dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion in this case. Although I agree with a great part of the Honorable Judge Popovich’s dissent, I am writing separately. I do so because I feel that the majority’s opinion, while embedded in the best intentions, will have a deleterious effect on the efficient administration of criminal justice in this Commonwealth. My view of the correct disposition of this case, however, varies slightly from that which learned Judge Popovich opines.
Police employed by both the City of Pittsburgh and Allegheny County searched defendants’ residence pursuant to a valid search warrant. The search was fruitful, producing what the officers believed to be illegal narcotics and drug paraphernalia. The city police, as the affiants on the warrant, maintained custody of the contraband. In an effort to zealously represent his potential criminal defendants, the Stipetichs’ private counsel initiated negotiations with the city police, custodians of the contraband. An agreement was reached whereby “no charges would be filed” if the Stipetichs would cooperate with the police concerning the source of the seized narcotics. Majority opinion at 608. Defendants promptly cooperated.
In the meantime, the Allegheny County Police filed a criminal complaint with the Allegheny County District Attorney’s *440office. The district attorney began his prosecution of the case, but, much to his surprise, the city police had agreed that “no charges would be filed” against defendants. The majority of this Court now holds that the “contract” between the city police and defendants must be specifically enforced against the district attorney. In doing so, the majority “deem[s] unnecessary, to the disposition of this case, the exploration of whether ‘the police’ as an entity, have authority to enter into non-prosecution agreements.” Majority opinion, at 608. Despite this statement, by enforcing the “contract” against the district attorney, the majority effectively holds that the police have the authority to enter into these agreements. So long as defendants and their lawyers (who may be ex-judges and former United States Attorneys) are induced by the police to believe that the officers have the authority to bind the district attorney, the non-prosecution agreement is enforceable. This result is potentially ruinous to the orderly administration of justice.
. As Judge Popovich’s dissent notes, a large body of caselaw recognizes that the district attorney has wide discretion in deciding whether to file charges against a defendant pursuant to a private criminal complaint.
In capacity as the Commonwealth’s attorney, the district attorney has traditionally fulfilled the obligation of investigation and prosecution of crime by initially evaluating complaints to determine whether a charge should be brought against a suspect. “A district Attorney has general and widely recognized power to conduct criminal litigation and prosecutions on behalf of the Commonwealth, and to decide whether and when to prosecute, and whether and when to continue or discontinue a case.”
Petition of Piscanio, 235 Pa.Super. 490, 494, 344 A.2d 658, 660 (1975) (citation omitted). Because the district attorney is an elected official entrusted with conducting the criminal litigation of the county on behalf of the electorate, a court should be wary of impinging on that discretionary power:
[The] discretionary power of the District Attorney in determining whether prosecution shall be commenced or main*441tained may well depend on matters of policy wholly separate and apart from the existence or non-existence of probable cause. For this reason, the courts have been wary of interfering with or attempting to supervise the District Attorney in the exercise of his discretion in controlling criminal prosecutions.
In re Wood, 333 Pa.Super. 597, 602, 482 A.2d 1033, 1036 (1984).
The thrust of the cases cited by Judge Popovich’s dissent, however, concerns whether, on appeal, a private complainant may win reversal of a district attorney’s decision to not approve the complaint. In this case, however, the issue is whether the district attorney may be stripped of this decision-making power, in cases involving the police as well as private complainants, before ever having the chance to exercise it. I am of the position that our Legislature has provided the answer. Neither a private complainant, a policeman, nor a court may usurp this power.
A district attorney holds an office created solely by statute. Commonwealth v. New York & Pennsylvania Co., 378 Pa. 359, 106 A.2d 239 (1954). His or her duties are prescribed by our Legislature:
The district attorney shall sign all bills of indictment and conduct in cowrt all criminal and other prosecutions, in the name of the Commonwealth, or, when the Commonwealth is a party, which arise in the county, and perform all the duties which now by law are to be performed by deputies attorney general, and receive the same fees or emoluments of office.
16 Pa.C.S. § 4402(a).
By using the phrases “shall sign all bills of indictment” and “conduct in court all criminal prosecutions,” the Legislature has clearly indicated an intent that the district attorney be solely responsible for signing a bill of indictment that will begin formal prosecution of a criminal defendant in the Commonwealth. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1901. Indeed, our Supreme Court has held that the district attorney may not constitutionally agree to divest himself or herself of any duty attendant to *442the elected office of district attorney. Smith v. Gallagher, 408 Pa. 551, 185 A.2d 135 (1962). No exception to the statute exists which allows a municipal police officer to make a bargain that strips the district attorney’s power to prosecute a case in court. The majority’s holding, however, creates such an exception.
