept as provided in ORS 12.120 and 12.135, but notwithstanding any other provision of ORS chapter 12 or other statute providing a limitation on the commencement of an action,” actions filed against a public body must be commenced within two years. The plaintiff in Lawson argued that, because ORS 12.160 extends the time for commencement of an action, it is not a “limitation” and *567therefore is not excluded by the language of ORS 30.275(8). We disagreed, noting that ORS 12.120 and 12.135 are the only two statutory exceptions to ORS 30.275(8) and that the language “notwithstanding any other provision of ORS chapter 12” excludes ORS 12.160. 94 Or App at 390. Lawson only held that ORS 12.160 does not toll the OTCA limitation; its holding is limited and is not relevant to the case at bar. It did not present any issue regarding the effect of a guardian ad litem appointment and had no effect on Banda.
Judgment of dismissal of personal injury claim reversed; otherwise affirmed.
ORS 30.275(8) provides, in pertinent part:
“[A]n action arising from any act or omission of a public body or an officer, employee or agent of a public body within the scope of [OTCA] shall he commenced within two years after the alleged loss or injury.”
Plaintiff also argues that, although the wrongful death claim is on behalf of the decedent’s estate, a minor is one of the beneficiaries of the estate and, therefore, the statute of limitations should not begin to run until a personal representative for the estate is appointed. The appointment of a personal representative is irrelevant in determining when a wrongful death action accrues. See ORS 30.020(1).