I concur in the result. Again, though, this court perhaps has failed to observe California Rules of Court, rule 29(a), which advises that “hearing in the Supreme Court after decision by a Court of Appeal will be ordered . .. where it appears necessary to secure uni*732formity of decision or the settlement of important questions of law ... .” (Cf. my conc. opn. in People v. Szeto (1981) 29 Cal.3d 20 [171 Cal.Rptr. 652, 623 P.2d 213].) Hearing in this case was not necessary to secure “uniformity of decision” or to settle “important questions of law”; and questions such as those raised here regarding the persuasiveness and substantiality of the evidence do not, I think, require this court’s attention.
Further, I believe that we should also have been guided in this ALRA matter by the following comment concerning NLRA matters that was approved 30 years ago by all 9 United States Supreme Court justices in Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Bd. (1951) 340 U.S. 474, 491 [95 L.Ed. 456, 469, 71 S.Ct. 456]: “Whether on the record as a whole there is substantial evidence to support agency findings is a question which Congress has placed in the keeping of the Courts of Appeals. This Court will intervene only in what ought to be the rare instance when [during the appellate court proceeding] the standard appears to have been misapprehended or grossly misapplied.” (Italics added. Cf. my conc. opn. in People v. Superior Court (Wells) (1980) 27 Cal.3d 670, 674-675 [165 Cal.Rptr. 872, 612 P.2d 962].)
Finally, by no means am I persuaded that “[a]n administrative board must accept as true the intended meaning of uncontradicted evidence.” (See maj. opn., ante, p. 728; cf. 2 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (1958) § 14.13, p. 324 re “whether a supposedly expert tribunal may use its own judgment in the face of uncontradicted expert testimony to the contrary”; 3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (2d ed. 1980) § 14.28, p. 126: “Findings may be based on an agency’s expertise, without supporting evidence, and . . . may be especially important to the judicial review process when the court does not share the agency’s expertise”; and compare the pertinent opinions cited by the majority here (LeVesque v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 627 at p. 639 [83 Cal.Rptr. 208, 463 P.2d 432], and McAllister v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 408 at p. 413 [71 Cal.Rptr. 697, 445 P.2d 313]) with Wilhelm v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 30, 33 [62 Cal.Rptr. 829]: “[T]he board may disbelieve the testimony of any witness....”)
The petition of real party in interest United Farm Workers of America for a rehearing was denied August 26, 1981. Bird, C. J., did not participate therein.