DISSENTING OPINION OF
MARUMOTO, J.I dissent. This case involves the construction and application of HRS § 46-72 to the notice of claim for damages filed by plaintiff with the mayor of the county of Hawaii on May 9, 1969, which stated that he suffered personal injury “on the streets and highways of the County of Hawaii”, on November 11, 1968.
According to the Data Book 1970, issued by the State Department of Planning and Economic Development, there were 1,355 miles of public streets and highways in the county of Hawaii in that year.
HRS § 46-72 requires, as a condition precedent to the liability of a county to any person for injuries suffered on a street or highway thereof, that the injured person file with the official designated therein, within six months after receiving the injuries, a notice of claim “stating fully * # # where * * * the injuries occurred”. That statute is a combination and compilation in one section of the following: (1) RLH 1955, § 149-6, originally enacted as SLH 1907, c. 118, § 130, which required the filing of notice of claim with respect to injuries suffered in the city and county of Honolulu; and (2) RLH 1955, § 138-21, originally enacted as SLH 1943, c. 181, § 1, which required the filing of notice of claim with respect to injuries suffered in the counties of Hawaii, Maui and Kauai.
SLH 1907, c. 118, § 130, was construed in Rogers v. City and County of Honolulu, 32 Haw. 722 (1933) . This court held in that case that the statement in the notice of claim that the death of the claimant’s husband was due *225to “the failure of the City and County of Honolulu to properly maintain and keep in repair North King Street” did not satisfy the statutory requirement that the place where the injuries occurred be fully stated because North King Street stretched over more than two miles, and “a statement that the accident occurred somewhere on a street more than two miles in length does not sufficiently apprise the mayor of the city and county of the place of the accident or serve the purpose of the statute in requiring such a notice to be given.”
The legislature enacted SLH 1943, c. 181, c. 1, ten years after Rogers. In recommending its enactment, the Senate Judiciary Committee stated: “Your committee believes that the purpose of the bill is clearly expressed therein. It is similar to the provisions of section 3112 of the Revised Laws of Hawaii 1935, which requires notice of injuries to be made to the mayor of the city and county of Honolulu. The city and county has found said section 3112 to be very desirable and your Committee believes that a similar provision should be made in the case of other counties.” RLH 1935, § 3112, mentioned by the committee, was a compilation of SLH 1907, c. 118, § 130, in the 1935 revised laws. The House Judiciary Committee made a recommendation couched in identical language.
In this case, the majority of the court approves the holding implicit in Rogers that the requirement for the filing of notice of claim within the time specified in the statute could not be waived, but overrules the holding therein that the statement in the notice regarding the place of accident was deficient.
The action of the majority with respect to Rogers raises two questions. One is whether this court may overrule Rogers at this time, assuming that it was incorrectly decided. The other is whether the decision in Rogers was wrong.
On the first question, I do not think that this court *226is warranted in overruling Rogers at this time. The requirement for the filing of a notice of claim as a condition precedent to the liability of a county to a person suffering personal injuries on a county highway is solely a legislative matter. If this court did not construe the legislative intent correctly in Rogers, the legislature could have amended the statute. However, after Rogers, instead of amending the statute construed therein, the legislature enacted the statute applicable to the counties of Hawaii, Maui, and Kauai in the identical language used in the statute applicable to the city and county of Honolulu. By doing so, it impliedly adopted the construction in Rogers as expressing its intent.
This court stated in Territory v. Pacific Coast Casualty Co., 22 Haw. 446, 453 (1915) : “Where the terms of a statute which has received judicial construction are used in a later statute, whether passed by the legislature of the same state or country or by that of another, that construction is to be given to the later statute. # * * It is to be presumed in such case that the legislature which passed the later statute knew the judicial construction which had been placed on the former one and such construction becomes a part of the law.”
The foregoing statement is particularly true in connection with the statute in question because Rogers appeared as an annotation under RLH 1935, § 3112, at the time the legislature enacted SLH 1943, c. 181, § 1.
