dissenting:
Once again, I must dissent from the majority’s view that the scope of an appeal from compulsory arbitration should be narrowly confined. The issue raised in this case is.quite simply, when one of multiple parties to an arbitration appeals, which of the non-appealing parties are to be included in the review?
Klugman v. Gimbel Bros. Inc., 198 Pa.Super. 268, 182 A.2d 223 (1962), laid down the general rule by which the majority is guided. In that case, an additional defendant was held liable over to the original defendant for the plaintiff’s *18damages. An appeal was filed by the additional defendant. The plaintiff subsequently had judgment entered against the original defendant. The lower court granted the original defendant the right to participate in the appeal, and the plaintiff tried her case de novo. On appeal, this court reversed the lower court’s orders dismissing the plaintiff’s exceptions to the trial judge’s decision in favor of the original defendant and entering judgment for that defendant. We held that the award against the original defendant was final since he had not appealed nor been made a party to the additional defendant’s appeal.
Many cases have since held that an appeal by one party to an arbitration does not include other parties in the case. E. g., Ottaviano v. SEPTA, 239 Pa.Super. 363, 361 A.2d 810 (1976); Delmarmol v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Md., 225 Pa.Super. 90, 310 A.2d 363 (1973); Fante v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 222 Pa.Super. 276, 294 A.2d 776 (1972). In other situations, the Klugman rule has been found not to control the case. E. g., Mitchell v. Pittsburgh, 233 Pa.Super. 119, 335 A.2d 403 (1975); Washik v. Chase, 231 Pa.Super. 378, 332 A.2d 481 (1974); Hammerman v. Lee, 207 Pa.Super. 370, 217 A.2d 853 (1966).
This court has permitted an appeal by one defendant to operate as an appeal by all where that appeared to be the intention of the appealing party. Mitchell v. Pittsburgh, supra (an affidavit on record stating the intended scope of the appeal, one attorney representing both defendants during. the arbitration, and captioning the appeal “appeal from ‘the award of the arbitrators’ ”); Hammerman v. Lee, supra (a sharing of the costs of filing the appeal and an affidavit of intention). Other rules which the court has formulated are that where there are separate awards, an appeal from one does not constitute an appeal from all, Romanovich v. Hilferty, 212 Pa.Super. 570, 245 A.2d 701 (1968); Klugman v. Gimbel Bros. Inc., supra, and that if one defendant states that the appeal is to operate as his alone, it will be held to do so. Romanovich v. Hilferty, supra.
*19In the past, I have stated my opposition to the promulgation of so many rules which unnecessarily complicates the simple issue presented in these cases. In Mitchell v. Pittsburgh, supra, a trespass action, the arbitrators awarded plaintiff recovery against the city and its employee. We held that the city’s appeal would include the employee, so that a trial de novo as to all parties was granted. I proposed in my concurring opinion that the current rule, that an appeal by one party to compulsory arbitration does not constitute an appeal by all, should be abandoned. The confusion and uncertainty engendered by the rule and its numerous exceptions should be brought to an end. I again recommend that an appeal by one party from compulsory arbitration should be treated as an appeal by all parties, embracing all issues. This would result in a true trial de novo on appeal, as granted by the Arbitration Act of 1836.1 This rule would ensure fairness to all parties and would promote speed in final resolution of arbitrated cases.
. The Act of June 16, 1836, P.L. 715, § 27, as amended [5 P.S. § 71 (V)].