Police officers should not be entitled to make a bargain which essentially divests the district attorney of the power to decide whether a case should be prosecuted to finality. Police officers are not privy to the reasons behind a district attorney’s decision to prosecute. This Court should not sanction a police practice which effectively places the power to make policy decisions in their hands. This is especially so when our Legislature has provided that the district attorney is the public officer solely responsible for that duty.
It is my opinion that we need to look no further than the statute to conclude that the district attorney should be entitled to prosecute this case. If the Legislature is inclined to impose prosecutorial decision-making authority upon a public official other than the district attorney, then so be it. Until that day, however, judicial fiat should not entitle any person, either by express language or implicit effect, to divest the district attorney of the power to prosecute a case.
The majority’s decision, however, does not have its genesis in a concern for the duties and powers of the district attorney. Rather, its holding incorporates principles of fairness to the defendant. The majority cites Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971), for the proposition that the prosecutor should be held to the letter of the bargain: “when a plea rests in any significant part on a promise or agreement by the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” Id. at 262, 92 S.Ct. at 499, 30 L.Ed.2d at 433. In Santobello, the facts demonstrated that during defendant’s prosecution, one prosecutor made a plea agreement with defendant, but a different prosecutor assigned to the case failed to follow it. The Supreme Court indicated that specific performance might be appropriate, since “[t]he staff lawyers *443in a prosecutor’s office have the burden of ‘letting the left hand know what the right hand is doing’ or has done.” Id. As one can plainly see, the prosecutor’s office in this case made no promise, no inducement, and had no knowledge that a deal had been struck. In fact, the district attorney in a Pennsylvania county should have no concern that the police might strike a deal without his knowledge since it is beyond question that in this Commonwealth, the police cannot make such a bargain.
The remedy for a violation of defendants’ constitutional rights is suppression of evidence unconstitutionally procured. While Judge Popovich’s reliance on the Michigan and Massachusetts cases is persuasive, I see no need to leave the jurisprudence of this Commonwealth to provide a remedy. Our Supreme Court has held that “[a] confession induced by a promise of immunity from a person in apparent authority to perform the promise is involuntary ... A fortiori, a waiver of rights cannot be considered voluntary where it is induced by promises of immunity from such a person.” Commonwealth v. Peters, 473 Pa. 72, 86, 373 A.2d 1055, 1062 (1977). In Peters, the Supreme Court ordered the suppression of incriminating statements made by a defendant after a detective employed by the district attorney’s office told him that “the most that would happen to him would be that he would be picked up or held as a witness on dollar bail.” Id. at 78, 373 A.2d at 1058. Likewise, this Court has upheld suppression of physical evidence and statements given as a result of an improper police promise not to charge defendants with the mandatory five-year weapons enhancement under the sentencing guidelines. Commonwealth v. Elslager, 349 Pa.Super. 217, 502 A.2d 1354 (1986). We stated in Elslager:
Here, as indicated, it was the police who originally attempted to exercise the discretion in invoking the five year mandatory sentence provisions. The mandatory sentence procedure is not a matter for the police in charging an offense. “Section 9712 applies only in the event the defendant is convicted of one of the offenses numerated therein and thus relates solely to the sentencing proceedings.” As *444a result, the [defendant’s] waiver of their privilege of self-incrimination was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made. The statements of the [defendants] were therefore involuntary.
Id. at 226, 502 A.2d at 1359 (citation omitted).
I see no reason why the exclusionary rule should not apply to afford defendants relief upon an independent showing that their constitutional rights were violated. Neither Peters nor Elslager give any indication that the district attorney in those cases might be bound by the improper police promises. Indeed, if the district attorney is bound to the letter of every improper promise a police officer makes, the exclusionary rule as a remedial device becomes unnecessary. More importantly, our settled system of the administration of justice will be sent into utter chaos.
Therefore, I would reverse the order of the trial court dismissing the action against defendants. At the proper juncture, defendants may make a motion to suppress any confessions, statements, or physical evidence obtained by the police in an unconstitutional manner. This remedy puts defendants in the same position they would have been had no improper conduct occurred. At the same time, we would not compromise the district attorney’s discretion, and duty, to decide whether prosecution of these defendants will serve the public good. Any other remedy, in my opinion, is an abuse of discretion.
I respectfully dissent.
ROWLEY, President Judge, joins.