With regard to the second question, I think that Rogers was decided correctly, considering the mandatory nature of the statute and the categorical nature of the language used therein.
Rogers is not unique. Olivier v. City of St. Petersburg, 65 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1953), is similar. So is Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 2d 198, 120 P.2d 13 (1941). As a matter of fact, the decision in this case is unique. That is conceded in the following statement in the majority opinion: “We appreciate the fact that no other *227jurisdiction may have construed a notice of claim statute as expressed herein.”
In Olivier, the statement in the notice of claim was that the accident was due to “a defect in the street caused by resurfacing of the street.” The Florida supreme court held that the notice was deficient, stating:
“While the notice complies fully with the statutes in regard to the time, it is completely silent in regard to the place of said accident.
“It is contended by the plaintiff that since the notice stated that the injury ‘was caused by resurfacing of the street’ this would be adequate for the city to have determined where the work was in progress on the date alleged. This argument, however, cannot stand in view of the fact that the defendant City of St. Petersburg is a large city and has many miles of street and is constantly repairing and resurfacing the various streets within its limits. The notice could not therefore be construed to be even substantial compliance with the provisions of the Statute, but in noncompliance with the requirements that specifications as to place be given.”
Monchek v. City of Miami Beach, 110 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1959), is mentioned in the majority opinion as stating a contrary view. Monchek is an intermediate appellate court decision. Furthermore, the statute involved in that case differed significantly from the statute construed in Olivier.
The notice of claim in Hall stated that injuries were received “from slipping on sidewalk which was covered with mud, leaves and debris” in the city of Los Angeles. In holding that there was a failure of compliance with the applicable statutory requirement, the court stated:
“Compliance with the statute referred to is mandatory and there must be at least a substantial compliance with its provisions before a suit for damages *228for personal injuries resulting from a defective sidewalk or street may be maintained against the City. =& # #
“It is contended by plaintiff that the notice in question substantially complied with the requirements of the act and that since the city officials actually investigated and discovered the place where the accident occurred, the city was not misled by her failure to designate the place of the accident in the claim. * * *
* * * ^ the present case, however, there is an entire failure on the part of the plaintiff to comply with one of the mandates of the statute. Substantial compliance cannot be predicated upon no compliance. A contrary holding would permit a claimant to bring suit against a city on the basis of a claim that included none of the information required by the statute if he offered to show that the city acquired the information independently of the claim. Such a holding would emasculate the statute.”
At the oral argument in this case, counsel for plaintiff cited Silva v. Fresno County, 63 Cal. App. 2d 253, 146 P.2d 520 (1944), as a California decision contrary to Hall. It is not. Silva is an intermediate appellate court decision, in contrast to Hall, which is a decision of the state supreme court. The notice of claim in the case described the place of accident as “a public highway approximately four miles east of Dos Palos in the County of Fresno.” The court distinguished the case from Hall, by stating:
“In the Hall case * * * the claim filed by plaintiff was for personal injuries received from slipping on a ‘sidewalk which was covered with mud * # * ’ in the City of Los Angeles. The court held the claim was defective in that it failed to state with sufficient particularity the place where the accident happened *229and that actual knowledge by the officials of the facts required to be stated in such a claim did not dispense with the necessity for filing of a proper claim. Defendant claims here that there is no distinction between the claims filed in the instant case and the claim filed in the Hall case. In that case it was held there was an entire failure to designate in the claim the place where the accident occurred. Considering the territorial extent of the city limits of the city of Los Angeles, such a description of a sidewalk as one being somewhere in the city limits of that city would be quite indefinite and uncertain. In the instant case, however, there was an endeavor to state the place of the accident and injury. The place where the accident occurred was on a country road, away from the inhabited portions of the valley, about four miles east of the small town of Dos Palos, and was a public highway which came to an abrupt end, where no signs were maintained by the county so indicating.”
As stated at the outset of this dissent, there were 1,555 miles of public streets and highways in the county of Hawaii at the time plaintiff suffered his injury. In such situation, I do not think that the description of the place of injury as being “on the streets and highways of the County” complied with the statutory requirement.