Dissenting.
¶ 1 The majority opinion concludes that Commonwealth v. Williams, 443 Pa.Super. 479, 662 A.2d 658 (1995) is not controlling in this case, although it is directly on point. Thus, I must respectfully dissent.
¶2 Appellant argues that 42 Pa.C.S. § 9760(1) and (2) mandates that he should receive credit for any time served for the same offense based on the same act or acts. I am constrained to agree. In Williams, appellant received a sentence of eleven and one-half to twenty-three months’ imprisonment and a consecutive term of three years’ probation when he pled guilty to attempted theft by unlawful taking. See id. at 658. He served the minimum sentence and was released on parole, which was later revoked as a result of convictions for new crimes. See id. Appellant served the remainder of his twenty-three months, and his probation was continued. See id. Then, Appellant’s probation was revoked after conviction of an additional crime. See id. Due to appellant’s probation revocation, appellant was re-sentenced to three and one-half to seven years’ imprisonment on the original conviction of theft by unlawful taking. See id. at 658-59. However, the sentencing court faded to credit appellant with the twenty-three months he had already served. See id. at 659. A panel of this Court vacated the sentence, and credited him with the time he had already served on the underlying offense. See id. The majority tries to distinguish Williams from the present case by focusing on the fact that Williams would have been serving a sentence exceeding statutory máximums if not credited for time served. I believe that to distinguish the case in this manner is to obfuscate the opinion of the Court. The Court did not merely reverse the judgment of sentence and remand the case for re-sentencing based on the fact that the cumulative sentence exceeded the statutory maximum. See Williams, 662 A.2d at 659. Instead, the Court credited appellant for the entire period he had served for the single act of theft by unlawful taking. See id. In addition, the Court’s argument focused almost entirely on calculating credit for time served. Thus, I am constrained to agree with appellant that he too must be credited for the entire period he has already served.
¶ 3 Our scope of review following probation revocation “is limited to the validity of the revocation proceeding and the legality of the final judgment of sentence.” See Williams, 662 A.2d at 659 (citing Commonwealth v. Beasley, 391 Pa.Super. 287, 570 A.2d 1336 (1990)). A challenge to the legality of a sentence is nonwaivable. See id. Section 9771(b) of the Sentencing Code states:
The court may revoke an order of probation upon proof of the violation of specified conditions of the probation. Upon revocation the sentencing, alternatives available to the court shall be the same as were available at the time of initial sentencing, due consideration being given to the time spent serving the order of probation.
In addition, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9760 provides:
Credit for time served.
After reviewing the information submitted under section 937 (relating to report of outstanding charges and sentences) the court shall give credit as follows:
(1) Credit against the maximum term and any minimum term shall be given *352to the defendant for all time spent in custody as a result of the criminal charge for which a prison sentence is imposed or as a result of the conduct on which such a charge is based. Credit shall include credit for time spent in custody prior to trial, during trial, pending sentence, and pending the resolution of an appeal.
(2) Credit against the maximum term and any minimum term shall be given to the defendant for all time spent in custody under a prior sentence if he is later reprosecuted and resentenced for the same offense or for another offense based on the same act or acts. This shall include credit in accordance with paragraph (1) of this section for all time spent in custody as a result of both the original charge and any subsequent charge for the same offense or for another offense based on the same act or acts.
¶ 4 Appellant entered a guilty plea for receiving stolen property and the trial court imposed its sentence pursuant to a plea agreement. While awaiting trial, the Commonwealth incarcerated appellant for eleven months and nineteen days. Because the minimum sentence imposed was only six months, appellant was immediately released on parole. On June 29, 1998, the lower court revoked appellant’s probation due to a new criminal conviction, then re-sentenced appellant to one to three years. These sentences were both imposed as a result of the single underlying offense of receiving stolen property. Thus, appellant is entitled to credit for all “time spent in custody prior to trial, during trial, pending sentence, and pending resolution of an appeal.” Williams, 662 A.2d at 659 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9760(1)). To do otherwise would be to impose two separate sentences on appellant for a single crime, a sentence that would not have been available at the time of the original sentence. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. See Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 422 Pa.Super. 52, 618 A.2d 1011, 1013 (1993) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969)). If the trial judge meant for the new sentence to be inclusive of the original sentence, he should have stated on the record that he was sentencing appellant not to one to three years, but to 18 to 59 months3. Appellant would then receive credit for time he had already served. This Court should not ignore the fact that the trial court cannot impose multiple punishments for the same offense. Therefore, I would reverse and remand for imposition of a revised sentence, crediting appellant with all time served on the underlying offense.
. Six to twenty-three months (original sentence), plus twelve to thirly-six months (revocation sentence).