OPINION
TERRIE LIVINGSTON, Justice.Appellant Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. appeals from the default judgment entered against it in favor of appellee Diane Kelley in connection with her workers’ compensation case. We affirm.
In appellant’s first issue it challenges the trial court’s failure to grant its motion for new trial. We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for new trial under an abuse of discretion standard. Dir., State Employees Workers’ Comp. Div. v. Evans, 889 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex.1994); Mantis v. Resz, 5 S.W.3d 388, 391 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. de*644nied), overruled in part on other grounds, Sheldon v. Emergency Med. Consultants, I, P.A., 43 S.W.3d 701, 702 n. 2 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). To overturn a default judgment a movant must show it met the three Craddock elements:
[1] the failure of the defendant to answer before judgment was not intentional, or the result of conscious indifference on his part, but was due to a mistake or an accident; [2] ... the motion for a new trial sets up a meritorious defense and [3] [the motion] is filed at a time when the granting thereof will occasion no delay or otherwise work an injury to the plaintiff.
Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (1939); Sharpe v. Kilcoyne, 962 S.W.2d 697, 701 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1998, no pet.). While appellant is not required to prove its meritorious defense, it must produce some evidence, that if true, would support its meritorious defense. Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex.1966). Appellant submitted no evidence of its defense at the hearing on its motion for new trial, and neither of the affidavits attached to its motion showed it had a meritorious defense. See Evans, 889 S.W.2d at 270. “The motion must allege [f]acts which in law would constitute a defense to the cause of action asserted by the plaintiff, and must be supported by affidavits or other evidence proving prima facie that the defendant has such meritorious defense.” Ivy, 407 S.W.2d at 214. Thus, we conclude there was no showing of a meritorious defense.
The dissent disagrees but fails to follow the case it cites, Evans. 889 S.W.2d at 266. Evans clearly sets forth the sole exception to offering competent evidence to support the movant’s Craddock motion for new trial: affidavits attached to the motion are sufficient, not required. Id. at 268. Thus, the movant must either submit competent evidence to support the Crad-dock elements OR attach affidavits to its motion. Here, appellant did neither yet the dissent is willing to rely on appellant’s vague reference to the commission decision as support of its meritorious defense. Appellant never offered an authenticated copy of the decision or the commission file and never asked the court to take judicial notice of it. See Tex.R. Evid. 201, 902. Thus, neither was before the court. Additionally, even if the commission decision was before the trial court, at most it would be only proof of the commission’s decision, not of its correctness.1
Likewise, the dissent’s reliance on ESIS is misplaced. ESIS, Inc. Servicing Contractor v. Johnson, 908 S.W.2d 554 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1995, writ denied). ESIS only holds that a commission opinion is admissible because it is a part of the commission record, which is admissible by statute. Id. at 560; see also Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 410.306(b) (Vernon 1996). ESIS does not hold that one does not have to even offer it into evidence. It simply holds it is admissible if offered.2 ESIS, 908 S.W.2d at 560; see also Tex.R. Evid. 902, 1005 (authentication requirements).
Next, the dissent claims that because rule 320 contains no requirement that documentary evidence be attached to the mo*645tion for new trial, that the majority has created new requirements of its own. TexR. Civ. P. 320. The dissent misreads the majority opinion. We do not say documentary evidence has to be attached to the motion for new trial; we simply acknowledge that that is the only recognized alternative when a movant offers no evidence of its meritorious defense at the hearing on the motion for new trial. We are mindful of rule 320’s silence on this issue but also acknowledge Craddock's clear application to appellant’s motion for new trial. It is Craddock, not rule 320, that requires the movant to come forward and offer into evidence the facts that show it has met Craddock’s three-part test to justify a new trial. See Craddock, 133 S.W.2d at 125-26. Even appellant acknowledges this. Further, we note that this argument, made by the dissent, was not even raised by the appellant at the hearing on the motion for new trial or here. See Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a); Pat Baker Co. v. Wilson, 971 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Tex.1998) (“It is axiomatic that an appellate court cannot reverse a trial court’s judgment absent properly assigned error.”). Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion for new trial. Appellant’s first issue is overruled.
In appellant’s second issue it contends the trial court committed harmful error by failing to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law upon appellant’s request and notice that they were past due. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 296, 297. However, appellant failed to timely file its request for findings of fact and conclusions of law, so we may presume the record supports the trial court’s judgment unless challenged by appellant. See Pharo v. Chambers County, 922 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex.1996). Generally, the failure of the trial court to file timely requested findings and conclusions is presumed harmful unless the record affirmatively shows that the complaining party suffered no injury. Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Magallanes, 763 S.W.2d 768, 772 (Tex.1989); see also Tex.R. Civ. P. 297. However, because appellant failed to timely file its request, it has waived its complaint regarding the court’s failure to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law. See Am. Realty Trust, Inc. v. JDN Real Estate-McKinney, L.P., 74 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2002, pet. denied). Further, because the record affirmatively shows that appellant failed to present a meritorious defense, it could show no harm. We overrule appellant’s second issue.
Having overruled appellant’s issues on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
CAYCE, C.J. filed a dissenting opinion.
. The dissent says because the decision was attached to appellee’s petition it was in the record. This is not enough. Laidlaw Waste Sys. (Dallas), Inc. v. City of Wilmer, 904 S.W.2d 656, 660 (Tex.1995) ("Generally, pleadings are not competent evidence, even if sworn or verified.”)
. Likewise, we have not said the commission decision cannot be given any weight; only that before it can be given any weight it must be before the court.