(concurring in the result)—I concur in the result reached by the majority. I believe that the majority's analysis fails to recognize the prejudice which may arise from admission for impeachment purposes of a past conviction for a crime identical to that charged in the case at bar. I am far from convinced that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, but need not decide that question because defendant failed to make a proper offer of proof.
Parenthetically, I note that the majority properly avoids deciding one of the issues raised by the defendant, whether State v. Workman, 90 Wn.2d 443, 584 P.2d 382 (1978) prohibits enhancement of punishment by a special verdict under RCW 9.95.040, which limits parole board discretion regarding felonies committed with a deadly weapon. We *761need not reach the issue in light of the trial court's failure to instruct on the proper burden of proof and thus leave it for another day.
Under ER 609(a), a prior conviction is admissible for impeachment purposes if either (1) the crime was a felony and "the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant" or (2) the crime was one which "involved dishonesty or false statement". The majority apparently concedes that robbery is not a crime "involv[ing] dishonesty or false statement" (see State v. Moore, 29 Wn. App. 354, 364, 628 P.2d 522 (1981); 5 K. Tegland, Wash. Prac., Evidence § 235, at 502 (2d ed. 1982)); however, it upholds the trial court's ruling that Pam's conviction fits the first category of ER 609(a). Majority, at 757-58.
As ER 609(a)(1) makes clear and the majority correctly points out, the test for admissibility of prior convictions is one of balancing. In State v. Alexis, 95 Wn.2d 15, 621 P.2d 1269 (1980), we set out seven factors to be considered. They were: (1) the importance of the defendant's testimony; (2) the length of the defendant's criminal record; (3) the remoteness of the conviction in question; (4) the nature of the prior crime; (5) the age and circumstances of the defendant; (6) the centrality of the credibility issue; and (7) the impeachment value of the prior conviction. Alexis, at 19.
The fact that this prior conviction was for an offense identical to that with which the defendant is charged in the present case is of paramount significance. This very situation was addressed by Chief Justice (then Judge) Burger in Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
Where multiple convictions of various kinds can be shown, strong reasons arise for excluding those which are for the same crime because of the inevitable pressure on lay jurors to believe that "if he did it before he probably did so this time." As a general guide, those convictions which are for the same crime should be admitted sparingly; one solution might well be that discretion be exercised to limit the impeachment by way of a similar crime *762to a single conviction and then only when the circumstances indicate strong reasons for disclosure, and where the conviction directly relates to veracity.
Gordon, at 940. Accord, State v. Renfro, 96 Wn.2d 902, 908, 639 P.2d 737 (1982); People v. Fries, 24 Cal. 3d 222, 230, 594 P.2d 19, 155 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1979); C. McCormick, Evidence § 43, at 89 (2d ed. 1972). This indicates that there should be a strong presumption against the admission of evidence of a prior conviction identical to that for which the defendant is on trial.
In the present case, the other factors enumerated in Alexis do not counter this strong presumption. Pam's prior robbery conviction was very remote—it was more than 11 years old. While Pam's credibility would admittedly have been of great importance, the added impeachment value of his prior robbery conviction would have been minimal. In the first place, robbery is only partially probative of credibility. State v. Moore, 33 Wn. App. 55, 62, 651 P.2d 765 (1982) (Moore II); People v. Fries, supra at 229. This is because robbery has elements of both assault and larceny (Fries, at 229) and assaultive crimes are of little relevance to credibility (State v. Renfro, supra at 908). Secondly, Pam had two other prior convictions which could have been used for impeachment—admitting his robbery conviction as well was only slightly cumulative at best. Compare State v. Thompson, 95 Wn.2d 888, 893, 632 P.2d 50 (1981) (prior manslaughter conviction admissible in assault prosecution in part because other conviction, for narcotics violation, was no longer available); United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1034 (1980) (prior robbery conviction admissible in robbery prosecution because "the court had reason to believe the defendant would take the stand and palm himself off as a peace-loving member of the American Friends Service Committee with interests in prison reform and social protest"). In particular, Pam's forgery conviction was much more probative of credibility, as well as less remote in time.
It is true that admission of prior convictions for purposes
*763of impeachment is within the sound discretion of the trial court. See State v. Thompson, supra at 892. When that discretion is not sound, however, but is instead abused, we should reverse. Thompson, at 892; Moore II, at 61. This court should not act as a mere rubber stamp.
In light of these considerations, I would reverse the trial court's ruling if Pam's testimony had been shown by an offer of proof to be of any significance at all. Absent a proper offer of proof, however, Pam waived his right to appeal the trial court's ruling. See United States v. Fountain, 642 F.2d 1083, 1088 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 993 (1981); United States v. Cook, supra at 1186. Such an offer requires both a statement by the defendant that he or she would testify if the prior convictions were excluded and a general outline of what his or her testimony would be. Cook, at 1186. Though he satisfied the first requirement, Pam did not satisfy the second.
An offer of proof is especially important where the issue is admissibility of a prior conviction for purposes of impeachment. An offer not only aids appellate review and self-evaluation by the trial court (see 5 K. Tegland, Wash. Prac., Evidence § 12 (2d ed. 1982)), but is also necessary for the trial court to evaluate the importance of the defendant's testimony, one of the considerations enumerated in Alexis.
Contrary to Pam's assertion below, requiring an offer of proof does not violate a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. The offer of proof need not necessarily be made until trial. See 5 K. Tegland, Wash. Prac., Evidence § 12, at 43-44 (2d ed. 1982). Even if it were made prior to trial or a second trial became necessary, moreover, it could not be used as evidence against the defendant, for it would be a classic example of hearsay. Neither would the offer waive either the attorney-client privilege (see State v. Vandenberg, 19 Wn. App. 182, 186-87, 575 P.2d 254 (1978), quoting 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2327, at 637-38 (rev. ed. 1961) (client's offer of own testimony does not waive attorney-client privilege regarding related communications)) or *764the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination7 (see United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1210 (1st Cir. 1973), quoting 8 J. Wigmore, supra § 2276, at 470-72 (testimony at first trial does not waive privilege at second trial); cf. United States v. Licavoli, 604 F.2d 613, 623 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 (1980) (waiver of privilege at one proceeding does not extend to second proceeding).
In the circumstances of this case, the failure to exclude Pam's prior robbery conviction was in all likelihood an abuse of discretion. Nonetheless, I would affirm, as the defendant did not preserve the error by a proper offer of proof.
Williams, C.J., and Stafford, Brachtenbach, and Pearson, JJ., concur with Utter, J.
Reconsideration denied May 26, 1983.
Even if the offer is viewed as a statement by the defendant, the general rule that testimony regarding an incident waives the privilege as to related facts and details (Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 373-74, 95 L. Ed. 344, 71 S. Ct. 438, 19 A.L.R.2d 378 (1951)) is inapplicable. The only reason for that rule is to prevent the defendant from "putting before the trier of fact a one-sided account of the matters in dispute." Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 155, 2 L. Ed. 2d 589, 78 S. Ct. 622, 72 A.L.R.2d 818 (1958); State v. Robideau, 70 Wn.2d 994, 999, 425 P.2d 880 (1967). It would thus not apply to an offer of proof since such an offer is not put before the trier of fact.